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SOVIET COMMUNISM. A
NEW CIVILISATION. BY
SIDNEY AND BEATRICE
WEBB.

VOL. II

SOVIET COMMUNISM:
A NEW CIVILISATION

SECOND EDITION

LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO., LTD.,
15 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON, E.C. 4.
NEW YORK, TORONTO, BOMBAY,
CALCUTTA AND MADRAS. 1937.

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PART II

SOCIAL TRENDS IN SOVIET
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PART II

SOCIAL TRENDS IN SOVIET COMMUNISM

“The philosophers have only interpreted the world: our business is to change it.”

KARL MARX

“In order to manage successfully, in addition to being able to convince, and in addition to being able to conquer in Civil War, it is necessary to be able to organise. This is the most difficult task, because it is a matter of organising in a new way the most profound economic foundations of life of tens and tens of millions of people. And it is the most grateful task, because only after it is fulfilled, in its main and fundamental outlines, will it be possible to say that Russia has become not only a soviet but also a socialist republic.”

LENIN

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CHAPTER VII

THE LIQUIDATION OF THE LANDLORD AND THE CAPITALIST

THE revolution of February 1917, which swept away the tsarist régime, was not the work of the Bolsheviks. Lenin, in fact, did not arrive in Petrograd until over a month, and Trotsky until nearly three months, after the edifice had collapsed through its own rottenness. This had almost happened twelve years before. Already in 1905, when the universal disgust at what the Japanese war had revealed made the throne totter, it could be said that, in every class and section of the nation, there were demands for revolution.¹ But "to think of these people as forming one united army, or of the revolution itself as a unitary movement upon a single front and towards a single goal, is to misunderstand the situation so completely that certain subsequent developments must seem a miracle. Actually there was and there could be no full agreement as to either the direction or degree of the desired change; and in a concrete and positive sense there was now in progress, not one revolution, but a whole series of revolutions in parallel."² As a whole the peasantry were passive and the urban workers divided. This lack of unity among the upheaving forces was not remedied by any persistent will and purpose. The Tsar was then able to save himself and the whole governmental machine by what seemed the great concession of a Duma. But it soon appeared that nothing had been changed. The autocratic

¹ In 1905, as has been pointed out by a careful student, "a greater or smaller proportion of the members of every major social class in Russia—the peasants and the nobles, the urban workers and the bourgeoisie—were involved in attempts to change, in one way or another, the established order of life" (*Rural Russia under the Old Régime*, by G. T. Robinson, 1932, p. 164).

² *Ibid.* p. 164; see also *Memoirs of Count Witte*, by his widow (1920, pp. 266-267). Witte records that the minister Plehve had told General Kuropatkin that "we need a little victorious war to stem the tide of revolution".

administration remained intact. Within a couple of years the Duma had been reduced to a nonentity and the repressions became even more tyrannous than before. The peasantry, which had broken out in scattered refusals to pay the oppressive taxes, and even in lootings of estates and mansions, was ruthlessly flogged into submission. The steadily increasing class of factory operatives and miners, largely working under foreign managers and foremen, for companies of foreign shareholders, were denied all rights of collective bargaining.¹ In 1907 all trade unions were suppressed. Every activity of the zemstvos was stopped by the bureaucracy. Even among the nobles the expression of the mildest aspiration for constitutional reform was visited with the Tsar's displeasure, and sometimes by arbitrary relegation to distant estates. The oppressive "russification" of the various subject nationalities, numbering together very nearly one-half of the whole population, was continued even more sternly than before. The vernacular tongues were suppressed; and newspapers, books and schools which used these languages were shut down. The Jews, in particular, continued to be confined to their ghettos in the Jewish Pale, to be harassed by the caprices and extortions of the officials, and even to be scourged by deliberately promoted pogroms. The Greek Orthodox Church, with its superstitious and illiterate clergy, itself continued to be an instrument of oppression of the numerous sectaries; and it succeeded, in the proceedings of the notorious Rasputin, in creating an almost universal disgust and abhorrence, with which the Tsar, his court and the whole régime were besmirched. History records no clearer case of an incapable autocratic ruler, with a degenerate aristocracy and a hidebound and corrupt bureaucratic administration, blindly staggering towards its doom.

It is ironical to learn that the Great War, with its appalling holocaust of Russian soldiery, was (as in 1904) entered upon, at least by some of the Russian statesmen, as a means of preventing the renewed popular uprising that they feared. Lenin, with clearer vision, realised at once that the war made the revolution inevitable. Nor did the outbreak of February 1917 require either his inspiration or his presence. All that was needed to stir to

¹ "Between the first revolution and the war industrial production in Russia approximately doubled" (*History of the Russian Revolution*, by L. Trotsky, vol. i. p. 29). This happened largely under the fostering care of Witte (*Memoirs of Count Witte*, by his widow, 1920).

action the accumulating forces of upheaval was the crushing defeat of the ill-equipped, badly provided and ignorantly led millions of Russian soldiery, and their persistent streaming back, from 1915 onwards, as deserters from the front. When Lenin arrived at Petrograd in April 1917 he found the "bourgeois revolution" accomplished, and a mildly liberal republican government in power, avowedly wedded to parliamentary democracy and the maintenance of the rights of private property. The task of Lenin, to which he at once rallied the small Bolshevik Party, was to convert the bourgeois revolution into a socialist revolution, involving the expropriation of the landlord and the capitalist.

The Liquidation of the Agrarian Landlords by the Peasantry

In the rural districts, for the most part, the peasants themselves saw to the "liquidation of the landlord", quite apart from government action or Marxian theory. The Russian peasant, whether poor or well-to-do, had never relinquished the conviction that the land which he cultivated, or from which he had been evicted, was rightfully his own property, subject only to the right and duty of the Mir periodically to rearrange its distribution among all the village households. For twenty years prior to the revolution of 1917 the peasants in various parts of Russia had been spasmodically liquidating the landlord in their own rough way.¹ The floggings, imprisonments and hangings, by which

¹ "During the five-year period ending with 1904, there were in European Russia some hundreds of instances of agrarian disturbance, including certain cases of the burning of buildings and even a number of fatal assaults upon the landlords or their deputies; but these disturbances were for the most part widely separated in both time and space. By way of exception, the disorders of 1902 in the *gubernias* of Kharkov and Poltava were so highly concentrated that the movement might perhaps be called a miniature revolution. . . . More than 160 villages were involved in the movement; some 80 estates were attacked within the space of five days; and in the *gubernia* of Poltava alone 75 landlords subsequently brought in claims for losses amounting to a quarter of a million roubles" (*Rural Russia under the Old Régime*, by G. T. Robinson, 1932, p. 138).

A report of the military commander stated that "in Saratov *gubernia* more than 300 estates have suffered losses from the disorders. In Balashov *uezd* there are places where all the manor houses have been destroyed. A terrible impression is produced by an examination of the ravaged estates. With an astounding violence the peasants burned and destroyed everything; not one stone is left upon another. Everything has been plundered—grain, stores, furniture, household utensils, animals, the sheet iron from the roof—in a word everything that could be carried or hauled away; and what remained was given to the flames" (See the report in *ibid.* p. 175).

these outrages were punished, failed to prevent their recurrence, now at one place and then in another. The dislocation caused by the war was marked by a widespread renewal of these popular holocausts. The news of the February revolution, with the Tsar's abdication, and the general weakening of authority throughout the provinces, soon made the "liquidation of the landlord" almost universal, even whilst Lenin was a hunted fugitive, hiding from Kerensky's police. One specimen will give the reader a vivid sense of what was everywhere happening. "One September day in the fateful year 1917, by a roadside in the South Central Steppe, a man climbed a telephone pole and cut the minute thread of communication which joined a manor-house on the northern horizon with the towns, the police stations and the barracks along the railway line to the southward. In one sense the manor-house now stood quite alone, but not really so, for within sight of its groves there were several peasant villages. Thus, the two elements—peasant and proprietorial—were left momentarily to react upon each other in isolation. And within a few hours the estate had been looted, the mansion was in flames, and somewhere within the fiery circle the master of the house lay dead."¹

Thus, before the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks in October 1917, the "liquidation" of the landlords up and down rural Russia had been, to a considerable extent, roughly but effectively carried out by the peasants themselves. The process was substantially completed during the ensuing year. This was far from being in accordance with any programme of Lenin or his associates. The expropriation of the owners of manor-houses, and of the

¹ *Rural Russia under the Old Régime*, by G. T. Robinson, 1932, p. 64. A detailed description of similar happenings in the Ukraine will be found in *Seed and Harvest*, by Vladimir Korostovetz, 1930. *The Russian Land*, by A. R. Williams (New York, 1928), gives other examples. The articles entitled "The Russian Agrarian Revolution of 1917", by Lancelot A. Owen, in *Slavonic Review* for July 1933 and January 1934, give a summary of this widespread *jacquerie*. See also *Die Bauerbevegung in der russischen Revolution, 1917*, by S. Dubrovsky, Moscow, 1932.

It should be said that, although a considerable number of landlords and stewards were killed in the course of the *jacquerie* of 1917–1918, sometimes under the circumstances of revolting brutality, these were principally those who had made themselves personally hateful to the peasants, or who actively resisted expropriation. The great majority of the landlords and their families escaped with their lives; either because they were non-resident, or accidentally absent from their estates, or because they were able precipitately to flee to the towns or to the White Armies, and eventually overseas.

estates appertaining to them, may have seemed all to the good, though in method deplorable. But the destruction of property meant an incalculable loss to the community as a whole, whilst the division of the relatively large holdings among the eighteen million peasant householders and their landless relatives and associates rapidly resulted in a reduction of the aggregate yield of foodstuffs, and still more of the quantity marketed, on which the urban population depended. Yet what was to be done? It is doubtful whether any government at Petrograd or Moscow in the circumstances of 1917-1918, when millions of soldiers were hastening from the front to take part in the division of the landlords' estates, could have had sufficient power to have stopped this popular expropriation. Certainly the newly installed Bolshevik administration was helpless in the matter. Mere denunciation of the peasants' precipitous action would have been not only futile but dangerous. What Lenin did, with prudent promptitude, was to get the Congress and the new Sovnarkom to issue a decree declaring all the land the property of the people as a whole; throwing open for re-allotment among the peasant cultivators the vast estates owned by the Tsar and his relatives, or by the Church and the monasteries; placing this redistribution in the hands of local committees to be elected by the peasants; and reserving for national administration, as model agricultural establishments, the home farms which a relatively small number of improving landowners had developed for stock-breeding and grain-growing on a large scale. Unfortunately, even many of these home farms were seized and divided by the peasants. Not for a whole decade did the Soviet Government find it possible to deal with the bulk of the land, nominally nationalised, but perforce left, in usufruct, in minute and often dispersed holdings, in the hands of what had grown to be as many as twenty-five million peasant families.

The Expropriation of the Capitalist

For the liquidation of the capitalist, the new Bolshevik Government was wholly responsible. To the followers of Karl Marx, as we shall show in our chapter entitled "Science the Salvation of Mankind",¹ the very existence of the profit-making or rent-

¹ Chapter XI. in Part II.

receiving capitalist, whether financier or trader, manufacturer or shipowner, speculator in land values or investor on the stock exchange, seemed the root of all that was evil in modern civilisation. It was this class, as it appeared, that was directly responsible for the division of the population, in every capitalist state, into what Disraeli, nearly contemporaneously with Marx, had described as "two nations"—the rich and the poor. The nationalisation of the means of production, distribution and exchange, without any compensation to their owners, had, in fact, been a plank in the programme of every section of the Russian social democrats. Nor could this systematic liquidation of a whole class be accomplished otherwise than by a revolution having for its object the replacement of the manifest "dictatorship" of the few, who owned the means of production, by that of the many, who earned their sparse and insecure livelihood by wage-labour. Such a revolution throughout the capitalist world, it was confidently assumed, would inevitably be brought about by the continuous growth, in numbers and in organisation, of the increasing hordes of wage-earners, already in some countries constituting two-thirds of the whole population, who "had nothing to lose but their chains". To the old Marxist it was anomalous that the first successful rising of the proletariat against their masters should be accomplished in Russia, the least industrialised of all the Great Powers. What Lenin's predecessors did not realise was that they had in Russia one revolutionary condition which was absent in Great Britain, France, Scandinavia and other western political democracies, and which was not even present in Imperial Germany, with its honest and efficient bureaucracy, its developed social services, its freely elected and powerful social democratic party, its legalised and highly organised trade union and cooperative movements. This asset was the well of hatred, animated by heroic courage, in the minds of countless men and women of all classes and successive generations—leaders of peasant revolts, organisers of revolutionary strikes, conspirators among freedom-loving intellectuals—all of whom had suffered imprisonment and exile, with prolonged fear of imminent death, in poverty and privation. Not a few of them had watched their loved ones or their comrades suffer martyrdom in the cause of freedom. Thus Lenin and his followers, ignoring the absence in other countries of this embittered class- (or creed-) consciousness,

fervently believed in the possibility of an early uprising of the wage-earners of the world, especially in the highly industrialised countries. Their faith in the righteousness and practicability of communism was accompanied by an equally fixed belief that a communistic régime could neither be completely established nor continuously maintained in Russia alone. They were so fanatically convinced, not only of the validity of their policy of abolishing private property in the means of production, and of replacing the motive of profit-making by that of social service, but also of its intrinsic morality, that they steeled their hearts to all the individual suffering that a social revolution inevitably causes. To overthrow the "dictatorship of the capitalist", which an essentially liberal new Provisional Government was seeking to maintain, Lenin would have waded through seas of blood. In fact, although there were several days of fierce fighting at Moscow, and many individual murders in Leningrad and elsewhere, the October revolution itself was substantially an expression of the popular will. It was afterwards, in maintaining the Soviet Government in power, and in repressing the counter-revolutionary rebellions which marked the inevitable reaction, that Lenin and his colleagues found themselves using the weapons of tyranny: the autocratic imprisonment and summary execution of political opponents equally with robbers and bandits, the terrorism of an irresponsible secret police, and all the horrors of civil war on the largest scale. Hatred of the capitalist soon extended to all governments, whether republics, kingdoms or empires; for did not these, one and all, support the capitalist system? Was not their reliance on the profit-making motive as the "invisible hand of God" the principal feature which they all had in common? Such denunciation of all the governments of the world naturally aroused the hostility of the victorious allies of the Tsar. It was, very largely, the armed intervention of half a dozen capitalist governments against the Soviet Government which drove that government to the wall, and compelled it to fight desperately for its life. And this intervention, undertaken in 1918 partly for strategic reasons, in order to restore the military front against the triumphant German forces, was continued and extended in 1919-1920, not merely from sympathy with the Russian landlords and capitalists, but in no small degree out of fear that the Bolsheviks would succeed

in their avowed purpose of stirring up revolutionary upheavals in other countries. Thus the beliefs of some of the Bolsheviki about the imminence of world revolution were not merely logical errors. In 1919-1920 these very beliefs came nearly to overwhelming the revolution in Russia itself which the Bolsheviki were struggling so valiantly to maintain.

It is hard to disentangle, and still harder to visualise, what happened in these first hectic days of the Bolshevik revolution. "The Russian smash at the end of 1917", wrote Mr. H. G. Wells from what he saw and learned in 1920, "was certainly the completest that has ever happened to any modern social organisation. After the failure of the Kerensky government to make peace, and of the British naval authorities to relieve the situation upon the Baltic flank, the shattered Russian armies, weapons in hand, broke up and rolled back upon Russia, a flood of peasant soldiers making for home, without hope, without supplies, without discipline. That time of débâcle was a time of complete social disorder. It was a social dissolution."¹

The Civil War and Foreign Invasion

In 1918 the authority of the Soviet Government was far from being firmly established. Even in Petrograd and Moscow there was the very smallest security of life and property. Robbery with violence in the streets, and the incursion of armed bandits into the houses—often under pretence of authorised searches or requisitions—were of daily occurrence. Outside the cities there was no organised protection. The deliberate and long-continued blockade maintained by the British fleet, and supported by the other hostile governments, kept out alike food and clothing, and the sorely needed medicines and anaesthetics. The whole country swarmed with counter-revolutionaries, who passed easily from individual *saboteurs* into wandering groups combining in varying

¹ *Russia in the Shadows*, by H. G. Wells, 1920, p. 34. The best documentary survey of these proceedings appears to be *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1918* (documents and material), by James Bunyan and H. H. Fisher, 1933, 735 pp. (No. 3 of Hoover War Library Publications, Stanford University, California).

Something may be gathered from the adverse, if not spiteful, account of one who was for a short time associated with Lenin's government, published in German and subsequently in French (see *Souvenirs d'un Commissaire du Peuple, 1917-1918*, by J. Steinberg, especially chapters i. and ii.). And see *The Russian Revolution, 1917-1921*, by W. H. Chamberlin, New York, 1935.

degrees rebellion with banditry. Presently came the armies of the governments of Great Britain, France, Japan, Italy and the United States, without any declaration of war, actually invading, at half a dozen points from Vladivostock and Batoum to Murmansk and Archangel, the territory of what had never ceased to be technically "a friendly power". The same governments, moreover, freely supplied officers, equipment and munitions to the mixed forces raised by Denikin, Kolchak, Judenich and Wrangel, who took up arms against the Soviet Government. Incidentally, the Germans and Poles ravaged the western provinces, whilst the army formed out of the Czecho-Slovakian prisoners of war held an equivocal position in its protracted passage through Siberia to the Pacific Ocean. Professedly independent governments were set up, with more or less open foreign support, in Georgia and the Ukraine, where fierce partisan warfare led to dreadful outrages and reprisals, in which the representatives of the foreign powers did not always refrain from participating.¹ These horrors, in the perpetration of which mere banditry and racial and religious persecution joined hands with war and rebellion, lasted at one place or another for more than two years; and extended, at one time or another, to nearly the whole of what is now the USSR. We quote only one description of the effect upon the civil population, written by one who was himself an extreme revolutionary, but who was, at the same time, in profound and convinced opposition to the Bolsheviks—the anarchist Alexander Berkman, who traversed European Russia from end to end.

"In the South of Russia", he wrote in his diary in July 1920, "all is unformed, grotesque, chaotic. Frequent changes of government, with their accompaniment of civil war and destruction, have produced a mental and physical condition unknown

¹ One incident is frequently recalled as "the murder of the 26 commissars". "The Fifteenth Anniversary of one of the blackest days in the history of the Civil War was commemorated yesterday in Baku and all over the Soviet Union. It was on September 20, 1918, that the 26 Commissars of Baku were murdered in the night by the Menshevik and Social Revolutionary government at the behest of the British expeditionary forces. . . . From Persia, British armies were marching on Turkestan, to deprive the revolution of cotton, and create a basis for imperialism in Central Asia. Baku fell on the night of September 20, 1918, to the British, who were aided by their agents, the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries. The 26 Commissars, who had been under arrest, were taken out of jail, railroaded out of the city, and shot" (*Moscow Daily News*, September 20, 1933).

in other parts of the country. They have created an atmosphere of uncertainty, of life lacking roots, of constant anxiety. Some parts of the Ukraine have experienced fourteen different régimes within the period of 1917-1920; each involving violent disturbance of normal existence, disorganising and tearing life from its roots. The whole gamut of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary passions has been played on this territory. Here the nationalistic Rada had fought the local organs of the Kerensky government till the Brest treaty opened southern Russia to German occupation. Prussian bayonets dissolved the Rada, and Hetman Skoropadsky, by grace of the Kaiser, lorded it over the country in the name of in 'independent and self-determining' people. Disaster on the Western Front and revolution in their own country compelled the Germans to withdraw, the new state of affairs giving Petlura victory over the Hetman, [which] kaleidoscopically changed the governments. Dictator Petlura and his 'directorium' were driven out by the rebel peasantry and the Red Army, the latter in turn giving way to Denikin. Subsequently the Bolsheviki became the masters of the Ukraine, soon to be driven back by the Poles, and then again the communists took possession. The long-continued military and civil struggles have deranged the whole life of the South. Social classes have been destroyed; old customs and traditions abolished; cultural barriers broken down, without the people having been able to adjust themselves to the new conditions which are in constant flux. There has been neither time nor opportunity to reconstruct one's mental and physical mode of life; to orient oneself within the constantly changing environment. The instincts of hunger and fear have become the sole *leitmotif* of thought, feeling and action; uncertainty is all-pervading and persistent; it is the only definite, actual reality. The question of bread, the danger of attack, are the exclusive topics of interest. You hear stories of armed forces sacking the environs of the city, and fanciful speculations about the character of the marauders whom some claim as Whites and others as Greens [peasant bands], or pogrom bandits. The legendary figures of Makhno, Marusya and Stchooss loom large in the atmosphere of panic created by the horrors lived through and the still more fearful apprehension of the unknown. Alarm and dread punctuate the life and thought of the people. They permeate the entire consciousness of being. . . . The whole

country resembles a military camp, living in constant expectation of invasion, civil war and sudden change of government, bringing with it renewed slaughter and oppression, confiscation and famine. Industrial activity is paralysed, the financial situation hopeless. Every régime has issued its own money, interdicting all previous forms of exchange. But among the people the various 'papers' are circulating, including Kerensky, Tsarist, Ukrainian and Soviet money. Every rouble has its own varying value. . . . Beneath the surface of the daily life man's primitive passions, unleashed, hold almost free play. Ethical values are dissolved; the gloss of civilisation is rubbed off. There remains only the unadorned instinct of self-preservation and the ever-present dread of to-morrow. The victory of the Whites, or the investing of a city by them, involves savage reprisals, pogroms against Jews, death for communists, prison and torture for those suspected of sympathising with the latter. The advent of the Bolsheviki signifies indiscriminate Red Terror. Either is disastrous; it has happened many times, and the people live in perpetual fear of its repetition. Internecine strife has marched through the Ukraine like a veritable man-eater, devouring, devastating, and leaving ruin, despair and horror in its wake. Stories of White and Red atrocities are on everybody's lips, accounts of personal experiences harrowing in their recital of fiendish murder and rapine, of inhuman cruelty and unspeakable outrages."¹

¹ *The Bolshevik Myth* (Diary 1920-1922), by Alexander Berkman, 1923, pp. 160-162. An experienced German observer, visiting the USSR in 1929, gives the following account: "Men who spent seven years at the front and then at home, the ruthless storm troops of the régime who quailed at nothing, will to-day cover their eyes when the scenes of the civil war are conjured up before them by questions. They must have been appalling beyond all measure, incomparably worse than the scenes of the external war. The infernal cruelty of man's hate of man, compatriot of compatriot, neighbour of neighbour, the bestiality on both sides induced by familiarity with murder, which must eventually have become for many an indifferent habit, a mechanical exercise of eyes and hands; and all this piled upon misery intensified to the utmost degree. Villages and industrial works converted into fortresses, defended by men and even women, pausing in the intervals of fighting to manufacture the articles of peace; and these manufactures always being claimed first of all, and often simply commandeered, for the fighting troops of the side which, in the changing fortunes of the civil war, was uppermost for the time being—this is what the economic system must have looked like over a great portion of the country" (*The Experiment of Bolshevism*, by Arthur Feiling, English edition, 1930, pp. 43-44).

No part of the country suffered more than the once-prosperous Ukraine, where "the war brought about an almost complete collapse of the economic position. . . . The occupation of that country by the Germans was followed by a line of brigand bands, who alternated with great rapidity and severe destruc-

Amid such horrors it was inevitable that both agricultural and industrial production should go to pieces. It seems, on the best estimates obtainable, that the aggregate production of the territory which became the USSR did not in 1920 amount to as much as one-third of what it had been in 1913. More than once during the years 1918-1920, when the supplies of food and fuel failed, the whole population left in Petrograd came near actual death from hunger and cold. The entire country suffered terribly from a privation that was chronic and unescapable. Even to maintain the troops in the field taxed to the uttermost the government's powers.

It was one of Lenin's firmly held principles that, whilst it was mere foolish sentimentalism to be, like Blanqui and the anarchists, always rebelling against a government, it was indispensable, once a revolution was started, to carry it through at all hazards to the bitter end. And he held equally firmly to the maxim, which the revolutionists of 1848 had ignored, that when a revolution had once been effected, it was an imperative duty—and one which will involve even greater peril than the making of the revolution had done—at all costs to maintain it against the inevitable assaults of the counter-revolutionaries. If it is asked what the Soviet Government accomplished during the first three years of its existence, the answer must be that it "maintained the revolution". But so dire was the condition of the people, so implacable was the enmity of practically all the governments of the world, and so fierce and persistent were the attacks which the most powerful of them promoted and supported, that the Soviet Government only just managed to survive.

War Communism

This was the period (1918-1920) subsequently designated as that of "War Communism". What was universally shared was not wealth but privation and hunger. Every other consideration was sacrificed to the urgent necessity of defeating both the hostile armies in the field and the insurgent counter-revolutionaries. In addition to minor bands which carried on destruction in the various parts of the country, Makhno, Grigoriev, Skoropadsky, Denikin, Petlura and many others were plundering on a large scale. Under the pretence of fighting against Bolshevism, brigands of every description despoiled the country, until they brought it to almost complete ruin" (Moscow Narodny Bank *Monthly Review*, December 1934, p. 9).

behind the military fronts. All the factories were made to concentrate their production upon what was needed by the sixteen Red Armies of five million men that Lenin was able to put in the field under Trotsky, Stalin and Frunze; and that Trotsky so dramatically directed from his perpetually moving armoured train. The trade unions became recruiting agencies to keep up the necessary stream of men to the various fronts. The peasants, within the area for the time being free from hostile domination, were harried with arbitrary requisitions for all the foodstuffs that could be extorted from them. The entire population of the cities was put on exiguous rations, in order that regular supplies might be sent to the soldiers. Every decision of Lenin and his colleagues took the form of a peremptory order, to be complied with under penalty of instant arrest, and, frequently, of summary execution. The least inclination towards counter-revolutionary activity of any kind was, in the same way, ruthlessly stopped and extinguished. And the people did not revolt. The peasants everywhere hated the Whites more than they did the Reds. The workmen swarmed into the Red Army. Those who remained in production, far from resenting the pressure upon them, intensified their efforts to increase output. Everybody grumbled about the continued shortage of food, fuel and clothing; about the lack of light, of sugar, of drugs, of all the comforts of life. But the people as a whole did not rebel; there was not even any pressure on the government to discontinue its efforts against the successive waves of the White armies that British, French, Italian, Japanese and American governments sometimes officered, usually equipped and occasionally subsidised. It may, indeed, be said that it was just the feeling aroused by these foreign invasions that enabled the Bolshevik Government to survive. It was during these two or three years of Allied intervention and civil war; of assassinations and attempted assassinations of Soviet Government officials, and innumerable instances of counter-revolutionary sabotage and plotting; of outrages and reprisals by the soldiery and the partisans on both sides; and of a civilian death-rate increased much more by the long-continued privation and chronic disease than by wilful homicide in all its degrees, that were piled up the oft-quoted statistics of Russian lives lost "through the revolution"—a loss of life which, with an incredible naïveté, is sometimes debited, not at all to the rebels

who took up arms against the *de facto* government, or to the foreign governments that, without lawful excuse, incited and supported them, but wholly to the Bolshevik influences in the government of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic ! ¹

This three years' episode of War Communism has been looked at in two ways. It has been described as if it had all been part of a deliberate plan to establish a communist state. Possibly there were, among the Bolsheviks, some who had at first believed that, as it has since been said, they "could carry out the evolution to communism at one great bound. Nationalisation of banks ; sequestration of the private property remaining in their custody ; expropriation of the bourgeoisie, including their houses, and even their silver, jewels and works of art ; all land declared to be state property ; the whole of large-scale industry taken over by the state ; the rationing of all articles of prime necessity ; the destruction of the market by the prohibition of trade ; the militarisation of labour by universal obligation to work ; and finally the abolition of money by the state, which, instead of paying its workers and employees in cash (amounting to only 7 per cent in 1920), aimed at supplying an ever-growing proportion of their requirements in kind (maintaining them by the distribution of rations or free meals in public eating-houses ; housing to include fuel, gas, water and electricity ; use of the railway and the trams ; clothing and domestic articles to be supplied from the public stores ; schools, newspapers and the theatre) ; likewise supplying the peasants with the industrial products they needed in exchange for the foodstuffs they were bound to deliver—such, in broad outline, were to be the features of this transition to communism." ² Lenin, on the other hand, as plainly appears from his numerous publications during 1917, had contemplated a lengthy period of transition, the various stages of which he could not foresee, and which he imagined would have to take the form of a whole series of economic experiments. In 1921, he explained—to use the words of an able German investigator—that "it was only dire necessity, war and wholesale destruction that had imposed this war-time communism upon the Bolsheviks. It had consisted in

¹ "It is reckoned that two and a half years of the civil war alone were responsible for the premature death of about seven millions of people" (*The Economic Policy of Soviet Russia*, by Paul Haensel, 1930, p. 2).

² *The Experiment of Bolshevism*, by Arthur Feiling (English edition, 1930), pp. 52-53.

the fact that all the surplus, and sometimes a portion of the necessary, foodstuffs were taken from the peasants in order to supply the army and the workers. . . . This military communism was a provisional measure, because in their then desperate plight the Bolsheviks could shrink from no measures, however extreme ; half starved and worse than half starved, they had to hold their ground at all costs and keep alive the workers and peasants.”¹

Fortunately for the Bolsheviks, just when the people, as it now seems, were at their last gasp, the foreign intervention came to an end. The year 1920 was the year in which War Communism reached its culmination. “That year”, it has been said, “will live long in the memory of all Russians who lived through it as the coldest, hungriest and most dreadful year of the revolution.”² But at the end of it “the power of the Central Committee of the ruling Party was absolute and complete”.³ The foreign governments had failed to coordinate the successive invasions that they promoted. Their own countries were mostly too much exhausted by the years of war, and their statesmen too much afraid of their own wage-earning class, to continue their efforts. The White Armies were too incompetently led, and the conduct of both officers and rank and file was too scandalously bad, to obtain any support from the peasantry whom they oppressed, or to withstand the patriotic fervour of the Red Armies. The British troops were soon withdrawn from Murmansk and Archangel, and eventually the Japanese from Vladivostock. British and French steamers evacuated both foreigners and Russians hostile to the Bolsheviks from the coasts of the Black Sea. “The peace treaties with Latvia and Lithuania were signed in July 1920 ; and the treaty with Finland in October of the same year. The civil war in Siberia was finished by October 1920 ; the fight against Wrangel, Petlura, Bulak-Balahovich and Makhno, in Southern Russia, likewise came to an end in November 1920. In fact, by the end of November 1920 there was peace throughout the country.”⁴

Nevertheless, so uncertain was the position, and so high was

¹ *The Experiment of Bolshevism*, by Arthur Feiling (English edition, 1930), pp. 53-54.

² *After Lenin*, by Michael Farbman, 1924, p. 27.

³ *Ibid.* p. 27.

⁴ *Economic Trends in Soviet Russia*, by A. Yugov (English edition, 1920), p. 41. It was, however, not until the end of 1922 that the last of the Japanese forces evacuated the port of Vladivostock, and not until 1924 that they left North Sakhalin.

the determination of the Bolshevik Government, that the policy of War Communism was maintained for some months longer. "The decree for the complete nationalisation of all industries, including small scale enterprise" (that is to say, all undertakings employing more than ten workers, and also all those employing more than five workers if with mechanical power) was issued "under date November 30, 1920; the decree that the levying of taxes was to cease, because money no longer functioned as a means of payment, under date February 3, 1921. In December 1920 . . . the Eighth Soviet Congress passed the most Utopian of all the resolutions of the days of War Communism, the resolution concerning the socialisation of peasant agriculture. Special committees were [to be] appointed to prescribe the scope and the kinds of cultivation to be practised on every one of the twenty [five] millions of peasant farms." Peasant farming, said this resolution, "must be conducted in accordance with a unified plan, and under a unified management".¹

The Famine of 1921

Then, in the spring of 1921, the year in which all the horrors culminated in the direst famine within Russian memory, the régime of War Communism suddenly broke. Whole provinces were reduced to absolute starvation, in which the worst horrors occurred. Famine in Russia was, of course, no new thing. It was, in fact, expected every few years in one part or another of that vast area. But the failure of crops in 1921, coming on the top of a diminution of the area sown, and the slaughter of livestock, proved to be both more complete and more widespread than had been known within living memory. "The famine of 1891 had affected seventeen million persons; that of 1906 twenty-one millions; that of 1911 twenty-seven millions; but that of 1921 involved no less than forty-three millions. In the worst of the previous Russian famines the number of peasants who could not get even enough grain for seed never exceeded three millions; but in 1921 such peasants numbered thirteen millions. That is to say, thirteen million peasants were practically destitute. Twenty-seven provinces, that is nearly half Russia, were in the grip of the famine. In these provinces the food consumption of the

¹ *After Lenin*, by Michael Farbman, 1924, p. 41.

people sank to a terribly low level, and the death-rate among both human beings and cattle was terribly high." ¹

The New Economic Policy

The people, who had borne so much, could stand it no longer. There were peasant risings at Tambov and along the Volga. Gravest of all, the sailors in the Red Fleet centred at Cronstadt, together with the Cronstadt garrison, broke out in armed revolt against the Soviet Government itself, not on account of any service grievances, but in protest against the starvation of the families to which the soldiers and sailors belonged, in the rural villages of the stricken areas. "The Soviets without the Communist Party" was the sailors' slogan. It was one of the features of Lenin's genius that he knew when to yield to unmistakeable popular discontent; and not less so that he knew how to yield dramatically and completely, whilst never abandoning his fundamental aim.² The revolt at Cronstadt had plainly to be forcibly suppressed, by bombardment and assault across the ice, yet without undue punishment for the gravest of all military offences.

¹ *Ibid.* p. 41. To what depths every form of activity had been reduced in 1921 may be seen in the terrible description by a Petrograd university professor and prominent cooperator, entitled *Russia after Four Years of Revolution*, by S. S. Maslov, 1923.

The inevitable consequences on women, children and the family, and the general relaxation of morals were at least as serious as the swollen death-rate. "Then there were the terrible famine years of 1921-1922, which produced a positive migration of the peoples amongst the utterly destitute population; whole families, all the inhabitants of a settlement, were forced to leave their homes and go elsewhere in search of a crust of bread. . . . What followed—the period of the NEP, the New Economic Policy—confused people's ideas still more. For whereas the preceding years had let loose the brutish instincts of the starving people, now the instincts of those were roused who scraped together the money which but yesterday had been utterly worthless and so enjoyed a degree of prosperity hitherto unknown in Soviet Russia. The demand for women who had fallen on evil days increased from day to day. Restaurants, cafés, and taverns flaunted themselves again, and wine was sold once more. There was nothing to bridle the human instincts which had at least been repressed in the days of war communism by a stern military régime. The number of divorces and abuses of the law increased vastly even in the country. And so that 'free love' which has so often been misunderstood, as well as the misunderstanding or misinterpretation of revolutionary forms, began to degenerate into excesses" (*Woman in Soviet Russia*, by Fannina Halle, 1933, p. 107).

² "Lenin is an opportunist genius. He has a wonderful knack of recognising when it is necessary to change his tactics. And then he changes them with lightning rapidity. But whether he is advancing or retreating, attacking or retracting, he is always firm and determined. He never wavers. He is never afraid" (*Bolshevism in Retreat*, by Michael Farbman, 1921, p. 59).

But in March 1921, at the Tenth Congress of the Communist Party, Lenin startled his followers by proposing and carrying a complete abandonment of the measures of War Communism.¹ First, the unlimited requisitioning of grain was done away with, and replaced by a fixed graduated tax on each peasant proportionate to his holding of land, leaving to him the right freely to dispose of his produce, over and above the tax, in the open market, at the highest prices he could obtain. Next the use of money was reverted to, and the currency was stabilised, and all limitations on the possession and handling of money were repealed. "The decree of July 9, 1921, re-established railway fares. That of August 1 restored post and telegraph charges. That of September 15 reintroduced water-rates (and) electricity rates, along with charges for the use of tramways, public baths and laundries."² A decree of August 12, 1921, gave a virtual autonomy to nationalised undertakings on the startling new basis of paying their way! "Such factories or undertakings were to retain all their equipment, stocks of fuel, raw materials and semi-manufactured products; but they were to lose any claim to being supplied by the state with money or food for paying wages: they had to run their business on commercial lines, and they were under no obligation to supply any government department with their produce without payment. Very soon most of the former state industries became autonomous in this sense. Later in the same month the state factories acquired the right to buy on the market the raw material they needed and the food they required to pay the workmen's wages, while in October 1921 they secured the additional privilege of selling their produce in the open market. In this rapid and summary fashion were the necessary steps taken for building up the new economic system."

The revival of productive enterprise, the establishment of innumerable small businesses of every kind, and the development of free exchanges between town and country producers naturally took some time. It was, we suggest, mere "wish-fulfilment" that the whole world outside the USSR, together with nearly all

¹ The fullest account accessible to the English reader of the New Economic Policy will be found in *After Lenin*, by Michael Farbman, 1924, pp. 85-170. This admirable volume is all the more interesting from being written at a time when the New Economic Policy and the dominance of an individualist peasantry seemed destined to permanence.

² *After Lenin*, by Michael Farbman, 1924, p. 109.

the opponents of the Bolsheviks inside the USSR, acclaimed the New Economic Policy as both confession and proof of the failure of collectivism. Nearly everyone assumed that any further pursuit of the policy of liquidating the landlord and the capitalist had been abandoned. Yet Lenin made it abundantly clear that it was, as he said, only a case of taking one step backward in order to be able to take two steps forward. So long as the government continued to own and to operate the entire banking system ; the whole of international commerce ; the various means of communication and transport ; practically all the urban land and buildings ; the mineral resources, the supplies of every kind of fuel and all the sources of electric power ; the heavy industries, and even all the enterprises of any magnitude in the light industries—to say nothing of directing the trade unions and the consumers' cooperative societies—what did it matter to the future of collectivism if the millions of individual peasants were set free to sell their baskets of produce in the street markets ; or if everyone was allowed to open in the cities multitudes of little restaurants and cafés, confectioners' shops and tea-houses, grocery and drapery stores, and even petty workshops and factories making the hundred and one articles of household use ? Whilst the “commanding heights of socialism ” continued to be occupied by the government, so Lenin argued, the thousands of minor outposts might safely be abandoned to the profit-maker for just as long as the government found it convenient to forgo these channels of supply of the consumers' demands. Even the most fanatical communist might safely invite the foreign capitalist to apply for concessions, allowing him, for a strictly limited period, within the limits of legal and trade union control, to develop such of the natural resources as the government found itself, for the moment, unable to attend to. The trouble was that the Bolshevik administrators underrated or ignored the potency, for good or for evil, of the profit-making motive. It might increase production and facilitate the exchange of commodities between industrialists and agriculturists. But, once liberated, the motive of pecuniary self-interest took devious ways, and rapidly undermined the new morality upon which the success of Soviet Communism depended. Every day the New Economic Policy widened the range of its intellectual influence. At the start only the peasant market was abandoned to the private greed for gain.

All other spheres of enterprise were supposed to be governed by the pursuit of the commonweal. But more and more NEP extended towards the complete liberation of private enterprise from all attempts at public regulation, whilst even state enterprises became insidiously permeated with the spirit of individual self-interest. "There is a Russian saying," we are told, "always very popular with the disciples of Marx, that whoever says A says B. The cogency of this maxim was never better illustrated than by the rapid evolution of measures" that were found to be involved in the New Economic Policy. The abolition of the state's arbitrary requisitions of the peasant's harvest, and the substitution of a fixed tax on grain, was designed to give a stimulus to production to the peasants. "This was the innocent A in the alphabet of the Bolshevik retreat. Within a month it seemed necessary to give the urban producers a similar stimulus. Soon it became unavoidable to suffer the reappearance, not clandestinely but legally, of the hated bourgeois, first as middleman and trader, and then even as employer of labour. And subsequently a whole series of concessions, large and small, was made, all of them modifying in the direction of individualism, the economic relations, not only between the urban and the rural populations, but also between both of them as producers and the central and municipal governments."¹

The evil effects of these developments of the New Economic Policy became quickly manifest to the leaders of the Communist Party. This led to a general desire for something in the nature of a general plan to which both state and private enterprise would be subordinated.² Thus when, towards the end of 1920, the Commission for the Electrification of Russia presented its report to the Eighth Congress of Soviets, Lenin congratulated the Con-

¹ *After Lenin*, by Michael Farbman, 1924, p. 134. In 1924 "the number of all licensed trade establishments—that is of all traders, from wholesale dealers to the smallest village retail shops, with the exclusion of pedlars"—in the USSR was 460,803 as compared with 935,000 pre-war. Thus in three years' time 50 per cent of all trade establishments had been restored. If we "divide these 460,000 shops according to proprietorship, we find that the state possesses altogether, in the cities and in the villages, 11,915. The cooperative societies possess 26,678. The privately owned shops number 420,366. If we divide all the shops according to their four categories—wholesale, wholesale and retail, retail, and market (stalls), we find that only in the wholesale trade, of which they possess 55 per cent, are the state-owned shops predominant" (*ibid.* pp. 106-107).

² This will be explained in the following chapter, "Planned Production for Community Consumption".

gress on having at least secured not merely a plan for electrification but also, in effect, the basis of one for a general control of all economic life. It was not regarded as possible immediately to regulate all production and distribution by such a plan. But it was felt that, in so far as it was necessary to appeal to the motive of the pecuniary self-interest of the individual producer or trader, this could be kept in check only by the formulation and enforcement of a comprehensive plan for the whole economy of the state.

We have neither the space nor the data that would enable us to discuss the question whether the New Economic Policy, if it had been allowed to develop for as long as a decade, and even if it had been controlled and guided by a general plan, either would or could have proved successful in building up a socialist state. In the cities the rapidly extending enterprises of the Nepmen were not long allowed to continue. It quickly became manifest that the assumption of any intentional reversion to capitalism was without foundation. Within twelve months, the policy of liquidating the profit-maker began to be resumed. This was not effected wholly by repression. The mere expansion of production and trade by the state trusts and municipal departments, and the preferential treatment that they received, was, in itself, sufficient to bring down the edifice of profit-making trade. But the weapon of repression was also used in the harrying of the Nepman by such methods as exceptional taxation and enforced contributions; obstructing his supplies; arresting and expelling his foreign assistants; harassing his operations by labour disputes and demands for higher wages, and finally police suppression of this or that manifestation of NEP activity in attracting customers.

It will be realised that the reversal of the New Economic Policy, and the liquidation of the Nepman in all his various activities, was a gradual process not effected by any one decree, or even by any one governmental device, but was extended over several years. We may perhaps take the year 1928, when the first Five-Year Plan was promulgated, as marking the date when in the cities this process had been practically completed. In all the urban centres of the USSR the liquidation of the capitalist, in anything more substantial than street-selling, had by then been substantially accomplished. The swarm of "speculators" who had between 1921 and 1927 started hundreds of thousands of

little businesses in wholesale and retail trading, the running of eating-houses, and petty manufacturing, had been finally suppressed ; some to die, many to linger out terms of imprisonment or administrative exile, others to escape to foreign lands, whilst probably a majority found themselves not actually excluded from wage-earning employment, but sunken to obscurity among the "deprived classes". Practically the whole of the activities of these Nepmen in wholesale and retail trade, as well as in manufacturing, had been, by 1929, replaced by the continuous extension of collective enterprises, by which an ever-increasing proportion of the needs of the urban population were being supplied. In this growing supersession of the private profit-maker, the thousands of factories of the state trusts directly under the orders of the Supreme Economic Council, in conjunction with the efforts of the trade unions to increase production, were aided by the ever-increasing manufacturing and distributing enterprises of the constituent republics (principally the RSFSR and the Ukraine); and by those of the municipal soviets in such cities as Moscow and Leningrad, Kharkov and Rostov. But a large part was played also, and not in distribution alone, by the rapidly growing consumers' cooperative societies ; whilst the reviving artels, as manufacturing associations of owner-producers (incops), likewise contributed substantially to the output. There were in 1929, as the government spokesmen admitted, still many gaps, which the private profit-makers, if they had been allowed, would have filled to the greater comfort of the citizens. Such minor deprivations suffered by the consumers did not much disturb the Soviet Government. What was serious, and what caused the greatest concern to the leaders of the Communist Party, was the persistent shortage of foodstuffs. But before dealing with the successive liquidations to which this problem led "on the agricultural front", we must first notice certain consequences of the summary supersession of the New Economic Policy itself.

The Persecution of the Intelligentsia

The spasmodic and abrupt changes of front, between 1920 and 1929, on the vital question of whether or not profit-making was an ethical offence to be condemned as a crime, and ruthlessly suppressed, had, we believe, an injurious effect on public morality.

Nor was this shock to public morals lessened by the measures of suppression that were spasmodically and, as it seemed, arbitrarily applied. Individual producers who had done their best to become well-to-do ; traders who had merely followed their avocation of buying in the cheapest and selling in the dearest market ; officials of state banks and public trusts who had freely given credit to the new class of manufacturing employers, found themselves suddenly subject to obloquy, dismissed from office or harried by the police and the taxing authorities ; often condemned to imprisonment, and occasionally shot.

There was a more insidious effect of the successive changes of policy in the minds and upon the conduct of the intelligentsia, who had, in large part, stood aloof from the October revolution, and from the administration which emerged from it. Many of the scientists, engineers and expert managers of the old régime, who had not taken to flight, had, during the years of War Communism, remained quietly in obscure poverty rather than take service under a government of which they disapproved, so long as it was pursuing a policy in which they could put no faith. When the New Economic Policy was adopted in 1921, many of these intellectual workers, believing that the Soviet Government intended henceforth to revert gradually to free private enterprise, with the motive of " profit on price " on which alone they thought it possible successfully to organise industry, voluntarily accepted the specialist posts for which they were qualified. Many of them, it may be the majority of them, honourably fulfilled the duties with which they were entrusted. It was, however, inevitable that persons holding their opinions should, in the atmosphere of mingled hatred and fear that prevailed, become objects of suspicion. This suspicion was in many cases increased by their intellectual attitude, their unguarded utterances and their habitual conduct. When it became manifest that there was no abandonment of the policy of liquidating the capitalist, and when the harrying of the Nepmen was resumed and even intensified, a certain disapproval, by these intellectual recruits, of the communist administration could not be concealed. They were, it is clear, whether or not intentionally or even knowingly, sources of criticism of the government. In some cases they were apparently unable to maintain the loyalty required from executive officers. They became centres of accusations and recriminations, if not

actually of counter-revolutionary activities in the nature of sabotage. There were anyhow innumerable hitches and breakdowns in the newly restored or newly erected machinery of power stations, blast furnaces, rolling mills, and automobile and machine-making establishments that were rising up all over the USSR ; and, naturally, always failing to come up to their designers' optimistic expectations of their accomplishments. Whether or not there was often sabotage, it was inevitable that this should be popularly suspected. In 1927-1928 the widely advertised Shakhty prosecution of Russian technicians in the Donets coal mines, in conspiracy with certain Germans, further inflamed popular feeling. There ensued a steady dispensing with the services of all whose loyalty was not completely beyond question. A foreign journalistic critic of the Soviet Government declared, in 1931—probably with some exaggeration—that “hundreds of so-called ‘spetsies’ [specialists] of all kinds have disappeared during this last year from places in which they had long been working for the Soviet Government. Either they have been simply dismissed because a Red professor, a Red engineer, a Red librarian had meantime grown up out of the ranks of proletarian youth to take their positions ; or else they have been arrested on some flimsy charge.”¹

It was a time when living conditions worsened for all sections of the population, and not least for the brain workers. “Yet at the same time the population was asked to work more intensely for the fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan. ‘Why should we?’ many engineers and intellectuals asked themselves. ‘It is not our government. Sacrifices are demanded, and simultaneously harsh treatment is meted out to us.’ The cumulative effect of all these circumstances was to make the intelligentsia bitterly and actively anti-soviet, so that in 1929, when agrarian collectivisation disaffected millions of peasants, the intelligentsia believed, indeed many of them hoped, that the Soviet Government was about to collapse. During the first three months of 1930, Stalin expected foreign military intervention. The atmosphere grew tense. Intellectuals and Bolsheviks acted nervously.”²

¹ *Seven Years in Soviet Russia*, by Paul Scheffer, 1932, p. 343.

² *Machines and Men*, by Louis Fischer, 1932, p. 221.

In the same year we read : “Simultaneously with the announcement of the Five-Year Plan, preparation was made for a monster trial at Kharkov, specially directed against the Ukrainian intelligentsia. With this aim in view, mass

The Trial of the Industrial Party

In December 1930 came the famous "Promparti" trial of eight soviet engineers whom the state charged with economic sabotage, the organisation of a secret political party, and conspiracy with France to invade Russia with a view to the overthrow of the soviet régime. Six of the defendants were sentenced to death, two to ten years' incarceration.¹

This much-discussed prosecution of Professor Ramzin and his colleagues inaugurated a veritable reign of terror against the intelligentsia. Nobody regarded himself as beyond suspicion. Men and women lived in daily dread of arrest. Thousands were sent on administrative exile to distant parts of the country. Evidence was not necessary. The title of engineer served as sufficient condemnation. The jails were filled. Factories languished from lack of technical leadership, and the chiefs of the Supreme Economic Council commenced to complain "that by its wholesale arrests of engineers, the GPU . . . was interfering with industrial progress". In the end none of the condemned

arrests were made and people shot without trial as early as the autumn of 1929; while between March and April 1930 a 'trial' of 45 persons, lasting 40 days, was conducted in one of the largest Kharkov theatres, which was crowded with spectators from all parts of Soviet Ukraina. The most important of the prisoners was Efremov, a member of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, and those who stood their trial with him were professors, writers, doctors, schoolmasters, priests and so on. The prisoners were charged with having formed a 'Society for the Liberation of Ukraina', which aimed at the forcible separation of the country from the Soviet Union. They were all condemned to exile and imprisonment, and the trial itself was used as a pretext for the complete suppression of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Science, to which soviet commissaries such as Schlichter, Zatonsky and the like were elected members in place of genuine Ukrainian scholars. The autocephalous Ukrainian Church was also liquidated, for it was supposed to be connected with 'The Society for the Liberation of Ukraina'. Ukrainian literary periodicals, such as *The Red Road*, *Life and Revolution*, *The Literary News*, *The Literary Fair* and others, were suppressed. The State Publishing Department of Ukraina was abolished, and in its place a 'United Publishing Department of Ukraina' was created, which was completely under Moscow's thumb" ("Ukrainia under Bolshevik Rule", by Isaac Mazepa, in *Slavonic Review*, January 1934, p. 337).

¹ *Le Procès du parti industriel de Moscou*, compte rendu abrégé, avec une préface de Georges Valois (Pierre Dominique), Paris, 1931, 744 pp.; *Seven Years in Soviet Russia*, by Paul Scheffer (1932), pp. 342-344; *Machines and Men in Russia*, by Louis Fischer (1932), p. 222; *Acte d'accusation présenté au procès du parti industriel*, par N. Krylenko, avec préface de Marcel Cachin (Paris, 1930, 100 pp.); *Lettre aux ouvriers et paysans des pays capitalistes*, par Maxime Gorki, avec préface de Marcel Cachin (Paris, 1930, 14 pp.); *Capitalisme contre socialisme; le sens politique du procès de Moscou*, par L. Madyar (Paris, 1931) 65 pp.; *Portraits and Pamphlets*, by Karl Radek, 1935.

engineers were actually executed, and even the terms of imprisonment were greatly reduced.

"That Russian engineers have engaged and are engaging in sabotage is never disputed. American specialists working in Russia have said so repeatedly in private and in print. Circumstantial evidence supports their contention. But this fact constitutes no warrant to arrest and condemn an entire class, many of whose members are loyal, devoted citizens."¹

The Trial of the Menshevik Professors

There was yet another elaborately staged and widely published trial in March 1931, when fourteen professors and state officials (including Groman of Gosplan, who had insisted on much lower estimates of production in the First Five-Year Plan) were accused of "counter-revolutionary" activities in conspiracy with Mensheviks in the USSR, and their colleagues in foreign countries. Here, it may be suggested, the defendants really aimed at were the members of the Russian Social Democratic Party residing abroad, who continued to constitute the Russian Section of the Second International, and who, it was asserted by the prosecution, had taken part in inciting and subsidising various measures of "sabotage" at the behest of committees, in Paris and London, representing the former proprietors of great industrial enterprises in Russia.²

¹ *Machines and Men in Russia*, by Louis Fischer, 1932, chap. xv., "Russian Intelligentsia comes into its own", pp. 210-231; see also *Russia's Iron Age*, by W. H. Chamberlin, 1935, pp. 162-164.

² See, for the official accounts of this trial, *Acte d'accusation relatif au procès de l'organisation mencheviste contra-révolutionnaire de Groman, Cher, Ikov, Soukhanov et autres*, par N. Krylenko (Paris, 1931), 98 pp.; also the issues of *Izvestia* and of *International Press Correspondence*, between February and April 1931, and the replies of the Second International in *The Moscow Trial and the Labour and Socialist International* (The Labour Party, London, 1931, 48 pp.); also the pamphlet entitled *Révélation sur un complot contre le pouvoir soviétique*, by G. Krjijanovsky, president of Gosplan (Paris, 1931, 72 pp.).

An earlier prosecution of Social Revolutionaries, in 1922, had, it is believed, a similar motive. The accusation was, in effect, against the "Second International", which was supposed to be plotting an armed uprising, to be preceded or accompanied by assassinations of leading Bolsheviks. Among the accused persons were Social Revolutionary members of the Russian Section of the Second International; and eminent members of that body, including the Belgian ex-Minister, Emile Vanderveelde, with Liebknecht and Rosenfeldt, travelled to Moscow in an endeavour to secure a fair trial. Their reception was not such as to impress the Second International with confidence in the judicial impartiality of

Stalin's Pronouncement

At this point we come to one of those sudden and dramatic changes of policy that make the story of the Soviet Government so bewildering to those who are unable closely to follow the details. The period that we have described (1929-1931) was, writes a trustworthy American resident at Moscow, "the blackest in the history of the intelligentsia under the soviet régime. But 1931 marked a sharp change for the better. . . . To-day [1932] Russia's intelligentsia is coming into its own. It breathes more freely. New rights and privileges are being accorded to it. The soviets are making its life more comfortable."¹

Within a few months of the verdict and sentences of the great trial of Groman and his associates, "the new policy was announced by Stalin in an historic speech on June 23, 1931. It was the Magna Charta, so to speak, of the soviet intelligentsia. Previously the orthodox Bolshevik, or at least the ordinary worker, might have imagined that the intelligentsia was a disease of which he would sooner or later be cured." But Stalin declared that "no ruling class has yet managed to get along without its own intellectuals", and the Soviet Union was no exception. The intelligentsia, Stalin submitted, must be helped. "The problem is", he said, "not to discourage these comrades." The fact that many of the intellectuals were not Bolsheviks, Stalin declared, "should not serve as a barrier to quick promotion to leading positions". Even the old bourgeois specialists, inherited by Bolshevism from the tsarist régime, must receive better treatment. Therefore, Stalin urged, "the Bolsheviks must pursue a policy of attracting it [the intelligentsia] to us, and of concerning ourselves with its welfare". There was to be "no more persecution of engineers". "Specialist baiting", Stalin asserted emphatically, "has always been considered and continues to be a harmful and shameful manifestation." Presently a government decree gave engineers and other technicians the same high status as manual workers in industry, in the way of rations of food and clothing, the allocation of apartments and

the proceedings; nor were these, it has been asserted, calculated to allay the fears of the intelligentsia in the RSFSR itself. The twelve defendants were all sentenced to death, but the sentences were commuted to long terms of imprisonment (see *The Twelve Condemned to Death*, Berlin, 1922).

¹ *Machines and Men in Russia*, by Louis Fischer, 1932, p. 22.

the privilege of admission to sanatoria and rest-houses. They were each to be entitled to an extra room for study at home. They were placed in a more favourable class of income-tax payers by which their tax percentages were reduced. Their children were to be admitted to schools and colleges on the same terms as those of manual workers.

"A marked improvement", we are authoritatively told, "in the lot of Russia's intelligentsia followed immediately. . . . A large number of engineers were released from jail or recalled from exile, and few, if any, are [1932] being arrested. . . . Non-communist physicians and technical men have been promoted to high positions of trust. Many engineers are being awarded the Order of Lenin, and other soviet distinctions. . . . Where previously the intellectual hesitated a hundred times before lifting his voice in complaint, he has now been endowed with new courage, and every government office lends him an attentive ear. Punishment for 'production risks' is now frowned upon. This practice was the bane of the engineer's life. Suppose a specialist believed that a certain district was petroliferous, and decided to sink a well in the hope of striking oil. If he failed to find it, he might easily have been accused of deliberate anti-government sabotage. The consequences, at times, were unpleasant. Now [1932] every state spokesman declares loudly that production risks are desirable and useful, and indispensable to industrial progress. The natural right of unfettered initiative has been returned to the engineer. In a recent speech, Nicolai Krylenko, Commissar of Justice, endorsed the principle of equality between factory workers and engineers; and told of a case in which he had dismissed, and then arrested a provincial prosecuting attorney for taking legal action against several engineers without sufficient incriminating evidence. . . . Even more noteworthy as an indication of fair weather for the intelligentsia is an article in the official Moscow *Izvestia* by Arnold Soltz, a member of the pivotal central Control Committee, and one of the leading legal minds of the USSR. 'We are not accustomed to value the human being sufficiently', Soltz declared. 'To withdraw men from important posts in industry and civil service by arresting and sentencing them without adequate justification has caused the state tremendous loss', Soltz complained. He condemned the practice, and thereby implied a

criticism of the authorities, who have deprived soviet institutions of thousands of indispensable employees by thrusting them into prisons on the slightest provocation, and keeping them there, in true Eastern fashion, until they could prove their innocence—not until the state could prove them guilty.”¹

Trial of the Metro-Vickers Engineers

It adds to the bewilderment of the student of soviet policy to find that, notwithstanding Stalin's pronouncement of June 1931, and the manifest change of attitude that it produced, renewed outbursts of persecution of the intelligentsia almost immediately recurred.

We need do no more than record the dramatically staged criminal prosecution, in January 1933, of six British and ten Russian engineers, together with a Russian woman secretary, for alleged wrecking activities at power stations, accompanied by conspiracy, espionage and bribery. This case became of world importance owing to its immediate consequences. The British Ambassador manifested at the outset a resentment, for which there was no diplomatic justification, at British engineers being even suspected of any criminal offence, let alone being prosecuted! He peremptorily demanded their immediate discharge without trial. What made matters more difficult was the very undiplomatic action of the British Government in publicly threatening to impose an embargo on all imports from the USSR, should any one or more of the British defendants be found guilty and sentenced by the Supreme Court of the USSR. After this public threat, as might have been foreseen, the Supreme Court found the evidence of guilt, supported as it was by manifold confessions, convincing in sixteen out of the seventeen cases. One of the British defendants was acquitted. Three others, though found guilty, were sentenced only to immediate expulsion from the USSR for a period of five years, whilst the other two, who had elaborately confessed their own and their comrades' guilt, were condemned respectively to two and three years of imprisonment. The British Government, without even waiting to consider the verbatim stenographic reports of the evidence that were promptly published, imposed the embargo which had been so precipitously

¹ *Machines and Men in Russia*, by Louis Fischer, 1932, pp. 228-229; see on this *Red Virtue*, by Ella Winter, 1933, p. 76.

threatened, and by which—followed as it was by a counter-embargo on the other side—practically all trade between the two countries was stopped. The pecuniary loss thus caused to individual British manufacturers and shipowners was at least comparable with the inconvenience inflicted on the Soviet Government. This irrational outcome of regular judicial proceedings, taken in proper form before the highest tribunal of an independent sovereign state, was endured for over two months. At last, when the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs (Litvinov) visited London to attend the World Economic Conference, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs (Sir John Simon) deigned to approach him verbally with a view to a settlement. The blessed word was immediately found in “simultaneity”. It was agreed that the withdrawal of the two embargoes, and the release of the two prisoners, should take place at the same moment of time. Thus honour was saved, and an unfortunate international incident was, after substantial economic loss to both sides, at length closed.¹

Murder of Kirov

Unfortunately the prosecution of the British and Russian engineers in 1933 did not stand alone. The very next year witnessed the assassination at Leningrad, by a dismissed employee (Nikolaev), of one of the principal members of the Soviet Government (Kirov, an old revolutionary, a member of the Politbureau, and secretary of the Leningrad Committee of the Party). This vindictive murder was immediately made the occasion of drastic reprisals. In Moscow and Leningrad, Kiev and Minsk, some two hundred Russians, including intellectuals suspected of counter-revolutionary activities, with which the murder of Kirov

¹ These proceedings were, for weeks, the talk of every legation and every Foreign Office, and received an immense press publicity all over the world. The Soviet Government immediately issued in English as well as in Russian a verbatim report of the eight days' trial, exceeding a thousand pages, in three volumes (*The Case of [eighteen defendants] charged with wrecking Activities in the Soviet Union, etc.* Moscow State Law Publishing House, 1933). The British Government published despatches, etc., as Cmd. 4286 and 4290 of 1933.

The principal defendant published a book entitled *Moscow, 1911-1933*, by Allan Monkhouse (1933, 348 pp.). Other books are *The Moscow Trial*, by A. J. Cummings, 1933, 387 pp., and *The Problem of the Moscow Trial*, by G. W. Keeton, 1933, 143 pp. See also *World Revolution and the USSR*, by Michael T. Florinsky, 1933, pp. 248-250, 253-254; and “The Trial of the Engineers at Moscow”, by W. R. Riddell, in *American Bar Association Journal* for December 1933.

was alleged to be connected, were promptly and privately tried by "Military Commissions" of the Supreme Court of the USSR. These summary trials were held in secret, exactly as they would have been by the Ogpu, without the defendants being allowed either legal assistance or opportunity of collecting witnesses in their defence. The trials ended in more than a hundred of the prisoners being sentenced to death; and, as the usual privilege of making an appeal for clemency had been expressly abrogated in advance, the condemned men were, it was announced, instantly shot. The proceedings were taken, by order of the Soviet Government itself, by the newly formed Commissariat of Internal Affairs (Narkomvnutdel), in which, as we shall presently relate,¹ the Ogpu had been merged. The same authority seems to have been responsible for the secrecy maintained as to the evidence; for the reason, it is alleged, that it implicated one or other foreign government, with whom it was not desired to break off friendly relations. For half a dozen other persons, being old Bolsheviks, who were arrested for supposed complicity in what was alleged to have been a widespread conspiracy of the adherents of the Trotsky faction, including Zinoviev and Kamenev, with Salutzki, Yevdokimov, Safarov and Vardin, a different fate was reserved. At first it was admitted that the evidence against them was insufficient, and they were not brought to trial, but remained in charge of the Commissariat of Internal Affairs, for administrative exile to distant parts of the USSR. Presently, however, it was announced that further incriminating evidence had been found in the papers and confessions of the other defendants; and these prominent members of the Communist Party were brought to trial. They were all found guilty, but in view of their services immediately after the Revolution, and their personal acquaintance with Lenin, they were sentenced only to long terms of imprisonment.

We are unable to interpret the proceedings of the Soviet Government in this case. The proceedings against the British engineers and their Russian colleagues in 1933 seem to have been initiated by the Ogpu without prior consultation either of the Sovnarkom or of the Politbureau. They may be plausibly ascribed to the Ogpu being "out of step" with the Soviet Government, and possibly to a self-willed attempt of an organ threatened

¹ Pp. 591-592.

with new forms of control, to assert its independence. But the proceedings so precipitately instituted in December 1934, after the murder of Kirov, were initiated by the Soviet Government itself. The indictments against the several batches of defendants appear to have contained, under the common designation of counter-revolutionary activities, various different charges. A considerable proportion of the defendants, who had been arrested before the murder of Kirov, and had been under examination for several months, seem to have been guilty of entering the USSR illegally, and in possession of arms intended for no lawful use. Others, ordinarily resident in the USSR, were accused of conspiracy, in which the Latvian consul at Leningrad was said to have been implicated, to commit terrorist assassinations, of which that of Kirov was to be only the first. The inclusion in the list of such impenitent opponents of Stalin's policy as Zinoviev and Kamenev, and the combination of persons guilty of illegal entry with those charged with conspiracy to murder Kirov, were open to misconstruction.¹

It is one of the penalties of the secrecy to which the Soviet Government is addicted in such matters, that the world at large inevitably puts a bad construction on everything. The arrest and summary execution, after a single murder, of a whole multitude of persons of diverse antecedents and conditions, spread over a wide area, and explained on different grounds, could not but excite adverse comment.² Even if it was justified by

¹ The indictment of the defendants arrested at Leningrad, where the murder of Kirov is alleged to have been concerted, will be found in full in *International Press Correspondence* for January 5, 1935. The same paper contains the statement that "the November issue" of *Za Rossiyu*, "the White Guard newspaper of Belgrade [which styles itself The Organ of the Central Administration of the Russian Nationalist Organisation] . . . deliberately called for the 'removal' of Kirov in Leningrad", as well as of Kaganovich in Moscow, observing of Stalin that he was too well guarded; a specific incitement to murder which is said to have been repeated in other journals of the *émigrés*. Louis Fischer, whose able articles in *The Nation* (New York) of May 8 and 15, 1935, afford the best analysis we have seen, declared that he had himself read this specific incitement to the assassination.

² One manifestation of the popular condemnation of these proceedings (as reported in the press) was a deputation of protest to the Soviet Ambassador in London by the General Council of the Trades Union Congress and the Executive Committee of the Labour Party. (It is not easy to imagine what the British Ambassador at Moscow would have said to a deputation from the All-Union Council of Trade Unions, coming to protest against the trial and sentence by a British Court of Justice, of Englishmen convicted of high treason and conspiracy to murder!) The Soviet Ambassador (Ivan Maisky), whilst expressing his surprise at the unusual step, received the deputation with scrupulous politeness,

evidences of criminal conspiracy of which the public had no opportunity of judging, it had the appearance both of revenge and of a determination to take the opportunity of removing from the scene all the surviving opponents of the government's present policy. It was widely interpreted as a deliberate manifestation of terrorism. We are concerned with it here only in its effect upon the intelligentsia as a class. To them it seemed making an excuse for a revival of the persecution which Stalin had sought to bring to an end by his pronouncement of June 1931. This, however, proved not to be the case. In July 1934, Vyshinsky, as Deputy State Prosecutor, even issued an order to local prosecutors to cease making engineers and directors scapegoats for administrative failures. He strongly deprecated indiscriminate prosecutions. He stated that he had lately had to quash a large number of sentences wrongly pronounced by Siberian courts. He definitely forbade any further arrests of this kind.

The Liquidation of the Kulaks

The persecution of the intelligentsia between 1928 and 1934 was contemporaneous with an entirely separate and no less ruthless decision of policy in the "liquidation of the kulaks as a

and even supplied an explanation of the judgments of the Supreme Court. He said that the condemned men "had been found guilty of preparing and carrying out terrorist acts. The majority of them came from abroad and on them were found bombs, grenades, revolvers and other weapons. In Court they openly declared themselves enemies of the Soviet Union, and also admitted the crimes which they were charged with. In ordinary circumstances", Mr. Maisky went on, "the persons arrested previous to the murder of Kirov would probably be tried at different times, and be subjected to appropriate punishments. The assassination of Kirov, however, has called forth the necessity of strengthening the means of combating terrorism, and in connection with these circumstances the Soviet authorities found it imperative to expedite the investigation of all pending terrorist cases, as well as the trials in Court." After a reference to the assassinations of the King of Yugo-Slavia and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the action taken by the League of Nations, Mr. Maisky pointed out that "it is universally known that the White Guard terrorists enjoy generous hospitality in certain European countries, where they openly incite the committing of terroristic acts against the representatives of the Soviet Government, and are engaged in preparing such acts. Notwithstanding the fact that in the countries adjacent to the USSR the strictest régime of passport and police control exists, the White Guard terrorists cross unhindered from those countries into the USSR, with the object of fulfilling their terrorist designs. Such a situation ought to have aroused the indignation of all honest people" (Reports in *The Times*, *Manchester Guardian* and other British newspapers of January 3, 1935).

class". We have already described¹ how the Communist Party wrestled with the problem of the shortage of foodstuffs, and we shall refer to it again in the chapter entitled "Planned Production for Community Consumption".² Here we need only recall how, unlike the procedure of a dictatorship, the intellectual wrestling with the problem lasted for a couple of years; how it took the form of a long-drawn struggle in endless meetings and debates, rival pamphleteering and newspaper controversy; how it produced the most acute cleavage in the ranks of the Communist Party that had occurred in all its decade of governmental experience; and how, at last, after interminable parleyings in committee among the warring factions, a decision was arrived at, against which a minority intrigued and rebelled in such a way and to such an extent as to lead at last to the expulsion and exile of some of the most prominent personalities among the "Old Revolutionaries". The new policy thus adopted amounted to nothing less than a second agrarian revolution, even greater in magnitude than that of 1917-1918. The innumerable scattered strips and tiny holdings throughout the USSR were to be summarily amalgamated into several hundred thousand large farms, on which agriculture could be effectively mechanised. Only in this way, it was finally concluded, could the aggregate production of foodstuffs be sufficiently increased, within the ensuing decade, to meet the requirements of the growing population; to rescue from inevitable poverty the mass of the peasants unable to produce even enough for their own families; and to build up a grain reserve adequate to provide against the periodical failure of crops, whilst meeting the needs of defence against the ever-possible foreign invasion.

This momentous Party decision—perhaps the most important since that of 1918 in favour of accepting the terms of peace dictated by the German Army—committed the Soviet Government, in addition to all its other work, to a task of colossal magnitude and difficulty. Here we are concerned only with the fact that it incidentally involved the "liquidation" of the last remaining sector of individual capitalists. Among the twenty-five million peasant families there were, as we have elsewhere

¹ Chapter III. in Part I., Section III, "The Collective Farm".

² Chapter VIII. in Part II., "Planned Production for Community Consumption".

described, three recognised grades, the poor (bedniaki), the middle (seredniaki) and the relatively well-to-do (kulaki). Of these it was assumed that the first could easily be persuaded to unite in the kolkhosi that would offer them prospects of larger shares than their tiny holdings had ever yielded. The second grade could, it was supposed, for the most part, be won over by demonstration of the success of the kolkhosi. But it was foreseen that an uncertain proportion of these middle peasants, including both the more energetic and ambitious, and the more obstinate and prejudiced, would prove entirely recalcitrant. Finally, the relatively well-to-do peasant, who had managed to enlarge his holding by renting land, often joining with his farming a little trading and a persistent money-lending; and who had developed his cultivation with the aid of the agricultural cooperative societies, by himself acquiring a greater knowledge and through the employment of low-paid wage labour—in short, the much-hated kulak—would have to be “liquidated as a class”. It can be inferred that it was actually expected that to carry to completion this new agrarian revolution would involve the summary ejection, from their relatively successful holdings, of something like a million families.¹ Strong must have been the faith and resolute the will of the men who, in the interest of what seemed to them the public good, could take so momentous a decision.

It must be recognised that this liquidation of the individual capitalist in agriculture had necessarily to be faced if the required increase of output was to be obtained. To allow of a mechanisation of all the agricultural processes, it was indispensable, not only that the scattered strips and tiny holdings should be merged, but also that no separate holdings should be allowed to obstruct the wide area of each collective farm. It was, it is true, not necessary in Russia, as it had been in the analogous statutory enclosure of

¹ The numerical strength of the kulaks was considerable. Stepniak, in 1895, observed that “Every village commune has always three or four regular kulaks, as also some half dozen smaller fry of the same kidney. . . . They want neither skill nor industry; only promptitude to turn to their own profit the needs, the sorrows, the sufferings and the misfortunes of others” (*The Russian Peasantry*, by Stepniak, 1895; English edition, 1905, p. 54).

This proportion, in some seventy thousand villages, corresponds approximately with Stalin's estimate in November 1928 that “It has been proved that the kulaks amount to about 5 per cent” (*Leninism*, by Josef Stalin, 1933, vol. ii. p. 164). It was this whole class, possibly numbering a million households, that the Soviet Government in 1928 was instructed to “liquidate” within five years.

commons in the England of 1760-1820, to deal always with whole parishes or manors. But at least each collective farm needed a clear run of hundreds of acres, an area which might be irrespective of village or district boundaries, but which inevitably involved the forcible removal of any holder who refused (or was not allowed to) merge his little farm in the new kolkhos. It was, we may say, not on this point that the serious cleavage of opinion in the Communist Party had arisen. None of the factions wished to show any mercy to the universally hated kulak.

It is hard for the Englishman of the present day to appreciate the abhorrence and hatred felt by the Russian for the kulak. To-day, in his "liquidation", he may seem only the exceptionally thrifty and energetic peasant, who had raised himself by his virtues out of the destitution of the thriftless and incapable mass. But all students of Russian rural life have, for the past half-century or more, stigmatised the kulak as a terrible oppressor of his poorer neighbours. Stepniak, in 1895, gave an appalling description of the effects upon his neighbours of the kulak's inveterate usury, and his virtual enslavement of the landless peasant. "The distinctive characteristic of this class", Stepniak declared, "is the hard, unflinching cruelty of a thoroughly uneducated man who has made his way from poverty to wealth, and has come to consider money-making, by whatever means, as the only pursuit to which a rational being should devote himself."¹ "The kulak", wrote an able German observer in 1904,² "is a very interesting figure in rural Russia. . . . There is no doubt that the methods used by this usurer and oppressor in the peasant's blouse have not been of the cleanest. . . . The conspicuous position he now occupies came about during the last twenty or thirty years. . . . The 'village eater' . . . is the natural product of a vicious system. . . . Utilising the unpropitious condition of their fellow members of the commune [they] made one after another their debtors, next their hired labourers, and appropriated for their own individual use the land shares of these economical weaklings." Dr. Dillon, whose testimony is of unimpeachable authority, declared in 1918 that "this type of man was commonly termed a kulak, or fist, to symbolise his utter

¹ *The Russian Peasantry*, by Stepniak, 1895 (English edition, 1905, p. 35).

² *Russia, her Strength and her Weakness*, by Wolf von Schierband, 1904, p. 120.

callousness to pity or ruth. *And of all the human monsters I have ever met in my travels, I cannot recall any so malignant and odious as the Russian kulak.* In the revolutionary horrors of 1905 and 1917 he was the ruling spirit—a fiend incarnate.”¹ Many illustrative examples of relentless economic oppression by kulaks may be gathered from Russian sources.² Yet the kulaks as a class may be said to have done no more than would have been considered “sound business” by the individualist economists of Victorian England; namely, habitually to take advantage of the economic weakness of those with whom they made their bargains; always to buy in the cheapest and sell in the dearest market; paying the lowest wage at which they could hire the services of those who begged for employment; and extracting the utmost usury from those who voluntarily accepted their loans.

But whether the successful peasant was a good or a bad member of rural society, the Communist Party was determined that the USSR should not follow the example of France in permanently establishing a class of peasant proprietors. The experience of the preceding seven years, during which only one or two per cent of the peasants in the whole USSR had voluntarily joined the various kolkhosi, in spite of these having been expressly favoured in grants of credit and remissions of taxation, showed that a much more determined effort was required. Within the first year after Stalin’s enunciation of the new policy, the second agrarian revolution was already in full swing, with summary expulsion from house and home of those objectors whose holdings stood in the way; coupled with confiscation of their property, and forcible removal of themselves and families to new localities. At the same time, taxation was differentiated in such a way as severely to penalise the individual peasant holding, even when it did not stand in the way of a kolkhos, merely in order to convince its owner that his position would soon become unendurable.

At first the new agrarian revolution went ahead at a rate surpassing all expectation. The First Five-Year Plan had provided for the amalgamation, each year, of 20 per cent of the peasant holdings. But within a year no less than 55 per cent of them had merged their holdings in collective farms. There were nothing

¹ *The Eclipse of Russia*, by E. J. Dillon, 1918, p. 67.

² See for instance the convincing story of a woman peasant in the pamphlet *Collective Farm Trud*, by Eudoxia Pazukhina (Moscow, 1930).

like enough tractors and other agricultural machines ready for such a rapid development, and great discontent arose. The Central Executive Committee (TSIK) reported that something must be done to allay the unrest; and the Central Committee of the Communist Party instructed Stalin to deliver the speech which was circulated all over the USSR under the title "Dizzy with Success". In this he sharply rebuked the local committees and officials for their excess of zeal. He insisted that joining a collective farm was to be an entirely voluntary decision of each individual peasant; and that, far from depriving such voluntary recruits of the advantage of the property that they brought in, the kolkhos authorities ought to allow a reasonable equivalent for this addition to the common stock. He declared that any member who wished to withdraw must be allowed to do so upon reasonable terms. The result was that the aggregate membership of the kolkhosi at once fell off by nearly one-half. Collectivisation thereafter proceeded with less precipitancy and more discretion. But it continued without a break until, by the end of 1933, about 65 per cent of the peasant holdings had become merged in over two hundred thousand collective farms, which yielded more than three-quarters of the aggregate harvest of the whole USSR for the year. In those provinces in which the formation of kolkhosi had been specially pushed forward, comprising nearly the whole of the area on which more wheat is normally produced than is required for local consumption, it could be reported, at the end of 1933, that the liquidation of the kulak had been substantially completed.

It is, we think, to be regretted that no statistics are accessible, and not even a descriptive report has been published, as to the manner in which this enforced *diaspora* of probably some hundreds of thousands of persons was effected. We can form no estimate of the number of cases in which practically the whole property of these families was confiscated, or was simply taken over by the kolkhosi, which, as kulaks, they were not allowed to join, or membership in which they stubbornly refused. We can form no idea as to how many of them could accurately be described as kulaks, or persons guilty of economic oppression of their less successful neighbours; and how many were merely obstinate individualists who, whether or not their separate cultivation of their little holdings had been successful, resolutely declined to merge these in the collective farms. We do not know

to what extent or by what means their cases were investigated, before they were forcibly ejected from their homes. We have been unable to learn how many of these peasants were removed to prison, or (as is specifically alleged) deported to the lumber camps in the northern forest areas, or employed on public works of railway or canal construction, or taken on as labourers at such gigantic industrial enterprises perpetually hungry for men as Magnitogorsk or Chelyabinsk, or sent to the Donets Basin to work in the coal mines, which have been equally suffering from shortage of labour force. Nor is there any account known to us of the conditions under which these hundreds of thousands of men, women and children have had to live in this process of arbitrary removal and resettlement, nor any estimate of the mortality involved in their displacement. So far as we are aware the Soviet Government has not deigned to reply to the numerous denunciations of the cruelty on a gigantic scale alleged to have been perpetrated by its agents; nor published any explanatory account of its proceedings in this summary "liquidation" of so large a proportion of its citizens. In fact, almost the only thing publicly known is that travellers throughout the southern parts of the USSR have, during the past few years, repeatedly witnessed in the railway stations groups of weary and disconsolate men, women and children, with no more belongings than they could carry, being shepherded by armed guards into trains carrying them to unknown destinations. The sum of human suffering involved is beyond all computation.¹

The procedure on which the kulaks were got rid of was

¹ A competent observer writes in 1933: "Two successful hardworking peasants who were certainly not kulaks, and both of whom I knew, had been taken from their houses at two o'clock in the morning and deported to an unknown compulsory labour district without any charge being made against them. Their land had been confiscated and their families had been left destitute. . . . The majority of his village was collectivised, but the collective-farm organisation had refused to include him. He had been a more prosperous peasant and had employed agricultural labour, therefore he was disfranchised and not allowed to take part in the collective farm. 'So you see, I am a deportee like you are' (this was the day after the Moscow Trial concluded), 'but', he continued, 'there is a difference—you go home to order and plenty: for us our only way out is closing the window and opening the stove; in that way one goes out without the pains of death by starvation'" (*Moscow, 1911-1933*, by Allan Monkhouse, 1933, pp. 219-220).

The same observer describes the kulaks at Chelyabinsk in January 1932: "I paid a visit to the special station where agents were taking on workers for Magnitostroi. . . . *The majority of these unfortunate work-seekers were kulaks*

peculiar. Decrees of the USSR Sovnarkom declared that the kulaks as a class were to be liquidated. Up and down the country the batraks and bedniaks, the landless and the poor peasants, with such of the seredniaks (the middle peasants) as chose to attend, held village meetings, and voted that such and such peasants of their village were kulaks, and were to be dispossessed. We have already quoted the testimony of the American journalist long resident in the USSR as to the seriousness and sense of responsibility with which the meetings that she attended came to their decisions, and as to the belated attempts made by higher authorities to moderate the harsh judgments that were come to.¹ As to how the decisions were put in operation we have no record and no direct testimony. But we venture to transcribe a passage from a recently published work of fiction by a writer who was an eye-witness of much that he describes. We do not give this as evidence. But, even if not to be relied on for details, the novel certainly expresses the spirit with which the expropriation was carried out :

" Timothy, stately and handsome like his mother, rose from his place. He wiped his red lips beneath the downy youthful moustache on a cloth, screwed up his insolent, bulging eyes, and, with the ease and assurance of the best concertina-player in the village and the favourite of the girls, said with a wave of his hand : ' Come in, take a seat, respected authorities '.

" ' We have no time to sit down ' , said Andrei, drawing a sheet of paper out of the bundle he held. ' Citizen Frol Damaskov, the meeting of poor peasantry has decided to eject you from your house and confiscate all your property and stock. So finish your dinner and vacate the house. We'll draw up a list of the property at once.'

" ' Why so ? '

" Frol put down his spoon and rose.

who had been deprived of their land and their property, and had been expelled from their villages. In many cases their families accompanied them. Their plight reminded me of the Polish refugees in Moscow in 1915. The older ones were obviously too terrified to talk, and would say very little of their feelings and their experiences. Two children came to ask for assistance . . . and I heard a pitiful tale of destroyed village life, broken homes and the search for employment, which had become the lot of these peasants" (*Moscow, 1911-1933*, by Allan Monkhouse, 1933, p. 190).

¹ *Dictatorship and Democracy*, by A. L. Strong, 1934, p. 267.

“ ‘ We are destroying you as a class ’, Demka Ushakov explained to him.

“ Frol went out of the room, his leather-soled felt boots creaking, and came back with a paper.

“ ‘ Here’s my certificate. You signed it yourself, Razmetnov.’

“ ‘ What certificate ? ’

“ ‘ To show that I gave up all the grain consignment.’

“ ‘ This has nothing to do with grain.’

“ ‘ What do you want to send me out of my house for and confiscate my goods ? ’

“ ‘ The poor peasants have passed a decision, I told you.’

“ ‘ There’s no such law ! ’ screamed out Timothy. ‘ It’s robbery ! I shall go straight to the District Executive Committee, papa. Where’s the saddle ? ’

“ ‘ If you want to go to the Executive Committee, you can walk there ! I won’t give you a horse ’, said Andrei, sitting on the edge of the table and taking out pencil and paper.

“ Frol’s torn nostril went blue and his head began to shake. Suddenly he collapsed where he stood, moving with difficulty his swollen, blackened tongue.

“ ‘ Sons of bitches, sons of bitches, robbers, cut-throats ! ’

“ ‘ Papa, get up for Christ’s sake ’, wept the girl, tugging at her father’s arm-pits.

“ Frol recovered, rose, lay down on the bench and simply listened while Demka Ushakov and tall, shy Mikhail Ignatenok dictated to Razmetnov :

“ ‘ One iron bedstead with white knobs, one eiderdown, three pillows.’

“ ‘ Two wooden beds.’

“ ‘ A cupboard full of crockery. Am I to tell you all the crockery ? To hell with it.’

“ ‘ Twelve chairs, one long seat with a back to it.’

“ ‘ A triple concertina.’

“ ‘ I’m not going to give away my concertina ! ’

“ Timothy tore it away from Demka. ‘ Leave it alone, squint-eye, or I’ll break your nose for you.’

“ ‘ I’ll punch you so your mother won’t be able to wash it off. . . .’

“ ‘ Comrade Zakharenko, District Representative of the GPU, I herewith hand over to you the kulak, Borodin, Tit

Konstantinovich, as a counter-revolutionary and treacherous element. While making an inventory of his property, he officially made an attack on Comrade Davidov, one of the 25,000 mobilised workers, and managed to hit him on the head twice with an iron bar.

“ ‘ In addition to this I certify that I saw in Borodin’s possession a rifle, Russian type, which, owing to circumstances not under my control, I was unable to obtain, being on a hillock and fearing bloodshed, and which he managed to throw away without us seeing. When found, it will be handed to you as material evidence.

“ ‘ M. Nagulnov, Secretary of the Gremyachy Nucleus of the All-Russian Communist Party (B), Holder of the Order of the Red Banner.’

“ They placed Tit in the shed. He asked for a drink and called Nagulnov to him. The latter only shouted from the porch :

“ ‘ What do you want ? ’

“ ‘ Makar ! Remember ! ’ cried Tit, waving his bound hands like a drunkard. ‘ Remember ! Our paths will cross again ! You have trampled me under, but afterwards it will be I who will do the trampling. I shall kill you ! This is the grave of our friendship.’

“ ‘ Off with you, counter-revolutionary swine ! ’ shouted Nagulnov.”¹

How many kulaks were summarily expropriated in this way, stripped of all their possessions, and turned out of the villages, we cannot say. But this was not the only cause of their “ liquidation ”. In 1931 and 1932, concurrently with the widespread partial failure of the harvest that we have described, many peasants, both members of the new kolkhosi and non-members, obstinately refused to cultivate their holdings ; limited their sowing to a small proportion of their land which they thought would yield a crop large enough for their own maintenance ; wholly neglected the weeding, and when the grain ripened limited their reaping to the minimum that they required, and left the rest of the harvest to rot on the ground. The result was that, when the drought interfered with their estimates of yield, many peasants

¹ *The Soil Upturned*, by M. Sholokhov (Moscow, 1934), chap. vii. pp. 71-73, 80-81 ; also published in London, 1935.

in the Ukraine and in the North Caucasus found that they had nothing to live on during the winter and spring. The Soviet Government, after remitting taxes, and in some cases bringing grain to the starving, decided that it was impolitic to feed these recalcitrants in the holdings which they had refused to cultivate. They were deported, either as individual families or, in some cases in the North Caucasus, as whole villages, to places in which they could be saved from starvation by being employed, as on "relief works", at bare subsistence wages. Tens of thousands of the men were put to work on the construction of the White Sea canal. Others were sent to swell the labour force building the new cities of Chelyabinsk and Magnitogorsk. How many hundreds of thousands of families were thus, between 1930 and 1934, forcibly torn from their holdings, losing all that they possessed, we are unable even to estimate.

We have no wish to minimise, still less to seek to justify, this ruthless expropriation and removal of the occupiers and cultivators who were stigmatised as kulaks, any more than we do the equally ruthless expulsion, little over a century ago, of the crofters from so much of the Scottish Highlands, or the economic ruin of so many small-holders that accompanied the statutory enclosure of the English commons. The policy of compulsorily substituting sheep-runs and large farms for tiny holdings may have been economically sound in the one case as in the other. The Soviet Government may well have been right in concluding that only by a widespread amalgamation of the independent peasant holdings could any general mechanisation of agriculture be made practicable; and that only by such mechanisation could the aggregate production of foodstuffs be made equal to the nation's requirements. In fact, the partial failure of crops in 1931 and 1932 (though, as we have already explained,¹ far removed from anything to be properly called a famine) brought many thousands of small peasants within reach of actual starvation; and it may well have seemed that, in these cases at any rate, nothing but removal could save them from death at the next failure of crops, or even before the next harvest. It is, indeed, not so much the policy of removal that is open to criticism, as the manner in which it appears to have been carried out, and the unsatisfactory conditions of life into which the victims seem to

¹ Chapter III., Section III., in Part I., "The Collective Farm".

have been, without judicial trial or any effective investigation, arbitrarily deported.¹

The Activities of the Tcheka and the Ogpu

Notwithstanding the immense and long-continued sufferings which were the incidents of War Communism, the civil wars, the famine of 1921, and the liquidation first of the Nepmen and then of the kulaks, it is, we suggest, impossible to avoid the conclusion that, during the whole period from 1917 to 1935, the Soviet Government has received the support, not only of the couple of millions of members of the Communist Party, but also of the bulk of the workmen of the towns and the mining districts; of those employed in the transport services; of the hundreds of thousands enrolled in the Red Army, and, although with many exceptions, even of the hosts of peasants throughout the greater part of the vast area of the USSR.² We have already described the ubiquitous political education and propaganda by which the Communist Party has won and maintained its unquestioned leadership.³ Here we have to notice the effective use made, during the whole

¹ We have been told of a group of deported kulaks having been, under very comfortable conditions, employed as labourers on the Turksib railway construction works. On the completion of their particular task, the engineer in charge is reported to have suggested that the whole group should be assigned an adequate amount of vacant land, and set up as a kolkhos by themselves, where they could utilise their agricultural skill in doing all the work of cultivation, without employing any wage labour. We do not know whether such a suggestion has anywhere been acted upon. Something of the sort may have been effected by a "colonisation and settlement plan", under a special All-Union Settlement Commission, promulgated in August 1933. It had been experimentally put in operation in 1932, in connection with the deportation of whole villages of Cossacks from the North Caucasus. The new colonies are in suitable agricultural districts in the southern part of Siberia (see *The Times*, August 31, 1933).

² The Bolshevik majority was not only most conspicuous, but also has been most continuously effective, in and about Leningrad and Moscow. But even in 1917, the Bolsheviks commanded a majority of votes throughout Russia proper. A competent observer reports that "there is no doubt that, in Central Russia, the majority of the population welcomed the Revolution. I was amazed to discover, from a study of the statistics of the elections for the Constituent Assembly, taken on an orthodox democratic basis, that the Bolsheviks had polled a clear 55 per cent of all the votes cast in Northern and Central Russia, including Moscow, Petrograd and the North-Western and West-Central areas. They were outvoted in the richer outlying parts of Russia, the Ukraine, the South, the Caucasus and Siberia, where the Social Revolutionaries predominated. These regions they have slowly conquered, thanks mainly to the folly and brutality of the 'White' Generals" (*The Russian Workers' Republic*, by H. N. Brailsford, 1921, p. 110).

³ Chapter V. in Part I., "The Vocation of Leadership".

period of the liquidation of the landlord and the capitalist, and of so many of their intellectual supporters, of widespread repression, and drastic punishment of every "counter-revolutionary" activity. The main instrument of this "terrorism" has been an extensive organisation of the nature of a secret police, known successively as the Tcheka and the Ogpu, and in 1934, as we have mentioned, merged in the new Commissariat of Internal Affairs (*Narkomvnutdel*).

Terrorism by a secret police force is, of course, in Russia, no new thing. Like so much else, it may be traced to Peter the Great, if not to Ivan the Terrible. But its effective organisation may be said to date from the formation of the corps of *gendarmérie*, soon after the revolt of the Dekabrists in 1825, subject to the notorious "Third Section" of the court "chancery", under Nicholas the First. Notwithstanding various so-called reforms, the organisation continued substantially unchanged in scope and method, under the name of the Okhrana, down to the revolution of February 1917, when for a few months it disappeared in the loosening of all governmental authority. Kerensky, however, soon found the need for some such national force of political police, and was taking steps to resuscitate the Okhrana, when the October revolution swept him and his projects away. Lenin and his Sovnarkom were promptly driven to the conclusion that, without a similar organisation, the new government could not cope successfully with the counter-revolutionaries rising up all around, often in communication with the invading armies.¹ In

¹ "Lenin issued a decree on December 11, 1917, declaring the Kadets 'a party of enemies of the people'. The directing members of the party became liable under this decree to trial by the revolutionary tribunals. Lenin then wrote a memorandum, on December 19 or 20, to F. E. Djerjinsky, containing the draft of a general decree for combating counter-revolution and sabotage. He suggested that the Commissariat of the Interior should, with the aid of house committees, assume supervision of all the bourgeoisie, the landowners and the wealthier classes. In the category of persons belonging to the wealthier classes was included everyone with an income of five hundred roubles a month, or more, or who possessed town property, securities, or money to the amount of more than a thousand roubles. Such persons, and also all employees in banks, investment firms and other institutions, were required to submit to the house committees information concerning their incomes and occupations" (*Lenin, Red Director*, by G. Vernadsky (1931), p. 190). See also *Economic Policy of Soviet Russia*, by Paul Haensel, p. 27; *La Révolution Russe*, de Fernand Grenard (Paris, 1933); *Souvenirs d'un Commissaire du Peuple, 1917-1918*, translated from the German edition, by J. Steinberg (Paris, 1930), especially chap. iii. pp. 86-97; and *Mon Ambassade en Russie Soviétique, 1917-1919*, par J. Noulens (Paris, 1933), vols. i. and ii.

June 1918 the Sovnarkom willingly accepted the recommendation of Felix Djerjinsky, one of their most trusted colleagues, that the spasmodic and irregular activities of the inchoate force of secret police, which had begun almost immediately after the seizure of power, should be definitely organised under an "Extraordinary Commission to deal with Counter Revolution, Speculation and Sabotage"—a title immediately shortened to Tcheka. By a decree of November 7, 1918, Djerjinsky was made president of this board of fifteen tried and trusted Bolsheviks, upon which much the same exceptional powers were conferred as those formerly wielded by the Okhrana. The new body, although not re-engaging any of the personnel of the old Okhrana, adopted the same methods of spying and delation, oral examinations and secret trial. It was, at first, even less controlled than its predecessor, which had been directly subject to the Tsar's Ministry of the Interior, whereas the Tcheka was responsible only to the Sovnarkom as a whole, which had not the assistance of an organised department. Moreover, the Tcheka took upon itself, from the first, the power to punish even by death those counter-revolutionaries whom it discovered *in flagrante delicto*; whereas the Okhrana had professedly no power itself to inflict any punishment whatever—a fact which, if we may believe even a hundredth part of the allegations made against it, did not prevent it from detaining persons indefinitely in prison, subjecting them to flogging and other physical violence, and summarily deporting them to Siberia.

It is unfortunately impossible for anyone to tell the story of the years, 1918–1922, during which the Tcheka wielded uncontrolled its tremendous powers, under which no man's life was safe. Like everything else in that grim time, the Tcheka was drastic, uncontrolled and ruthless. Its arbitrary arrests and summary executions; the horrors of its nerve-racking investigations and secret tribunals; the widespread anxiety and gloom caused by its network of spies and their almost continuous delations—all this has been described sensationally in dozens of books in several of the languages of western Europe. There is, we fear, no reason to doubt the reality of the "Red Terror" any more than that of the "White Terror", with which, wherever the White Armies held sway, the Red Terror alternated. But with regard to any particular incident, the evidential value of the greater part of the mass of lurid literature on the subject is of the slightest. Very

naturally these volumes betray intense bias. They are full of "hearsay evidence", and of unsupported allegations and unsigned letters, wholly unverifiable. No archives have been published, and no such publication is ever likely. Accordingly, the world will never be able to explore, and still less to judge with any accuracy, even a fraction of the cruelties that marked the first few years after the October revolution, any more than it can properly estimate those inflicted by the White Armies in 1918-1920, or those of the tsarist repression from 1907 to 1912.¹

In 1922, when all the successive wars had come to an end, and civil order was substantially restored, the Tcheka itself was, in an attempt to dispel the anxiety and fear of the public, ostensibly abolished. But it had, with all its brutalities, proved too useful an instrument for any government willingly to dispense with its protection. It is one of the worst features of a desperately fought civil war that it hardly ever ends in any genuine peace

¹ The same warning to the reader is given in Mr. W. H. Chamberlin's latest volume, *Russia's Iron Age*, 1935. "Many of the books which profess to expose the G.P.U. are so grossly exaggerated and uninformed that they are worse than worthless from the factual standpoint" (p. 160).

Those liking sensational literature may find useful the following sample list: *Siberia and the Exile System*, by George Kennan, with extensive bibliography and appendices (2 vols., 1891); *The Ochrana: the Russian Secret Police*, by A. T. Vassilyev, the last chief of the police under the Tsar (1930, 320 pp.); *The Terror in Russia: an Appeal to the British Nation*, by Prince P. A. Kropotkin (1909, iv and 74 pp.); *Tcheka, the story of the Bolshevik Extraordinary Commission*, by J. Alinin (1919); *Tscheke: der Staat im Staat*, by G. Popoff (1925, 306 pp.), translated as *The Tcheka, the Red Inquisition* (1925, 308 pp.); *En prison sous la terreur russe*, par L. Nadeau (1920, 247 pp.); *Tcheka, matériaux et documents*, par V. M. Chernov et E. Pierremont (1922, 305 pp.); *The Red Terror in Russia*, by Sergey Petrovich Melgounov (1925), with lengthy bibliography, translated as *La Terreur Rouge en Russie, 1918-24* (1927); *Moscou sans voiles: neuf ans de travail au pays des Soviets*, par J. Douillet (1928, 249 pp.), translated as *Moscow Unmasked: A Record of Nine Years' Work and Observation in Soviet Russia* (1930, 223 pp.); *An Expert in the Service of the Soviet*, by M. I. Larsons (1929); *In the Clutches of the Tcheka*, by B. Cederholm (1929, 349 pp.); *In the Toils of the Ogpu*, by Dr. Karl Kindermann (1933, 288 pp.); *The Methods of the Ogpu*, by Vladimir Brunovsky (1931, 235 pp.); *Das Sowjetparadies*, von W. W. Antonois (1931, 175 pp.); *Ogpu: in der Hölle der Tscheke* (1932, 222 pp.); *Die Verschwörung gegen die Welt*, von Essad Bey (1932, 259 pp.), translated as *Secrets of the Ogpu* (1933); *Die Tscheke bei der Arbeit*, von Gregor A. Agabekow (1932, 207 pp.); *Souvenirs d'un Commissaire du Peuple, 1917-1918*, par J. Steinberg (1930, 250 pp.); *Escape from the Soviets*, by Tatiana Chernavin (1933); "Life in Concentration Camps in USSR", by Vladimir Chernavin, in *Slavonic Review* (January 1934, pp. 387-408), amplified in *I speak for the Silent*, by the same, 1935; "Government by Terror", by W. H. Chamberlin, in *Atlantic Monthly* for October 1934, and "The Evolution of Soviet Terrorism", by the same, in *Foreign Affairs*, October 1934, resumed in *Russia's Iron Age*, by the same, 1935, and in his *Russian Revolution, 1917-1921*, New York, 1935.

within at least one generation. Governments can terminate hostilities against other governments, and make peace with each other, because, of the citizens themselves, neither victor nor vanquished has to go on living in close intermingling in daily life. When, as in the USSR, millions of men and women had spent years in more or less overt hostility, ranging from the ordinary quarrels of town life to actual guerilla warfare, arising out of embittered class hatred which the issue of the fighting did nothing to dispel, it was inevitable that monarchist and communist, bourgeois and proletarian, Menshevik and Bolshevik—in short, revolutionary and counter-revolutionary—should continue not only estranged but also mutually resentful. The conquerors, in particular, were without belief in the loyalty of the conquered to the social order that had emerged from the ruin. There existed, moreover, a swarm of common criminals who, under cover of one flag or another, practised theft and embezzlement, rape and murder. It must be remembered that there was at that time, in the vast area of the USSR, no organised force of “preventive police”, such as most western nations had, during the nineteenth century, equipped themselves with. Even the cities possessed no local constabulary equal to maintaining order or preventing burglary and street robbery, let alone suppressing any treasonable conspiracy. Thus, it was not altogether without reason that, in 1922, coincidentally with the institution of the New Economic Policy and with the establishment of the USSR itself, a new organisation was created having much the same functions as the Tcheka, under the new name of the “Union State Political Administration”, a title immediately abbreviated to Ogpu, or GPU (Gay Pay Oo). The Ogpu had the same head (Djerjinsky) as the Tcheka; and much the same personnel. The change amounted, in fact, to no more than the continuation under a new name, on slightly improved lines, of an organisation which, however hated and feared, had proved its effectiveness.¹

¹ For the GPU, amid a wild and luxuriant crop of denigrating references without authority, there are few sources of trustworthy information to which the student can be referred. Zelitch (*Soviet Administration of Criminal Law*, 1931, pp. 34, 40, 129, 135 and 193) gives precisely its origin and summarises its legal powers. We have found the most illuminating description of its activities in the volume, *Working for the Soviets*, by W. A. Rukeyser (1932). This Canadian expert, working in soviet industry, saw a great deal of the GPU organisation and its criminal prosecutions. Equally trustworthy testimony, not dissimilar in effect, is given in *Moscow, 1911-1933*, by Allan Monkhouse

The Organisation of the Ogpu

The Ogpu is to-day, under a second new name, an organisation of great magnitude, extending to every corner of the USSR. "Its nature", we are informed, "is twofold: first, a division of secret agents circulating unknown even to one another: second an open, uniformed personnel of officers and men, who have distinctive uniforms, special barracks, the best quarters in Russia, whose annunciatory signs, with the letters OGPU above, cause an involuntary shudder even in the passing foreigner."¹ The whole department was, down to 1934, directed by the board of fifteen commissioners, who shared the administration among themselves, either individually or in collegia, subject to the decisions on matters of principle taken by the plenum. Great authority was given to the president, who was habitually in communication with the Sovnarkom. Djerjinsky is stated to have personally controlled everything down to his death in 1926, even after he had added to his work the presidency of the special commission for dealing with the homeless waifs, and that of the Supreme Economic Council. He was succeeded as president of the Ogpu by another Polish nobleman, Menzhinsky, whose grasp of the office is reported to have weakened with advancing years, and on whose death in 1934 a thorough reorganisation was effected, and Yagoda, Djerjinsky's closest collaborator, became president of the Narkomvnutdel.

On the executive side the work is done by half a dozen distinct departments, namely: (1) the operative or general (OO), which supervises the whole, and directs the movements of the staff, including the brigades of special troops; (2) the foreign (INO), which watches the machinations of the *émigrés* and others abroad; (3) the economic (EKU), dealing with industrial offences, especially sabotage, bribery, counterfeiting and smuggling; (4) the transport, inspecting passports, and maintaining order on railways and steamboats; (5) the Red Army, keeping a vigilant eye on symptoms of disaffection or attempts at seduction in the armed

(1933), pp. 274-275. *Soviet Russia* (by W. H. Chamberlin, 1930, chap. xviii. pp. 387-403, "Liberty in the Soviet State") gives a carefully phrased and seemingly trustworthy account of the institution. On leaving the USSR permanently the same author has written more adversely to the Ogpu; see his subsequent publications cited in the footnote on p. 575.

¹ *Working for the Soviets*, by the Canadian asbestos expert, W. A. Rukeyser, 1932, p. 44.

forces ; and (6) the secret service (SO), for detecting counter-revolutionary tendencies in the USSR itself. There are public offices of the GPU (now of the Commissariat of Internal Affairs) in all cities and other considerable urban centres in the USSR, often at the railway station, to which any traveller is recommended to apply in difficulty ; where information, advice and assistance are courteously supplied on any subject whatever.¹ These offices keep a constant watch upon their several localities ; ready at a moment's notice to intervene in the suppression of riot or disorder, or in case of need to support the local constabulary (called militia). In any local calamity, such as a railway accident or shipwreck, flood or fire, they supply whatever protection or assistance is required. Within reach there is everywhere a detachment of the organised military force of the OGPU, parallel with but, down to 1934, not included in the Red Army ; at hand at every place of entry into the USSR to give force to the Customs administration and, in fact, stationed largely on the frontiers ; but ready to start at a moment's notice to cope with any armed revolt or serious riot.

The less public side of the GPU organisation is still maintained in all its ubiquity, including its very extensive secret service of spies and investigators, who are, in the main, unknown even to each other, and who ostensibly pursue, by way of camouflage, all sorts of occupations enabling them to keep other people under constant observation. How far this secret service of the GPU differs either in magnitude or in the minuteness of its espionage from that maintained by most other governments, about which

¹ "The American working in Russia will probably find the GPU to be at all times to him a friend in need. When transportation is difficult (which means practically always) the GPU will give him space reserved especially for that organisation. Should trouble arise concerning his passports the GPU will always be found willing to help. Should he feel himself persecuted or hindered by his trust officials, Communists or non-Communists, the all-dreaded GPU can be relied upon to alleviate the difficulty. The GPU forms a sort of liaison organisation between foreign technicians and Russian co-workers . . . among the Russian people of to-day only the members of the GPU have nothing to fear from contact with foreigners" (*Working for the Soviets*, by W. A. Rukeysers, 1932, p. 44).

In the USSR, alone among civilised countries, the word "police", now common to nearly all languages, is never used. We are told that this results from the universal fear, hatred and contempt inspired by the tsarist police. What would be in England the local constabulary force is, in the USSR, termed the militia. The word police is never applied either to the uniformed force or to the secret service agents of the OGPU.

little is said, we have no means of estimating. The GPU perhaps differed from analogous organisations elsewhere chiefly in its combination, in one and the same body, at any rate down to its reorganisation in 1934, of detective functions with those of trial and sentence. The extensive staff came to include a strong and professionally qualified legal department which provided its own procurators, investigators and courts of judges which, as it was claimed, and not effectively denied, dealt with offenders, though always *in camera*, and without the assistance of advocacy, with just as much regard—however this may be estimated—for law, evidence and extenuating circumstances as the ordinary soviet tribunals.¹

The primary function of the GPU is to “maintain the revolution” by suppressing all “counter-revolutionary activities”, including not only what we should call treason and sedition, but also espionage and any sort of conspiracy with the enemies of the soviets; any form of banditry; any riot or serious public disorder; and the destruction or misappropriation of any form of public property by sabotage or otherwise. An invidious feature is the looseness of the definition, which enables anything to be thought “counter-revolutionary” that is of the nature of resistance to the policy of the government for the time being. At different dates mere passive membership of the defeated factions of the Constitutional Democrats (Kadets), the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries has been accounted a serious crime. At all times it has been extremely dangerous for anyone to be even supposed to be in correspondence, however innocently, with

¹ All proceedings of the GPU in its reorganised form are still secret—a practice abhorrent to modern standards of judicial proceedings—imperfectly justified by the analogous sessions *in camera* of other courts, or by the plea that it is as much against public policy to publish the details of counter-revolutionary activities as it is those of spies in war-time, and at any time those of smugglers of prohibited drugs or of dealers in pornography, all of whom are, even in Great Britain, France and the United States, frequently tried without the presence of the press and the public. It is, we believe, incorrect to assert that the GPU condemns and executes without trial. Latterly, at least, whenever the accusation is such as to warrant a sentence, there has always been a formal trial, and a quite serious weighing of evidence, though not necessarily with any actual confrontation of the defendant by the witnesses, and never with the assistance of advocacy. There are (at least usually—we cannot speak of cases of urgency) opportunities for appeal to higher authorities of the province, or even to Moscow; but such appeal is only to higher collegia of the GPU itself; never to the USSR Supreme Court, although there may be eventually a petition for clemency to the highest soviet authorities.

Russian *émigrés* in other countries, many of whom never cease intriguing for the "independence" of the Ukraine or of Georgia, and who still claim to maintain staffs in France and organisations of thousands of officers and men in Manchuria and the Balkans, ready, on any signal, to invade the USSR. Latterly the greatest danger has seemed to be the ubiquitous kulak, and his machinations against the collective farms. "The anti-soviet elements of the village", reported Kaganovich to the Communist Party in January 1933, "are offering fierce opposition. Economically ruined, but not yet having lost their influence entirely, the kulaks, former white officers, former priests, their sons, former ruling landlords and sugar-mill owners, former Cossacks and other anti-soviet elements of the bourgeois-nationalist, and also the Social-Revolutionary and Petlura-supporting intelligentsia settled in the village, are trying in every way to corrupt the collective farms, are trying to foil the measures of the Party and the Government in the realm of farming."¹

It is, indeed, plain that any action whatsoever of which the Soviet Government thought fit to disapprove could be brought within the jurisdiction of the OGPU, and can now be brought

¹ Report of Kaganovich on Resolution of the Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the Communist Party, in *Moscow Daily News* (weekly edition), January 20, 1933. To the same audience Stalin observed that "our comrades of the locals have not been able to readjust the front of the struggle against the kulaks and have failed to realise that the physiognomy of the class enemy in the villages has changed, and that our tactics must change accordingly in order to be successful. . . . They seek the class enemy outside the collective farms; they expect to find him with the face of a brute, with big teeth, a thick neck, and gun in his hand. They seek the kulak such as we know him from our posters. But such kulaks have long since disappeared. Present-day kulaks and their agents, present-day anti-soviet elements in the countryside, are to a large extent 'quiet, sweet', almost 'saintly' people. One does not have to look far from the collective farm for kulaks; they are right inside the collective farm, and hold positions there as warehouse managers, business managers, bookkeepers, secretaries, and so on. . . . [The kulak] will never say 'down with the collective farms'. They are 'for' collective farms. But they carry on sabotage and wrecking in the collective farms, which will not do them any good. They will never say 'down with the grain collections!' They are 'for' grain collections. They 'merely' resort to demagoguery, demanding that the collective farms should form reserves for live-stock, three times as much as is necessary, that the collective farm should organise insurance reserves, three times as big as is necessary, that the collective farm should distribute for public feeding from six to ten pounds of grain per day for each worker, and so on. It is obvious that after such 'reserves' and distribution for public feeding, after such roguish demagoguery, the economic strength of the collective farm would be undermined, there would be nothing left for grain collections" (*Moscow Daily News*, January 18, 1933).

under that of Narkomvnutdel, merely by ascription of "counter-revolutionary" motives or intentions. Unfortunately, as little is authentically known of the procedure and severity of the thirteen years of the Ogpu as of the three years of its predecessor, the Tcheka, or the half-century of their common ancestor, the Okhrana. There can, however, be little doubt of the terror that was caused by all three institutions among innocent and guilty alike. It is, we think, an objectionable feature that this very terror has been and apparently still is a deliberately chosen means of deterrence. An exceptionally qualified witness¹ has recently put on record his opinion that "the Ogpu themselves circulate fantastic tales of the tortures and punishments which it is alleged are employed in their prisons and places of detention. When the new headquarters of the Leningrad Ogpu were recently completed, a terrible rumour was circulated throughout the city regarding an elaborate mincing-machine in which it was alleged that the GPU destroyed their victims before washing their remains out into the Neva. Although I am convinced that there does not exist the slightest pretext for this rumour, it was nevertheless firmly believed by thousands of Leningrad's inhabitants. In Moscow one frequently hears fantastic tales of physical tortures to which the Ogpu are reputed to subject their victims. Many of these alleged tortures completely eclipse the horrors of the Spanish Inquisition, but it is my own conviction that such methods are not used by the Ogpu. . . . The Ogpu have a definite purpose in circulating such wild stories of their methods, and there is little doubt that, when they detain their own nationals for questioning and examination, the mere existence of these rumours is in itself sufficient to so terrify their victims as to make them comply readily with the examiner's demands, without the Ogpu officers themselves resorting to anything other than a little exaggerated politeness and firmness."

It is, we believe, very largely the manner in which the GPU carries on its work, even more than the ruthlessness of its sentences, or any actual injustice in its operations, that creates such an impression on the public. There is something ghastly in its inveterate secretiveness, even down to the detail of making nearly all its arrests in the dead of night. The public hears nothing until a brief notice in the newspapers informs it that a death

¹ *Moscow, 1911-1933*, by Allan Monkhouse, 1933, pp. 274-275.

sentence has been carried out. Thus, in a case in which a mill had been burnt down, and three important engineers were accused of undefined "counter-revolutionary activities", three judges elaborately tried the case in secret for several days on end. "The sentence was death by shooting. Later the case was appealed . . . the verdict was sustained. Still later, with the condemned men's wives fighting for them like Trojans, the case went to Moscow. The sentence was again upheld. The GPU swallowed them up. A German in Sverdlovsk told me that, as is usual in all such cases, the newspaper had merely a little item : 'December 31 at midnight, the death sentence by shooting was carried out on engineers So-and-so by the Ogpu'.

"There are two peculiarities of these GPU sentences. First, it is said that the convicting prosecutor must execute the sentence himself. Second, the condemned are not lined up against the wall to be shot. They are led from their cells ostensibly for another interview. . . . As the doomed man, all unknowingly, walks between his guards, he is shot as mercifully as possible : the bullet usually goes into the back of his neck at the base of the brain.¹ A third peculiarity about these sentences is significant. Notices in the newspapers notwithstanding, oftentimes the sentence has never been executed at all ! (I do not refer to open commutation or pardon.) Officially dead, the prisoner still lives to continue his work for the soviets, abiding night or day in the GPU dungeon, and working the rest of his time. Good experienced engineers are now too scarce in Russia for many still to be shot promiscuously. They must be kept working for the Plan."²

¹ This detail, confirmed by other testimony, appears to have been derived from the practice of the Okhrana. "The execution was regularly carried out by shooting in the Tcheka building : a revolver shot was fired into the back of the neck" (*The Ochrana*, by A. T. Vassilyev, 1930, p. 293).

If the death penalty is to be retained for any offences, there is much to be said, if not for permitting the criminal at any time voluntarily to enter a lethal chamber, at least for causing death suddenly, instantaneously and unexpectedly.

² See the volume, *Working for the Soviets*, by W. A. Rukeyser, 1932, p. 182. We ourselves happened in 1932 upon a confirmatory incident. In an important city we found, occupying the best room in the best hotel which we thought had been reserved for us, a Russian specialist who had been sentenced to a long term of imprisonment for counter-revolutionary activities. He had served only a small part of his term when the president of the trust for which he had worked, feeling severely the loss of this expert service, obtained the favour of his release, and his re-assignment to the factory, with permission to live with his wife at the hotel.

An American observer records several instances of similar treatment : "A grafting contractor, whom I met in prison in 1924, was in 1931 in an important

Similar testimony is borne by one who has had exceptional opportunities for studying the operation of the GPU—Mr. Allan Monkhouse—who goes so far as to state, “I very much doubt whether many of their reputed victims are ever shot”.¹

It is, of course, only the worst cases in which the death penalty is even pronounced. The great majority of the persons arrested by the GPU are now either promptly transferred as criminals for

executive post. He had been sent to Central Asia to take part in a big development of flax cultivation, and had made good. The famous engineer-professor Ramzin, sentenced in the famous Prom Party trial, was not kept in gaol, but sent back to his lecture-room every day, at first under guard, and then unattended. He lost his house, his automobile and his prestige, but not his job. If he continues to do that well his prestige will return” (*In Place of Profit*, by Harry F. Ward, 1933, pp. 91-92). As already mentioned, none of the persons found guilty in this trial were actually executed. One of them, a medical practitioner who was condemned to death, was acting as prison doctor, living with his wife in a comfortable flat at the Saporosche prison colony when this was visited in 1933 (*Soviet Russia Fights Crime*, by Lenka von Koerber, 1934, pp. 23-24).

“Recently eleven thousand roubles were awarded for good work to one of the engineers who, about eighteen months before, had been convicted and sentenced for sabotage. He had been sent back to work under surveillance, and made good” (*ibid.* p. 46). “Four men in a civil aviation factory were arrested for wrecking. They were given ten-year sentences. A year later they were all amnestied, given 10,000-rouble bonuses for good work done, and sent back to work without a stigma” (*Red Virtue*, by Ella Winter, 1933, p. 76).

Other cases have been publicly referred to: “In the Menzhinsky Factory No. 39 [Moscow], which has received several high rewards from the Soviet Government for outstanding achievements, former wreckers, who had been convicted in court in their day, have taken an active part in the struggle of the workers for a high tempo and a high quality of production. . . . Some of the ‘heroes’ of the Shakhty wreckers’ trial are now successfully participating in the development of the eastern coal and metal base, and displaying great creative initiative” (*New Methods of Work, New Methods of Leadership*, by J. Grabe, Cooperative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the USSR, Moscow, 1933, p. 57).

Aspecially remarkable instance was given on the opening of the first blooming-mill constructed in the Izhorsky Plant. “The presence of two members of the convicted group of engineers who are responsible for the design and construction lent a touch of the dramatic to the ceremony. It climaxed two distinct features of soviet life, the high achievements of the machine-building industry, and the changing viewpoint of the engineers formerly hostile to the soviet régime. . . . Its history goes back to May 1930, when representatives of the OGPU entrusted its design and construction to several specialists held in confinement for their participation in the Ramzin-engineered counter-revolutionary activities of the Industrial Party. . . . In the early conferences held between representatives of the OGPU and the engineers it was ascertained that the latter were anxious to prove their loyalty to the Soviet Union by carrying out any task assigned to them which fell within the scope of their qualifications. They felt that they could cope with the designing of a blooming-mill even though they had little to guide themselves by, either in materials or in experience in this specific field” (*Moscow Daily News*, February 4, 1933).

¹ *Moscow, 1911-1933*, by Allan Monkhouse, 1933, p. 274.

trial by the regular courts, or, if their action is regarded as only mildly counter-revolutionary, they are discharged, after brief detention, with a warning. Others may be directed to reside somewhere outside the six principal cities. More dangerous political offenders may be simply exiled to uncomfortable localities beyond the Urals or near the Arctic Circle. Long terms of actual imprisonment appear to be uncommon; and when the victim gives evidence of repentance and willingness to abandon his past errors he is often released and given opportunities of service to the state.

More invidious was the practice, which seems to have been extensively resorted to after 1927, of relegating "counter-revolutionaries", and of forcibly deporting kulaks and other recalcitrant peasants, as we have elsewhere described, to concentration camps or special industrial depôts, where they could be set to hard labour in return for a bare subsistence. It is with regard to the conditions in these exceptional places of confinement, as distinguished from the regular prisons, that the gravest accusations have been made against the Ogpu. The worst of these places was from 1923 (and perhaps still is) the vast aggregation of prisoners, alleged to number many tens of thousands, upon the shores and islands of the North Sea, between Kem and the ancient monastery of Solovetsk. Here the miseries of a rigorous climate were aggravated by a cruel administration by brutal jailers, in which every kind of torment seems to have been employed. The terrible reports that reached the western world at last led to an official enquiry early in 1930, of which no report was ever published. How serious had been the maladministration, under which innumerable prisoners had died, may be judged from the fact that the outcome of the enquiry was the summary shooting of many of the overseers and warders, whilst many more were dismissed or removed elsewhere. By order of the Ogpu itself, in May 1930, the whole administration was reorganised, and largely reformed. The entire establishment became an enterprise of economic exploitation, the prisoners being set to work in a whole series of lumber camps, fishing brigades and industrial factories. The conditions, we fear, continued to be inhuman; but, if only in order to make the labour productive, the diet has been improved, and there is authority for saying that the prisoners were, after 1930, no longer beaten, tortured or

killed. How many others of these special places of detention have been maintained by the Ogpu, with what number of inmates and under what conditions, is a carefully guarded secret; and no one can hazard even a plausible guess at the present position.¹

More fortunate may be the fate of the highly skilled engineers, of whom so many suffered in the various proceedings of the Ogpu. Many, if not most, of these were, as we have shown, neither shot nor kept in prison, but were directed to continue in the exercise of their profession, either under guard or under surveillance. It is even reported, we know not with what accuracy, that the Narkomvnutdel, in succession to the Ogpu, maintains an extensive engineering office of its own, where a whole bevy of skilled professionals, under sentence for various counter-revolutionary acts, are employed in working out plans for public works or special machinery for which premature publicity is to be avoided, especially for the service of the Red Army.

It is to be noted that, with all the public fear of the GPU, there is now, we think, little or no sign of general disapproval among the four-fifths of the people who are manual workers in industry or agriculture, either of its continued existence or of its vigorous activities. It is the intellectuals, especially those who held positions under the tsarist régime, who mainly suffer from distrust leading to trumped-up accusations. If, as may well be the case, injustice and unmerited hardship still occur, it arises

¹ An elaborate description of the ancient monastery and place of pilgrimage of Solovetsk, as it was in 1863, may be found in *Free Russia*, by W. Hepworth Dixon, 1865. A terrible account of the same place as a penal settlement in 1931-1932 is given by an escaped prisoner, in the article "Life in Concentration Camps in the USSR", by Vladimir Chernavin, in *Slavonic Review* for January 1934, pp. 387-408; repeated in his book, *I speak for the Silent* (1935). It is to be regretted that this testimony—very naturally strongly biased—mixes up personal observation and experience of conditions that are, in all conscience, bad enough, with hearsay gossip unsupported by evidence, and with manifestly exaggerated statistical guesses incapable of verification. The account would have carried greater weight if it had been confined to the very serious conditions of which the author had personal knowledge. His naïve belief that this and other penal settlements are now maintained and continuously supplied with thousands of deported manual workers and technicians, deliberately for the purpose of making, out of this forced labour, a net pecuniary profit to add to the state revenue, will be incredible by anyone acquainted with the economic results of the chain-gang, or of prison labour, in any country in the world.

Another description of the horrors of Solovetsk (on which, unfortunately, no reliance can be placed) will be found in chap. xx. pp. 200-216 of *Secrets of the Ogpu*, by Essad Bey, 1933.

from the suspicion in which these survivors of the Imperial service continue to be held. The average workman, in the cities at any rate, thoroughly believes that it is to the vigilance of the GPU that is due the continued existence of the Soviet State, which would otherwise have been overthrown by the innumerable enemies, within and without, against whom, as he believes, the struggle has been so great, and is still incompletely successful. And this view, as we have found, is taken also by foreign residents of candour and experience. "In all fairness", writes the one who has put into a book the most personal knowledge of the GPU, "I must add that, wherever the GPU strikes, it is usually with reason. Perhaps the accusation is trumped up or exaggerated; perhaps the particular incident leading to the arrest is but a pretext. Yet behind these possibly flimsy excuses, the GPU is practically dead certain that the accused was engaged in activities against the state. When they do strike they strike sure and hard. Their case is practically watertight. If the charge is a minor one, and the man repents, he is released. However, many of the condemned men have admitted, fully and unrepentantly, their counter-revolutionary activities and flagrant sabotage. Without the GPU there would be no Communist Party in Russia to-day, no Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. Spies are shot in time of war, and Russia is admittedly at war. In Russia the greatest crime is justly that against the state."¹

The Constructive Work of the OGPU

During the past few years increasing attention has been paid to what may be called the constructive work of the OGPU. Its preventive service has greatly improved. On the railways, as in the streets of the great cities of the USSR, there is now at least as much security against robbery with violence as in other countries. What is even more to be praised is the reform in prison administration that was started by Djerjinsky, and has been maintained by his successors.

The ordinary prisons of the USSR are maintained not by the GPU but by the sovnarkoms of the several constituent republics. The buildings are, in most cases, those inherited from the tsarist

¹ See the interesting account in *Working for the Soviets*, by W. A. Rukeyser, 1932, p. 182.

régime, and often still inadequately improved in sanitation and amenity. But the administration is well spoken of, and is now apparently as free from physical cruelty as any prisons in any country are ever likely to be.¹ But in addition to these government prisons, the GPU itself maintains at Bolshevo, in the Moscow oblast, a remarkable reformatory settlement, which seems to go further, alike in promise and achievement, towards an ideal treatment of offenders against society than anything else in the world. This is an extensive establishment, accommodating nearly a thousand inmates. It is situated on the pleasant country estate of an expropriated millionaire industrialist, where it combines manufacturing production with agriculture. It has no walls or locked gates interfering with the inmates' freedom to leave. These, who are specially selected as likely to be reformable out of the mass of persons who have been at least twice convicted by the ordinary tribunals of the several constituent

¹ The present writers have had no opportunity of investigating the prison system of any of the constituent republics of the USSR; and they have found no adequate sources of information as to present prison conditions. But it may be recorded that a French *avocat*, P. Guiboud-Ribaud (who was known to be friendly to the USSR), wished, in 1927, to inspect the prisons. He saw the People's Commissar of Justice of the RSFSR (Kurzky), who at once acceded to his request, and obtained for him, by telephone to the Commissariat of the Interior, the complete list of some hundreds of prisons. M. Guiboud-Ribaud was able to choose whichever he pleased, and was given written orders admitting him without notice to any of them, either alone or with an interpreter of his own selection. He thereupon visited many prisons, and found there, mixing with the other convicts, numerous political prisoners (some whose death sentences had been commuted to long terms of imprisonment). He was able to have long conversations with them alone, as they were free to circulate about the corridors, and many of them spoke one or other of the languages at his command. He found the prisons, and the treatment of the prisoners, humane and rational, and far superior, in his estimation, to those of France. His long and interesting account ends with the conclusion, "le régime pénitentiaire en Russie soviétique est humain et acceptable" (*Où va la Russie?* par P. Guiboud-Ribaud, Paris, 1928, chap. vii., "La régie pénitentiaire et les prisons", pp. 115-134).

Even more informative, and equally laudatory, is the book, *Soviet Russia Fights Crime*, by Lenka von Koerber (1934, 240 pp.), who, in 1932, wandered during many months over innumerable prisons (other than those for political offenders) all over the USSR, freely conversing with the prisoners without let or hindrance. See also *Russian Justice*, by M. S. Callcott, New York, 1935.

Official reports published by the Prisons Department of the Commissariat of the Interior of the RSFSR in 1932 record steady progress in the industrial training of convicted prisoners, and their employment in productive work, particularly in timber-working, metal, leather, quarrying, textiles and food industries, at which they earn wages according to the trade union standard rates, with the hours of labour usual in those industries. The overhead charges prevent any claim to make economic profit, but the moral effect of regular and especially of purposeful occupation is reported to be remarkably good.

republics of petty larceny, or burglary or robbery with violence, are simply set to work at piece-work wages, to be spent freely at the various departments of the prison shop ; allowed to smoke and to talk, to enjoy music and the theatre, and to spend their leisure, within reasonable limits, as they choose. They are, in fact, shown that a life of regulated industry and recreation, with the utmost practicable freedom, is more pleasant than a life of crime and beggary. After a certain period they may invite their wives to reside with them, and each family is set up on its own homestead. Many refuse to leave on the expiration of their sentences, some find wives there ; and the colony steadily grows as a self-supporting mixed population, now nearing 3000, of convicts and freemen.¹ Nor does Bolshevo stand alone. There are in the USSR ten other reformatory colonies on the same plan.

The GPU appears to be made use of whenever the Soviet Government has a difficult task to accomplish which transcends the sphere of any of the constituent republics. When, in 1925, the task was undertaken of capturing and reforming the hundreds of thousands of "homeless waifs"—the sad product of the civil war and the famine—it was to the head of the Ogpu—the idealist fanatic Djerjinsky—that the difficult job was entrusted. He was appointed president of a special commission to "liquidate" this formidable problem ; and he mainly employed for this purpose the only ubiquitous civil staff that the USSR possessed, namely, the officials of the Ogpu itself. It was under this commission that Djerjinsky and the Ogpu established and maintained the institutions (now converted into reformatories for youthful offenders or orphan asylums) in which these hundreds of thousands of boys and girls were, in the course of the ensuing seven years, with a considerable degree of success, "reconditioned", and

¹ This prisoners' colony of Bolshevo, some twenty miles from Moscow, has been visited by many persons, including one of the present writers, with others better qualified to appraise reformatory prisons. See for instance the description by D. N. Pritt, K.C., in *Forward*, January 7, 1933 ; that in *Red Medicine*, by Sir Arthur Newsholme, K.C.B., and John T. Kingsbury, 1933 ; that in *Soviet Russia Fights Crime*, by Lenka von Koerber, 1934, pp. 98-120 ; and that in *The Russian Judicial System*, by Harold J. Laski, 1935.

The theory on which it was established is now frequently described in the soviet newspapers : "Crime—thrift, robbery, murder—is the result of social and economic conditions. That was the principle which prompted the organization of the Labour Commune. Remove the people from corrupting influences ; give them the type of work which will make an appeal to them ; offer them a means of subsistence—and they will not desire to lead a life of vagrancy on the streets" (*Moscow Daily News*, August 2, 1933).

placed out in the industrial world, where a remarkably large proportion have already made good as self-supporting and law-abiding citizens.

In another direction, the Ogpu during the past few years has been engaged in many constructional works, partly as a means of employing the engineers, technicians and manual workers whom its tribunals have condemned for counter-revolutionary activities, and whose sentences have been commuted into terms of enforced labour. The total number so employed is quite unknown. In many cases special housing facilities have been arranged, for people working in this manner under guard, actually in the works in which they were employed. It has been stated that Professor Ramzin, the central figure in the Industrial Party Trial in 1931, who has spent practically the whole period of his sentence employed in useful consulting-engineering work, was during the greater part of the first year housed under guard at the Electrosila works in Leningrad, in the house that in pre-war days was occupied by Krassin, then one of the directors of these works. The Ogpu receives payment from industrial trusts for the services of technical men working in this manner, and pays a portion of the sums thus earned to the men serving under sentences.

The latest example of the constructive work of the Ogpu will strike the British or American student of public institutions as even more remarkable than its prison reforms or child-rescue work. When, in 1929, it was decided by the Soviet Government to construct an artificial waterway from Leningrad to the White Sea, this huge operation was entrusted, not to a contractor, and not even to one of the state departments or trusts dealing with "heavy industry", or performing other feats of civil engineering, but to the Ogpu. To the Ogpu itself was given the task of engaging, organising and directing the whole staff required, which seems to have amounted, at times, to over two hundred thousand. A large proportion of the manual labour was performed by men who had been sentenced to imprisonment by the ordinary courts for such offences as robbery, embezzlement, assault and homicide. To these there appear to have been added a considerable number of persons, some of them technical specialists, who had been sentenced by the Ogpu's own tribunals for counter-revolutionary activities; and also a number of men deported from their villages

as kulaks or recalcitrants whose holdings stood in the way of the formation of collective farms. This heterogeneous host was organised into companies and brigades under foremen and engineers, some of whom were, in the course of the work, promoted from the ranks. This industrial army was housed and fed and medically attended to, and moved from place to place, just as if it had been a military force. Yet it did not behave as a military force. These convicts serving their sentences rose to the height of the occasion. Realising that they were engaged on a work of great public utility, they were induced to enter into "socialist competition", gang against gang, locality against locality, as to which could shift the greatest amount of earth, erect the greatest length of concrete wall, or lay the longest line of rails, within a given number of hours or days. It is, we think, not surprising that Maxim Gorky should describe this almost incredible experiment in glowing terms. In the *Moscow Daily News* of August 14, 1933, he writes: "Out of the ranks of law-breakers of 15 years there was salvaged, in the colonies and communes of the Ogpu, thousands of highly qualified workers and more than 100 agronomists, engineers, physicians and technicians. In the bourgeois countries such a thing is impossible. . . . How does the process of reconstructing the now socially dangerous, but potentially socially useful, people on the Baltic-White Sea Canal show itself, and what are the measures employed? The nondescript army of law-breakers, vandals and enemies are told: 'It is necessary to connect via canal the Baltic and the White Seas. You must construct a waterway 227 km. long, and you will have to work in the woods, in the swamps, tear down granite cliffs, change the course of turbulent rivers, and lift their waters up by means of sluices to a height of 103 metres. It will be necessary for you to dig up more than 30 million cubic metres of earth. All this work will have to be done in the shortest possible time. You will receive good food, good raiment, good barracks, and you will have club-quarters and cinemas. The Government does not promise you anything beyond that. Your own work will prove your worth. . . .'

"The army of prospective wrestlers with nature, not being of a homogeneous social origin, could not all be of one mood. But it so happens that in the Ogpu's correctional camps they teach not only reading and writing, but also political wisdom.

Man is by nature quick-witted and it is very seldom that stupidity is conditioned by one's physical make-up. More often than not, it is the result of bourgeois class violence. Among the tens of thousands there were many who at once grasped the importance of such a work for the state, and the physically healthy were eager to exert themselves. The wildly flowing rivers and the swamps of Karelia, her fields and woods covered with huge boulders—here was something to struggle against.”¹

In the end, this huge work, which comprised every kind of engineering operation, was accurately measured up and rigorously tested, when it was found that the waterway, carrying sea-going vessels of considerable tonnage, had been completed well within the contract time, at a total cost for labour and materials below the estimate. The Soviet Government, quick to recognise how to make this success of value in the education of the public, celebrated the opening of the White Sea Ship Canal by giving decorations, not merely to the directing superintendent and his principal engineers, but also (the same decorations) to several dozens of the convict labourers who had excelled in zeal and good conduct. In addition money awards were made to a considerable number of the best workers ; and the remainder of the sentences of 12,484 of them were remitted, provision being made for their immediate admission to normal employment, jobs being quickly found in one or other of the numerous industrial establishments needing workmen in the various parts of the USSR. In addition, remissions of part of the remaining term of their sentences were made to 59,516 others. It is pleasant to think that the warmest appreciation was officially expressed of the success of the GPU, not merely in performing a great engineering feat, but in achieving a triumph in human regeneration.²

Amid the flood of unverifiable denigration, and in the absence of authentic information, it is hard to come to any confident conclusion about the Ogpu of 1934, or of the new Commissariat of Internal Affairs (Narkomvnutdel) into which it was in that year converted. We venture to infer, during recent years, a steady improvement in more than one respect. With the growing feeling

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, August 14, 1933.

² The soviet newspapers during August 1933 contained long reports of these public celebrations ; see for summaries in English, *Moscow Daily News* for that month, notably August 6 and 17, 1933. The decree, signed by M. Kalinin as President of the Central Executive Committee, is dated August 4, 1933.

of security the governing authorities of the USSR have been, on the whole, although not without nervous backslidings, relaxing the sternness of repression of those who, without intrigue and without active resistance, nevertheless by opinion and sympathy, still remain hostile to the present régime. Concurrently, those very persons, without conversion to communism, have become increasingly convinced of the stability and, indeed, the permanence of the Soviet Government, whilst becoming reconciled to the better conditions of life and increased opportunities for responsible work that are now afforded to them. There is, accordingly, no longer the same justification for the difference that the Ogpu seems to have made in the treatment of Mensheviks, Social Revolutionaries, anarchists and monarchists on the one hand, and of common thieves and bandits on the other. It appears to have been held, in practice, that mere criminals could safely be dealt with exclusively with a view to their reform, but that political hostility was irremediable, so that enemies of the régime had to be either exterminated or else put away in prison or relegated to distant exile. In the period of prolonged civil war this view certainly led to a great many summary executions, of Whites by Reds as of Reds by Whites. It survived, through the ensuing decade, in the permanent suspicion of disloyalty with which, by the communist activists, and perhaps by the Ogpu itself, the intelligentsia were regarded. With a real increase in loyalty on the one side, we seem to notice a substantial decrease in the miasma of suspicion on the other. It is at least interesting to find it definitely reported by a soviet writer that the Ogpu has lately begun to treat rebels and counter-revolutionaries on the same lines as common criminals, on the theory that, as man has been made by his environment, he ought to be reformed by change of environment, rather than punished. "In the Karelian woods," wrote, in the spring of 1933, a man serving a ten-years sentence as a counter-revolutionary, "in the barracks of the technical workers, I first learned the meaning of real work, and what it means to be an engineer who has behind him the persistent energy of a mass of workers who know what they are working for. At my age I cannot philosophise much, but the idea of rehabilitating wayward people by means of constructive labour is a wonderfully healthy and beautiful one. As for the practical application of the idea, let the two thousand shock-workers who

were released in our district long before the expiration of their terms testify. As might have been expected, all such heroic toilers were set free long before the expiration of their terms. But until then, for a period of some five hundred days, these engineers were moving in the thick of a 'socially dangerous mass', which knew that they were counter-revolutionaries, yet, though counter-revolutionaries, they worked unselfishly. . . . How did the kulaks work? There was, for example, the 'Podlinsky' brigade of District One numbering 32 kulaks. The last 10 days of the month of May the brigade attained the record figure of 256 per cent above the required norm of labour on soft soil. It refused to leave the work even when another brigade appeared to replace it, and it became necessary to remove it by special order from the superintendent." ¹

It is not inconsistent with such a change of practice that the new Commissariat of Internal Affairs, into which the Ogpu was in 1934 transformed, should retain all its old machinery of close inspection of the whole population, or that this should be kept sharpened by perpetual reports and delations. This general supervision of the whole population may even be perfected as a consequence of recent measures. In order to clear the large cities, and Moscow in particular, from the accumulation within them of nondescripts without legitimate occupation or means of livelihood, the old system of internal passports is being revived, involving some form of registration of domicile and of *permis de séjour*. "A universal passport system for the USSR has been adopted by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR . . . every citizen of the USSR from the age of 16 upwards will have to obtain a passport if he permanently resides in town or workers' settlement or is employed on a railroad, state farm or new construction job. . . . To effect this registration and handling of passports the Government sets up an administrative department of the militia [the local police], under the auspices of the Ogpu with G. E. Prokofiev at the head. This department will have general control of the Workers' and Peasants' militia in the constituent republics. It will also train militiamen for these republics and to introduce legislative acts before the Council of People's Commissars pertaining to the militia. The militia remains otherwise an autonomous body in

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, August 14, 1933.

accordance with the statute of May 25, 1931, passed by the Council of People's Commissars, concerning the rights and powers of the militia. . . . *Izvestia* stresses the new regulation as an important act from the point of view of statistics which, it declares, is one of the major requisites of socialist planning. This truth was realised long ago and many statistics are already available on production, output, fixed and circulating capital, money resources and so on. Very little is known, however, about the major factor in production—man himself. On this subject statistics are meagre. We know little about composition, position and movement of population. The government consequently has no means of influencing movement of population. Passport regulations will alter the situation, and this alone renders the new regulation of extraordinary practical and political importance. On the verge of the Second Five-Year Plan the country must know what changes were wrought by the First Five-Year Plan in the masses of the people, and incidentally in the geographical distribution of population.”¹

Thus, we may conclude that the other functions of this extensive government department, in the considerable social services rendered by its uniformed staff, and its positive achievements of a reformatory character, now constitute a larger proportion of its work than its criminal prosecutions or the imposition of death sentences.²

The Procurator of the USSR

What will now be the trend of development cannot easily be foreseen. In 1933 there was created an important new office which may possibly have some significance. Akulov, an old revolutionary and associate of Lenin, who had been a vice-president of the Ogpu commission, a place from which he was removed in 1931, and relegated to an inferior post in the Donets Basin, was appointed, in July 1933, Procurator of the USSR,

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, December 29, 1932.

² This was noted in 1930 by an American observer long resident in the USSR: “Whereas the executions by the Tsheka during the years of desperate civil war ran well into thousands, the annual lists of persons shot by order of the Gay Pay Oo could probably be reckoned in scores, or at most in hundreds” (*Soviet Russia*, by W. H. Chamberlin, 1930, p. 390). For a population exceeding 160 millions such a number of executions does not compare badly with the statistics of various other countries deeming themselves civilised.

a new office with all the wide powers and functions of the Procurators of the constituent republics. An additional duty explicitly imposed upon him is "the supervision . . . of the legality and regularity of the actions of the Ogpu". This may perhaps mean that there is a feeling in the Central Executive Committee (TSIK) that the time has come when there can safely be established a systematic check on the methods and procedure of the Ogpu, possibly with a view to a change in its psychology.¹ In the following year the reform was completed, as we have already described, by the transformation of the Ogpu into the new Commissariat of Internal Affairs (Narkomvnutdel), under a People's Commissar of its own (Yagoda), with a seat in the USSR Sovnarkom.

Three Revolutions in One

Let us, before leaving this darkest chapter dealing with the most destructive trend of Soviet Communism, which shows no sign of weakening—the liquidation of the landlord and the capitalist—attempt some comparison between it and the corresponding revolutionary period that England has, in its own way, traversed.

The Russian revolution of 1917–1935 has combined in one what are essentially three distinct struggles, which in western Europe came separately to a crisis in a period stretching from the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries. There was first the conflict, between rival interpretations of man's relation to the universe, for supremacy over the mind and conduct of men. There was next the violent transformation, standing between the Middle Ages and modern times, of the way in which the mass of the population gained its subsistence. And there was finally the struggle for the control of the government between the narrow oligarchy of a superior class and the mass of common citizens. It was the fate of Russia to have its religious, its industrial and its political revolutions, not separately, but almost simultaneously; and, perhaps consequently, to make each of them more drastically complete than has happened elsewhere. Within the short space of eighteen years, the dominant faith by which men's

¹ *L'Europe nouvelle*, July 29, 1933; also article by Louis Fischer in *The New Republic*, July 1933.

We have been told that Akulov, the USSR Procurator, now has an assistant permanently inside the new Commissariat of Internal Affairs, who makes regular reports on all cases dealt with, so as to enable the Procurator promptly to intervene whenever he considers that injustice has occurred.

lives are governed has undergone, in the USSR, the most fundamental change, to which we devote a subsequent chapter.¹ Two successive agrarian revolutions have coincided with a gigantic mechanisation of every kind of production both agricultural and industrial, working under an entirely novel theory of wealth production.² We have described in the six chapters of Part I. how the entire governmental structure of one-sixth of the total land-surface of the globe has been drastically reversed, replacing the "dictatorship" of the capitalist by that of the proletariat. If we find the fight in the USSR fiercer, the destruction of social tissue more ruthless, the cruelty and suffering greater, than in the Reformation in Elizabethan England, or in the Industrial Revolution in the England of George the Third, or in the constitutional changes in the England between 1640 and 1918, we should remember the intensity given by the concentration, in the USSR, of all three revolutions within one-twentieth part of four centuries, and a simultaneous coalescence of the differences and insurgencies of a population more than twenty times as great as that of England in the middle of those centuries. Surely so large a proportion of the whole world has never before undergone, suddenly and simultaneously, a transformation alike so penetrating and so volcanic !

No one can compute the sum of human suffering caused by this triple revolution over so vast an area, in so brief a time, amid the most embittered civil war, supported by half a dozen foreign armies actually invading soviet territory. But equally no one can compute the sum of human suffering, even unto death, caused in England by the Protestant Reformation, the Industrial Revolution and the triumph of democratic parliamentaryism, the whole drawn out over four centuries, with only the mildest of civil wars, and with next to no foreign invasion. If, eighteen years after the Bolshevik seizure of power, all ministers of religion, together with the impenitent landlords, capitalists and speculators, are disfranchised, and are excluded alike from membership of the soviets, the trade unions and the consumers' cooperative societies, we ought in all fairness to remember that, for nearly three centuries after the Anglican Church had abjured

¹ See Chapter XI., in Part II. "Science the Salvation of Mankind".

² See Chapter VIII., in Part II. "Planned Production for Community Consumption".

the primacy of Rome (in fact, down to 1828), not only every Roman Catholic priest, or member of a religious order, but also every person adhering to the Roman Catholic faith, was denied a vote. For at least as long, members of the Jewish, the Baptist, the Quaker or the Unitarian religion were excluded alike from Parliament, the municipal councils, the ancient trade gilds, the Royal College of Physicians, and the Commission of the Peace. Their sons were denied admission to practically all the then-existing secondary schools, as well as to all the universities in the land. These disqualifications on account of religion, not confined to the priesthood, were in England not entirely got rid of until the twentieth century.¹ Eighteen years' mechanisation of Russian industry and agriculture have ruthlessly upset the "established expectations" of millions of Russian handicraftsmen and peasants, and involved the deportation and confiscation of property of possibly hundreds of thousands of supposed kulaks and other recalcitrants, many of whom must have died under their hardships. In Great Britain the statutory "enclosure of commons"; the eviction of the Scottish crofters in favour of sheep and grouse and deer, and the triumph of the machine industry between 1700 and 1850, were accompanied by the practical ruin and destruction of nearly the whole surviving peasantry, and the reduction of the independent handicraftsmen to the hideous conditions of the unregulated mines and factories. We are apt to forget the terrible record of the virtual enslavement, by the thousand, of little children in the new textile factories; the actual purchase of orphans (with "one idiot among every twenty") by the mill-owners from the parish vestries and Poor Law Guardians; the young boys and girls working naked in the coal mines; the indescribable state of the prisons and the general mixed workhouses; the paupers arbitrarily deported to their places of settlement; the daily slaughter and maiming of the

¹ See the Act 16 & 17 George V. c. 55 (1926). Priests and deacons of the Roman Catholic Church, together with those of the Church of England, are still disqualified for sitting in the House of Commons (though not in the House of Lords). The King and Queen, together with the Lord Chancellor, have still to profess the Protestant religion. Under the Tudor and Stuart statutes the mere profession of Roman Catholicism, or the possession of Romish books, incurred all the penalties of *praemunire*. These laws were virtually abrogated in 1792 and 1829, but they were not wholly repealed until 1871 (*Guide to the Laws of England affecting Roman Catholics*, by T. C. Anstey, 1842, 193 pp.; *Manual of the Law specially affecting Catholics*, by W. S. Lilly and J. E. P. Wallis, 1893, 286 pp.).

workers of all ages, by wholly preventible "accidents" from the machinery that it was too expensive to fence; and the incredible insanitation, generation after generation, of the new industrial centres, all of which, as we can now recognise, formed, in the nineteenth century, a frightful background to the brilliant coronation of the young Queen Victoria.¹ Even the constitutional reform of 1832, which brought political power to the British bourgeoisie, not only left nine-tenths of the adult men (and all the women) without a vote, but even arbitrarily took away the vote that many handicraftsmen of Westminster and a few other constituencies had long exercised under an exceptional popular franchise. In Great Britain, it is true, there has been no Okhrana, Tcheka or OGPU, of which the irresistibly dominant aristocracy and bourgeoisie never felt the need. But even without such a force the eighteenth and even the nineteenth century witnessed a persistent oppression, by High Court Judges as well as by magistrates belonging to the governing class, of trade unionists, strikers, poachers, vagrants, sellers of popular newspapers, "seditionists" and blasphemers—all professedly in accordance with a criminal law so vague and ambiguous that it could always be stretched to cover every activity displeasing to the governing oligarchy. It is only a callous ignorance that prevents our recognising that, even in the twentieth century, this oppression has not wholly disappeared.²

¹ When Engels, in 1845, drew attention to some of these evil conditions in his *Lage der englischen Arbeiterklasse*, his work seems never to have penetrated either to the Poor Law Board or to the Home Office or the House of Commons (it is not in their libraries). It was ignored by the London publishers and did not appear in English until 1887, when it was published as *The Condition of the English Working Class in 1844*.

² Even down to the present day the law relating to criminal conspiracy, sedition and seditious libel, strikes and picketing, blasphemy and vagrancy has not been thoroughly reformed, and is still from time to time the cause of "legal" oppression of the poor for action which among the well-to-do usually goes unpunished. We may yet see it used much more frequently than at present for the oppression of those who are still widely regarded as the "lower orders". Nor should we ignore the very frequent hardship to wage-earning families caused by certain features of the English legal system itself, such as the prohibitive expense and difficulties of an appeal to Quarter Sessions against the judgments of Petty Sessions (the often prejudiced decisions of a couple of landed proprietors); or the whole practice of "imprisonment for debt"; or the quite insufficient provision yet made for ensuring that every person sued for debt, or endangered by proceedings for eviction, or even accused of crime, is able to secure, without question, the services of an advocate, and defray the necessary expenses of defence against what may well prove to be absolute ruin to himself and his family.

The English reader may impatiently declare that we have overstated the indictment that the Russian communist may bring against us. Quite the contrary. On discussing the matter with a member of the Marx-Lenin Institute at Moscow, he indignantly objected that such a comparison as we have made understated the case of the Bolshevik Government, and gravely overstated that of the British Government, by a most important omission. He pointed out that we had taken, on the one side, the whole of the immense territory of the USSR, with its 170 millions of people of the most diverse races, creeds, languages and customs, the vast majority being illiterate and uncivilised. On the other side, he objected, we had taken, not the British Empire, but only the small section of it, perhaps one-tenth of the whole, which belonged to the dominant race and dwelt in the most civilised area. Even leaving out of account the short time that the Soviet Government had been at work, the comparison between the judicial systems of the two countries could only be fairly made between the USSR as a whole and the British Empire as a whole. "You tell us", this outspoken critic declared, "that in the sight of your God all men are equal; that one soul is as precious as another. We prefer to express the same thing in the American statement that all men have equal rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. In the USSR, from one end of the vast territory to the other, we have absolute identity of franchise; equality of rights under the law; universal education without the slightest colour-bar or racial prejudice; complete freedom for all without exception from exploitation by landlord or capitalist, and a genuine and persistent attempt to level up the backward races as quickly as possible to an equality of civilisation with the highest. If you reproach us", he continued, "with defects and shortcomings in our eighteen years of social construction, what about the record of the British Empire during its hundred and fifty years of social organisation since the conquest of Canada and the discoveries of Captain Cook? What justice did the British Government accord to the Irish Catholics under the Penal Laws, and to the Scottish Jacobites at Glencoe and Culloden? What about the slave trade of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries? What has happened to the aborigines of Australia? Up to what level of civilisation has your Government, in a whole century, brought the

descendants of the negro slaves that your ships carried to the West Indies ? What is to-day the status, politically and legally, of the Africans in the Cape Colony and in Kenya ? Was the judicial procedure always perfect in the suppression of the Indian Mutiny ? What happened fifty years afterwards at Amritsar ? Even to-day, how many thousands of Indians are in prison *without having been convicted of any crime whatsoever*, merely because the magistrate suspects that they are 'bad characters', and they are unable to find the two sureties for their future good behaviour, which he summarily orders them to find ? And what about the rights of property of the inhabitants of the lands that you have conquered ? Above all, what about the denial of political rights and economic freedom to the hundreds of millions of British subjects in Africa and India ? Compare the Soviet Government's treatment of the backward races in the wilds of Siberia and on the borders of Afghanistan and Mongolia with your own dealings with similar people. The verdict of history will, we think, be on our side."

Two wrongs do not make a right. Moreover, the mutual reproaches of those who have sinned in common make rather for exasperation than for enlightenment. We had better leave the future historian to come to his own verdict ! Meanwhile comparisons between different nations may more profitably lead to each learning, from the other's aspirations, how to improve and refine his own ; and to each discovering, from the other's shortcomings and mistakes, as if in a mirror, the very defects and blunders that he has made but of which he had been scarcely conscious. We may safely conclude, from the common experience of mankind, that whenever, in any country, there takes place a great redistribution of power among groups or classes, a new destination will be given to existing wealth, especially that in the form of ownership of the means of production. If that new destination is forcibly resisted by the old possessors, there has always been fighting ; and both during and after the fighting, more or less "terrorism" by those who prove to be the stronger, and who regard this as the only means of destroying or maintaining the social revolution that is occurring. This fighting and "terrorism", and the misery to which it leads, are, as it seems to the present writers, strong reasons in favour of proceeding as far as possible by general goodwill.

There is one other consideration with which we shall conclude. Future generations will estimate the worthwhileness of national conquests or internal revolutions, not so much by the temporary misery that they inevitably create, but largely according to the relative social value, in each case, of the new order in comparison with the old. In the USSR the substantial completion of the liquidation of the landlord and capitalist, together with the coincident abandonment by the western powers of their original project of armed intervention to suppress Soviet Communism, have not only made humanity to individuals at last socially safe, but have also witnessed a considerable building up of new social tissue, and the purposeful reorganisation of community life on a deliberate plan for the Remaking of Man, the various trends of which we have now in successive chapters to examine.

CHAPTER VIII

PLANNED PRODUCTION FOR COMMUNITY CONSUMPTION

In this chapter we seek to describe what seems to us the most significant socially of all the trends in Soviet Communism, namely, the deliberate planning of all the nation's production, distribution and exchange, not for swelling the profit of the few but for increasing the consumption of the whole community. And if we may be forgiven an autobiographical note, it is this outstanding discovery in economics, and its application, in unpromising circumstances, to the relations between nearly 170 millions of persons on one-sixth of the earth's land-surface, that induced us, despite the disqualifications of old age, to try to understand what is happening in the USSR. Will this new system of economic relationships, and this new motivation of wealth production, prove permanently successful? For if it does, it will not only show the rest of the world how to abolish technological, and indeed all other mass unemployment, together with the devastating alternation of commercial booms and slumps; but further, by opening the way to the maximum utilisation of human enterprise and scientific discovery in the service of humanity, it will afford the prospect of increase beyond all computation, alike of national wealth and of individual well-being.¹

¹ The First Five-Year Plan led to an ocean of literature in many languages. The publications (mostly in Russian) of Gosplan itself are numerous and extensive, the Plan alone occupying half a dozen volumes. The official summary of the Plan, without comment, was published in English in 1929, under the title of *The Soviet Union Looks Ahead* (New York, 1929, 295 pp.). Gosplan itself published in English, in 1933, a *Summary of the Fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR* (296 pp.). The best exposition in English is perhaps the set of four lengthy papers contributed by Gosplan in 1931 to the World Social Economic Congress at Amsterdam, the responsible authors being V. V. Obolensky-Ossinsky, L. Solomon Ronin, A. Gayster and L. A. Fraval (published in the bulky report entitled *World Social Economic Planning*, 2 vols., 1931, by the International Industrial Relations

How Planning Arose

The theory and practice of planned production for community consumption did not exist ready-made in the minds of Lenin and his followers when they found themselves in office as the Government of Russia. Year by year it was slowly and painfully evolved ; at first by the primitive process of " trial and error " ; presently to be superseded by " the scientific method " of perpetually testing the " order of thought " by comparison with the " order of things " ; that is to say, by observation and experiment, ratiocination and verification, all the results being recorded in detail for comparison and future action. The Bolsheviks had what most governments lack—a fixed purpose of social change, to be persistently pursued and relentlessly fulfilled, at whatever

Institute [I.R.A.], the Hague and New York) ; and partly republished in the volume entitled *Socialist Planned Economy in the USSR*, by V. V. Obolensky-Ossinsky. A clear analysis (in German) is *Die planwirtschaftlichen Versuche in der Sowjetunion*, by F. Pollock (Leipzig, 1929). Another description, by a former chief of Gosplan, is published in German as *Die Planwirtschaftsarbeit in der Sowjetunion*, von M. Krischanowski (1928, 124 pp.). A good popular explanation will be found in *Piatiletka : Russia's Five-Year Plan*, by Michael Farbman (New York, 1931, 220 pp.), first published as a special supplement to *The Economist* (London, November 1930). More elementary is *Modern Russia, the Land of Planning*, by Louis Segal (1933, 169 pp.). *The Soviet Five-Year Plan and its Effect on World Trade*, by H. R. Knickerbocker (London, 1931, 246 pp.), affords a series of vivid impressions. *Le Plan quinquennal*, par A. Jagow (L'Eglantine, Brussels, 1932, 266 pp.), is an entirely adverse but merely theoretical criticism. A more balanced view, based on observation of the facts, is given in *Les Leçons du Plan quinquennal*, par Gustave Maquet (Paris, 1932, 252 pp.) ; and the article by Margaret Miller, " Planning System in Soviet Russia ", in *Slavonic Review* for December 1930. *Der russische Fünfjahres Plan*, by Nils Oleinhoff (Brunswick, 1932, 86 pp.), has a good bibliography of works in the languages of western Europe. Other German studies are *Die russische kommunistische Theorie und ihre Auswirkung in dem Planwirtschaftsversuchen der Sowjetunion*, von Mary Bauermeister (1930, 154 pp.) ; *Der Fünfjahrplan und seine Erfüllung* (1932, 106 pp.), by Boris Brutzkus ; *Russland vor dem zweiten Fünfjahrplan*, von Georg Kaiser (1932, 143 pp.). Almost the only British economic examinations of the Plan known to us are the able volume entitled *Plan or no Plan*, by Barbara Wootton (1933) ; the article by Paul Winterton in *The Economic Journal*, September 1933 ; the chapter " An Economist looks at Planning ", in *Gold, Unemployment and Capitalism*, by Professor T. E. Gregory (1933) ; and three paragraphs in *The Great Depression*, by Lionel Robbins (1934). A useful account will be found in Hugh Dalton's chapter in *Twelve Studies in Soviet Russia*, edited by Margaret Cole (1933). To the above must be added two substantial works of criticism, avowedly mainly theoretical and historical, and largely written in 1900–1922, both with introductions and recently written chapters by Professor F. A. Hayek, namely, *Collectivist Economic Planning*, by various economists, with useful bibliography, 1935, 293 pp. ; and *Economic Planning in Soviet Russia*, by Boris Brutzkus, 1935, 234 pp.

cost and sacrifice. This purpose they themselves described as the creation of a new social order, "the classless state"; by which they meant a society in which no one would be able to use the labour of others in order to enrich himself, or even in order to live without producing. Hence the liquidation of the landlord and the capitalist. But the term contained also a constructive meaning, briefly summed up as social equality. It implied, that is to say, the establishment of a community in which every able-bodied person, without exception, would be expected to repay to the community the cost of his upbringing, as well as to contribute to the common well-being, in whatever way his faculties permitted; whilst being secured his own share in the common product, in a form and to an amount appropriate to his particular needs. It is this far-reaching purpose, which the government of the USSR has never lost sight of, and in pursuit of which it has never weakened, that runs like a red thread through all the warp and weft of its administration, and that inspires and elucidates, as we shall attempt to show, the whole trend of its history.

The Episode of Workers' Control

With all its purposefulness, the Bolshevik Party, in common with other Marxists, had no idea of how this social ideal could be realised.¹ Lenin himself was distinguished for his firm grasp of the conception that the revolution was not itself communism, nor even the first stage of a socialist state, but only the opportunity for its construction. But so long as he was in exile, even he had thought out no plan of how to build up a classless society. During his six months' residence in or near Petrograd in 1917, when he was maintaining a continuous bombardment of the public with articles, pamphlets, letters and speeches, we can see him, in successive publications, bit by bit recognising and accepting

¹ "In the days before 1918, all the Marxist world thought of the social revolution as an end. The workers of the world were to unite, overthrow capitalism and be happy ever afterwards. But in 1918 the communists, to their own surprise, found themselves in control of Russia, and challenged to produce their millennium. They have a colourable excuse for a delay in their production of a new and better social order in the continuance of war conditions, in the blockade and so forth; nevertheless, it is clear that they begin to realise the tremendous unpreparedness which the Marxian methods of thought involve. At a hundred points . . . they do not know what to do" (*Russia in the Shadows*, by H. G. Wells, 1920, p. 132).

the materials out of which the socialist state was to be built. In his writings he adumbrated, successively, the pyramid of soviets by which the citizens would create the instruments of local and central administration; then the trade unions, comprising all the wage-paid workers by hand or by brain, who would by this means jointly control the conditions of their working lives; then the consumers' cooperative movement, through which the whole adult population, as consumers, would manage the distribution among themselves of the commodities which they, as producers, had created. In Russia all the waterways and nearly all the railways were already state enterprises; and Lenin contemplated the immediate nationalisation of the banks and of all credit and currency operations. To these main social structures he added the notion, not of immediate nationalisation, but of a public control of the manufacturing, mining and trading enterprises still left in private hands. This control was to be exercised through universal publicity and a close supervision of the management by the whole working class, in all its various organisations, not excluding the salaried managers, technicians and clerical employees. But Lenin realised, quicker and more completely than his colleagues and supporters, that these proposals did not amount to a "blue-print" of reconstruction, and that what the new government had to do was to try a whole series of experiments in almost every department of social organisation. In one of his speeches he put this position with perfect candour. "We knew", he said, "when we took power into our hands, that there were no ready forms of concrete reorganisation of the capitalist system into a socialist one. . . . I do not know of any socialist who has dealt with these problems. . . . We must go by experiments. . . . We do not close our eyes to the fact that we are alone in one country only, and even if Russia were not so backward, we cannot achieve a socialist revolution. . . . But it does not mean that we have to cease to act. Once we have got a chance of experimenting, we must do it as it [the soviet state] accumulates more and more power."¹ In the first few weeks

¹ "The way to avert a catastrophe is to establish a real workers' control over the production and distribution of goods. To establish such control it is necessary (1) to make certain that in all the basic institutions there is a majority of workers, not less than three-fourths of all the votes, and that all owners who have not deserted their business, as well as the scientifically and technically trained personnel, are compelled to participate; (2) that all the shop and factory

after he and his friends had seized power, they could do no more than live from hand to mouth, without anything like a plan, issuing innumerable separate orders about particular industrial enterprises that had been left derelict. "Workers' delegations", he said afterwards, "used to come to me with complaints against the factory owners. I always said to them, 'You want your factory nationalised: well and good. We have the decree ready. But tell me. Can you take the organisation into your own hands? Have you gone into matters? Do you know how and what you produce? And do you know the relations between your production and the Russian and international market?'" And inevitably it transpired that they knew nothing. There was nothing written about such matters in the Bolshevik textbooks, or even in those of the Mensheviks."¹ For the vast majority of manufacturing and trading enterprises, Lenin drafted with his own hands² a resolution on workers' control, which was published in *Pravda* of November 16, 1917, and converted into a decree in the most sweeping terms by the Sovnarkom of People's Commissars on the 28th of the same month. This decree provided that "in all industrial, labour, financial, agricultural, transportation, cooperative and similar enterprises, employing wage-workers or contracting for work to be done at home, there is introduced workers' control of production, of the purchase and sale of products and raw material, of their storage, and also of the financial management of enterprises. The workers in any given

committees, the central and local soviets of workers', soldiers' and peasants' deputies, as well as the trade unions, be granted the right to participate in such control, that all commercial and bank accounts be open to their inspection, and that the management be compelled to supply them with all the data; and (3) that the representatives of all the more important democratic and socialist parties be granted the same right. Workers' control, already recognised by the capitalists in a number of cases where conflicts arise, should be immediately developed, by way of a series of carefully considered and gradual, but immediately realisable, measures, into complete regulation of the production and distribution of goods by the workers" ("Measures to overcome Economic Chaos", by N. Lenin, published in *The Social Democrat*, No. 64, June 7, 1917; included in Lenin's *Works*, vol. xx. Book II. pp. 136-137 of English edition).

¹ Speech of Lenin at the opening of the first Congress of the Supreme Economic Council (May 26-June 4, 1918). "Lenin . . . whose frankness must at times leave his disciples breathless, has recently stripped off the last pretence that the Russian revolution is anything more than the inauguration of an age of limitless experiment. 'Those who are engaged in the formidable task of overcoming capitalism', he has recently written, 'must be prepared to try method after method until they find the one which answers their purpose best'" (*Russia in the Shadows*, by H. G. Wells, 1920, p. 133).

² *After Lenin*, by Michael Farbman, p. 43.

enterprise shall establish workers' control through their elected agencies, such as the mill and factory committees, shop foremen's councils and the like, with the condition that representatives of the [clerical] employees and the technical staff shall be included in the membership of these agencies. The workers' control bodies shall have the right to supervise production and to set a minimum output for each enterprise. The workers' control bodies have the right of controlling all the business correspondence of any enterprise, and for withholding correspondence the proprietors shall be liable to trial. . . . Commercial secrecy is abolished." ¹ Under this decree, practically all the important business enterprises in Petrograd passed, during the ensuing six months, under the control of variously constituted workmen's committees, beneath which such managers and foremen as had not fled, and sometimes even the proprietors themselves, struggled to keep their businesses going.

The Result of Workers' Control

It was a bad time to try the crucial experiment of workers' control as the pattern for the management of industry, even if, as it is now suggested, it was viewed by the wiser heads only as a temporary expedient. But it was important for the world to have it tried. Looking back on those hectic months in Petrograd, in the winter of 1917-1918, it seems clear that, after making all allowances, this particular idea, when put in operation, failed to commend itself to any of the persons concerned, including even its warmest advocates. It was not merely that the committees elected by the factory operatives, skilled craftsmen though these were, were found to be lacking in the various kinds of knowledge and skill required for the quite different task of direction and management. Nor was it conclusive that factory discipline was impaired by the continual interference of the members of the committee with the authority of the foremen. Such shortcomings and defects were neither universal nor inevitable, and would, moreover, be lessened by experience. What was fatal and irremediable in giving the management of each factory to the persons employed therein, whether to a majority or to the whole

¹ *Pravda*, November 16, 1917; Decree of Sovnarkom, November 28, 1917; *Lenin: Red Dictator*, by G. Vernadsky, 1931, p. 105.

aggregate of them, and even in its best examples, was that each factory under such control—deprived of the automatic checks and warnings which the capitalist system supplies to the profit-maker in the relations of wages costs to selling prices, and of these to customers' demands—necessarily judged and decided its policy exclusively from the standpoint of its own wishes or interests. Each factory was without knowledge, alike of what the whole community of consumers needed or desired, and of how much all the other factories were simultaneously producing. If its product had been wooden chairs or copper cables, it went on turning out wooden chairs or copper cables, usually of the kinds, shapes and qualities that had been customary, irrespective of what was now required. It soon became evident that, on such a system, even if aggregate production could be kept up, there could not be the necessary continuous adjustment of supply to demand, on which, not only exchange value, but also the very maintenance of the citizens depended. What stood revealed to every intelligent person, when the experiment was tried, was that the function of each producing unit in the community was to produce, *not what that unit might prefer to produce, but what the community needed or desired*. In any highly evolved industrial society, whatever its economic or political constitution, the citizen as a producer, whether by hand or by brain, in his hours of work, must do what he is, in one or other form, *told* to do; for the very purpose of being able to receive, along with all the other producers, in the rest of the day—the consuming hours—that which in order to live they all need and severally desire. And if the consumers' needs are to decide the producers' work, there must be—where the guidance of profit-making in a free market is abandoned—some organisation, outside the factory, outside the trade union, outside the industry itself, by which the spokesmen or representatives of the whole community of citizen consumers can instruct each factory, and even each group of handicraftsmen or peasants, from time to time, exactly what it is to produce.

The Supreme Economic Council

In Petrograd in 1918 a drastic remedy had to be applied. The idea of the “self-governing workshop”; the dream of the anarchist and the syndicalist, which had misled whole genera-

tions of socialists, had to be abandoned. Workers' control, though not eliminated for other functions, was definitely deposed from management. Within six months of starting the experiment, Lenin induced his colleagues in the Sovnarkom to insist, by a decree of June 28, 1918, that, whatever workmen's committees might be in the field, each industrial enterprise must be put under the control of a single manager, appointed by and responsible to the government itself. Lenin was, in fact, keenly conscious that, as he said, "One of the most important tasks is in labour discipline. . . . Labour discipline, the discipline of comradely intercourse, and soviet discipline, is actually being developed by millions of toilers. . . . It is the most important historical mission. . . . We do not claim or count on rapid success in this. We know that it will take up a whole epoch before it is achieved."¹ But this was not enough. An industrial programme for each manager had to be authoritatively formulated from time to time, if not actually week by week. A new government department was accordingly set up, under a committee specifically charged to direct manufacturing and mining industry throughout the whole country, with the dominant object of getting produced, not what the workmen in each factory thought fit, or even what the manager might decide, but what the community needed and desired in due order and proportion. It had, in fact, been discovered by painful experience that the "liquidation of the employer" necessarily involved the governmental planning of production. "As one would naturally have expected," relates an English eye-witness of the proceedings, "the greatest danger in the transition period came from those workmen's councils, shop stewards' committees [factory committees] and professional alliances [trade unions and local trades councils] who ran their own provincial economic policies without considering the needs of the country as a whole. A guiding hand was necessary, and that was found in the Supreme Economic Council. I well remember being present at its first meeting.

¹ *Verbatim Report of the First Congress of the Supreme Economic Council, May 26-June 4, 1918* (in Russian); *Lenin's Works*, vol. xxiii. p. 43 (in Russian); quoted in English in *Summary of the Fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan*, 1933, p. 26.

This has been made a matter of reproach by an opponent: "After scrapping the traditional methods of managing enterprise, they [the Communists] have had to return to a régime of steady work, to an enforcement of the authority of foremen and managers, to a realisation of working discipline" (*Economic Trends in Soviet Russia*, by A. Yugov, 1930, p. 68).

A few workmen from the Petrograd and Moscow professional alliances [trade unions and local trades councils] and shop stewards' committees [factory committees], together with some trusted revolutionary leaders, and a few technical advisers who were not sabotaging [all these, we must explain, having been chosen and appointed by the Sovnarkom for this purpose], met together on the Tuchkof Naberezhkaya at Petrograd, with the object of organising the economic life of the republic in the interests of the toiling masses. All around them was chaos produced by the Imperialist war and the orgy of capitalist profiteering. Famine, dearth of raw materials, sabotage of technical staff, counter-revolutionary bands invading from the south, Prussian war-lords threatening from the west, made the outlook apparently hopeless. Yet, nothing daunted, these brave workmen, with no experience, except that derived from the hard school of wage-slavery and political oppression, set to work to reconstitute the economic life of a territory covering a large part of two continents. I saw them, at that meeting, draw up plans for the creation of public departments which should take over the production and distribution of the 'key' industries and the transport. Their field of vision ran from the forests of Lithuania to the oases of Central Asia, from the fisheries of the White Sea to the oil-fields of the Caucasus. As they discussed these schemes, one was forcibly reminded that many of these very places, for which they were preparing their plans to fight famine and re-establish peaceful industry, were at that moment threatened by counter-revolutionary forces, and by the armed hosts of the European war-lords, whose so-called 'interests' demanded that famine, anarchy, and misery should teach the workers and peasants of Russia not to dare to lift their hands against the sacred 'rights of property'. And the wind howled round that cold stone building, which looked over the frozen Neva, and the winter snows were driving down the dismal streets, but these men, fired with imagination and buoyed up by courage, did not waver. They were planting an acorn which they knew would one day grow into an oak.

"I saw them five months later at a big conference in Moscow. The Supreme Economic Council of Public Economy had now become a great state institution and was holding its first All-Russian Conference. In every province in Central Russia, and

in many parts of the outer marches, local branches had been formed and had sent their representatives. The first organ in the world for carrying out in practice the theory that each citizen is part of a great human family and has rights in that family, in so far as he performs duties to it, was being visibly created before my eyes in Russia. In the midst of the clash of arms, the roar of the imperialist slaughter on the battle-fields of France, the savagery of the civil war, with Krasnoff on the Don, and with the Czecho-Slovaks on the Volga, the Supreme Council of Public Economy was silently becoming the centre of the new economic life of the republic. It had been created while the more prominent political body, the Soviet, was struggling to preserve the existence of the republic from enemies within and without. The Supreme Council of Public Economy was the tool designed to create the new order in Russia; the Soviet was only the temporary weapon to protect the hands that worked that tool.”¹

¹ *Capitalist Europe and Bolshevik Russia*, by M. Philips Price, 1919, pp. 18-19. The membership of the Supreme Economic Council (OVWR) under the decree of August 8, 1918, was made up of 10 members of the Central Executive Committee (TSIK), 30 members of the trade unions, 20 members of district economic councils, 2 members of consumers' cooperative societies, and 7 officials of as many people's commissariats. This plenum of 69 was directed to meet monthly, but also to elect a presidium of 8 persons for continuous activity, under a president to be appointed by the Central Executive Committee itself, who was to become *ex officio* a member of that body. (*Die planwirtschaftlichen Versuche in der Sowjetunion, 1917-1927*, von Friedrich Pollock, 1929, pp. 80-81.) Among its members were A. J. Rykov (president); L. B. Krassin, who brought to its deliberations great experience in industrial management as well as the highest technical ability; G. I. Oppokov, a highly educated man with the training of a lawyer; L. Karpov, a skilled engineer; and M. S. Lurie, also known as Yoric Larin, an eccentric economist of talent; together with leading representatives of the trade unions.

The Supreme Economic Council reported to, and its action was ratified by, an All-Union Congress of Councils of National Economy. This congress, whose proceedings were honoured during the first few years by the publication of a verbatim report (in Russian), began, in May 1918, with an attendance of 252 delegates, of whom 104 had a “decisive vote” and 148 only a “consultative vote”. All parts of the RSFSR sent delegates including Eastern and Western Siberia, and “Middle Asia” (Tashkent). Besides the local economic councils the trade unions and consumers' cooperative societies were represented, and also the great productive enterprises. 30 per cent of the delegates were workmen, 20 per cent technicians, 10 per cent engineers, 40 per cent statisticians, accountants and writers of books on economic subjects. 70 per cent were Communist Party members; 14 per cent were styled “non-Party”; 8 per cent Social Revolutionaries; whilst there were three Mensheviks and three Social Democratic Internationalists. By 1921 this Congress had grown to 593 delegates, of similar mixed character.

Another account of the formation of this body, under the titles of the “All-

The first decree of the Sovnarkom "as to the Supreme Economic Council", dated December 5, 1917, endowed the new body with extraordinarily wide powers and extensive rights. It was to organise "national economy", and also the finances of the state. For these purposes it was to produce general plans and estimates for the regulation of the whole economic life of the country, coordinating and unifying the activities of the central and local regulating institutions, including particularly all the commissariats of the several People's Commissars. The new Council had rights of requisition, sequestration, confiscation, compulsory syndification and what not. All existing institutions regulating economic circumstances were made subordinate to it. All measures of importance, including all projected laws relating to the regulation of national economy as a whole, were to emanate from the Supreme Economic Council, and to be submitted for ratification to the Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom).¹

It was at this stage that, very largely by accident, the "liquidation of the capitalist" was formally completed, so far as large-scale industry was concerned, by a decree of general nationalisation dated June 28, 1918. Larine had been sent to Berlin to negotiate with the German Government the necessary protocol defining details of the execution of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. On June 25, 1918, he telegraphed secretly to Lenin to the effect that the Germans were insisting that no measures should be taken impairing the value of any industrial undertaking belonging to a German national. He pointed out that any such restriction could easily be indefinitely extended by the transfer to Germans of the industrial shares belonging to Belgian or English nationals. The only way by which the Soviet Govern-

Russian Soviet of People's Economy" and the "High Soviet", will be found in the very critical volume entitled *The Russian Revolution*, by James Mavor (1928, 470 pp.), which is entirely drawn from sources hostile to the Bolsheviks (see pp. 263-264, 279-294, 298-302). His principal source for the council is the description, written long afterwards, by A. Yurovich, a member of the Cadet Party, who took service on the staff of the Supreme Economic Council for a short time, but could later remember nothing good about its members, its policy or its administration ("The Highest Soviet of People's Economy", by A. Yurovich, in *Archives of the Russian Revolution*, vol. vi. p. 305, an émigré production published in Berlin in Russian in 1921-1924).

¹ Decree No. 5 of December 5, 1917, in *Collection of Decrees of the RSFSR* (in Russian), 1917, p. 83; see *Fifteen Years of Soviet Building* (in Russian), by G. Amfiteatrov and L. Ginsburg, 1932, p. 306.

ment could retain its industrial freedom of action was immediately to make all industries the property of the state, as the treaty contained no restriction on the government's liberty to deal as it chose with government property. Three days after this telegram, a decree was issued declaring all enterprises having a capital exceeding 200,000 roubles to be the property of the RSFSR.¹

Despite all the powers entrusted to it, and the enthusiasm and zeal of its members, the Supreme Economic Council had, for a long time, little opportunity of planning for social reconstruction. The council got promptly to work, and called into existence a whole network of local "councils of national economy" all over the huge area of the RSFSR, from Poland to the Pacific. From the first the situation was critical owing to the chaos and ruin into which the country had fallen.² In a very few months came the outbreak of local rebellions and the successive advances of composite armies, largely subsidised and officered by half a dozen capitalist governments. Presently the military situation became desperate, with sabotage and rebellion everywhere, and hostile armies converging from all sides on Leningrad and Moscow. Every other consideration had to be subordinated to provisioning the Red Army and these two cities. Every factory found itself concentrating on military equipment and munitions. There was planning, sharp, direct and continuous, but it was planning exclusively for the daily needs of war.³

¹ This curious incident is described in *La Révolution russe*, par Henri Rollin, Part I. "Les Soviets", 1931, pp. 229-230. It is based on Larine's own statement, published after he had left Lenin's administration, and was living outside the USSR. See also *Souvenirs d'un Commissaire du Peuple, 1917-1918*, by J. Steinberg, translated from the original German (Paris, 1930); and *La Révolution russe*, by Fernand Grenard (Paris, 1933).

² Lenin said that "Russia has emerged from the war in such a condition that it resembles a man who has been beaten until he is almost dead" (reprinted in his *Works*, vol. xxvi. of Russian edition, p. 345; as quoted in *Fifteen Years of Soviet Building* (in Russian), by G. Amfiteatrov and L. Ginsburg, 1932, p. 348.

³ N. Popov, an historian of the Bolshevik Party, states that the years of the civil war were essentially "an era of planned economy in a land of impoverished resources, in a state of isolation from the rest of the world externally and from the producing elements internally". He points out that the planning extended to agriculture: "The crying need for bread was the first dictator of the planning, compelling the creation of a network of state-controlled agriculture. A relentless drive was instituted to organise large government farms, which socialism always regarded as superior economically [to peasant agriculture]. A campaign against the Kulaks was conducted without mercy. By the end of 1921 there were 4316 soviet farms (sovkhosi) and 15,121 collective farms (kolkhosi) covering a total area of over 10,000,000 acres. . . . In the conditions of civil war, lacking capital and technical personnel, this was no mean political achievement on the

The Emergence of the General Plan

But Lenin never lost sight of the necessity of a General Plan of reconstruction. When the delegates to the First All-Union Congress of Councils of National Economy met in Moscow at the end of May 1918, the resolution put before them, and duly adopted, made it quite clear that their task was that of systematic planning of economic relations throughout the whole country. The congress resolved as under :

“ The primary task in the sphere of production is : to proceed from the separate nationalisation of individual enterprises to the nationalisation of industry ; beginning with the metal industry, the machine industry, the chemical, oil and textile industries.

“ The development of productive forces of the country requires the introduction of compulsory quotas of output ; the co-ordination of the rates of wages with the output ; a strict labour discipline, introduced by the labour organisations themselves ; a gradual introduction of the obligation to labour, especially for persons who are not employed ; the mobilisation of all specialists and technicians, and the redistribution of the labour force in accordance with the redistribution of industry.

“ In the sphere of exchange and distribution, the centralisation of trade in the hands of the state and of cooperative organisations, with the gradual liquidation of private trade. The system of state monopoly of goods for mass consumption makes necessary the introduction of exchange between different oblasts, and the fixing of prices, with the gradual reduction of them.

“ The supply of villages with live-stock and machines, and with manufactured goods ; the introduction of improvements ; and a regular exchange of goods between town and countryside.

“ In the sphere of finance : the nationalisation of all banks

part of the dictatorship ” (*An Outline History of the All-Russian Communist Party* (in Russian), by N. Popov, 1930 ; see the comments in *Stalin*, by Isaac Don Levine, p. 357).

“ At the close of the year 1920 there were under the management of the central and local authorities [the Supreme Economic Council, etc.] 37,000 enterprises. Each branch of industry was managed by a special board ” (*Economic Trends in Soviet Russia*, by A. Yugov, 1930, p. 53).

and the introduction of a system of cheques, current accounts, etc.”¹

This systematic planning had been prepared as part of the new programme of the Communist Party, which Lenin himself drafted, and which, as adopted in March 1919, expressly provided for a planned development of the entire national economy, including the continuous utilisation of the whole of the labour force, without any recurrence of unemployment; places being found for all able-bodied workers, whilst the distribution of all the commodities that they produced would be systematically coordinated. It was to carry out this Party decision that the State Planning Commission (Gosplan) was formally appointed by the Sovnarkom's decrees of February 24, 1921.²

In 1920 it was this idea of a General Plan that inspired Lenin's letter to Krzhizhanovsky, out of which arose the scheme of national electrification. Lenin, as he said, wanted this in order to “centralise the energy of the whole country. . . . I repeat”, he said, “it is necessary to rouse the workers by a grand programme for the next ten or twenty years.”³ The adoption of this programme

¹ Resolution on the Economic Situation and Economic Policy: in *Verbatim Report of the First Congress of the Supreme Economic Council, May 26–June 4, 1918* (in Russian).

² Programme of Communist Party, March 1919; RSFSR Sovnarkom decree of February 24, 1921. Lenin doubtless learned something as to what would be involved in a General Plan for the whole economic life of the nation from a German book entitled *Der Zukunft Staat: Production und Consum im sozialistischen Staat*, by Professor Karl Ballod of the University of Berlin, the first edition having an introduction by Dr. Karl Kautsky; published in Germany in 1898 and 1919, translated into Russian in 1906; and reissued in Moscow at Lenin's instance in 1919. This work calculated in detail, for each main industry, the statistics that must underlie any systematic planning of mass production directed to supplying the needs of the whole population, on the basis of the state ownership of all industries, and (a Prussian touch!) the application of universal industrial service for the whole male adult population, not exceeding five or six years in each man's life. (See *Stalin*, by Isaac Don Levine, p. 355.)

³ Lenin's letter, which Krzhizhanovsky produced in 1929, when he expounded the First Five-Year Plan into which the seed thus sown had grown, is worth reproduction: Lenin wrote, “Couldn't you produce a plan (not a technical but a political scheme) which would be understood by the proletariat? For instance, in 10 years (or 5?) we shall build 20 (or 30 or 50?) power stations covering the country with a network of such stations, each with a radius of operation of say 400 versts (or 200 if we are unable to achieve more). . . . We need such a plan at once to give the masses a shining unimpeded prospect to work for: and in 10 (or 20?) years we shall electrify Russia, the whole of it, both industrial and agricultural. We shall work up to God knows how many kilowatts or units of horse power” (given in article by Michael Farbman in the *Daily Herald*, in 1929).

G. W. Krzhizhanovsky, to whom was entrusted in the first instance the organisation of Gosplan and in 1927–1928 the preparation of the First Five-Year

by the Eighth Congress of Soviets in December 1920 led to the appointment of a commission in April 1921 to work out a plan of electrification of the whole country (the GOELRO). There followed, by decrees of the Sovnarkom of February 22, 1921, December 22, 1922, and August 21, 1923, the establishment of a separate body, the State Planning Commission (Gosplan), for the express purpose of working out a General Plan of all economic relationships.¹ This took at first the modest form of annual "Control Figures", being tables of statistics showing the amount of every kind of production to be expected during the ensuing year. These statistics, which each year became more exact and more complete, enabled the Supreme Economic Council, in the light of the aggregate output to be expected, to formulate with greater precision its instructions to the government trusts and enterprises, including the various transport undertakings.

Krassin's Exposition of Planning in 1920

It happens that the present writers are able to supply some contemporary evidence as to the soviet intentions and designs about a General Plan in 1920. In August 1920 the usual "summer school" of the Fabian Society was occupied principally with problems of foreign relations. Two envoys from the RSFSR, L. B. Krassin and Kamaneff, happened to be in London, endeavouring to arrange with the British Government for a resumption of trade relations. It was suggested that they should be invited to visit the school. The following extract from a contemporary diary enables us to see how far Krassin's speech foreshadowed the action of the Soviet Government during the ensuing decade. "Krassin, with his lithe figure, his head perfectly set on his shoulders, with his finely chiselled features, simple

Plan, was eminent as a scientist, long a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, of which he became vice-president (*Modern Russia, the Land of Planning*, by Louis Segal, 1933, p. 8).

¹ Decrees of February 22, 1921, December 22, 1922, and August 21, 1923. An informative article (in Russian) by S. Strumilin, entitled "The First Experiments in Planning", included in (Russian) *Planned Economy*, No. 12 of 1930, makes it clear that the first decree contemplated only a plan for one year ("current planning"). It was P. A. Bogdanoff who, in the autumn of 1921, first suggested the necessity, at any rate in the metal industries, of a plan for as long as five years ("prospective planning"), which Gosplan recognised in its revised regulations of March 8, 1922.

manner and keen direct glance, looks, every inch of him, the highly bred and highly trained human being, a veritable aristocrat of intellect and bearing. So far as one can gather from listening to him, he is a curious combination of the practical expert and the convinced adherent of a dogmatic creed. But one is tempted to wonder whether this creed does not consist almost entirely in an insistent demand for the subordination of each individual to the 'working plan' of the scientifically trained mind; though, of course, the plan is assumed to be devised in the interests of the community as a whole. . . . He spoke in German, with the clear enunciation and the limited vocabulary of an accomplished linguist speaking in a foreign language; so that even I could understand every word of it. It was a remarkable address; admirably conceived, and delivered with a cold intensity of conviction which made it extraordinarily impressive. Especially skilful was his statement of general principles, combined with a wealth and variety of illustrative fact and picturesque anecdote. The greater part of the speech was a detailed account of the industrial administration he had actually set up, or hoped to introduce into Russia. Working to a plan, elaborated by scientific experts, under the instructions of the Communist Party, was the central idea of this industrial organisation. Russia's needs, external and internal, were to be discovered and measured up; and everything was to be sacrificed to fulfilling them. All the workers by hand and by brain were to accept this plan, and their one obligation, as members of the Soviet Republic, was to carry it out with zeal and exactitude. There were, he implied, two great sources of power in Soviet Russia, which would lead to its redemption, and its complete independence of the hostile world by which it was surrounded; the fervour of the faithful, organised in the Communist Party, and the scientific knowledge of the experts specially trained to serve that Party in all departments of social and industrial life. Every expedient of modern industrialism designed to increase the output of the individual worker, whether new mechanical inventions, new forms of power, new methods of remuneration, piece-work, premium bonus, the concentration of business in the best equipped factories, were to be introduced in order to achieve the working out of this plan. Even consumption was to be organised. Payment in kind, with a small balance of money for 'supplementary needs', was to

supersede the ordinary wage system, so that the consumption of commodities by individuals might lead to the maximum mental and physical development of the race. The peasants, comprising as they did the vast majority of the population, were, he admitted, a difficulty. . . . The Bolshevik Government had been compelled to accept individual production on the land. But land could not be sold in the market ; if the peasant who worked it threw it up the commune would allot it to someone else. Krassin, however, affirmed his faith that eventually the peasants would be converted to communism ; and he gave us a glowing description of what might be done by introducing scientific agriculture on a great scale, and sweeping away individual production in favour of communal production according to a plan worked out by scientific agriculturalists. Finally, in a splendid peroration, which excited the most enthusiastic applause from all those assembled Fabians who understood German, he asserted that Soviet Russia, alone among nations, had discovered the ' philosopher's stone ' of increased productivity in the consciousness, on the part of each individual operative, that he was serving the whole community of the Russian people—a consciousness which would transform toil into the only true religion, the service of mankind.”¹

Experimental Development of Planning

Probably no one in 1920 realised how long and arduous would be the putting in operation of any General Plan. Indeed, so long as the New Economic Policy was adhered to, and so long as the private businesses of half a million profit-makers were, if only in the smaller enterprises, producing and distributing whatever commodities they chose—so long, moreover, as most of the agricultural production was abandoned to the uncontrolled action of twenty-five million peasant households—no successful planning for the allocation of the labour force of the community was practicable. But in 1927, coincidentally with the substantial liquidation of the New Economic Policy, and with the determination to take seriously in hand the collectivisation of peasant agriculture, Gosplan was able to venture to submit to the Council of Labour and Defence (STO) a General Plan on the lines that Krassin had adumbrated, and notably of the kind that Lenin had

¹ MS. diary by Beatrice Webb, September 4, 1920.

called for, namely, a scheme to "centralise the energy of the whole country", with which to "rouse the workers by a grand programme for the next ten or twenty years". We come thus to the adoption, by the Fifteenth Congress of the Communist Party in 1928, of the First Five-Year Plan of production and distribution for the USSR, with which a less definite Fifteen-Year Plan of electrification was associated.

This momentous and even audacious piece of planning was undertaken at a critical time. The policy upon which the Plan had to be constructed had been, from 1925 to 1927—odd though this must seem to those who regard the government of the USSR as a dictatorship of Stalin or any other individual—the subject of the longest and widest controversy since 1917. Its adoption took place, as a competent observer writes, at a time of "trouble and torments. Russia's international affairs were in a dismal plight. England had broken off relations, America persisted in her policy of non-recognition, France continually sulked, Poland never ceased to make wry faces, China forcibly broke into the Soviet Embassy in Peking and the consulates in other cities, raided them and ousted the soviet representatives. No nation, save possibly Germany, then a republic, and Turkey, evinced any sympathy, and neither was too openly nor too abundantly friendly; no credits were in sight, save in limited amounts from Germany and Italy. No help was forthcoming from anybody, anywhere."¹

"Internally the picture in 1928 was no more cheering. The Communist Party was riven with dissension. Trotsky was ousted; his followers in their hundreds, among them [some of] the ablest men in the country—orators, executives, writers, engineers, economists—were exiled to remote parts of the land, and the 'Right Opposition' was continually threatening a fresh disruption. The peasants were growling with dissatisfaction, the nepmen [private capitalist entrepreneurs and dealers] and the intellectuals were recalcitrant; and some of the latter, though a much smaller number than the hysterical soviet press would have the world believe, were actually effecting sabotage. There was little skilled labour in the country, and very few

¹ It should, however, not be forgotten that the English Cooperative Wholesale Society and various considerable British firms made it known that the official breaking off of relations would not interfere with their continuing to fulfil soviet orders, upon the customary credit terms.

engineers experienced in building modern industrial plants ; and few leaders to manage such plants once they were built. The country itself was backward, and had barely recovered from the cumulative ravages of the world and civil wars, which had reduced industrial output to one-fifth and agricultural to three-fifths of normal. In brief, Russia was alone, disunited and impoverished.”¹

The controversy in which the First Five-Year Plan was involved may be summarily described in the words of a subsequent official report, in which the reader must kindly accept the characteristic phraseology and discount the inevitable bias. “The Right Opportunists,” declared Gosplan in 1933, “while in words admitting the planned character of economy in the USSR, actually denied it, in so far as they refused to admit that industrialisation was the decisive lever for the reconstruction of national economy ; they fought against high rates of industrialisation ; they denied the decisive significance of the link between the working class and the peasantry on the basis of production ; to the class struggle for the realisation of the socialist reorganisation of the whole of national economy, they counterpoised the theory that the kulaks would peacefully grow into socialism ; the theory that things should be allowed to go automatically their own way. Taking this as their starting-point, the Right Opportunists, in opposition to the Five-Year Plan . . . proposed a Two-Year Plan, in which the central link was not industry but agriculture ; not the socialist transformation of the countryside but the consolidation of private peasant economy. This, in fact, implied the denial of the possibility of building socialism in a single country ; the denial of the possibility of drawing the main masses of the peasantry into socialist construction. The realisation of the Two-Year Plan would have led to the perpetuation of the technical backwardness and agrarian character of the country, to bourgeois restoration, and to the colonial subjugation of the USSR to the capitalist world. . . . The Trotskyists, in their turn, denied the possibility of the planned development of the economy of the USSR, in that they denied the law of the uneven development of capitalism, and asserted that the international division of labour stands higher than the dictatorship of the proletariat in a single country, and imperatively

¹ *The Great Offensive*, by Maurice Hindus, 1933, pp. 24-25.

dictates to it its further development. They denied that the dictatorship of the proletariat was a special form of the link between the working class and the peasantry, and prophesied the inevitable rupture between [them]. . . . The Trotskyists advanced the bourgeois theory that the building up of socialism in a single country, and the reconstruction of the national economy of the USSR by its own efforts, were impossible. . . . The Five-Year Plan was born in the midst of a fierce class struggle around the question of the main roads [or] means of socialist construction. Notwithstanding the counter-revolutionary resistance of the Rights and the Trotskyists, the Communist Party and the Soviet Government adopted the Five-Year Plan for the socialist reconstruction of national economy. More than that, of the two variants of the plan—the initial plan and the optimal plan that were submitted by the State Planning Commission—the Sixteenth Party Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and the Fifth Congress of Soviets adopted the optimal variant of the plan, which, in the subsequent course of its fulfilment, became a minimum plan, for the scope of its main tasks was considerably widened.”¹

We may add that the First Five-Year Plan, in its “optimal variant”, which was presently greatly enlarged in scope and content, was held to be substantially fulfilled by the end of 1932, within four and a quarter years. A Second Five-Year Plan was accordingly formulated for the years 1933–1937, which is now (1935) in course of execution.

Gosplan as Planning Authority

The USSR State Planning Commission (Gosplan), to which this important work was entrusted, is now appointed by and is directly responsible to the Sovnarkom, of which its president is always a member. The Commission, unlike some other bodies, has never taken the form of a committee wholly or mainly composed of People’s Commissars already busied with their own work; and consisted, down to 1935, of a president who is now one of the two vice-presidents of the Sovnarkom; two vice-presidents, none of whom held any other public office, and no fewer than

¹ *Summary of the Fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan* (Gosplan), 1933, pp. 4-5.

158 members. The supreme planning authority—Gosplan USSR—is supported by similar planning commissions in all the constituent and autonomous republics. These republic planning commissions (which are also referred to as Gosplan, but followed by the name of the republic) are each subject to its own Sovnarkom, but bound to adopt the lines decided on by the USSR Gosplan.¹

All governmental or public institutions or establishments of every kind, including not only those engaged in industry or agriculture, but also those concerned with such services as education; medicine and public health; the arts; music and the drama; social insurance; defence; justice; and transport and communications, are statutorily required to supply Gosplan with all necessary data as to their present and prospective operations. To deal with the enormous mass of information that pours in continually from all over the USSR, Gosplan has gradually developed an extensive staff of trained statisticians and technical experts in all branches of industry, exceeding a thousand in number, which is elaborately organised, with all its thousands of clerical workers, in a large number of departments. The special department of statistics, working independently, has now become a Central Board of National Economics Accounting, subordinate to the USSR Gosplan, and paying particular attention to cost accounting.

The internal organisation of an office charged with a task of such magnitude and complexity seems worth describing in some detail. We may therefore be pardoned for placing on record an unpublished departmental order—No. 103 of April 12, 1932—signed by V. Mezhlauk, then deputy president of the Commission, directing a complete reorganisation of Gosplan into 10 main departments, most of which have from 3 to 7 sub-departments (sectors), making in all 33 divisions, among which the whole

¹ "Each of the various republics that combine to form the Union has its own State Planning Commission, which drafts a scheme for the economic development of its own area. The general plan for the USSR is drafted by the State Planning Commission of the Soviet Union. The last-named authority is not subordinated to any of the People's Commissariats; and should any difference of opinion arise between the State Planning Commission and economic commissariats, the matter has to be submitted to . . . the Council of Labour and Defence, whose decisions are binding on all the state authorities" (*Economic Trends in Soviet Russia*, by A. Yugov, 1930, p. 298).

This work, by an opponent of the Soviet Government, is untrustworthy in its details, but is not without use as suggesting possible criticisms.

work was, at that date, carefully divided. This Order ran as follows :

“ The gigantic sweep of socialist construction on the completed basis of soviet economics, the building up of the Second Five-Year Plan with a view to achieving a classless socialist society within five years, and accomplishing the reconstruction of national economy on the basis of modern technique and inventions, and the corresponding reconstruction of Narkomats [ministerial departments] in the direction of their specialisation, which would enable them to exercise more direct control and planning—all this makes it imperative for Gosplan to create more coordination (*uviazka*) in the planning and correlation and control of different branches of the Plan and to work out a synthetic plan of socialist construction of the USSR.

“ The preparation of such a plan and its execution cannot be carried out by one sector or group of sectors of Gosplan. Its success depends on the active participation in it of all workers in the constructional and functional sectors of the Plan in constant coordination with each other. Only on these conditions is it possible to utilise the tremendous experience of all republican, oblast and scientific planning institutions, and to build up a scientific technical and economic synthetic plan comprehending the oblasts, their groups, and the republics of the USSR.

“ In accordance with these considerations the apparatus of the Gosplan must be reconstructed by creating in the midst of its organisation combined kindred sectors, and by regrouping the functions of different sectors and their groups. The administration of the department must be placed in the hands of their chiefs and of the deputies, without creating special organs attached to them for this purpose.”¹

Gosplan worked under this scheme of 1932 for three more years with steadily increasing efficiency. In April 1935 the whole department was again reorganised by a decree of the USSR Central Executive Committee (TSIK) and Sovnarkom, which testified appreciation of the brilliant success of the planned economy.² But these very achievements, and the ever-increasing scale of their application, were held to call for a yet higher level

¹ Gosplan, Order No. 103 of April 12, 1932.

² Sovnarkom Decree of April 1935; *Pravda*, April 6, 1935; *Moscow Daily News*, April 6, 1935; *Izvestia*, April 8, 1935; *Russian Economic Notes* (of U.S.A. Department of Commerce), June 15, 1935.

of planning, to be directed towards completing the reconstruction of the entire national economy. Planning must henceforth penetrate even the smallest section of the economy of the Union. Now that 96 per cent of the national income and of the means of production are in the hands of the collectivity, there must be, in the whole organisation, the most exact accounting, a high degree of knowledge of economics, complete familiarity with the technique of all forms of production, and ability to find a solution for any problem, however complicated, that may arise in practice. This is deemed particularly important in the case of agriculture, where there are still thousands of farms which can reach their objectives only by planned direction. Distribution, transport and stabilisation of prices all demand increased attention from the planning authorities. One of the chief tasks of the reorganised Gosplan must be what is called synthetised planning, or the more rational amalgamation into a single whole of the separate plans for the various geographical and economic divisions of the Union.

The reorganisation called for by these considerations took the form of the supersession of the presidium and the vice-presidents by a new commission of the fixed number of 70 persons, who were chosen for appointment by the Savnarkom by the president of Gosplan himself. Among these carefully selected members the principal workers under the former scheme have found places, but the list also includes the most effective members of the local planning commissions, and also a number of scientists and technicians specially chosen regardless of their connection with other organisations and agencies. A new scheme of internal organisation has been worked out under this commission, adopting the most successful parts of the previous one, with an improved distribution of work according to subjects and localities, accompanied by increased provision for the continual inter-regional and inter-industrial "synthesisation" of the plan. Independent sections are being built up to overhaul, from the standpoint of planning, the scheme of national defence; to deal, from the same angle, with the problem of the training of "cadres" (adequately differentiated grades of technical efficiency); to devise a fuller utilisation of alternative building materials; to plan a systematic coordination of automobile highways and aeroplane routes; to effect a general planning of all the means of communication; to survey the mutual relations of the lines now opening

out for a further improvement of the national health ; and to concert measures for the special training of planners ! There are now, in close connection with Gosplan, a central administration of national accounting ; an institute of economic research ; and an All-Union Academy of Planning, with subordinate institutes of research on the aims and processes of planning, at Moscow and Leningrad respectively. The whole staff of the USSR Gosplan now amounts to something approaching to a couple of thousand expert statisticians and scientific technicians of various kinds, with as many more clerical subordinates—certainly the best equipped as well as the most extensive permanent machine of statistical enquiry in the world.¹

How the Plan is made

Upon all the information obtained by Gosplan the preparation of the Plan proceeds by successive stages. It starts—and this is an important point on which it differs from any analogous forecast in other countries—not from any consideration of the government's financial requirements or any statistics of the "balance of trade", but from the human beings of whom the nation is composed, the whole population of the USSR whose labour force is available for employment, and whose consumption of commodities and services has to be provided for. From the total population to be expected, in the whole of the USSR and in each of its principal areas, there have to be deducted the numbers under working age ; the numbers too old for service ; the numbers disabled by sickness or infirmity, and the numbers otherwise occupied, including the homekeeping wives and domestic workers ; those engaged in study or research ; those serving in the defence forces or in administration unconnected with production ; the priests and other members of the deprived categories, and finally, along with the nomadic tribes, the still surviving independent peasants and handicraftsmen. The remainder constitutes the labour force available for the more or less collectivised production of commodities and services, to be

¹ Students of political science will notice the extent and range, we think unparalleled in other countries, of the machinery for devising the means of coordinating the administrative work of separate government departments ; and for "thinking out" the problems arising from their several uneven developments.

distributed, to the best advantage of the community, over the whole field of collectivised industry and agriculture.

How is this distribution effected? Gosplan obtains annually, with regard to every enterprise in the USSR, whether state or municipal, central or local, factory or mine, sovkhos or kolkhos, university or hospital, cooperative society or theatre, health office or medical service, an elaborate statistical statement as to what it has produced or done during the last completed year; what is going on during the current year; and what is expected during the year next ensuing; including, in particular, how many workers of the various kinds and grades; and what amounts and kinds of materials and components have been or will be required; and what demands on the banking and transport services are involved. At the same time the consumers' cooperative movement, which has (1935) some seventy-four million members, reports how many persons each society has been supplying, and how many it expects to be supplying next year; with what kinds of commodities and to what aggregate amount; which of these commodities it can produce for itself, which it will need to obtain from other USSR producers, and which it proposes to import from abroad. The tens of thousands of industrial cooperative societies (incops or artels) equally report the proceedings of their several establishments. Corresponding data are obtained from the quarter of a million collective farms.¹ Analogous information is obtained from the railway, river, canal, air and maritime transport service, and from that dealing with the service of communications by post, telegraph, telephone and radio. All the "cultural" institutions supply similar information as to what they are doing or requiring, whether they are educational or medical, artistic or recreational, publishing books or newspapers, or running theatres, concerts or cinemas. This nation-wide reporting of economic data, elaborately organised, through the

¹ Even the millions of individual peasant families, and the vaguely known nomadic tribes producing mainly for subsistence, are not wholly ignored by the General Plan. Estimates have to be included in the Plan for (a) the aggregate produce that these peoples may be expected, from past experience, to bring to market; and (b) for the aggregate amount and the principal kinds of commodities that they may be expected to purchase. As these two estimates approximately balance each other in aggregate value, the totals are not affected; but the calculation is made in order that note may be taken of the additional produce likely to be available on the one hand, and, on the other, of the additional demand to be expected for certain commodities.

several ministerial commissariats, in the various central offices, is, we are informed, made with extraordinary willingness and punctuality, if only because the failure of any one of the hundreds of thousands of separate establishments to reply fully and punctually might result in its exclusion from any provision of materials and financial credits. But Gosplan gets in the laggards by sending special inspectors to visit them, even in the most distant and obscure corners of the USSR ; and may even supply instructors to help in the preparation of the voluminous returns.

The Provisional Plan

With all this enormous mass of information, which is daily being examined and verified, classified and digested in the appropriate departments, Gosplan, with a whole decade of acquaintance with the facts and with the personnel of each enterprise, is able to form a preliminary and hypothetical picture of what next year's output would be if each enterprise proved to be able, and was also left free, to accomplish exactly what it individually proposed. Simultaneously, the Politbureau and the Central Committee of the Communist Party, in consultation with the People's Commissars of the principal departments of the government, will have been coming to general conclusions as to the particular expansions and new developments to be pressed forward. These provisional decisions "from above" have to be worked into the multifarious proposals "from below". But to make consistent with itself even the first draft of the provisional Plan thus made up, partly of proposals from below and provisional decisions from above, the whole aggregate of existing and projected enterprises in the USSR must be brought to a very complicated balance. One fundamental question is in what industries, and what parts of the USSR, the whole of the available labour force will find employment. For the last few years, indeed, the question has had to be put the other way about. The problem has been how to distribute the available labour force so as to make it, as far as possible, suffice for the demands of all the establishments, industrial and cultural, great and small. Whichever way the question is put, the total increase of population may be sufficiently accurately estimated, and changes in its location may be statistically

allowed for, without in any way prescribing, to any individual person, where he shall reside or in what vocation he shall engage. The notion that the Plan includes or requires any such regimentation is simply a delusion. In the following chapter we shall describe in detail by what devices all the persons seeking employment are led voluntarily to choose among the several occupations and locations in the proportions that the interests of the community require. Here we need only mention that this optimum distribution of new recruits among the various branches of the army of labour is secured largely by the provision of the appropriate number and kinds of opportunities for training in the skilled crafts and learned professions that are most in demand ; and by the trade unions agreeing to fix the several rates of remuneration for different occupations with due regard to the " social value " of any particular kind of labour that is temporarily in short supply.¹

Meanwhile all the various enterprises, industrial or cultural, will be, in their several programmes, requiring a particular amount of labour power without which they cannot achieve the output that they propose or that which will be demanded from them. A certain proportion of this labour power has to possess this or that kind of experience or skill. Whence is this labour power, skilled or unskilled, to be drawn ; how many trained youths will be turned out by the various educational establishments ; and what will probably be the outflow of surplus labour from the agricultural districts in course of mechanisation ? But apart from the allocation of labour power, the other requirements of each of the various establishments, made without knowledge of what the rest of them are requiring, involve a whole series of complicated adjustments. All the establishments, industrial or cultural, will be dependent, to take the simplest example, on the supply, throughout the year, of fuel for heating purposes, whilst all the important ones require also artificial power. What is the aggregate demand of all the enterprises for heating, lighting and power ; and how does this compare with the expected output of timber, coal, oil, peat and hydro-electricity ? Most manufacturing industries require for their production either iron or steel, or one or other of the non-ferrous metals. The aggregate supply of each

¹ See Chapter III. in Part I., " Man as a Producer : Soviet Trade Unionism " and Chapter IX. in Part II., " In Place of Profit."

of these necessities from the mines and furnaces has to be made to fit the aggregate demand. Each enterprise, in short, has its own requirements in materials, components and accessories, without an exactly proportionate supply of which throughout the year it cannot maintain its planned output. Moreover, in most cases it is not enough to provide, of each component, a sufficient aggregate in the USSR to supply all the establishments throughout the land. It is often necessary, and for various reasons always desirable, that each economic region of the USSR should be able to satisfy its own requirements, and thus avoid increasing the strain of long haulage on the overworked transport system. Then there is the immense problem of the food, the clothing, the housing, the educational and health services, the holidays and the amusements of the entire population to be provided for, as and when and where it is demanded. Gosplan has to compare the aggregate expected demand for each commodity or service (in the light of past experience, and as reported by the network of consumers' cooperative societies to which nearly every adult belongs, and also by the other agencies receiving the current expenditure of the population) with the amounts that the productive enterprises are severally proposing to turn out during the year, and with the manner in which these several outputs are distributed in relation to the homes and to the expected desires of the people. And when all this has been done, there has still to be considered the carrying capacity that the transport system must have in order to move everything without delay from where it is made to where it will be consumed or used. Even more difficult and complicated is the adjustment to be made between home and foreign supply. In the circumstances of the USSR a profound economic truth is revealed, namely that the fundamental interest of every country in foreign trade is not in its exports but in its imports. The USSR, like every other country, is compelled to seek some commodities in foreign lands ; and it suits its present policy of rapid industrialisation to obtain from abroad much else in the way of machinery of all kinds that it cannot for the moment conveniently find sufficient labour force or plant to produce for itself. All such things the People's Commissar of Foreign Trade will be prepared to order from abroad, on the best terms he can obtain. But these imports have, in the absence of loans from foreign investors, necessarily to be paid for out of the proceeds

of sales of exports. It becomes, accordingly, an anxious problem to decide which commodities—not excluding gold itself—it will be most profitable, or least costly to the USSR, to produce in order to ship to foreign countries, and in what quantities; whether, for instance, it will be more profitable, at the prices that the foreigner will pay, to ship more timber, oil and furs, or more wheat, butter and eggs.¹

We pause at this point to note that, so far, the preparation of the draft provisional Plan, complicated and difficult though it is, is merely a matter of statistical calculation and estimate, on the basis of the figures drawn from all parts of the USSR, combined with the best possible forecast of such indeterminate factors as the local harvests and next year's world prices of the commodities to be exported in order to pay for the imports. Such a calculation and estimate is required before any sensible orders can be given to the hundreds of trusts and services, controlling the tens of thousands of separate factories, mines, oil-fields, state farms, transport systems, and social service agencies of all kinds. Once private ownership, with its profit-seeking motive of production for the competitive market, is abandoned, specific directions must be given as to what each establishment has to produce. It is this necessity, and not any question of policy, that makes indispensable, in a collectivist state, some sort of General Plan. And once private ownership and the profit-seeking motive of production for the competitive market have been abandoned, it becomes plain that these necessary directions cannot be given without producing unutterable chaos and ruinous waste, unless the collection of facts is adequate and extensive and (though here accuracy

¹ It is not easy to explain with brevity how far the planning descends to the innumerable details of size and shape, material and style, size and colour of the myriads of commodities that have to be produced. The decree embodying the Plan, which is eventually passed by the Central Executive Committee (TSIK), contains statistical totals for only about a dozen of the main divisions of production, with merely general reference to the Plan with regard to the quantities of other commodities. The widely published "control figures" usually give statistical totals for sixty or seventy kinds of commodities, including for instance 25 specified classes of "producers" goods (such as coal, mineral oil, iron ore, rolled iron, agricultural machinery, etc.), 14 specified classes of "consumers" goods (such as cotton yarn, boots and shoes, matches, sugar, etc.); and 23 specified classes of marketable agricultural products. But the Plan itself involves a quantitative regulation of the production or service of every kind of establishment, each of which can deviate from the specification only by express permission of the People's Commissar under whom it works; permission which is given only after consultation with Gosplan.

and precision cannot be completely attained) unless the forecast of harvests and world prices is either fairly sound, or else safeguarded by adequate reserves. If these difficulties can be overcome, the planning becomes a mere scientific process, applicable to any purpose whatsoever. Planning is, in fact, undertaken—it is true with a purpose quite different from that of the USSR—by every important capitalist trust or combination, so far as concerns the whole sphere of its own enterprise. Such capitalist planning is, however, everywhere limited to the range of the particular trust or combination; and takes no account either of the labourers, or of the production, outside this range. What is more important is that such capitalist planning is governed by entirely different motives from those prevailing in the USSR.

It is rightly pointed out that planning makes, in itself, no promises to the people. In itself, it is merely a statistical process without a purpose. Logically, however, planning implies a purpose outside itself, a purpose to be decided and determined on by human will. In a capitalist society, the purpose of even the largest private enterprise is the pecuniary profit to be gained by its owners or shareholders. It may or may not be recognised that, in order to obtain, in the long run, the greatest pecuniary profit, various conditions have to be observed, such as the need for attracting and keeping in decent efficiency the workers concerned. But these conditions are all subordinate to the object of profit. In the USSR, with what is called the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, the end to be planned for is quite different. There are no owners or shareholders to be benefited, and there is no consideration of pecuniary profit. The sole object aimed at is the maximum safety and well-being, in the long run, of the entire community, on an equalitarian basis, so that everybody's faculties can be afforded the utmost scope in the common service, and everybody's needs as far as practicable satisfied. But the decision as to how exactly this object should be aimed at by each year's plan is not for Gosplan to make. The determination of the particular ends to be attained, and the manner and degree in which each of them shall be served during the period that is planned for, and the will to enforce this policy, is the business of the USSR Government itself.

Accordingly it is the duty of the USSR Gosplan, at some stage, to take the instructions of the Soviet Government—in

practice, to communicate the substance of the earliest draft of the provisional Plan to the Sovnarkom and the Council of Labour and Defence on the one hand, and the Politbureau and the Central Committee of the Communist Party on the other—in order to obtain decisions upon a series of points, before even the provisional Plan is completed. In practice, this takes the form of an almost continuous consultation throughout the year among the leading personalities in the Kremlin on a succession of problems of policy. These consultations, in which the experts of the USSR Gosplan necessarily play a great part, by the facts that they adduce, are summed up in a series of committee decisions. We can only give a general description of the social purposes by which are influenced all the innumerable adjustments that have always to be made in the formulation of even the provisional Plan. It will be seen that every one of these social purposes, by which the Plan is finally governed, imports considerations of social well-being which no profit-seeking capitalist—and, we may add, no deductive economist working out theoretically what will be the operation of an entirely unhampered competitive capitalism—admits into his problem.¹ That is to say, each of these decisions of paramount importance takes into account other ends than the making of pecuniary profit by production for a competitive free market; other ends even than the maximum satisfaction of the desires for consumption by the jostling crowd of consumers whose frictionless succession of momentary demands, all deemed in the argument to be equally “effective”, both create and govern such a market.

The General Object of Soviet Planning

The fundamental purpose that the Soviet General Plan has to promote has been, from the outset, definitely and, so to speak arbitrarily, fixed. The USSR, in which agriculture has always been the dominant occupation of the mass of the people, has got to be as far as possible industrialised and mechanised. Moreover,

¹ Such a decision between industries, “not strictly related to considerations of prices and costs”, seems to Mr. Lionel Robbins (*The Great Depression*, 1934, p. 130) to belong “only to the sphere of aesthetics or military strategy”. He apparently does not allow for Public Health or education, or even for the economic interests of future generations, in opposition to those of the present population.

the industrialisation must not be monopolised by any favoured district or districts, but has to extend, in due proportion, to every part of the country. The primary object of this industrialisation is to increase wealth production. It has always been held by the Soviet Government that an exclusively agricultural community is a community in which there is, for the masses, beyond a bare subsistence, very little surplus available, even for the means of civilised life, let alone for cultural developments. Without extensive industrialisation, and an equally extensive mechanisation of agriculture, so Lenin taught, there could be no great or continuous rise in civilisation for the whole mass of the people of the USSR. And to the advantages of this rise in civilisation every part of the USSR is considered to have an equal claim. Thus, it is not merely in order to lessen the cost of transport, and not only to put the most important new works out of reach of potential hostile invaders, that the additional mines, factories, oil-fields and electric plants of which the People's Commissar of Heavy Industry always has a long list waiting to be put in operation to the extent that the Plan may allow, are, as a matter of policy, geographically widely dispersed. The Soviet Government makes it a cardinal point of policy, largely irrespective of cost, or even of immediate maximum production, to see to it that the Plan leaves no part of the USSR, and no important national minority, dependent on agriculture alone, or on stock-breeding alone, or on hunting or fishing alone. This supreme decision of policy, it will be noted, has so far been made by no other government. Nowhere else has a government deliberately set itself to maximise industrialism and mechanisation; or to make all its citizens, to use Stalin's own phrase, "well-to-do". Least of all has any previous government ever set itself to cause all parts of its area, and all its various races, to enjoy equal shares in the common productivity.

Collectivisation and Mechanisation of Agriculture

It has, since 1927, also become a cardinal point in the policy of the Communist Party, and of the All-Union Congress of Soviets, to press forward, with all possible speed, the collectivisation of agriculture in state or collective farms. Only by such a transformation of rural life, as it seemed to the far-sighted,

could there be any possibility of raising the whole peasantry, especially the children, into an educated community, capable of understanding communism and familiar with its scientific methods. Compared with the peasant's izba, the sovkhos, and still more the kolkhos, would become the peasant's university. But the urgent reason for an immediate transformation was the need for introducing the mechanisation which alone would put the country beyond reach of local distress, or even of actual famine, brought about either through the periodical failure of crops or by the apathy or recalcitrance of an independent peasantry.¹ This involved a provision in the Plan for exceptionally rapid development of the production of tractors and other agricultural machinery, as well as such an expansion of transport facilities as would bring every village in the USSR into easy connection with the cities and the manufacturing centres. This insistence on the greatest practicable mechanisation of agriculture, for the sake of maximising quantitative output, and, at the same time, of educating the peasant population for a fuller citizenship, may well be inconsistent with maximising the pecuniary profits of agriculture, which is what the landlord, the capitalist profit-maker and even the kulak would look at.

The Coefficient of Increase

Another preliminary that it is necessary to decide for each year is what shall be the coefficient of increase to be applied to the total output of the last completed year. Besides the growth of population and the coming into operation of new plants and additional machines which this increase of labour force makes it possible to set going, there is the factor of human effort. Shall the people be called upon to increase their own exertions by 1 per

¹ It must be remembered that, as we have already described, owing to the "extensive" character of Russian peasant agriculture, to its backwardness, and to its lack of proper technical equipment, failures of the harvest in the USSR have always been frequent, rising from time to time to the proportions of veritable famine. During the first half of the nineteenth century, from 1800 to 1854, there are said to have been 35 years in which there was a more or less serious failure of the crops. In the 20-years period from 1891 to 1911, there were 13 poor harvests, 4 good harvests and 3 famine years. During the 10 years of soviet rule (1918-1927) there have been 2 famine years, 5 years with poor harvests, and only 3 years with good harvests. Unlike the Tsar's Government, that of the soviets feels bound to take steps to prevent such calamitous shortages.

cent, or 5 per cent, or any other amount? ¹ For the Plan, even in its provisional form, is more than a statistical exercise. It is, in itself, a potent instrument, having dynamic effect upon the General Will of the community. Whether the average amount of energy displayed, of persistence manifested, and of work done by each employed person in the USSR will increase, and by how much it will increase, is partly dependent on what the Plan demands. But this is not all. The Plan is not intended as a scientific prediction of what will actually happen. Without having read Browning, the soviet authorities act on the maxim that "Life's reach should exceed its grasp". The practice in the USSR is for the Government, each year, to ask of the community rather more than can objectively be expected from it, and to do this deliberately as a means of inducing the people to stretch themselves to the utmost. It is one of the results of the system of Participation, to which we have so often had to allude, that this deliberate public appeal for greater strenuousness, though repeated at frequent intervals, has a considerable effect.

*The Division of the Nation's Income between Current
Consumption and Capital Investment*

But all this leaves the quantitative decisions still open. How much of the additional industrialisation for which the Commissariats of Heavy Industry, Light Industry, Railways and so on have worked out plans shall be undertaken in the ensuing year? This question involves a division of the total expenditure

¹ This coefficient of increase was, at the very outset of the First Five-Year Plan, the subject of heated controversy within the State Planning Commission. There were some, such as Groman, who were dominated by the past experience of capitalist countries, and who accordingly doubted, not only whether anything more than an annual increase of 3 per cent should be calculated on, but also whether allowance should not be made for a steadily diminishing rate of increase of production, on the basis of a "law of diminishing return". The outcome was that, as already mentioned, Gosplan submitted the Plan in two variants, the "initial Plan" and the "optimal Plan", of which the Government adopted the latter (*Summary of the Fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan, 1933, p. 4*).

The two variants differed in their totals by approximately 20 per cent. The initial draft made allowance for (a) the possibility of widespread failure of crops, amounting to a famine; (b) the inability to increase imports in the absence of foreign loans or long credits, and (c) the need for greatly increasing the defence forces. The maximum draft held it sufficient (x) to estimate for local shortages of crop, far short of famine; (y) to meet the increase of imports by increasing exports, to be made possible by lowering costs of production, owing to increasing output; and (z) to slow down increases in the defence forces.

between individual consumption and new capital investment. It necessitates a corresponding allocation, in the Plan itself, of labour force and plant, either to the production of commodities and services for immediate consumption or use, on the one hand ; or, on the other, to the erection and equipment of new industrial establishments, or to the making of additional machines, or to the extension and improvement of such common services as transport and communications, or to the provision of additional dwelling-houses, and educational buildings, and other works of durable utility. Here we have an issue of high policy, on which Gosplan requires an authoritative ruling before even the provisional Plan can be completed and duly balanced. There is not only the depreciation, by wearing out, of all the existing equipment to be made good. The requirements of national defence in works and stores and equipment, possibly even of strategic railways, or a doubling of track not called for immediately on economic grounds, must be favourably considered. But what is no less important in deciding on the amount of additional industrialisation to be undertaken in the ensuing year is the limiting condition of the number of new workers who will be available ; and the allocation, among the various works and services, of these additional workers who will be seeking employment. When there is so much to be done, the state cannot afford to let any part of this labour force remain unadapted to the service of the community. How to ensure this adaptation is one of the problems to be taken into account in the protracted annual collective bargaining as to the standard rates of wages and conditions of employment, that we have already described, between the All-Union Council of Trade Unions AUCCTU, representing all the 47 (in 1934 redivided into 154) trade unions of the USSR, and the USSR Sovnarkom, representing the management of all the enterprises in which the workers are employed. These expert negotiators have, perforce, both had to recognise that there are three main parts into which the total expenditure of the nation must be arranged to fall. There is, first of all, the amount to be withheld from current consumption and invested in ways of lasting utility. This, in capitalist nations, is called the savings or the internal investments of the nation. In the USSR this share has, during the past few years, been as much as 30 or 40 per cent of the total national income, being many times as large

a proportion as in any other country at any time whatsoever. What remains has then to be allocated, partly to the maintenance of the common services of the nation, necessarily conducted on a collectivised basis, such as the various government departments, local and central; the defence forces and the administration of justice; and all the numerous branches of social welfare, such as public health, insurances, the whole educational system, scientific exploration and invention, literature and the arts, holidays and recreation. The whole of the remainder constitutes a wage fund more concrete than any imagined by Ricardo and McCulloch. This will constitute the income paid in wages and salaries to the whole of the workers, by hand or by brain, employed in the production of commodities and services. It is this three-fold allocation of national income and expenditure—made, it will be seen, according to other considerations than the pecuniary net profit of any enterprise—that enables the parties to the collective bargaining to arrive at a coefficient of wage-increase for the ensuing year. It is this determination of a coefficient of increase of the aggregate wages and salaries of the whole people that will permit Gosplan to complete its allocation of labour force and materials to the production of the various commodities and services on which, as it can be foreseen, the wages and salaries will, in the aggregate, be expended. And here emerges what the western economist, like the capitalist statesman, may well consider the supreme novelty and advantage of such a Plan. For the Plan, as worked out through the above stages, not only provides the necessary number of remunerative situations (or jobs in wealth production) for the whole of the anticipated able-bodied adults, but also ensures automatically that every one of these workers, together with all the non-able-bodied, are provided continuously with purchasing power, on the spending of which the producers of commodities and services can with absolute confidence count. Thus, within the ultimate limits of the Plan, there can be no failure of “effective demand” for whatever the people desire.

National Defence

Every government has to plan for national defence. But, to the Soviet Government the danger of war has hitherto been a constant preoccupation. Rightly or wrongly, the USSR lives in

constant apprehension of attack, not by one foreign power alone, but by a combination of capitalist governments. It is never forgotten that only fifteen years ago, the armies of no fewer than half a dozen governments were ravaging soviet territory, without any excuse that any of them can put up before an international tribunal, without even a declaration of war, doing immense damage to what had never ceased to be, technically, a "friendly power". And for this aggravated assault and colossal destruction no compensation has yet been paid. If combined invasion has lately become less likely, there is still fear of a particular invasion, as well as of a commercial embargo, or an economic boycott, or even a *cordon sanitaire* to prevent the spread of the bacillus of communism! This apprehension has, from the first, lent a strategic object to the planning. It has seemed of vital importance that, whilst the capitalist governments were divided among themselves, and whilst they had still not recovered from the losses of the Great War, the USSR should make itself substantially independent of the outer world, not only in all the means of waging modern warfare, but also in all indispensable commodities. Hence the exceptional concentration of the First Five-Year Plan on the opening of new mines, oil-fields, hydro-electric plants, iron and steel works, the construction of strategic railways, or the doubling of track through economically undeveloped districts, and generally on a rapid expansion of the "heavy industries", by means of which things can be made, or troops can be transported, instead of seeking directly to increase the making of the household commodities desired by the people.¹

The Development of Technical Education

Moreover, the whole development of industrialisation, and the mechanisation of agriculture, together with the increasing demands of an immense population ever more awakening to

¹ In 1932, as elsewhere referred to, considerations of high policy connected with national defence led the Government of the USSR to make an important deviation from the First Five-Year Plan, in order to avert the danger of invasion by Japan. Even at the cost of creating a serious shortage of foodstuffs, the Government established stores of grain and army equipment along the line to the Far East, and diverted much labour force to the building of additional aeroplanes, to all of which a calculated publicity was given. This action is believed to have averted, or at least indefinitely postponed, an invasion from Manchuria.

cultural needs, necessitate the devotion of a constantly increasing portion of the nation's means to technical education, and, indeed, to education of every kind. The Plan is accordingly called upon, if only as an economic necessity, to provide each year for more schools and colleges, more teachers and professors, more scientific researchers and inventors. Industry itself constantly calls for more assistance from the scientists; and the USSR scientists are not backward in demanding more and more costly opportunities for exploration and investigation of every part of the universe. In fact, the very large sums included in the Plan for scientific research excite the envy of scientists all the world over. Nor is it merely for the service of industry, or as a means of greater wealth production, that Soviet Communism insists on educational progress. One of its fundamental purposes, as we indicate in a subsequent chapter,¹ is the raising, to a higher level of civilisation, by the instrument of science, of all the races of the USSR. It is not without significance that the USSR is the only country in the world in which the public expenditure on education on the one hand, and on scientific research on the other, has been, throughout all the economic depressions of the past decade, continuously increasing.

Public Health and Housing

Nor can the Soviet Government afford to starve the social services on which the health and productive power of the people depend. Thus, the authorities have to scrutinise the draft Plan to see that enough is provided for additional dwellings for the steadily increasing population; for more and more hospitals and maternity centres and for an illimitable supply of trained doctors and nurses; for a constantly increasing care of the children; and for the development of every kind of social insurance. As with Public Education, the sums allocated to all these services have been increasing year by year, by leaps and bounds, calculated to reduce to despair the Finance Minister of any capitalist community.

The Provision of Adequate Reserves

Nor is this all that has to be looked for in the provisional Plan. The Plan can never be of the nature of an astronomical

¹ Chapter XI. in Part II., "Science the Salvation of Mankind."

prediction, assured of a full and exact fulfilment. Quite the contrary. It can be foreseen that no part of the Plan will be precisely fulfilled; at any rate, not to the extent, at the time, and with exactly the consequences that the optimistic proposals of particular enterprises, or of the experts of Gosplan itself, may have led the Government to believe. And every failure to realise, with precision, any one of the projects of the Plan, whether the failure is by excess or by deficiency, will entail consequences on other parts of the Plan.

The most obvious of these failures to realise the results projected in the Plan may be the "under-production" of particular factories or other industrial enterprises. Nothing is done, as an ingenious Frenchman has observed, without "deficiency, damage and delay".¹ There will certainly be accidents, great or small, which, in particular mines or electric plants, factories or oil-fields, will stop the work, wholly or in part, for hours or days, whilst the greater part of the costs run on. One or other section of the machinery breaks down, and cannot be instantly repaired. There are frequent shortages of supplies, either of materials or of components, which lessen the year's output. The staff actually at work, whether of skilled workmen or of unskilled, or of this or that kind of technician, is seldom continuously up to the full establishment. There may be exceptional absences from sickness, or from workers "leaving the job" to wander off elsewhere. More frequently than not, there is a positive inability to obtain the desired workers, either because men of this or that particular kind of skill are not to be found, or because the available supply of unskilled labour runs short. There may even be occasional stoppages from spasmodic short strikes, which the "triangle"—the internal arbitration tribunal—fails to avert or immediately to terminate.² Finally there are the ordinary shortcomings of "the human factor". The director or manager makes an "error of judgment". The specialist or the foreman perpetrates mistakes. The manual workers, male or female, are not fully

¹ *URSS : Une Nouvelle humanité*, par Joseph Dubois (Paris, 1932) ("perte, avarie, retard").

² In every establishment an *ad hoc* arbitration tribunal is instantly called together, consisting of one representative of the management, one of the workers (the local trade union secretary), and the local secretary of the Communist Party. This almost always settles the dispute, but either party had a right of appeal to the People's Commissar of Labour, and now has to the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions (AUCCTU).

trained and never perfectly competent. We can see that the seven or eight People's Commissars, to whom severally the supreme control of all the industries of the USSR is committed, do not have an easy task in straightening out the difficulties that are perpetually being reported to them. If a factory, or even a whole trust or combine, continually fails to produce the required output, or persistently exceeds its permitted costs, its administration will presently be ruthlessly overhauled, its managerial staff may find itself dismissed or demoted; and if no adequate improvement occurs, the worst plants may be summarily closed down, the necessary production being sought in enlargements of more successful enterprises, or in the establishment of new ones.¹ So far as the General Plan is concerned, it is clear that allowance must be made, by means of an adequate discount off all estimated output totals, for an inevitable average of shortcomings.

But there will certainly be, from time to time, other and more serious contingencies, which would fatally dislocate the Plan, if provision were not made by way of reserves. Famine or pestilence; war, or (as in 1932) urgent defensive measures calculated to ward off a threatened invasion, may play havoc with the vaticinations of the ablest and best informed of planners. Much smaller calamities will cause deficiencies, each of which will upset many other calculations. An indispensable feature of wise and prudent forecasting is, accordingly, a deliberate planning for shortages caused by losses, failures and calamities of all kinds, as well as for surpluses caused by "over-fulfilment". The ideal would be to make provision at every point for a surplus over the actual requirements of the year equal to the greatest recorded deviation from the normal during a series of years past, and for an appropriate disposal (including provision for a continually renewed storage) of that contingent surplus. The most certain of such deviations is the periodical failure of the harvest, or the "bumper crop", in one or other part of the country. Here the planners are helped by the existence of statistics of the yield per

¹ When incompetent operation of a factory becomes too glaringly obvious, the soviet authorities swoop down with draconic penalties, not only dismissing the luckless director, but sometimes putting him in prison. The factory then goes on as before under new direction (*Russia's Iron Age*, by W. H. Chamberlin, 1935, p. 58). A striking instance of the elaborate investigation made in such cases is given in *Working for the Soviets*, by W. A. Rukeyser, 1932, pp. 166-188.

hectare in previous years, which afford a reasonable indication of how great the local reserve of each kind of foodstuff ought to be. But, whether by way of substitution or by that of a specific reserve, the perfect plan must include provisions for every kind of deviation from prophecy.¹

Moreover, changes in the Plan may be made in subsequent years merely because it becomes apparent that more can be accomplished in the aggregate than had been contemplated ; or, on the other hand, because the popular demand for particular commodities unexpectedly declines. Thus, in the second and third years of the First Five-Year Plan, there was added to it, not only the creation of a new combined coal and metallurgical base in the Urals, but also the construction of a score or more of gigantic new factories that had hardly been thought of in 1928.² What is always involved in such changes is the establishment of a new balance between the production of materials and components, the available labour force duly provided with purchasing power, and the utilisation of both of these factors in additional production of commodities or services, of which, by the presence of the additional purchasing power in the hands of the people, the sale is well assured.³

Finance

The trouble is that no government, and no planning commission, ever has in view sufficient means to provide completely

¹ The authors of the First Five-Year Plan expressly stated that "in our projects there are sufficient reserves, and in the plan system sufficient 'give', to enable us to make any unavoidable corrections of the parts without, at the same time, altering the whole; thus we shall finally secure the market equivalent which we need" (*The Five-Year Plan* (in Russian), vol. ii. p. 47, quoted in *Economic Planning in Soviet Russia*, by Boris Brutzkus, 1935, p. 131).

² *Summary of the Fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan* (Gosplan, 1933, p. 5).

³ It reveals a curious ignorance of how, in capitalist industry, planning is actually conducted to find some theoretical critics insisting that there can be no planning for changes. What would Mr. Henry Ford or Imperial Chemical Industries, Limited, say to the following ?

"To begin with, a planned economy involves the rejection of *all alternatives save the one which is actually adopted*. A planned society which 'plans for change' is, in fact, a contradiction in terms. Either the plan is sound or it is unsound : either it admits of alteration, or it does not. If it does not allow for the improvements of technique, changes in demand, variations in the volume and composition of the population, it suffers some inherent weakness from the very beginning. If it does allow for such changes it is not a plan at all, but an aspiration" (*Gold, Unemployment and Capitalism*, by T. E. Gregory, 1933, p. 289).

for all that is desirable—just as the world's aggregate of capitalist entrepreneurs has not. This is not, as it should be needless to say, a difficulty of money or currency, coinage or credit. The most expert planners, instructed by the most far-seeing government, if it is unable or unwilling to obtain a foreign loan, cannot honestly plan the allocation during the year, to specific projects, of an amount in the aggregate exceeding the output of commodities and services that the community can produce within the year. What the government can do, with sufficient notice, is to transfer any portion of the available labour force, plant and materials from the margin of one kind of production to the margin of another; and so, within the aggregate, and often even within the current year, vary the several kinds of product to a considerable extent. But unless the government can somehow increase the aggregate output, the amount of this is the limit beyond which its planning will be nugatory. There is accordingly, during the preparation of the Plan, always a struggle between the planners on the one hand, and the whole group of advocates for specific commodities or services on the other; and, finally, a struggle among themselves of partisans of the various products, as to which of them shall be increased, whilst others have thereby to be decreased in amount.

But, after the Plan has been adopted and put in operation, a clever government can get a little "play", by means of which the unforeseen deviations from the Plan may be prevented from causing a breakdown, or even from requiring any immediate alteration in the Plan which might, for the moment, be inconvenient. Besides using, as a temporary cushion against the jolts of these deviations, the people's current deposits in the state savings bank, the Finance Minister can regulate at his will the issue of paper roubles in payment of wages. This way, however, lies inflation, with its inevitable rise in the prices of all the commodities and services not rigidly controlled. And inflation, as the Soviet Government is fully aware, amounts to a disguised cut in everybody's wages, which has hitherto been regarded as an objectionable form of taxation, though one found to be less injurious in an equalitarian community, in which there is no great difference in individual incomes, and an absence of incomes that are unearned. A preferential expedient to which the Soviet Government usually resorts is an internal loan. This has the

incidental advantage of attracting back some of the paper currency already issued as wages and salaries, and thereby lessening the currency inflation, whilst it permits the Government, without inflicting actual hardship, to lessen the production of those commodities and services on which the wages and salaries invested in the loan would otherwise have been expended. Apart from the expedient of an internal loan, the Government is driven simply to make, in the course of the year, the consequential adjustments in the plan that every unforeseen deviation inevitably necessitates in one direction or another. If at any point production falls short of anticipation the Government must receive the earliest possible information, so that it may postpone or diminish the expenditure of labour and the use of plant on something that may be, for the moment, most easily dispensed with. In this way additional productive forces can be diverted to increase the output of a substitute for the commodity or service in which there is developing a deficit. Similarly if by some happy conjunction, production of a particular commodity or service is developing towards a surplus—or if there are signs that the public demand is changing, so that less than was expected will be asked for by the consumers or users—a timely diversion of productive forces to another point can be made in reinforcement of some threatened short supply. This, in fact, is what goes on in the USSR continuously throughout the year, very much as it does in the vast aggregate of varied enterprises of Imperial Chemical Industries, Limited. Possibly the USSR has an advantage in its more complete supply of relevant information. The monthly, weekly and even daily reports that pour in upon Gosplan from every one of the enterprises in the USSR, have to be systematically digested, and all possible inferences promptly drawn from them as to eventual surpluses and shortages in particular commodities and services. The perpetual changes in the factors that make up the weather, for which nearly all governments now maintain extensive meteorological offices, are nowhere observed and recorded in the minuteness, variety and extent with which the Soviet Government detects and counteracts the changes in the economic sky, covering one-sixth of the habitable globe, of which it has to take cognisance. The industrial activities in every branch of production wax and wane according to the current fluctuations in supply and demand.

The Final Plan

We now ask the reader to assume that all the decisions on policy have been made, and that the provisional Plan has been properly balanced and completed. Gosplan now submits it for consideration, through the several commissariats and other centres, to all the enterprises and organisations whose proceedings for the ensuing year it will govern. Each centre transmits it through the provincial and district bodies, down to every one of the establishments affected. In each factory or office the part of the Plan relating to that establishment is not only exhaustively examined by the directors and managers and heads of departments, but also submitted to the whole of the workers concerned, through their various factory or office committees, production conferences and trade union meetings, at which the quotas assigned to the particular establishment become the subject of protracted discussions and debates. All sorts of suggestions and criticisms are made, which are considered by the foremen and managers, and finally transmitted to Gosplan with the director's own reports thereon. Very often, during the last few years, the workmen's meetings have submitted a counter-plan, by which the establishment would be committed to a greater production than the Provisional Plan had proposed,¹ to be attained either by more strenuous or more regular efforts on the part of the workers, or by means of economies in the use of material or components, or by a lessened breakage or creation of scrap, or by some saving of time permitting the working up of a greater amount of material than had been contemplated.² The counterplans thus submitted, together with all the other criticisms

¹ These "counter-plans", produced by enthusiastic bodies of workers, have, like the achievements of "socialist competition", to be scrutinised with cool realism. It is sometimes overlooked that machinery may be driven too hard, so that the increased output presently results in calamitous breakdown, which not only stops production but also involves considerable outlay on repairs.

² So enormous is the volume of work, and so protracted the discussion, that the actual decree making the Plan obligatory has seldom or never been issued prior to the date of its beginning; sometimes it is many months late. We may assume that provisional instructions are issued to each enterprise, informing its management what will be the minimum required of it, or what reduction or change of its accustomed work will be ordered. The exact months of all the various stages of the preparation of the Second Five-Year Plan, from February to December, are given in Dr. Hugh Dalton's chapter, entitled "A General View of the Soviet Economy", in *Twelve Studies in Soviet Russia*, edited by Margaret Cole, 1933, p. 20.

and suggestions, are duly considered by the appropriate departments of Gosplan in consultation with technicians and experts of all kinds. The Provisional Plan has then to be readjusted as a whole, according to the decisions taken, and every part of it again brought to the necessary balance. It thus becomes, at long last, the definitive or final Plan. This is formally submitted, on the one hand, confidentially to the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and on the other, more publicly to the Sovnarkom and to the Central Executive Committee of the USSR Congress of Soviets, when it is made law by decree. Such a decree, apart from special authority for particular deviations, governs every people's commissariat, every trust and service department and ultimately every establishment in the USSR, for the period to which the Plan extends.¹

We have spoken of this period as one year. This is the minimum period for which any Plan must provide that is largely dependent on agricultural production, and on the effect, upon industry and transport, of the succession of summer heat and winter ice. But as constructional works take several years to come into working operation, it was decided in 1927 to extend the Plan, as completely as possible, to a period of five, and for purposes such as electrical development, even of fifteen years. This extension of the planning has more than a statistical utility. It has fulfilled Lenin's desire for something on which an appeal to the people might be made, a slogan which should arouse

¹ Thus, it may not unfairly be said that "The social economic Plan . . . was not thought out and superimposed by a few people at the top. It grew up gradually in the course of years—after the first electrification plan so strongly advocated by Lenin—as the natural result of the union of two forces, the inherent nature of the socialist economy and the practical necessities of the situation. The first draft Plan is merely tentative and provisional, say the Gosplan authorities. It is subject to thorough discussion, critical examination, revision and amendment in accordance with the proposals made by the central and local bodies, public and business organisations, and the millions of workers in each respective district and factory. They report that the importance of this local planning work, and the number of people participating in it, increases yearly. The Plan of national economy in the USSR is a plan of the millions. The millions draw it up, carry it out, and closely watch the course of its fulfilment. This is the basis of success of planned economy; this is the fundamental advantage of the soviet system of economy. Thus the Plan provides the masses with more than a concrete aim and a unifying slogan. It gives them opportunities for developing their initiative" (*In Place of Profit*, by Harry F. Ward, 1933, pp. 163-164). The importance of this feeling that the workers themselves share in the planning is emphasised in *Principles of Economic Planning*, by G. D. H. Cole, 1935, chap. xii.: "Planned Economy and Workers' Control."

their energy, and concentrate it on a single object. The First Five-Year Plan, and its substantial fulfilment within four and a quarter years; and the Second Five-Year Plan, with its promise of increased provision of commodities for household consumption and use, have certainly gone far not only to create a popular understanding of the problems and projects of the Soviet Government, but also to secure for them public acquiescence and support.

Substantially, however, Gosplan plans for one year, with a preliminary survey over the four following years. The Plan is hypothetically completed for each of the five years; but the statistical forecasts, and particularly the assumptions as to policy, for the years after the first are made with progressively smaller confidence. In fact, the Plan is perpetually being revised at particular points, almost from the start, according to the contingencies that occur, the new information that is received and the changes that are thereby necessitated. Once a year the revision is so extensive and complete as to amount almost to a remaking of the Plan. The formulation, at the end of each quinquennium, of an entirely new Plan, serves principally as the opportunity for a new appeal; that is to say, as a fresh stimulus or incentive to the whole people.

The Efficiency of a Planned Economy

We do not, of course, suggest that a planned economy will necessarily accomplish, without error or loss, the task that it seeks to perform. It is, however, worth notice that—to adopt the conclusions of a recent observer¹—"A planned economy develops of necessity its own type of efficiency movement and its own brand of rationalisation. It requires cost-accounting and better management and the greatest possible coordination of processes to produce the greatest productivity at the lowest cost. The purpose of the Gosplan is to combine the maximum of production with the minimum of expenditure in the shortest possible

¹ The same American observer remarks that "the significance of the Plan is that it gives the masses . . . that which life has not had since the break-up of the Middle Ages—a central purpose. . . . Heretofore the social organisation has always betrayed the creative capacities of the workers, turned them towards greed and war and death. . . . Now a form of society appears which asks man to the greatest creative task of history" (*In Place of Profit*, by Harry F. Ward, 1933, p. 96).

time. The First Five-Year Plan was characterised by speed and quantity, the second will [in addition] be marked by quality. . . . Already results of the drive for efficiency and quality can be noticed. One runs into them everywhere. . . . When it comes to the wider aspects of efficiency to securing a rationalisation of industry, agriculture, transportation and distribution in the interests of the widest social well-being, the socialist economy has certain natural advantages. It is not limited by the demands of profit, nor hampered by private property rights. It has not to support any idle class, either at the bottom nor at the top. It suffers now but little from sabotage and has no bill of costs for long strikes. Against this must be set the waste from inefficiency and bureaucratism, But this will have to be enormous to offset the other savings. In addition, a planned economy can secure the most productive distribution of credit. It can build the biggest and best equipped enterprises. It can use its machinery up to the operating point of the law of diminishing returns. Allowing for that, the Soviet Union can use its agricultural machinery 100 per cent, the United States only 40 per cent. Also a planned economy permits, for the first time, a scientific development of natural resources. In the oil-fields, for example, the spacing of the wells at proper intervals, according to the stratum being followed, is in striking contrast to that of the older wells, which are sometimes close together on either side of a boundary line in order to tap a competitor's flow. Similarly, a national plan for agriculture enables distribution of crops on a scientific basis according to soil and climate. Underneath all this, as the enabling fact, and therefore a steady stimulus to the greatest economic efficiency, is the new form of property, social ownership." ¹

The Results of Planning

We have so far not troubled the reader with statistical or other details as to the results of the planned economy of the USSR. We have preferred to describe how the planning is actually conducted, and to discuss the lines on which each successive Plan is framed. We ourselves attach the very smallest importance to any merely theoretical demonstration of the admirable results

¹ *In Place of Profit*, by Harry F. Ward, 1933, pp. 64-66.

which it is assumed that the deliberate planning of all the economic relationships of a great nation must necessarily produce. And we give no greater weight to the merely theoretical demonstration, by adverse critics, that any abandonment of private ownership and the profit-seeking motive in the organisation of industry, and in particular their supersession by any form of deliberately planned economy, must inevitably be calamitous. We decline to be intimidated by the confident assumption that there can be no useful substitute, in deciding what shall be produced by any community, for the passionless arbitrament of a "free market". This arbitrament is one that no economist and no capitalist accepts, any more than the statesman, when the supreme ends of national defence, public health and universal education are concerned, to which every civilised country now forcibly devotes no trifling proportion of the nation's income.¹

In our opinion the only way of testing the validity of any economic or political hypothesis, whether it be called an assumption, a demonstration, a theory or a law, is by comparison of such an "order of thought" with the ascertained "order of things". With regard to the planned economy of the Soviet Union, we have, as yet, found no serious attempt by any western economist or statesman to put his opinion to the test of comparison with the facts. It is hard to believe that the outcome of a whole decade of preparatory "control figures" (1918-1927), the completion of the First Five-Year Plan (1928-1932), and the first two years (1933 and 1934) of the Second Five-Year Plan do not enable some conclusions to be confidently arrived at.²

¹ How curious are the economists' denunciations of planning! "A planned society, as Professor Mises has abundantly shown, deprives itself of all those guides to rational conduct upon which the progress of economic life, in the last two centuries, has depended" (*Gold, Unemployment and Capitalism*, by T. E. Gregory, 1933, p. 291). This is to assume that the "rational conduct" of a nation is to leave everything to the arbitrament of the profit-seeking capitalists in competition with each other, turning exclusively on what will yield them, in their own lifetimes, the maximum of pecuniary profit!

² The student will find nearly 300 pages of detailed statistics as to every branch of production in the *Summary of the Fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the USSR* (published in Gosplan, in English, 1933, and presented to the World Economic Conference). He may also care to read the worst that can be said in criticism of this detailed statistical report in the *Revue de Deux Mondes*, October 15, 1933, pp. 847-893, entitled "En URSS: l'Atlas de statistiques imaginées; les silences d'un document officiel", par le Comte W. Kokovtzeoff. This writer suffers from the disadvantage of not having been able to visit the USSR during the past seventeen years, and thus see with his own eyes the transformation of which he denies the

Let it be noted, in the first place, that the oft-predicted bankruptcy and economic ruin of the USSR under the system of a planned economy has not taken place. On the contrary, we do not think that any candid student of the picture that the Soviet Union presented in 1921, when planning may be said to have begun, and that which it presents in 1935, can have any doubt of its very considerable advance in aggregate capital wealth. This judgment finds ample support in statistics so numerous and detailed as to be bewildering, whether they relate to the increase of such constructional enterprises as railways and canals, hydro-electric works and oil-wells; or to dwellings and offices, factories, and shops, with their equipment, furnishings, and current stocks of all sorts of commodities in the cities, on the one hand, and the household possessions, poultry and pigs, and stores of grain, etc., of the agriculturists on the other; or to the individual investments of the masses in the savings banks. There are to be included, in all parts of the country, the gigantic iron and steel, chemical and machine-making works—which, it was alleged, could not be even set going, and which were jeered at as monuments of folly, destined to stand for ages, falling slowly in ruins on the steppe, as useless as the Egyptian pyramids! These “pyramids” are, to-day, as seen by countless witnesses, actually turning out yearly many tens of thousands of tractors and motor-cars, and making, literally by the hundred thousand, every kind of machine and every sort of commodity that formerly had to be imported. The railways, vastly increased in length between 1913 and 1935 are, in this decade, the only ones in the world to show, year after year, increased passenger and goods traffic habitually exceeding the transporting capacity. The production and distribution of electric current goes up annually by leaps and bounds, not only the cities and factories, but now actually many of the rural villages and collective farms, being supplied for power and heat, as well as for light. If the reader can stand any statistics at all, let him consider the following summary. “The gross output of industrial production increased from 15·7 billion roubles in 1928 to 34·3 billion roubles in 1932 (calculated at prices prevailing in 1926–1927), which represents 218·5 per cent of 1928.

existence! Much more valuable is the careful analysis of the statistics in *Das Experiment der Industrieplanung in der Sowjetunion*, by Dr. Robert Schweitzer, Berlin, 1934, 144 pp.

The volume of industrial production in 1932 exceeded the pre-war level more than three-fold, and exceeded the level of 1928 more than two-fold. The First Five-Year Plan as a whole was fulfilled (in four and a quarter years) to the extent of 93·7 per cent as far as the gross output of industry is concerned.”¹ Viewed in comparison with other nations that suffered from the Great War, and measured either by capacity to produce or by the aggregate of commodities and services distributed, there seems no doubt that the material progress of the USSR, *from the exceptionally low level to which it had been reduced in 1921*, has not only been enormous, but has even been proportionately greater than that of any other country. In fact, the Soviet Union has quite obviously grown richer in the very years in which most, if not all, other countries have grown poorer.

Out of the mass of testimony as to the great advances made under the First Five-Year Plan, we take no Bolshevik statement but the brief summary by the able Russian economist who is the most persistent and most energetic opponent of all the economic experiments of Soviet Communism. Dr. Boris Brutzkus records in 1935 that “the superficial successes achieved in the construction of the heavy industry are remarkable. The basic supply of energy to the economic system was expanded by the construction of a series of power-stations. New coalfields were developed out-

¹ *Summary of the Fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan* (Gosplan, 1933). It is, we suggest, sheer prejudice to pretend that the statistics of the USSR are to be disbelieved, because, like all other public statistics in the world, they are compiled and published by the government concerned. In fact, they command greater credence than the published statistics of any other government, because, in the USSR, they form the basis of all economic and financial action, which, if it were taken upon “cooked figures” must inevitably result in patent failure. They may be compared in this respect with the Budget forecasts of the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, which, although never perfect, have, in the Government’s own interest, to be as accurate as can be contrived, as any mistake or falsification would be inevitably revealed at the end of the year. Soviet statistics have their peculiar defects, as have those of other countries. In an area so vast and so diverse as the USSR—as in the U.S.A.—there cannot be perfect accuracy in the vital statistics of the whole population. We cannot believe that every birth and every death throughout all Siberia can possibly be registered, any more than every birth and every death throughout the whole of the United States. In the USSR publications there is often an inadequate discrimination between the actual statistics of completed years and mere estimates for the current year, which is apt to mislead the unwary reader. There is also a frequent unscientific use of percentages of increase, irrespective of the magnitude of the amounts. In propagandist statements there is an optimistic selection of the most favourable statistics. But none of these minor defects impairs the accuracy of the statistics themselves.

side the Donets Basin, in particular the enormous coalfield of Kuznetz (Western Siberia); deposits of coal in the Urals, of brown coal near Moscow, and of peat, were exploited. This made it possible to decentralise industry without, at least proportionately, increasing the dependence of industry on coal supplies from the Donets Basin. The iron industry showed a notable expansion; here most emphasis was laid upon the development, on a great scale, of the Magnitogorsk-Kuznetz expansion. According to the Five-Year Plan the capacity of blast furnaces in operation was to increase from 20,000 cubic metres to 36,800 cubic metres, or 84 per cent; and the areas covered by Martin furnaces from 4630 square metres to 6421 square metres, or 39 per cent. The engineering industry was developed on an especially imposing scale; there hardly remain machines so complex that they cannot be built in Russia. After the U.S.A. Russia has the greatest tractor industry in the world, whereas before the Five-Year Plan the Russian production of tractors was quite insignificant. A great chemical industry was hardly existent before the war. According to the calculations of Professor Prokopovich, the value of the original capital of Russian industry amounted in 1928 to 3700 million roubles in pre-war prices, while at the end of the Five-Year Plan it amounted to 8134 million roubles; thus capital increased by 120 per cent. In spite of all the reservations which have to be made in connection with such computations, these figures do give an idea of the magnitude of the capital investments into industry.”¹

At the same time, whilst the volume of production of nearly every commodity was vastly greater in 1932 than it was in 1927-1928—sometimes fourfold—it has to be recorded that it was, in many important products, considerably below what had been anticipated in the Plan. The planned production was realised eventually, but not in 1932. In the generation of electric power; in the output of pig-iron and steel and copper; in the production of bricks, cement and sawn timber; and above all in super-phosphate and nitric acid, it proved to take two or three years longer to raise the output to what had been required for 1932. If, as is claimed, the Plan was, as a whole, fulfilled in 1932 to the

¹ *Economic Planning in Soviet Russia*, by Boris Brutzkus, 1935, p. 198-199; quoting *The Planning Scheme and the Results of the Five-Year Plan*, by Professor Prokopovich, Paris, 1934, p. 95.

extent of 93·7 per cent within $4\frac{1}{2}$ years, this was due to the much more rapid development of production in other fields.

This demonstrable advance in material wealth does not imply that the average income enjoyed by each inhabitant of the USSR, and perhaps not even the total national income of the country as a whole, has yet reached the amount of that of Great Britain or the United States. Still less does it prove that the remarkable progress in capital wealth of the USSR since 1921 has been due to the adoption of a planned economy. It might, indeed, be cited as one more instance of the rapidity with which a virile people can, whatever the system of society, make good the material devastations of war. But communists are quick to point out, with complete accuracy, that the increase in capital wealth, and that of the commodities and services actually provided, afford conclusive proof of the contention that the adoption of a planned economy upon an "equalitarian basis" is, at any rate, not incompatible with such an increase.

The candid student may, indeed, consider that the statistics are less conclusive, with regard to the income (measured in commodities and services) actually enjoyed by the average household in the USSR, than with regard to the aggregate capital wealth. People in the USSR were, at any rate until recently, still conscious of scarcity; queues, although rare in 1934, have not yet completely ceased;¹ and there are always witnesses who assert that the experience of scarcity is actually more acute than it was at some previous period. Further scrutiny shows, however, that in the villages, the popularly remembered time of greater abundance always relates to the year of some particularly good harvest, which those of 1930 and 1933 have at least equalled in the aggregate. Similar memories in Moscow and other cities relate to the short period when the nepmen contrived temporarily to get hold of exceptional stocks, not simultaneously of everything, but alternately, of this and that commodity. Contemporary descriptions of home conditions among the peasants of tsarist times,

¹ We must, however, repeat that queues do not necessarily imply short supply. There are, in the USSR, constant queues at the post offices where the supply is unlimited. A queue will arise, whatever the supply, whenever purchasers arrive at a greater rate than they can be dealt with. Even if supply is unlimited, a queue of as many as 48 persons will form in an hour, wherever each purchaser takes five minutes to be served (which is expeditious for Moscow), whilst others arrive at the rate of one per minute.

right down to 1914, do not indicate that any large proportion of them habitually ate meat, or knew the luxuries of butter and sugar ; or had anything left to spend on clothing or amusements. With regard to housing accommodation, it is clear that a large proportion of the workmen in Moscow, and in such a factory centre as Ivanovo, in 1914 dwelt in cellars or in primitive barrack dormitories and were far from the luxury of having on an average, even one room per family ; so that it is hard to believe that the overcrowding has actually increased ! Making all allowances, however, we might easily imagine that little increase could be shown over 1913 in the average quantity of foodstuffs actually consumed by many an adult workman in the USSR. But any such depressing supposition would be subject to very large exceptions. The great mass of poor peasants (bedniaki) are certainly, in all the years of average or over-average harvests, getting much more to eat than they did before the war, when they were harried by the landlord, the tax collector and the usurer.¹ The children and the sick are everywhere very much better provided for in all respects than at any previous period. The whole twenty million adult workers in the factories are ensured a relatively good dinner daily at an exceptionally low price. These three classes alone comprise at least one-half of the whole population. We may quote on the subject the very restrained conclusions of a competent observer. Mr. Maurice Hindus, in his summary of the results in 1933 of the First Five-Year Plan, writes as follows : "For purposes of correctness and without presuming to be mathematically precise, I would divide Russian life at the present moment into the following sections : consumption, or the standard of living in terms of material satisfaction ; construction, or the process of developing industry ; culture, or education, hygiene, refinement of manners, and civilised diversions ; psy-

¹ "One of the reasons why a comparatively small amount of agricultural produce finds its way to the market is that the peasants' own consumption of their produce has increased. In pre-war days, although Russia was accounted one of the principal granaries of Europe, the actual producers of Russian grain, the peasants who form the majority of the Russian population, used to go hungry. . . . After the revolution . . . there was an improvement in the nutritive conditions of the peasant population. . . . The Russian peasants have . . . abandoned their compulsory vegetarianism" : this writer testifies that they now eat very much more meat and butter than before (*Economic Trends in Soviet Russia*, A. Yugov, 1930, pp. 123-127). This testimony is all the more impressive in that it is given by an adversary of the Soviet Government, and a severe critic of planning.

chology, or the reconstruction of the human personality. If one were to express the condition of each of these in terms of curves, one would note that the consumption curve has been steadily declining [he means, in comparison with the brief halcyon days of the supplies of the nepmen in the cities during 1922-1924] but that the construction, culture and psychology curves have been steadily ascending." We must not assume that Mr. Hindus regards the deliberate allocation made by the First Five-Year Plan as having erred in not allowing a larger share to "the standard of living in terms of material satisfaction", at the cost of allotting less to the four other curves. We think, moreover, that he would be far better satisfied with the results of the past two years (1934-1935).

We do not ourselves presume either to agree with or to differ from this summary. We do not feel that we have the materials for judgment. But it is evident that the enormous over-capitalisation, as the financier would call it, in agricultural machinery involved by the liquidation of peasant ignorance by collective farming, and in the direct education of the children, must have made the First Five-Year Plan a Self-Denial Plan, to the extent of obliging Mr. Hindus to describe the citizens of the USSR as if they were the most richly cultured and the poorest fed people in the world! The Soviet Government, which had the responsibility of deciding annually on the allocation of resources by the State Planning Commission, may well have something to say in defence of its decision. There are ends more important than additional food supplies for immediate consumption. Even Adam Smith held that "defence was more than opulence". If, as some critics declare, the stringency was intensified in the last two years of the Plan (1931-1932), we may note that this was just when the government deemed it necessary, in the national interest, to accumulate stores of food along the line to the Far East, and to divert a large amount of labour force, with intentional publicity, to the building of aeroplanes and the making of munitions; avowedly with the intention of warding off an expected declaration of war by Japan. What economist will venture to say that this decision was unjustified? Whether the allocation in the Plan was so far defective as to be injurious to health may, from the standpoint of the community, perhaps be tested by its effect on the death-rate. "Infant mortality rates", we are told

by no less an authority than Sir Arthur Newsholme, "form a sensitive index of domestic sanitation, and of personal hygiene and care. . . . In European Russia the infant mortality per 1000 births in 1913 was 275; in 1927, 186; in 1930, 141 . . . which indicates a great improvement in personal hygiene since the Revolution."¹ There seems to be no doubt that, in spite of a local rise in mortality in a few areas during certain months of 1931-1932, amounting to a tiny percentage of the whole (as the result, as we have explained in our section on the Collective Farm,² less of any failure of crops than of the refusal of peasants to sow or to reap), the general death-rate and the infantile mortality rate for the USSR as a whole have continued to decline, year by year, *at the rate actually greater than in most other countries in the world*. This statistical fact, however, does not stop the complaints of the Moscow households about scarcity, which are eagerly picked up and repeated by uncritical tourists and the Riga newspaper correspondents. None of these critics seem to realise that the continuance of an experience of scarcity, of which many a household in the USSR complains, *does not imply in itself any diminution in the aggregate income of the community*, or even any lessening of the total supply of the various commodities that the consumers, furnished with steadily increasing purchasing power, are anxious to buy. In mercy to our readers, we confine ourselves to one outstanding example. There is, for instance, a constant scarcity of leather boots and shoes. Is this due to any shortage of supply? In 1913 (when, we may add, there were practically no boots or shoes imported, except the statistically negligible purchases of the wealthy aristocracy and the diplomatic circle, who ordered from Paris or London)³ we

¹ *Red Medicine*, by Sir Arthur Newsholme and J. T. Kingsbury, 1933, pp. 202-203.

² Chapter III. in Part I, "Man as a Producer" ("The Collective Farm").

³ The Russian statistics of imports for 1913-1914 did not consider boots and shoes worthy of a separate record, but included them, with every other commodity made of leather, in "leather goods". Of these there were imported in 1913, 118 million poods weight, and in 1914, 89 million poods (a pood being a little over one-third of a hundredweight), the values being given as 63 and 52 million roubles (*Russian Year Book*, 1915). It may be added that the entire export from the United Kingdom to all the countries of the world of boots and shoes amounted in 1914 only to 226,184 dozen pairs valued at £839,133, which were mostly sent to the Dominions and Colonies (Statistical Abstract for the U.K.); so that the amount sent to the whole of tsarist Russia must have been well under one million pairs, if indeed, any but the statistically insignificant high-priced, hand-made articles surmounted the prohibitive customs tariff at all!

read, "Russia manufactured in factories 17 million pairs of boots, but in 1931 the figure rose to 76·8 million pairs. In 1913 Russia manufactured 27 million pairs of rubbers; in 1931 the number had grown to 65·9 millions." Yet leather boots and shoes and even goloshes are, it is said, as difficult to buy as ever! Another household requisite in constant scarcity is soap. "In 1913 Russia manufactured 94,000 tons of soap; in 1931 she manufactured 189,000 tons (all of which was issued to Russian housewives) and yet the demand far exceeds the supply."¹ We could quote similar statistics, which would only make the reader dizzy, with regard to article after article, of which it can be shown that, year by year, *a much larger quantity per head of population is actually being distributed to the inhabitants*, without in any way lessening the apparent scarcity.

Paradoxically enough, this continued experience of a scarcity of commodities and services in general consumption or use is actually a triumph for planned economy. The very purpose of the General Plan, as declared at the Fifteenth Party Congress, has always been, through industrialisation, to effect a "decisive raising of the cultural level of both city and village population",² including particularly the three-quarters of the population who are women and children, and especially the backward strata of

If, as has been suggested, the individual handicraftsmen and kустар artels produced, in 1914, more leather boots than they did in 1932, of which there is no evidence, something may be added for this source of supply.

The same calculation is put in another way by a recent well-informed writer, taking other figures. "Prior to the war Russia produced . . . from one-fifteenth to one-twentieth pairs of boots per person per year. The great majority of the village population did not wear boots but plaited grass shoes. Only the well-to-do peasants possessed leather footwear. In 1932 the Soviet Union [a much smaller area than pre-war Russia] produced 74 million pairs—nine times as many as before the Revolution. Nevertheless the demand for boots was not met. Of the 74 million pairs of boots and shoes produced nearly 20 million went to children. Nearly all children of school age are supplied with boots through the schools. At the present time, production is at the rate of half a pair per inhabitant of the Soviet Union. This is ten times as much as before the war, but it is still insufficient. Not only the workers but even the peasants want to have (and many of them already have) several pairs of footwear for working, holidays, etc." (*Supply and Trade in the USSR*, by W. Nodel, pp. 165-166).

¹ *The Great Offensive*, by Maurice Hindus, 1933, pp. 32-33. The visitor is struck by the spotless cleanliness of the white blouses, which certainly surpasses that of the common apparel of countries in which soap is reputed to be more plentiful than it is in the USSR.

² Report of Fifteenth All-Union Party Congress, 1927. See the comments in *The Great Offensive*, by Maurice Hindus, 1933, pp. 32-33.

the population, the backward districts and the backward races. The awakening of these backward elements, numerically vast, and all of them, by the very essence of the Plan, now for the first time continuously provided with purchasing power, necessarily involves a great increase in their material wants and daily purchases. Formerly, very few of the fifty or sixty million adult or adolescent peasants, and hardly any of their sons and daughters, ever thought of wearing leather boots. They wrapped their feet in coarse coverings of canvas, flax or straw (*lapti*). Now nearly every peasant man and woman, and all their elder children, want leather boots; and, what is more, the elders for comfort and the young people for smartness, they demand every year several different pairs of boots, appropriate to different seasons and occasions.¹ The tsarist factory production of 17 million pairs per annum has, under the Bolshevik Government Plan, already been multiplied more than fourfold. Probably not until it has been further quadrupled will the average householder cease to consider boots scarce in the USSR. And the same is true with regard to sugar and soap, and in fact to nearly all other household commodities. Thus, notwithstanding a steadily increasing aggregate national income measured in commodities and services, and constantly rising money wages, securing a steadily growing aggregate distribution of these commodities and services, the phenomenon of inadequately supplied government shops and cooperative stores, in face of an ever-increasing purchasing power, is likely to continue for a long time. This is because, whenever each increasing popular demand is being overtaken by increasing production, an indefinite number of new wants emerge, towards the satisfying of which an ever-rising portion of the increased productive power has to be allocated by the State Planning Commission. Who can compute the effect of the ever-widening desire for two or three rooms per family, instead of the one, or much less than one, with which nine-tenths of the city population of tsarist Russia contented itself;

¹ We owe to Mr. Allan Monkhouse an illustrative anecdote of a Commissar of Forest Industries. He said: "We have given the peasant a tractor instead of his wooden plough. We have given him a booklet showing him how to work the tractor, and on the cover of the booklet we have allowed our printers to show an American land worker operating the tractor complete with his tie and his polished boots. Our peasant says, 'Thanks for the tractor, comrade, but where are the ties and the boots? Can you expect me to drive the tractor in *lapti*?' "

of the never satisfied clamour for more clothing and better; of the ever-rising standards expected in public health and public education; of the demand for more hospitals and maternity centres, with an almost illimitable increase in the nurses and doctors serving all the villages between the Baltic and the Pacific; of the desire for more schools and libraries, with endlessly more teachers and professors and textbooks and scientific apparatus, over one-sixth of the entire land-surface of the globe? Adapt and contrive as it may, the State Planning Commission is perpetually finding itself at a loss how best to allocate, among the constantly widening range and increasing magnitude of the consumers' effective demand, the always insufficient labour force, buildings and raw material by means of which alone this demand can be satisfied. Meanwhile no one can fail to recognise that, in 1935, there is vastly greater plenty, in the cities and in the villages, than there has been at any previous time in Russian history. The shops and stores are (1935) now abundantly supplied, ration cards have been one after another abolished, and the total retail sales are going up by leaps and bounds.

The World's Argument about the Plan

The western world, and particularly the economists and statesmen, have, as it seems to us, been intellectually taken aback by the First Five-Year Plan being actually put in operation. They have been still more surprised by what they have heard of its substantial fulfilment in 1932, actually before the five years had expired, and by the confident launching of a Second Five-Year Plan for 1933-1937, on a much larger scale. We do not think that the stupendous experiment of a deliberate planning of the economic relationships of a population now approaching 170 millions has yet attracted as much serious attention from economic students as so considerable an enterprise deserves.¹

¹ We may cite, as the most serious of the economic examinations of the Plan, the able volume entitled *Plan or No Plan*, by Barbara Wootton (1934); the chapter "An Economist Looks at Planning", in *Gold, Unemployment and Capitalism*, by T. E. Gregory (1933); *Die Sowjetwirtschaft, ihr Wesen und ihre neue Entwicklung*, by Boris Brutzkus (1929); *Der Fünfjahrplan und seine Erfüllung*, by the same (1932, 106 pp.). The two volumes edited and contributed to by Professor F. A. Hayek, entitled respectively *Collectivist Economic Planning* and *Economic Planning in Soviet Russia* (mainly by Boris Brutzkus), 1935, deserve attention as the most competent of the adverse statements. Per-

The Alleged Impracticability

The first reaction of the economist, as of the British banker and manufacturer, when they realise the magnitude and complexity of the soviet General Plan, and the number and variety of the contingencies to be taken into account, is to declare that the task is beyond human capacity. But ten years' experience of the preparation of "control figures" by the State Planning Department, together with the actual execution of the First Five-Year Plan in 1928-1932, afford definite proof that such planning is not impossible. As we have already suggested, the process is not essentially different from that actually undertaken, for their own enterprises, in the United States and in Great Britain, by such industrial leviathans as the United States Steel Corporation and Imperial Chemical Industries, Limited, Mr. Henry Ford and the General Electric Corporation, the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company and the Canadian Pacific Railway Company. Measured by the value of the plant and equipment in use, or by the number of persons engaged, or by the aggregate volume of the commodities and services produced, the enterprises of the USSR are, of course, in the aggregate, vastly greater than those of any one British or American corporation. But they are of the same order of diversity and complexity as those for which the profit-making leviathans construct, for their own purposes, plans essentially similar to the formulations of Moscow. Whether the Five-Year Plan of the USSR is equal in magnitude to those of a hundred of the largest capitalist combinations; or, if preferred, to those of a thousand of them, all put together, the size has a bearing upon the scale on which the planning process has to be organised, but lends little support to its suggested impossibility.

The communists point out, indeed, that the task of planning haps we should mention also *Die Gemeinwirtschaft*, by Ludwig Mises (second revised edition, 1932; English translation, 1935), which confines itself, in all its 500 pages, exclusively to a theoretical demolition of any planned economy, without any reference to the fact of its existence in the USSR during the preceding five years! A book published in Russian (at Riga), and also in German, early in 1929, and in an English version in 1930, but evidently mostly written before the First Five-Year Plan had been actually put in operation, gives many economic and statistical details adverse to Soviet Communism, and has a chapter devoted to the projected planning, entitled "Purposeful Economics and State Regulation" (*Economic Trends in Soviet Communism*, by A. Yugov, 1930, 349 pp.).

the production of a whole nation is free from some of the difficulties encountered in planning for a single industrial corporation, whatever its magnitude. The Plan for the USSR need take no account of the hostile action of business rivals, whether they compete for raw material, for labourers, for specialist technicians, for bank credit or for customers. It has not to worry about possible changes in the price that the customers within the USSR will pay for their commodities and services, because these prices are, for the most part, fixed, as part of the Plan, by the government itself. Every producing unit in the USSR is free from anxiety—at any rate so far as the home customers are concerned—as to the market for its products; if only because it is known that the whole population will be, throughout the whole year, in possession of a predetermined aggregate of purchasing power, and will therefore certainly have an “effective demand” for whatever it desires. No provision need be made for the extensive staff employed in other countries exclusively on advertising, in the unceasing attempt to attract customers away from the products of other producers. Similarly, nothing need be set aside for fire or marine insurance premiums, as there can be no wider spreading of risk than the funds of the community itself. There need be none of the failures of adjustment between the supply of particular kinds of materials, components or technical skill, and the capacity immediately to absorb any or all of these factors, because it is the same authority that determines how much or how many of each factor there shall be produced within the year, and at the same time determines how much and how many of each of them so turned out shall during the same period be taken into use, by each of the various establishments.

The Indispensability of a Plan

Communists, moreover, point out that those who shrink back alarmed from the very prospect of a planned production must realise that it affords the only alternative to the anarchy of individual profit-seeking. It is just this anarchy that has given the modern capitalist world its devastating alternation of booms and slumps, with its perpetual “reserve army” of unemployed workers, swelling periodically to millions. It may be thought less objectionable that this same anarchy produces also

the vast incomes and prodigious accumulations of the industrial millionaires, the financiers, and the owners of minerals and urban ground-rents, alongside the continual existence of millions of families lacking the necessities of life. It is plain that if a nation decides, or is somehow driven no longer to depend, for the direction of its capital and for the organisation of its production, on the competitive struggle among the profit-seekers, and to cease to rely exclusively on the "price mechanism" of a free market, it is necessary that each factory or other enterprise should be told what it is to produce. And this involves the formulation of a Plan ensuring the production of exactly those commodities and services that the community needs or desires.

The Plan obviates both Booms and Slumps

As the aggregate amount of commodities and services required by the whole community varies only slightly from year to year—merely increasing steadily along with the increase in population and in production—there is no room, in a planned economy, for booms or slumps. In a planned economy there is no motive leading speculative individuals, hopeful of profit, to multiply factories, mines, oil-wells or sugar mills, automobile factories or wheat fields, beyond what the community needs; with the result of presently overstocking the markets, slaughtering world prices, and making unprofitable during the slump all production whatsoever. So far as production and consumption within the USSR is concerned it has been demonstrated that the Plan can be carried out with an evenness unaffected by the financial storms and panics of the capitalist money markets.

It may seem that the least foreseeable contingency that has to be, in one or other way, deliberately planned for, is a change in popular demand, which leads to a temporary accumulation of "bad stock". But this is met in the USSR, as it is already in every department store in the world, by deliberately planning for selling off such surplus at reduced prices, a contingency which happens every year as a matter of course in one branch of trade or another. The Plan is promptly adjusted in the course of the year, to the alteration in demand, by slowing down the production in one branch, and increasing to a corresponding

extent the production in another branch of what, under planning, is one and the same community enterprise.

As a matter of fact such popular changes of taste or fashion are, to some extent, themselves deliberately planned in western Europe by the principal producing firms and advertisers, and in the USSR, in a different way, by the public authorities. In the Soviet Union the various scientific institutes, together with other research organisations directly connected with producing trusts or government departments, or with the consumers' co-operative movement, are constantly at work upon discovering what is the most advantageous consumption. These agencies study such questions as the nutritive value of particular food-stuffs and the functions of the various vitamins ; the hygienic effects of different textile materials for the clothing of infants, older children and adults respectively ; the part played by different dyestuffs and even by particular colours ; the suitability of different building materials ; the effect, upon health, mental development and particular diseases, of different methods of working, different diets and different forms of recreation and amusement. These scientific enquiries, which are, in the USSR, carried on in an amazing variety, seldom issue in legal prescriptions or prohibitions. But one or other of them is from time to time made the subject of intense popular propaganda in all the forms in which public opinion in the USSR is habitually influenced to an extent that western Europe can scarcely imagine. Those in authority in the USSR are, like the American advertising magnates, very definitely of opinion that both fashion and taste can be largely influenced by propaganda. Hence changes in the volume of demand are by no means so completely unpredictable as is often supposed. If, for instance, a scientific committee in the USSR should condemn the use of "lipstick" as unhygienic ; and if for any reason the Communist Party decided to throw all its energy into denouncing it as a "petty bourgeois" imitation of a manifestly decadent civilisation, we suggest that Gosplan, and the People's Commissar controlling the production of lipstick, would soon find statistical grounds for lessening the output of a commodity that people were considering inconsistent with communist ethics. On the other hand, it is asserted that the popular demand for footballs, and consequently their manufacture, have, during the last five years, been greatly

increased as a direct result of the deliberately undertaken propaganda in favour of outdoor games. Here, as elsewhere, the planned economy of the USSR differs widely from the unplanned economy of the western world. The whole science and art of commercial advertising depends on its ability to change the customers' demands. On this immense business there is spent annually in the United States and Great Britain several hundred million pounds. Communists are not slow to point out that for this considerable sum the community obtains no assurance that the best commodities are supplanting the worst, or even any increase in the total consumption, but only an increase of the business of certain capitalist undertakings, exactly balanced by the diminution of the business of others. It is claimed that in the USSR such influence as can be exerted on popular taste or fashion is deliberately guided by a social purpose, which itself figures in the prognostications of the State Planning Department.

Equally too, the planned economy of the USSR is unaffected by crises of currency or credit. It has to fear no bank failures and no panic withdrawal of foreign gold. Changes in price levels caused by ups and downs of currencies leave the USSR unmoved. The effective operation of the Plan, in short, is as little concerned with the rating of the rouble in the markets of the world as it is with the problems of internal currency or credit. The oscillations of the foreign exchanges, and the ups and downs of foreign prices, affect it only to the relatively small extent to which the world price level of the commodities which it wishes to import, taken as a whole, *varies at a different rate* from that of the commodities, taken as a whole, which it has to export in order to pay for its imports.¹

The Abolition of Involuntary Unemployment

The most important of all the achievements claimed for economic planning in the USSR is the abolition of involuntary unemployment. This took some time to effect. In the disorganisation of War Communism, there was, naturally, a great

¹ Such a *differential* variation between the level of prices of primary products (which are those which the USSR has to export) and that of prices of manufactures (which it desires to import) has, in fact, characterised the past decade; and to that extent the Plan has to take cognisance of world prices; exactly as internationally operating capitalist undertakings do.

deal of distress in the cities, through wage-earners losing their jobs, and between 1917 and 1921 hundreds of thousands of workmen returned to their villages. Even the rapid revival of petty business enterprise in the cities under the New Economic Policy did not prevent the unemployment figures mounting up to more than two millions in 1925. One of the results of the adoption, in 1928, of the First Five-Year Plan was a steady and continuous reduction in the numbers of the unemployed. By 1929 there was actually a scarcity of labour. By October 1930, the unsatisfied demand for workers was so general that the People's Commissar for Labour ordered the discontinuance of all benefit to the healthy able-bodied unemployed.¹ A large proportion of the thousands of enterprises in the USSR have been, for the past six years (1930-1935), continuously not able to get as many skilled operatives—and in many cases, for long periods, not even as many unskilled labourers—as they were able and anxious to take into employment at the trade union standard rates of wages.

So incredible is the spectacle of a land without unemployment

¹ "There is no unemployment in the country of soviets" was the proud boast of *Trud*, the trade union journal, on October 11, 1930. The following was the minute of the People's Commissar for Labour of October 9, 1930 :

(1) Owing to the great demand in labour force in all branches of national economy, all insurance offices will cease payment of unemployment benefits. No provision is made in the Budget for social insurance for payment of unemployed benefit during the additional quarter, October-December 1930.

(2) All Labour Offices must take the necessary steps for immediate despatch of the unemployed to places of work. This applies, in the first instance, to those in receipt of unemployment benefit.

(3) The unemployed must not only be assigned to such works as are indicated by their special qualifications, but when necessary, also to other occupations not requiring any specialised skill.

(4) No reasons for refusal to accept employment must be accepted, except that of illness, which must be supported by a medical certificate. Medical certificates are to be issued to the unemployed by the competent medical authorities. Persons holding such certificates are entitled to benefit, but the payments shall be made from the insurance funds for temporary incapacity to work.

(5) The heads of the departments dealing with labour and the chairmen of the insurance funds will be held personally responsible for the strict fulfilment of the above minute.

(6) This minute is to be put into operation immediately by telephone.

At the same time increased provision was made for converting selected unskilled labourers into skilled craftsmen. "Instead of the fifty million roubles that were paid out in unemployment benefits in 1930, twice that sum was provided in the 1931 budget for the training (along with maintenance allowances) of new industrial workers" (*In Place of Profit*, by Harry F. Ward, 1933, p. 5). The soviet authorities thought this kind of "unemployment pay for training for jobs which are crying out for competent workers . . . a constructive expense" (*ibid.*).

that (outside the USSR) it is still denied that it can be true. It is, for instance, objected that it is incorrect to say that unemployment has been abolished in the USSR, when there are actually thousands of workmen wandering about, some even taking holidays between job and job. It has been pointed out that various government departments have, during the past three years, combed out thousands of superfluous clerical employees, who, it is assumed (without any warrant), must consequently be involuntarily unemployed, and unable to get another situation anywhere, at a moment when most of the two hundred and fifty thousand collective farms are badly in need of book-keepers ! The steps being taken by the government to lessen the congestion of population in Moscow and some other cities by refusing permits for residing there to all persons without legitimate employment, are actually taken to mean that there must be serious unemployment in those cities, where, in fact, factories are seeking in vain for additional labour.¹ It is even suggested that the "deprived categories" (priests and monks, ex-landlords and ex-capitalists, speculators and members of the tsarist political police), who, if they have not taken to "socially useful" occupations, are not allowed to vote or to belong to trade unions or consumers' co-operative societies, and who, it is assumed (also without warrant), must be without work and subsistence, are economically the equivalent of a large proportion of the unemployed of London or Berlin.

All these expressions of incredulity are beside the mark. The phenomenon that is common to all capitalist countries, and absent from the scene in the USSR, has nothing to do with workers wandering from job to job ; or with seasonal workers returning home when their season's work is completed ; or with men and women taking their holiday in travel ; or with the nondescripts of the population of a great city outside any industrial organisation, who pick up a living how they can in ways too obscure and often too discreditable to be even listed ; or with the industrial malingerers, who exist in the USSR as elsewhere, and who desire nothing less than to be regularly employed. The Soviet Government does not compel people to work, any more than the British

¹ The Moscow Labour Placement Bureau "in June of this year (1933) received requests for 20,938 workers and could supply only 3222 ; in July, 21,293 requests and 1769 filled ; in August, 14,111 requests and 1433 filled ; in September, 9787 requests and 1176 filled" (article by John van Zant in *Moscow Daily News*, October 1933).

and American Governments do. If any person chooses to live without work, in order to take a holiday in the Crimea or to go down the Volga, no obstacle is placed in his way. He may, indeed, exist indefinitely in idleness by spending his savings or his inheritance, or living on gifts from relations and friends, without any legal proceedings being taken against him; although, as he is not a producer, he will not obtain a ration card, so that he must buy his meat and sugar with valuta at one of the 1300 Torgsin shops, or else, with roubles, in the free market. And he may, presently, find himself deprived of a vote as a non-worker. What is asserted is, not that there is, in the length and breadth of the USSR, none of this flotsam and jetsam of the shores of the industrial sea, but merely that there has been, since 1930, no mass of able-bodied men or women wishing to obtain employment, and unable to find an employer willing to engage them at wages. Far from subsidising unemployment, as so many other governments have been driven to do, in poor relief or social insurance benefits, the Soviet Government was able, in 1930, to stop all such subsidies and to proclaim its readiness to discover a job at trade union wages for every able-bodied worker, though not necessarily in his own city or in his own craft. The only alternative is that the government may think it preferable to pay him or her a maintenance allowance whilst receiving technical training for this or that skilled work. This is certainly a notable result of planned economy.

It is often suggested that this absence of involuntary mass unemployment is merely an incident of an exceptional state of things, at a moment when a prodigious expansion of industry is taking place; that it will probably not be of long duration, and that it is certainly unlikely, whatever the Plan may say, to be a permanent feature of the Soviet Union.¹ Even if this should

¹ "The difficulty is that no known system had been able to abolish unemployment—not even Communism—for it is now quite clear that in the last few years Russia has been passing through a "construction boom" analogous in every respect to that experienced in the capitalistic world; and that, with the gradual slackening of the intensity of that boom, the phenomenon of unemployment is appearing" (*Gold, Unemployment and Capitalism*, by T. E. Gregory, 1933, p. 287).

Professor Gregory omits altogether to allow for the *planned possession of purchasing power* throughout the whole year by every person within the collectivised production of the USSR. "If we lack purchasing power", writes an American economist, "we lack everything. Possessing it, we have everything we value. . . . The energy and ingenuity which have been expended on

prove to be true, it must be accounted no mean achievement of planning to have avoided the creation of mass unemployment during several years of great industrial transformation. In England, in the absence of plan, we did not avoid periodical unemployment on a large scale, even in the generations when the Industrial Revolution or the early Victorian railway construction was at its height. In the United States there have been periods of acute mass unemployment over large areas at the times of greatest industrial expansion without plan. But more than the temporary cessation of involuntary unemployment is claimed for soviet planning. It is argued that so long as the existing system of planning production and distribution is adhered to, there is no reason to anticipate that there need ever be, in the USSR, any involuntary mass unemployment (other than for brief intervals, in individual cases), whether "technological" or "cyclical" or, with proper dovetailing arrangements, even "seasonal".

This remarkable claim is based on the fact—apparently unbelievable by the deductive economists—that the plan itself provides, at the outset, for the possession of purchasing power throughout the whole year by every person in the country who is within any part of the collectivist organisation. This organisation now extends to every branch of industry, and (with the notable exceptions of the still remaining minority of independent individual peasants, together with the nomadic tribes, who produce mainly for their own subsistence) also to every branch of agriculture. The aggregate number of places to be provided in industrial establishments, in the various governmental, cooperative, cultural and social services, including the staffs of all the our financial institutions ought to be turned towards the repairing of a national damaged purchasing power . . . actual power to buy" (*American Economic Life and the Means of Improvement*, by R. A. Tugwell, 1933).

Professor Gregory's view is, we think, not supported by those economists who have examined the facts. The author of the most complete analysis yet made concludes that "If the authorities controlling a planned economy consider it more important than anything else that everybody should be found a job, and that all the stuff that is produced for sale to the public should be promptly consumed, then there is no reason why they should not get very near to achieving this aim. This does, I think, amount to saying that planning is itself a powerful lever for doing away with the particular form of unemployment crisis which besets the capitalist world of to-day: that is to say, prolonged unemployment which, though more severe in some trades than others, is yet so nearly universal as to raise the unemployment figure above the normal average in practically every single occupation, and which is accompanied by closing down of plants and congestion of markets with unsaleable goods" (*Plan or No Plan*, by Barbara Wootton, 1934, pp. 203-204).

state farms, and the membership of all the collective farms, is, at the very outset of each year's planning, deliberately fixed so as to be equal to the estimated total, during that period, of men and women able to work. For the academic or technical students giving their whole time to study or research, as for the sick and infirm, including those either too young or too old to work, corresponding provision is made, wherever wages are not being earned, by stipend or pension or insurance benefits. It is accordingly known that all these millions will have at their disposal, continuously throughout the whole year, at least the amount of purchasing power constituting an "effective demand" for commodities or services which will keep fully employed the various establishments that produce what these purchasers require. These establishments will, accordingly, all be seeking, in accordance with the Plan, to engage the corresponding number of workers to produce these commodities and services up to the aggregate amount of the people's "effective demand". The necessary balance which the Plan has to attain—the correspondence in amount between the aggregate effective demand of the people and the aggregate amount of the commodities and services to be produced—is secured by the appropriate division of the total product, at the prices fixed in the Plan, into the three indispensable shares that we have already described in the collective bargaining of the trade unions.¹ Sufficient has first to be allocated to the required maintenance, extension and increase of the whole aggregate of plant and equipment with which the ascertained total amount of labour force will work. A second cut has to be made to cover the cost of all the governmental, cultural and social welfare services, which have to be paid for collectively. The rest—if we take into account also the salaries and wages provided for all those who work in the first two categories—forms the wage-fund, available for the individual remuneration of all the workers in any occupation whatsoever. We need not here repeat what has been said elsewhere as to the manner in which the wage-fund is shared among the several trade unions, and how the time rates for all the various grades of workers are translated into piece-work rates. Nor need we stay to describe how the receipts from sales by the collective farms and the manufacturing artels are divided as between joint and

¹ Chapter III, in Part I, "Man as a Producer", pp. 183-192.

individual disposal. Assuming the prices of commodities and services to be fixed, and the wage-fund to be adjusted accurately to the total exchange value of the output as so defined, we see accurately determined a continuous orbit of circulation of (a) the energy of the entire labour force ; (b) production of the commodities and services desired ; (c) the remuneration, at the trade union rates agreed on, of all the workers ; and (d) an effective demand for all the commodities and services produced. The Plan itself thus purports to provide for a perpetual correspondence between the moving aggregates of (a) working population, (b) output, (c) wages and salaries creating effective demand, and (d) sales to the happy possessors of that effective demand.

This claim to a perpetual adjustment of what in other countries is left unadjusted has been met, among nearly all the economists of the western world, down to the end of 1934, with complete incredulity. Their rejection of the soviet claim appears to us to waver between two attitudes. On the one hand, it is still often assumed and implied, though with less explicit declaration than was formerly customary, not merely that such a planned adjustment is impracticable and undesirable, but also that it is unnecessary. If, it is said, governments would only leave business alone, such an adjustment must spontaneously emerge, without any planning, in every completely individualist society, in which there is no hampering interference, either by custom or law, trade union action or capitalist combination, with the free play of the "law of supply and demand". Whether or not such an assertion, relating to a society that has never existed anywhere in the world, can be logically upheld, it is to-day more commonly admitted, even by the most abstract economist, that this constant moving equilibrium is, in the world as we know it, never in fact achieved. Every capitalist country manifestly suffers acutely from alternate booms and slumps, accompanied by involuntary mass unemployment on a large scale. Nor can it candidly be maintained that there is any prospect in the future, under a régime of capitalist competition, of such an adjustment being attained as would prevent the continuance, the perpetual recurrence, and even the increase of what is now called technological unemployment. On the contrary, it may be predicted that technological unemployment will spread from country to country, and, assuming that inventions do not cease, even in-

crease. Accordingly, most economists now admit the series of maladjustments attendant on freedom of competition, but they regard them as inevitable. Most of these economists are prepared to meet the situation by a certain amount of well-devised interference with freedom of competition by such instruments as factory legislation; the common rules and standard rates obtained by the collective bargaining of trade unions; the maintenance of the unemployed, preferably by some system of insurance; the public control of capitalist monopolies; and latterly even by the state assumption of the bankers' regulation, according to their pecuniary interest, of the credit currency. What is significant is that all schools of economists seem to feel that it is necessary to asseverate that, whether or not a perfect adjustment can be secured along the lines that they severally propose, one thing is certain, namely, that the adjustment actually secured, or likely in the near future to be secured, in Britain or the United States is, in fact, much more nearly perfect than that which can possibly be achieved under the planned economy of the USSR which they are so disinclined to examine.

The Abstract Economist's Criticism of a Planned Economy

There is one school of economists, which has adherents in all the western countries, who do not trouble to dispute the actual achievements of the planned economy of the USSR, because they claim to possess a science according to which these achievements are logically impossible. It is only fair to set forth, even if succinctly, the argument which convinces such an economist that a planned economy must, by the very nature of its being, fail to produce the results that it claims.

Such an economist asserts, in the first place, that the absence in a planned economy from the great part of the field of distribution, of a completely free market among individual buyers and individual sellers, must necessarily prevent the maximum satisfaction of the aggregate of consumers taken as a whole. What he calls the "price mechanism", based on perfect freedom of competition among buyers and sellers in such a market, coupled with unhampered liberty to any entrepreneur to produce whatever he chooses, and complete freedom of movement from market to market, both of commodities seeking purchasers and of

purchasers seeking commodities, *must* necessarily result, the deductive economist would say, in the whole aggregate of consumers getting, in return for the whole aggregate of their expenditure, the very maximum that is possible of what they themselves decide to be their heart's desire.¹ Or, with greater circumspection, he may declare that such a perfect freedom for buyers and sellers alike, must certainly result in a greater aggregate satisfaction of the consumers' conscious wants than the decisions, whether as to what shall be produced, or at what price each commodity shall be sold, made by even the wisest legislature or government department.

The deductive economist's second assertion about a planned economy, such as that of the Soviet Union, would be that its abolition or supersession of the motive of pecuniary profit in the entrepreneur or other proprietor of the productive enterprises of the community, and also in the merchants and traders who move the commodities to the markets in which they are most keenly in demand, must necessarily result in a less assiduous attention to the wants and desires of the whole community of consumers. It is, such an economist declares, the desire for profit, the determination to make profit, and the expectation of being able to make profit, that alone calls forth the greatest energy and persistence in the mine-owner, the manufacturer, the merchant, the wholesale trader and the shopkeeper, or anyone who acts in any of these capacities. It is this motive, selfish as it seems, that drives the capitalist to engage in business, to risk the loss of his capital, to make or adopt new inventions, and to strive to satisfy, to the utmost degree and at the lowest cost, the wants and desires of the consumers, on whose continued purchases any lasting success in profit-making ultimately depends. Such an economist will confidently assert that, at any rate over the greater part of the field of production and distribution, there is no known substitute for the incentive of pecuniary profit, without which,

¹ "The actual direction of industry, the decision whether more wheat shall be produced and less corn [maize], or more shoes shall be produced and less hats," writes an American economist, "is left to the choice of independent producers who make their decision with reference to the state of the markets." To him it seems clear that "prices in the market-places are in effect a continual referendum on what men wish to produce, what they wish to consume, where they wish to work, and where they wish to invest their savings" (article by Dr. Benjamin N. Anderson, junior, on "A Planned Economy and a National Price Level", in the *Chase Economic Bulletin*, July 9, 1933).

even under the wisest government, the methods of production must inevitably stagnate, and the nation's aggregate output decline in quality, and even in quantity per head of population, whilst the efficiency of distribution would very largely disappear, to the incalculable loss in satisfaction of the consumers.

Dealing in greater detail with the planned economy of Soviet Communism, the deductive economist of the western world would point out that, if the Soviet Government fails to debit each of its capital enterprises with annual interest, at an appropriate percentage upon the amount of capital invested in them, its failure to add this interest to the cost of production deprives that government, and the public, of the data necessary for a decision as to which of the proposed new works it is economically most advantageous to proceed with first ; and indeed, also of the data which might lead to the judgment that some of them involve too large an expenditure of the nation's capital to be economically justified. The only system, it is asserted, on which a community can obtain the maximum return for its investments of capital, is one which takes for its guide such a continual allocation of capital as will result in the return yielded to the last increment of capital employed in each of the enterprises being always uniform.¹ This optimum distribution of the nation's aggregate capital, it is declared, is that to which, under perfect freedom of competition, unfettered private enterprise is always tending to approximate. Such an optimum allocation of capital, it is asserted, will never be reached, or even attempted, by any government. In particular, it is urged (quite forgetting the grounds of the decision in the USSR) that the whole policy of Soviet Communism is constructing gigantic productive works scattered all over the USSR, and therefore not always at the economically most advantageous place, and its haste in developing mass production by the use of the latest machinery, at a time when capital is relatively scarce, has resulted in the consumers getting positively less to eat and less to wear than if

¹ Any government, of course, finds that it has to take into account needs and results incommensurable by the economists' arithmetic. The London County Council does not debit its parks with interest on their capital cost, as it is quite impossible to measure in money the returns that they make to the community ; and quite futile to compare the relative cost and utility of an expensive open space in a densely crowded central area, with those of a less costly open space on the edge of the mass of houses, where the use by the public is largely prospective.

the handicraftsman and the kulak had been left free to enlarge their own more primitive enterprises. It is suggested that it would even have paid the USSR to have imported the cheap machine-made products of western Europe and America in return for more timber, grain and furs, putting its scanty capital into enlarging these industries, rather than sink that capital in the attempt to make the USSR self-sufficient in the supply of every kind of machinery (as if there were no other consideration to be taken into account !).

Finally, the deductive economist of the western world denies that under the best planned economy there can be, in a community continuing to make inventions, to discover new sources of wealth, or even to change its fashions, any complete abolition of involuntary unemployment—even long-continued mass unemployment. Such ever-recurrent unemployment, it is declared, is the price that must inevitably be paid for the freedom to invent and explore, the freedom to substitute new methods for old, and even the freedom to alter tastes and habits, upon which the very progress of mankind depends. Such an economist may sometimes admit that the community as a whole may rightly relieve the sufferings of the involuntarily unemployed, as it might the victims of an earthquake. But the deductive economist is more apt to hint, if not openly to declare, that mass unemployment under the operation of the “ price mechanism ” is merely a result of the “ rigidity ” of the wage-scales of the wage-earners, even more than that of the rates of interest demanded by investors ; a rigidity which obstructs the operation of the law of supply and demand. The amount of unemployment, it is sometimes asserted, is a function of the cost of labour. If the wage-earners would let the “ price mechanism ” apply freely to the remuneration of labour, and, in bad times, accept lower wages, there would be fewer unemployed. If wages were low enough, it seems to be held, in face of all the facts, that no person would be involuntarily unemployed, perhaps except, transiently, a few individuals, through temporary maladjustments of the market !

A Communist Reply to the Economist's Criticism

The economic thinkers in the USSR to-day would, we fear, deal very summarily with such criticisms of the economists of

the western world as we have ventured to set forth.¹ The claim that the operation of the price mechanism in an absolutely free market necessarily secures the maximum satisfaction then and there possible of the wants and desires of the whole aggregate of consumers, would be simply laughed to scorn. In the first place, it would be objected that such perfect freedom is demonstrably incompatible with the actual organisation of any human society that has ever existed. It is, in fact, no better than an economic myth, and one which cannot be shown to be capable of application in any community whatsoever. Even as an economic myth, it must be rejected as logically indefensible, because by its very nature it is dependent on any number of unstated and arbitrary assumptions, such as the institution of individual ownership in the means of production ; the universal application of laws against theft and fraud of the particular kind now in force in western Europe and the United States ; and the existence of a police force capable of rigidly enforcing such laws. But, even assuming that such a mythical argument could have any cogency, the communist absolutely denies that there is any ground for the inference that the price mechanism, under complete freedom of production for a free market, ensures the maximum satisfaction of the consumers' desires. The "price mechanism" does not even purport to have regard to the wants or desires of all the members of the community, but only to those of such of them as possess purchasing power. *It is only what he calls "effective demand" that the deductive economist claims to satisfy.* It is only those having "effective demand" who are allowed votes in what has been termed a "continual referendum on what shall be produced and consumed". Yet in every country of capitalist civilisation a considerable number of persons at any time, and in every recurring slump millions of persons, find themselves, through no fault of their own, for longer or shorter periods, without any purchasing power, and yet with imperative wants and desires which are "effective" enough to cause suffering and

¹ It would be hard to convey, to the economists of the western world, the depth of the contempt felt for their reasoning by the economists of the USSR—unless by the estimate that it is at least equal to that felt by most of the economists of the western world for the reasoning of their Russian colleagues ! We venture to suggest that the reciprocal ignoring of each other's studies and the reciprocal contempt for each other's arguments is, on both sides, unworthy of what should be a matter of serious common investigation.

even death, but which do not constitute any "effective demand" that the economist will recognise.

Moreover, the economist's whole inference of "maximum satisfaction", even of "effective demand", is logically unsound, unless it can be shown that equal amounts of purchase price represent, to different purchasers, equal sacrifices of happiness. It is obvious that this cannot be demonstrated. On the contrary, the very inequality in individual wealth, which exists to a greater or lesser degree in every human society short of complete communism, necessarily involves the uncomfortable fact that purchase prices, of equal amount in money, represent, in different buyers, extreme differences in sacrifice. It follows that there is absolutely no ground for the inference that these equal prices purchase equal satisfactions. The London crowds returning home from city offices, overtaken by heavy rain, incur the cost of taking public vehicles very largely according to their degrees of opulence: the wealthy banker takes a cab in the least shower; the salaried manager yields to the expense if the rain gets slightly worse; the junior clerk turns up his collar and holds out until he can reach the underground railway; whereas the girl typist, sharing her scanty wage with a sick mother, trudges homeward drenched, before she will part with the price of to-morrow's dinner. But it is not merely the maximum satisfaction of desires that the price mechanism fails to secure. It is plain that, with unequal incomes, there is not even a decent measure of justice secured in a community of persons having unequal needs.¹ The "price mechanism" in the free market does not even ensure a maximum of social efficiency in wealth production, because this requires the exaction of less work from the sick and the weak than from the hale and strong, and the provision for the former of more care and sustenance than for the latter; whereas the prices for their labour, which provide their respective purchasing powers,

¹ The communist may safely admit that, *if it must be accepted that personal satisfaction is accurately measured by retail price*, the conclusions of Professor Mises and Professor Hayek are correct. But it is obvious that, in a population having unequal incomes, they are glaringly at variance with the facts. Other opponents of Soviet Communism admit that it "cannot be assailed in this position. If the problem consists of making the economic system serve extra-economic ends"—such, we suggest, as national defence, the improvement of Public Health and a universalisation of culture—"then the planned economy provides an excellent solution" (*Economic Planning in Soviet Russia*, by Boris Brutzkus, 1935, p. 230).

tend, in a free market, to be more or less proportionate to their value to the profit-making employer, and this value is almost in inverse ratio to their needs !

But the communist has a far stronger reason for objecting to the economist's argument in favour of production for a free market. The economist apparently can never rid himself of the conception that the main object of society must be to enable and promote the maximum accumulation of individual riches. For the sake of this all-important end, he will put up with the existence, and even the increase, of inequality in opulence among individuals and social classes, and the existence of a destitute proletariat whose wages do not suffice to maintain their families in health. For this end he insists on buying labour in the cheapest market, actually preferring, in many cases, children to adults, women to men, and even weaklings to the strong, if only he can get them at a low enough wage. For this end, he exploits the labour of backward races, incidentally destroying their indigenous social order, and recklessly introducing among them disease and demoralisation. For this end, he will allow the unrestrained using up of the future resources of the community ; the careless destruction of the forests ; the reckless draining of the oil-fields ; even the destructive exhaustion of the soil itself. The amenity, the beauty, even the healthiness of the country will be sacrificed to the supreme end of a maximum of production, not of wealth to the community but of riches to the entrepreneurs, to the very accumulation of which, it is claimed, society owes its material progress. It is interesting to contrast, with the criticism of the western economists, the ends that are sought in the planned economy of the USSR. Both the First and Second Five-Year Plans were avowedly governed, not by the question of how to secure the greatest profit or personal riches for a small minority of entrepreneurs and captains of industry—not even the greatest amount of wealth for the whole of the present generation—but *by considerations not taken into account at all by the individual profit-maker*, of whom the western economist habitually thinks. There was, first of all, the need for national defence, which is a terribly expensive service, not yielding pecuniary profit to the citizens as such. There was the requirement, deemed imperative for strategic reasons, of the quickest possible industrialisation of the country, irrespective of the economic cost that might be

thereby incurred, in order that the USSR might become practically self-sufficient before the capitalist powers were able to combine to attack it, or to blockade it. There was the imperative necessity, as it was, after prolonged consideration, deemed to be, of mechanising agriculture, as the only way of quickly increasing the gross output of foodstuffs to an extent that would ensure, even if not a maximum yield of profit each year, yet enough food in the famines which had heretofore desolated Russia every five or ten years. Then there was the conception that justice as well as humanity demanded that all the various peoples which together make up the USSR should be brought up to a common level of civilisation. This required that the new industrialisation should be extended to all parts of the Soviet Union, even if this involved some sacrifice of the greatest possible immediate wealth to the dominant race. The same conception demanded that positively more should be done for the women and the children than for the male adults, and more for the backward races and the backward districts than for those which had already made more progress. All this emphasised the importance, even for the sake of productive efficiency, of rapidly developing the education of an exceptionally backward population; and of equipping the whole area with hospitals, doctors and nurses, and generally the expensive apparatus of a Public Health service to fight disease and lessen the excessive infant mortality. The judgments and the decisions on all these matters may have been right or they may have been wrong. But no person of common sense can deny that they were of supreme importance to the well-being of the community and that they had to be made on other grounds than their effect on the personal riches of the minority of investors, or even than the amount of pecuniary profit or loss that they involved to the existing generation. Can we wonder, when the planned economy is found to be determined to an extent that is relatively great, by such ends as these rather than by considerations of what would yield the maximum profit—and this profit to be enjoyed by only a minority of the population—that the economist's criticisms fail to secure in the USSR even the amount of attention that they deserve? Whilst the western economists count as success solely the maximising of exchange values in relation to production costs, the soviet planners take account of every purpose of an enlightened community.

How the General Plan might be Upset

Probably nothing will convince the deductive economist that a planned economy can possibly work out to the common satisfaction, unless and until the actual results in the USSR during the ensuing decade are forced upon his attention. We think it more profitable to examine the doubts that are expressed, even occasionally in the USSR itself, whether the Plan may not be somewhat of the nature of a fair-weather excursion, almost certain to be upset by unforeseen contingencies. Even assuming that the Plan ensures, under ordinary circumstances, an approximation to complete adjustment between population and opportunities of employment, between output and sales, between wages and prices, and therefore between supply and demand, will it not be completely upset by any serious war, any considerable famine or even any extensive pestilence? The answer appears to be twofold. As already explained, it is of the essence of the Plan that it should include a definite provision for unforeseen contingencies. We may assume that the State Planning Commission has been accumulating an ever-increasing knowledge of all the various kinds of contingencies that have, during the past decade, more or less interfered with the fulfilment of the Plan at this or that point. This statistical experience enables an estimate to be formed, each year, of the probable "limits of deviation" from the prognostications that are constructed from the data supplied by every establishment. The variations in the harvests of the past fifty years, taken district by district and crop by crop, ought to enable a prediction to be made, with practical certainty, that the harvest of the ensuing year will not be at worst much less than the lowest recorded minimum, nor yet at best much greater than the highest recorded maximum of the past generation. Similar calculations can be made for each branch of production, for the aggregate population, for the average amount lost annually by sickness and accident, by breakdowns of machinery, by fraud and embezzlement and so on. In a calculation extending over so large a mass of persons and of facts, of such extreme varieties of every kind, the effect of many of the contingencies may be expected, in a considerable degree, to balance each other. For perfect safety, there should be, in each year's Plan, as soon as it can be afforded, the provision of a reserve at every point, in

order that even a serious deviation from the Plan may not involve so great a dislocation as to produce calamity. It would, of course, not be necessary to provide ten fully adequate reserves to meet ten different sorts of contingency. They will not all happen in a single year. Probably half the number would suffice. There is, however, one reserve that should certainly be fully provided in each year's Plan; that is, a store of wheat (and, possibly, of certain other foodstuffs), not only in one centre, but also in every oblast, sufficient to feed the whole population in case of a failure of the harvest as nearly complete and as widespread as that of 1891 or that of 1921. Possibly, in the climate of the USSR the same sort of reserve should be provided of timber, coal and oil, as the means of heating during the winter. Even with a Plan, such a perpetually maintained store of food, and perhaps also of heating material, by way of assurance in the event of a breakdown of transport, is as indispensable to the USSR as its gold reserve.¹

The contingency of war may perhaps be even more calamitous than a famine or a pestilence, especially as it may be accompanied or quickly followed by both of these scourges. Something should be done to meet the calamity of war, as of any other contingency, by providing stores of foodstuffs, equipment and munitions, together with a gold reserve, as a necessary part of the Plan. But what would happen in the case of a prolonged war on all the various fronts of the USSR, which would soon exhaust all possible

¹ It is as well that the USSR should be reminded also that the continued success of the General Plan will always depend on the continuance of the purpose of the governing authorities. "The mere fact that a plan has been made", it has been well said, "will not, of itself, in a changing world of fallible people, eliminate unemployment once and for all without more ado. A planning authority must be continually revising and adapting and extending its plans in order to make good its own mistakes and to meet the needs of new situations. If it sits still and does nothing, it will be faced with exactly the same situation as the government of an unplanned economy which sits still and does nothing, or next to nothing, to find employment for those to whom private industry offers no place."

"The true difference between the two types of organisation is that the capitalist government, except so far as it can initiate a few schemes of public works the products of which are not offered on any commercial market, is *compelled* to sit still and do nothing, because, if it should go further than this, its efforts to restart industry that has stopped will have the effect of stopping such industry as is already going; whereas the controllers of a socialised system, if they set additional plans afloat in order to absorb unemployed labour, are merely extending the existing system of industry, instead of establishing a rival one which cannot work harmoniously with that already in operation" (*Plan or No Plan*, by Barbara Wootton, 1934, pp. 203-204).

reserves ? The answer is that the abstraction of most of the able-bodied men from peace-time production, their maintenance in the field, and the universal concentration of practically all factories on war work instead of producing household necessities, would inevitably soon transcend the provisions of any Plan. It would certainly reduce the civil population of the towns to very short commons. On the outbreak of war, they would be none the worse off because there had been, throughout the years of peace, the most complete planning. Whilst the war lasted, its maintenance would have to be planned for, just as much as the winter's ice. Put simply, the Plan would have to provide for the illimitable wastage of war by suspending improvements and extensions of a capital nature ; by cutting down all expenditure on cultural objects ; by severely rationing the population ; by reducing everybody's income and by increasing everybody's labour. All these measures would have to be taken even if there had been no Plan. What a Plan would accomplish for the whole people during war—as it does for a shipwrecked crew, in an open boat, inadequately supplied with food—is to enable the privation to be diffused equally among the whole company, with such preferences to the children, the aged, and the nursing mothers as the current humanitarianism might prescribe, instead of letting the whole weight of suffering fall on the weakest members. But, even in the worst crisis of the longest war, there need be no persons unemployed. There is, indeed, in those circumstances, almost a certainty not only of everybody's labour being demanded, but also of an increase in everyone's hours of work. No one need be allowed to starve to death, but everyone, with no exception for the rich, would have to forgo luxuries, including the luxury of leisure.

There is, however, quite another objection often made to the possibility of planning : the Plan, it is said, will be wrecked, not by war, with its diminution of production, but by the very success of the Plan in its steady increase of production. What will happen when the present outburst of industrialisation slackens its pace ? It is admitted that, at present, the USSR can find employment for every able-bodied man and woman of its rapidly increasing population. But presently the factories will all be built, the railways will all be made, the cities will all be paved and lighted and drained ; the sovkhosi and kolkhosi will have their barns

bulging with excessive grain. It is already predicted by some economists in the western world that over-production is at hand, and that there will presently be as many unemployed in the USSR, in spite of its planned economy, as there is to-day in Great Britain and the United States. How can the Plan prevent future unemployment, it is said in Great Britain, with so many babies still being born, and with every demand already satisfied ?

It seems to us a strange objection to make to a planned economy that it will inevitably result in such a plentiful supply of commodities and services that every shop will be heaped up with goods of which everybody has so much that nobody desires to purchase ! In the USSR, even more obviously than in countries of a more mature civilisation, it is the very nature of human desire to be literally insatiable. There are, at present, in the Soviet Union nearly 170 millions of people wishing for more rooms, more meat and more sugar and butter, more clothes and more boots. And all of these millions are being provided throughout the whole year with purchasing power ! What was formerly obtained only by the relatively well-to-do, from sugar and butter to felt hats and silk stockings ; from several meat meals a day to wireless sets and daily concerts or theatrical performances, is now being more and more universally demanded by every peasant from the Polish border to the Pacific coast. We have already mentioned how the result of multiplying fourfold since 1913 the annual production of boots and shoes in the USSR has been to make boots and shoes seem scarcer than ever, because fifty or sixty million people are demanding leather boots instead of only a few millions. There is still a long way to go before every peasant and every workman between Murmansk and Vladivostock has as much food, as many delicacies, as spacious a home, clothes as comfortable for all the seasons, as good an education and as many books and newspapers to read, as frequent visits to the cinema, the theatre and the opera, as—to set no higher standard—the average professional man of western Europe ! When that degree of satiety has been reached—indeed, long before it has been even approached—there will arise new and competing desires for greater leisure, for longer and more frequent vacations, and for new opportunities of travel. If every material want has been supplied and every desire satisfied in every member of the community, the ultimate remedy for over-production is always at

hand in a reduction of the working day of the entire population—at last, by the then universal machine, freed from insistent toil—from eight hours a day to seven, to four or even to two.¹ The short answer to this strange apprehension of over-production is that the Plan itself regulates, according to the community's need of commodities and services, the number of hours per day during which all the able-bodied adult members of the community will be asked to produce.

The Law of Diminishing Returns

There is a more plausible way of "proving" that an early recurrence of unemployment is inevitable in the USSR, even under a planned economy. The annual increase in population, together with the labour continually rendered surplus by increasing mechanisation and rationalisation, might conceivably be taken into employment by bringing more land under cultivation, or making cultivation more intensive, or by starting more and more manufacturing enterprises. But, it is argued, the Law of Diminishing Returns must come into play from the point at which the additional workers will find themselves, because of their resort to worse land and inferior sites, producing not enough profit to induce any entrepreneur to continue the business, and therefore, as the economist argues, not enough foodstuffs for their own subsistence; or in manufacture, producing commodities so faintly desired by a satiated community that they will not sell at a price that will even buy the producers bread!

The communist answer is to laugh at the delusion that there is any such thing as a Law of Diminishing Returns. All that is needed is the appropriate knowledge of the possible improvements of processes of production, whether agricultural or industrial, which will enable any number of persons to produce any amount of output of the commodities that the consumers desire. At any rate, if this is an exaggeration, even our existing knowledge would enable us to multiply many times the amount of foodstuffs that

¹ This eventual reduction of the hours of labour is actually in the minds of those who prepare the Plan. "The Soviet Government", we are told, "foresees a time when overproduction will necessitate a gradual reduction of working hours for the community. Many years may elapse before this point is reached in the USSR, on account of the enormous leeway in the production of commodities which has now to be made up" (*Moscow, 1911-1933*, by Allan Monkhouse, 1934, p. 262).

the agriculturists at present produce, and permit the industrialists to multiply equally their output of clothing and every other commodity. To the communist it seems that it requires only scientific planning to demonstrate to the most sceptical practical man that the Law of Diminishing Returns is, with the technical science of the twentieth century, no better than an economic myth. The world is living, in fact, under a Law of Increasing Returns, likely to endure until a date far too remote to be taken into account in twentieth-century planning.

" But Planning means Slavery "

There is, however, a final objection to economic planning with which nearly every argument on the subject concludes. Admitting that planning may be practicable, and that a cunningly devised Plan may deal successfully with all contingencies, the result can be achieved, it is triumphantly declared, only by reducing the community to the condition of slavery. It is the very essence of capitalism, it is said, to cause production to be automatically adjusted by competition in a free market, and by this means to ensure the utmost attainable satisfaction of the desires of the consumers. This is taken to represent a state of perfect freedom. The very nature of planning, it is said, involves not only compelling everybody to work, but also, as there can be no free market, commanding them where they are to work, what particular work they shall do, and how many hours a day they shall devote to what will certainly be an uncongenial task, prescribed by a ubiquitous bureaucracy!¹

Let us analyse the modicum of validity that this objection contains. How far is it correct to say that the planning of the community's production and distribution involves, either in theory or in practice of the USSR, a compulsion to labour?

It is hard to see how it can honestly be suggested that, in the USSR, the General Plan itself imposes any legal obligation to

¹ " The system would require the complete regimentation of producers. As consumers they could choose between the commodities available. But on the choice of commodities to be produced they could have relatively little influence. They would have to take what it was decided to produce. And what it was decided to produce would be the resultant, not of the conflicting pulls of price and costs, but of the conflicting advice of different technical experts and politicians with no objective measure to which to submit the multitudinous alternatives possible " (*The Great Depression*, by Lionel Robbins, 1934, p. 155).

labour upon any person whatsoever. What the Plan does is a very different thing, namely, to ensure that *opportunity* to produce shall be provided for every able-bodied person. The obligation to labour remains, in the USSR, as in the United States, just as it is involved in man's very nature. He must eat in order to live. In every capitalist country to-day millions of persons find themselves without opportunity to "make a living", and at the same time forcibly prevented, by the police protection of private property, from satisfying even their most urgent needs. In the USSR, for every member of the collectivised organisation of industry and agriculture, the Plan provides a place in which he can earn trade union wages. But although the Five-Year Plan provides the necessary total number of situations waiting to be filled, neither the Plan nor any other law of the USSR dictates to Ivan or Nikolai which of the situations he is to fill. In a much more real sense than in Great Britain or the United States, he may, according to his faculties, make his own choice of work. Up and down the country many thousands of heads of establishments of the most diverse kind are seeking additional recruits, even recruits devoid of specific skill or training, in order to enable their works to produce up to capacity. The trade unionists, and also the recruiting departments of the factories, will tell Ivan and Nikolai where they can hopefully apply for jobs, and will even help them to go to the jobs. The establishments themselves have often sent out specially recruiting agents to remote villages who provide transport and subsistence on the journey (including the dependants) for any man or woman who will engage to serve at the standard wage. But no law compels any person (unconvicted of crime) to accept any one of these situations, even after he has exhausted all his savings or his inheritance, if he prefers either to live on his relations, or to incur the penalties for detected theft, or simply to starve to death.

There are seeming exceptions to this sweeping statement, but they do not affect the argument. Thus every member of (or candidate for) the Communist Party, and every member of the Communist League of Youth (Comsomols), has voluntarily undertaken, as a condition of admission to these organisations, or of remaining therein, that he will undertake any task or duty that is assigned to him by his corporate superiors. This obligation leads sometimes to the most devoted self-sacrifice for the

common good, and occasionally even to the most heroic martyrdom in the cause. But no one is required to join these organisations, and no such compulsion is involved in the Five-Year Plan. The Courts of Justice have constantly to sentence convicted criminals to imprisonment for specific crimes; and the sentence often takes the humane form of requiring the defendant to continue for a prescribed term (usually not exceeding six months) at his accustomed occupation in a particular establishment, suffering a deduction from his monthly wage. If the penalty is between six months and three years, he may be selected for reformatory treatment at Bolshevo or other reformatory settlement. In graver cases the defendant may be sentenced to a term of penal servitude, and be put to work on making a new canal or road. But all this has nothing to do with the General Plan. Equally remote from the Plan is the statutory privilege of all the rural inhabitants, in place of paying a road tax, to perform a certain number of days' labour on the local roads (as was the case in England down to 1835; and as is still the case in France, in some parts of the United States, and in various other countries). There may be other cases of *levée en masse* of all available inhabitants when, in some exceptional emergency, such as a fire or a flood, loss of life has to be prevented.¹ Even the forced removal from their homesteads to other districts, meaning normally to less pleasant opportunities of earning their living, of kulaks and other recalcitrants who in 1931-1932 obstructed the formation of collective farms or the timely sowing and reaping—harsh and arbitrary measure as this seems to the Englishman—was neither authorised nor contemplated by the Five-Year Plan. In short, unless we are to consider as slavery all work done for wages or salary, in pursuance of contracts voluntarily entered into, and upon conditions settled by the trade unions in collective bargaining, there does not seem to be any implication of slavery involved in a planned economy. The Government of the USSR

¹ Thus, it is pointed out that "Russian law . . . provides a reserve power of complete industrial conscription, which requires that in case of public crises everyone between the ages of eighteen and forty-five in the case of men (or forty in the case of women) must take part in work required by the Government except only women more than seven months advanced in pregnancy, nursing mothers and women with young children who have no one else to look after them" (*Protection of Women and Children in Soviet Russia*, by Alice Withrow Field, p. 225; Labour Code of the Russian Federal Republic, articles 11 to 13, quoted in *Select Documents Relative to Labour Legislation in the USSR*, Cmd. 3775; *Plan or No Plan*, by Barbara Wootton, 1934, p. 79).

has, indeed, no need to employ compulsion to fill its factories or state farms, or even its lumber camps. It finds it quite sufficient, as we shall explain in the following chapter,¹ to use the device of making more attractive the particular occupations in which there is, at any time, or in any locality, a shortage of suitable applicants. The obvious remedy is to provide additional opportunities for training in such occupations, effectively open to the youth of either sex. An even simpler way is to pay more liberally for the kinds of labour that are temporarily in short supply. Thus, in 1932, in the exceptionally rapid development of electrical installation there was, nearly everywhere, a shortage of copper-smiths. It was accordingly provided that more youths who voluntarily applied should be selected for training as copper-smiths, and it was also arranged by the appropriate trade union that the coppersmith should be paid at a higher rate than other smiths. The result was that more youths were tempted to learn coppersmithing, whilst many adult mechanics voluntarily qualified as coppersmiths in the evening technical classes. Another instance of payment according to "social value" is the decision come to in 1933 to allow a special increase in wages, coupled with a special exemption from certain forms of taxation, to the workers resident in the extreme east of Siberia, a measure presently extended to the districts bordering on Mongolia, in order to retain in those areas a population (and even to promote the removal to them of other persons) whose presence would help to defend it against a possible Japanese invasion. In conclusion, it is perhaps not unfair to suspect that the real origin of this particular objection to planning is, not that the Plan condemns the proletariat to this or that form of wage labour, but that the Plan is rooted in the conception which Lenin borrowed from the Christian Fathers, namely, that "if a man do not work neither shall he eat"—even if he be in legal possession of property! This, however, is an objection not to economic planning but to the whole constitution of the USSR.

Consumers' Control instead of Producers' Control

There remains to be stated one principle of organisation that we believe to be fundamental to the successful operation of a

¹ Chapter IX. in Part II., "In Place of Profit".

planned economy. If the Plan is to be successful, it must be devised and executed for the benefit, and according to the desires, not of any section of the population—not even of so large a section as all the entrepreneurs in an industry, or as all the trade unionists in that industry, or as all the manual workers, or even as all the producers as such—but of the entire community. Just as planning by the employers of labour will fail, or planning by the financiers, or even by all the capitalist class, so planning by or for the persons working in particular occupations, or even in all the several occupations, will fail; even as the management of factories by the workers' committees failed, in the episode that we have described in Chapter VII., of workers' control in the Petrograd of 1917–1918. Planning by or in the interests of the producers always proceeds by such a restriction or other manipulation of the output as will lead to a higher price. It was, we suggest, an instance of Lenin's genius that he led the Supreme Economic Council in 1918, and taught both the State Planning Commission and the Council of Labour and Defence that there was no way of ensuring that economic planning should be continuously directed to the benefit of the whole community, other than placing the control in the hands of the representatives, *not of any of the organisations of producers, but of organisations representing the consumers*. Only in this way can it be ensured that output should be continuously increased and that production shall really be "for use" and not "for profit", whether the profiteer be the capitalist employer or the proletarian craftsman.

Citizens' Control where that of the Consumer fails

It was not difficult to see that the consumers' cooperative societies, with a membership becoming practically universal, were the appropriate organs for administering, under their committees of management elected by and responsible to all the members, both the wholesale and retail distribution of food and commodities for household use, and even, in many cases, the production of such commodities. But this form of consumers' organisation is not available for the whole of consumption or use. There is no possibility of organising the unknown millions of persons who will, ultimately and indirectly, use or consume the products of the giant factories producing turbines, or those manufacturing

ball-bearings or motor lorries or tractors. Equally impossible is it to organise the users of the railway service, or of the Volga steamboats, or of the post and telegraph and telephone services. Nor can it be said that the workers in these services have interests in common with the users of them. The users and consumers in these cases are nothing less than the whole citizen community. In these, and a hundred other cases, the supreme direction and management can be undertaken only by the government itself, either central or local, with the assistance of advisory or consultative committees of the several categories of workers concerned in the production, and preferably also with the help, by way of criticism and suggestion, of specially qualified representatives of particular sets of users of the several products.

There is another reason why the planning of production, like its direction and management, cannot universally be entrusted either to the producers themselves, in their several occupations and trade unions, or to the consumers themselves, whether in the consumers' cooperative societies, or in committees of specially qualified users of particular services. All these organisations, and their members, are necessarily interested chiefly *in their own wants and desires*. Their minds are filled with a sense of present requirements. They are not to be trusted to plan, impartially and without bias, for the future. They are not qualified to weigh one against the other the importance of a fuller supply for the present, and a proper provision for the next generation. The community alone has to live for ever. The faithful communist, looking in a distant future for a "classless society", asserts that the state will "wither away". But whatever happens to the state, regarded as the wielder of coercive power, the state, in the double aspect of a benign housekeeping mother, indissolubly united with a trained and experienced statistician, will evidently always be with us ; and, as we suspect, with civilisation becoming ever more complex, continuously more and more !

Just as the central committee at the Kremlin alone is capable in estimating rightly both the needs of national defence against foreign aggression, and the appropriate means of warding off this danger to the very existence of the community, so a central planning authority alone is in a position adequately to survey the needs of the future, and to make the appropriate provision, even at the cost of the present generation, which will secure, alike to

the producers and to the consumers who are to follow, the conditions of an unbroken continuance of their common well-being. And thus, in our judgment, it was right to put the appointment of the USSR State Planning Commission in the hands of the USSR Sovnarkom, and to make it responsible to the Central Executive Committee (TSIK) as representing the All-Union Congress of Soviets, rather than in the hands of either the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions or of Centrosoyus. It is emphatically for the community as a whole, as the trustee for the future generations as well as for the present, and not for any contemporary section of the community, to decide on the General Plan.

The Supposed "Coercion of the Consumer"

We are now able to deal with the common objection of nearly all schools of economists of the western world to the very idea of a planned economy. Nearly all of them object to it, not only because they think it impossible for a General Plan to be framed to deal wisely with all the complications and contingencies of production and distribution in a populous community—or rather to deal with it with at least as much wisdom as the present congeries of capitalist employers—but because they are convinced that even the best devised General Plan must necessarily involve a coercion of the consumer. With capitalist production for a free market, it is said, the consumer can get whatever he likes. The capitalists of the whole world, eager for profit, will, it is alleged, compete with each other in struggling to satisfy the customer's whim or fancy, and thus meet every demand of changing taste or fashion. In any deliberately planned economy, it is claimed, the consumer will be obliged to accept whatever the government thinks fit to produce; and no government, it is suggested, will ever put itself to the inconvenience and expense of satisfying such a riot of fancies!

We suggest that this optimistic vision of the profit-seeking capitalists as the far-sighted agents of the customer, fully satisfying, through the apparatus of a free market, all the desires of the whole community of consumers, vanishes under the test of reality and must be dismissed as another economic myth. Even admitting that the capitalist entrepreneur acts, in effect, as an agent for the prospective purchasers of his wares, this does not mean that the

desires of the consuming public will thereby be satisfied. The profit-seeking entrepreneur does not even aim at satisfying the desires of the whole community. *He is concerned only with the desires of that part of the community which will have purchasing power sufficient to permit of paying the price for the product. The desires of all the rest of the community are ignored.* In this so-called "continual referendum" those without purchasing power have no votes. Now, in every country of advanced capitalism to-day, at least one-half in exchange value—it might even be said three-fourths—of all the commodities and services brought to the market are designed for sale to a minority of the community, less than one-fourth of the whole, which takes for itself two-thirds or three-fourths of the national income.¹ This fortunate minority, it is true, is free to satisfy every whim and fancy up to the very edge of its wealth. These customers in the market may fairly be said to have in their service the profit-seeking entrepreneurs and organisers of industry of the whole civilised world. It is this aspect of the free market on which the economists are apt to fix their exclusive attention. It is *these* consumers of whom the economist thinks. This fortunate minority would undoubtedly find their freedom of choice limited under such a planned economy as that of the USSR, though limited by its purpose rather than by its process.

There is, unfortunately, in the free market of a capitalist society, another side of the picture. It is a constant and, as it seems, a necessary feature of a capitalist society that the small minority of the rich are accompanied by a large majority of the poor. Of these, at any moment, a considerable number are without any purchasing power whatever! Many more have no more purchasing power than suffices for a bare subsistence on the lowest scale compatible with life. This is not a matter only of the existence of unemployment in periods of depression. In the England of the beginning of the present century, it was possible for a statesman about to become Prime Minister to mention that one-third of the whole population of the country

¹ It is not usually remembered, even by economists, that in Great Britain, as in other countries of advanced industrial civilisation, the wage-earning manual workers with their families comprise two-thirds of the whole population; and that the aggregate income of these two-thirds of the population nowhere exceeds one-third of the whole national income. See the statistical sources given in Fabian Tract No. 5, *Facts for Socialists*.

was *habitually* "on the verge of starvation".¹ This not inconsiderable proportion of every advanced capitalist community cannot be said to enjoy any effective freedom of choice in the much-vaunted free market! Not for them are produced all the wonderful variety of foodstuffs, of clothing, of comfortable homes, of household furniture, of the apparatus of games, of books, of works of art, of opportunities for travel. How limited is the range of choice of the labourer's wife, in expending the weekly income of one or two pounds (after setting aside the rent of the dwelling) which must provide over 100 meals per week (reckoning 5 persons and 3 meals daily), and clothe the whole family, and find the pence exacted for social insurance, if not also those demanded for tramway fares; and, perhaps, some modicum of amusement. The Russian visitor to England who visits the public markets during their busy hours cannot help remarking the amazing wealth, in quantity and variety, of the foodstuffs, sweetstuffs, clothing, toys, furniture, household utensils, and every conceivable temptation to the purchaser. Here, surely, is the amplest possible freedom of choice for the consumer! It takes a little reflection for even a trained economist to realise that the vast majority of the commodities displayed in the public markets, or in the shops of the London streets (which are estimated to offer for sale more than a couple of millions of different articles, including all the varieties of kinds, materials, shapes, colours and sizes),² are as *effectively forbidden to two-thirds of all the inhabitants of England as if this large majority were statutorily prohibited from purchasing them*. In the Soviet Union, under the Second Five-Year Plan, there are still far fewer commodities produced per head than in England, and in much less variety. But the Plan itself ensures that practically every family in the USSR has purchasing power throughout the year, in addition to a considerable addition in the way of socialised wages. Hence their effective command over commodities, alike

¹ The admission made by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman was based upon, and supported by, the exhaustive researches published as *Life and Labour of the People*, by Charles Booth (17 vols., 1892-1900). This survey was repeated in 1929-1933 under the direction of Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith, by the London School of Economics, and published as *The New Survey of London Life and Labour* (9 vols., 1931-1934).

² One of the largest of London's scores of huge "department stores" (Selfridge's) has estimated, on the basis of partial statistics, that it had at least one million different commodities on sale in 1934.

in quantity and in variety, is in fact nothing like so much restricted as that of the couple of million unemployed in Great Britain, and perhaps not so much as that of the millions of English farm workers and general labourers earning no more than £2 per week for such part of the year as they are fortunate enough to be in constant employment. There is, as it seems to us, no reason why, as production in the Soviet Union increases, even the manual worker under the General Plan, which is constantly elaborating the variety of its commodities and the range of its services, should not enjoy at least as wide a liberty of choice as the average wage-earner in any equally productive capitalist country.

Greater Freedom of Choice

There are, indeed, some striking features about the structure of industry and agriculture in the USSR which incline us to predict that it may provide even greater opportunities for the freedom of choice in consumption than the modern capitalist anarchy. In these days of crowded city life and mass production, the individual of exceptional tastes, unless he has both time and exceptional means, does not find it easy to get the exceptional service he requires. We have already more than once commented on the peculiarly soviet acceptance of the principle of multiformity in the economic and political constitution. Alongside the gigantic enterprises and standardised production of the manufacturing trusts and combines, and of the agricultural sovkhosi and kolkhosi, under the direction of the People's Commissars and the Central Executive Council, there works the steadily growing array of kustar artels and industrial cooperative societies that we have described.¹ These independent groups of owner-producers, unlike the trade unions and consumers' cooperative societies, are not closed to the "deprived" categories, some of whom already find there a means of livelihood. They are subject to the very minimum of government direction or control. They are practically free to make, for household consumption, whatever commodities they like, or to render whatever services in the way of mending or repairing, painting or decorating that they choose. The design, the style, the shape,

¹ Chapter III. in Part I., "Man as a Producer", Section II., "The Association of Owner-Producers".

the colour, the materials, and even the workmanship are all within their discretion. These independent groups of hand-working producers, which are steadily increasing in number, are already supplementing, by specialised individual production, the mass output which seems indispensable, alike under capitalism or under socialism, for the commodities required in colossal magnitudes.¹

A further extension of the range of the consumers' choice is being more and more afforded by the application of the "principle of self-supply". In order to relieve the burden upon the central organisations of coping with the demands of so large a population as 170 millions, all the factories and other industrial establishments and public services have lately been pressed, as we have described,² to undertake their own production of foodstuffs and the commoner household commodities that they desire, through the factory department which has superseded the closed cooperative society to which their members belonged. In this way associations of producers are invited to assume the functions of management, but not the management of their own occupations. They are to organise in order to manage the production of what they themselves are to consume. Hence there are now in the USSR many thousands of "vegetable gardens", orchards, piggeries, poultry farms, and dairies, in which all these separate groups are encouraged, irrespective of any government decision, to produce exactly what their own members desire to consume. What is more, in addition to this rapidly increasing collective production by groups of producers (factory workers) and of consumers (cooperative self-supply), there is now being added, on a gigantic scale, another form of "self-supply," namely, that by the workman himself in his abundant leisure. In the densely populated industrial district of the Donets Basin, and not there only, the miners and factory workers are being provided, free of rent or tax, with what in Great

¹ Such an alternative seems to be inconceivable by the individualist economist. "Either there is freedom of choice or regimentation of the consumer: freedom to make use of the most economical method, as judged from the standpoint of profit or loss, or there is authoritative regulation of the methods of production. Each of these alternatives excludes the other. To have both planning and freedom, regulation and perfect elasticity of organisation and technique, is an impossibility" (*Gold, Unemployment and Capitalism*, by T. E. Gregory, 1933, p. 282). This "impossibility" may be witnessed in existence on a large scale in the USSR under the Second Five-Year Plan!

² Pp. 335-336.

Britain are called allotments, that is to say, plots of agricultural land, on which, by the hundred thousand, they are already raising, with tools and seeds supplied on easy credit terms, whatever garden produce they prefer.

The application of this principle of self-supply to the purpose of enlarging the effective range of choice of the consumer may be noticed in some other of its ramifications. The member of a *kolkhos* is not only encouraged to take his own family product of eggs and chickens, piggery and dairy, to the free market anywhere he pleases, and at all seasons ; but also, since 1933, to bring for free sale also his share of the collective harvest of the *kolkhos*, as soon as the amount due to the government for tax and for the use of tractors, etc., throughout each district has been paid. But still more useful in widening the range of the consumers' choice may be the now frequent arrangement by which an agricultural *kolkhos* or a fishery *kolkhos* freely contracts in advance, at a bargaining price arrived at in a market comprising other purchasers, to supply a proportion or the whole of its product—of wheat or flour, of dairy or piggery, or the daily catch of fish—to the canteen of some particular factory, or the dining-rooms of a municipal office or school. In all these ways the consumers of the USSR are finding that the mass production of a nationalised industry, whilst useful in meeting standard needs, is not the only source from which they may indulge their peculiar fantasies and satisfy their exceptional tastes.

It will be seen that, whilst the adoption of a policy of Planned Production for Community Consumption goes a long way in placing economic relations under collective control, yet it leaves open to personal choice and individual decision, not merely transiently, but in ways likely to become ever more effective, both the expenditure of the purchasing power with which every worker is provided, and the selection of an occupation in which he can earn his income. Whilst the "price mechanism" no longer determines the production of commodities, it is still retained as a useful instrument by which people, whether as producers or as consumers, can direct their own lives.¹ With production and

¹ "The final conclusion . . . is, then, that on the one hand the soviet planned economy has rendered the price mechanism entirely useless in certain spheres, and has partially dispensed with it in others. On the other hand, it has apparently retained that mechanism as the means of giving effect to a certain proportion of the decisions that all economic systems have to make :

distribution very largely collectivised, and all family vicissitudes covered by social services, a specific allocation of income as salary or wage—the so-called “personal wage”—operates differently from similar economic relations under capitalism. How the difference affects personal motives and individual conduct on the one hand, and human initiative and mechanical output on the other, forms the theme of the following chapter, entitled “In Place of Profit”.

particularly as an instrument for regulating the actions of people, as distinct from the disposal of things (which can be nationalised and thus be disposed of by direct authoritative decree)—as in its relations with workers and with the still unnationalised industry of agriculture. But this mechanism is always employed with a difference, so that even where the plan apparently follows its readings the results obtained may be quite different from those which would be realised under an unplanned economy” (*Plan or No Plan*, by Barbara Wootton, 1934, p. 101).

CHAPTER IX

IN PLACE OF PROFIT

THE liquidation of the landlord and the capitalist, together with the substitution of collective for individual ownership, and of planned for unplanned production, necessitated, in industrial organisation, more than a structural change. It involved the loss of the powerful incentive of profit-making—that vision of “wealth beyond the dreams of avarice”, to be enjoyed by the minority who, under the capitalist system, controlled the use of capital and land and the hiring of labour. Some effective substitute for this incentive of private profit had to be found. Neither the Marxist theorists nor any other school of socialists had given any adequate attention to this need. We deal in this chapter with the way in which Soviet Communism has grappled with the problem.¹

The Magnitude of the Task

We must recall the conditions under which the Bolsheviks began their reconstruction. The nation with which they had to deal was exhausted by a prolonged war, which had cost it millions

¹ In this chapter we have been greatly helped (and even supplied with a title) by an informative work based on an acute analysis of soviet conditions, namely *In Place of Profit*, by Harry F. Ward (1933). Two able pamphlets by Russian trade union officials, entitled *Why Piecework in the USSR?* by L. Kaufman, and *The Development of Socialist Methods and Forms of Labour*, by A. Aluf (both Moscow, 1932), put the communist view before the thousands of foreign wage-earners now working in the Soviet Union. Much information will also be found in the (English) report *The Ninth Trade Union Congress* (Moscow, 1932). See also *The Trade Union Movement in Soviet Russia* (International Labour Office, 1927), and *The Soviet Worker*, by Joseph Freeman (1932). An able description by a temporary worker in the Putilov works at Leningrad is given in *Eine Frau erlebt den roten Alltag*, by Lili Korber (Berlin, 1932), translated as *Life in a Soviet Factory* (London, 1933).

of lives, and stripped it of territory containing many of its factories, much of its railway mileage, and a large proportion of its few useful ports. A defeated and demoralised army had streamed back in disorder into the villages. Then came armed rebellion against the *de facto* government, coupled with the lawless invasion of Russian soil by half a dozen foreign powers, fomenting a civil war of the most devastating character, in which much of the remaining railway mileage was ruined; thousands of bridges were destroyed; coal-mines and oil-fields were wrecked, and both manufacturing and agriculture were, in many districts, brought to a standstill. On this ensued, largely as a result of the desolation wrought by these years of embittered warfare, one of the worst and most extensive famines that Russia had ever known. In 1921 it could be estimated that, over an area one-sixth of the whole land surface of the globe, industry had sunk to one-fifth of its pre-war production, whilst agriculture was reduced by one-half, with typhus, enteric and syphilis vying with actual starvation to produce a fearful mortality, and even more socially destructive physical and mental damage in those who survived. To climb back to even a low level of efficiency was a difficult task. The peasantry were not producing enough foodstuffs to feed the cities. The Bolsheviks themselves, a tiny minority in the population, were wholly inexperienced in civil administration, agricultural organisation or industrial management. In industry, the greatest handicap was the lack of skilled workmen, and even of labourers of any competence in industrial work, let alone mass production, machine-making or electrification. Nearly all the civil servants and bankers, with many of the professional men and managers and foremen of the factories and mines, had abandoned their posts, to join the various White armies, or to flee to foreign parts. Lenin and his colleagues were confronted with cold and hungry cities bereft of municipal organisation, in the midst of a population overwhelmingly agricultural in character, a peasantry of many different races and languages, some of them the merest savages, a large majority of the whole quite illiterate; dominated by superstition and demoralised by greed and hatred, and all the horrors of a *jacquerie* unparalleled in extent and brutality.

But the Bolsheviks were not dismayed. They had some advantages not always possessed by successful revolutionaries. Their leaders had a creed in which they fervently believed.

They had evolved for themselves a code of social service and personal disinterestedness ; and they had, as we shall show in a subsequent chapter, what no government had ever before possessed, namely, a supreme faith in science, and in its unswerving application to all the problems of society. Moreover, the very abandonment of their posts by nearly all the members of the governing classes left the field free. The very ignorance of the mass of the population with which the Communist Party had to deal, their very illiteracy, the very diversity of race and language, with the lack of any uniform "cake of custom", the fact that what had to be moulded was a mentally unexhausted and practically formless multitude—clay in the potter's hand—made it relatively easy, from one end of the vast territory to the other, to instil a new faith. There have been in the past, though we usually forget it, voluntary mass conversions to a new religion, as, for instance, to the Christianity of the Dark Ages. In Russia there ensued, in the years following 1917, equally considerable mass conversions to the creed of Lenin. To inculcate in these millions a new code of conduct, and even to alter their mode of life, has naturally been a longer and more difficult task than to convert them to the liquidation of the landlord and the capitalist, and to the collective ownership of the means of production. How the Communist Party has achieved this radical change in the motivation of industry, and, to a large extent, even of agriculture, and by what devices they have made the social machine work without the lure of individual profit to the landlord and the capitalist, on which nearly the whole of industry and agriculture in other countries depends, clearly deserves the consideration of economists and statesmen.

We may notice, to begin with, that powerful as is the incentive of private profit, the capitalist directors of industry have seldom made use of it for stimulating the exertions of the great mass of the workers whom they employed at wages. Indeed, it is part of the historical evolution of capitalism that it gradually deprived of the opportunity of making a profit one section after another of the persons carrying on the business of production, each of these independent handicraftsmen and small masters being, one after another, reduced to mere wage-earners in the "great industry". We must therefore distinguish between profit-making, with which Soviet Communism has almost

entirely dispensed, and those other forms of self-interest to which the mass of industrial workers in Russia, as elsewhere, had already been restricted. The communist remotivation of wealth-production in this mass of wage and salary earners has involved, first, the remoulding of the old incentive of pecuniary self-interest so as to harmonise it with the welfare of the community as a whole ; and secondly, the discovery and application of additional incentives, by bringing into play, among the masses of workers and peasants, for the purpose of increasing the productivity of labour, new motives hitherto unexplored. There is, for instance, the desire on the part of individuals and groups of individuals to measure themselves against others in trials of skill and endurance, and thus display their superiority. This may be termed the sports instinct. Then there are the sanctions of public honour and public shame. Higher in the scale of moral values stand the stimuli of intellectual curiosity and of joy in perfected craftsmanship ; and, above all, the zeal for social service, irrespective of any special recognition, leading to sustained inconspicuous toil and even acts of heroism. It is needless to add that this separation of motives into two distinct categories, the old and the new, is artificial and for the purpose of lucid description only. No such cleavage corresponds with the facts. In actual practice, as we shall relate, all these separate motives, egoistic and altruistic, are inextricably combined in the appeal made to the masses by the legislative decrees and administrative policy of the USSR.

The Old Incentives Remodelled

The episode of "workers' control"¹ brought home to Lenin and his followers the leaderless chaos and widespread inefficiency occasioned by the extrusion of the profit-making entrepreneur, himself intent on getting an ever-increasing productivity for his own profit, as the director of wealth production. One of the characteristic diseases of non-profit-making enterprises the Bolsheviks termed "depersonalisation". . . . "What does depersonalisation mean ?" asks Stalin, in his epoch-making address to a conference of leaders of industry in June 1931.² "It means complete absence of responsibility for the work performed,

¹ See Chapter VIII., "Planned Production for Community Consumption".

² *New Conditions, New Tasks*, by Josef Stalin (Moscow, 1931), p. 10.

absence of responsibility for machinery, lathes and tools. Of course, where there is depersonalisation we cannot expect a serious increase in productivity of labour, improved quality of output, care for machinery, lathes and tools." It was this absence of personal responsibility, no less than the ignorance of shifting bodies of workers in each separate undertaking, which had led Lenin, in June 1918, to supersede "workers' control" in the direction of industry, by one-man management, under the orders either of the state and the municipality in their various trusts, or of the consumers' cooperative movement. But this one-man management and responsibility to the state or municipal trust, or to the consumers' cooperative movement, whilst it prevented the factory from turning out goods that were not required, and from rendering services irrespective of the needs of the community, did not in itself increase the productivity of labour, or prevent the waste of raw material and the reckless deterioration of expensive machinery. What was required was that, not the director or manager only, but also each worker, should feel himself responsible for his own job, and exert himself, in season and out of season, to fulfil it at the lowest cost. "Formerly", as Stalin continued, "we could somehow or other manage to get along, even with the bad organisation of labour which accompanies depersonalisation, and the absence of responsibility of every man for the task entrusted to him. But matters are different now. The conditions have entirely changed. In view of the vast scale of production and the existence of gigantic works, depersonalisation becomes a plague to industry and constitutes a menace to all the successes in production and organisation we have achieved in our factories".¹

Not Equality of Wages

At this point we may observe that it is a false assumption, current among the uninstructed, and even among persons who think themselves educated, that the Communist Party in the USSR began its task of building the socialist state upon the basis of identical incomes for all workers by hand and brain, on the ground that all men are born equal, with an inherent right to equal shares in the commodities and services produced by the

¹ *Ibid.* p. 10.

community in which they live and move and have their being. There has never been any such idea among the Marxists. Quite the contrary. Karl Marx and, after him, Lenin were always denouncing the conception of an abstract equality between man and man, whether in the new-born babe, or in the adult as moulded by circumstances. In so far as individual communists have indulged in ideals as to how the wealth of the community should be distributed among its members, the slogan has always been one of inequality. This, in fact, has constantly been expressed in the phrase "from each according to his faculties and to each according to his needs", which is certainly diametrically opposite to an equality among individuals, in the sense of identity either in rewards or in sacrifices.

This maxim was elaborated with precision by Stalin, in his address to the Seventeenth Congress of the Communist Party, January 1934: "These people" ("leftist blockheads", he calls them elsewhere) "evidently think that socialism calls for equality, for levelling the requirements and the personal lives of the members of society. Needless to say, such an assumption has nothing in common with Marxism, with Leninism. By equality Marxism means, not equality in personal requirements and personal life, but the abolition of class, *i.e.* (a) the equal emancipation of all toilers from exploitation, after the capitalists have been overthrown and expropriated: (b) the equal abolition for all of private property in the means of production, after they have been transformed into the property of the whole society: (c) the equal duty of all to work according to their ability, and the equal right of all toilers to receive according to the amount of work they have done (*socialist* society); (d) the equal duty of all to work according to their ability, and the equal right of all toilers to receive according to their requirements (*communist* society). And Marxism starts out with the assumption that people's abilities and requirements are not, and cannot be, equal in quality or in quantity, either in the period of socialism or in the period of communism."¹

So much for the ideals aimed at by orthodox Marxism. But Lenin himself was above all things practical. He refused to contemplate a state of society that was not yet born. He had to build the socialist state out of the human material presented by

¹ *Report on the Work of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, by Josef Stalin at the Seventeenth Congress of the CPSU.*

the 160 millions of workers and peasants, who had been taught, by centuries of political and economic oppression, to grasp all they could get by hook or by crook, and to give as little effort as they dared to the landlord and the capitalist. Moreover, Lenin recognised that the impulses implanted in the ordinary man to seek comfort and security, and in many men to better their customary condition of livelihood, were impulses which, if directed into channels of public usefulness, and blocked from the channel of getting something for nothing, were useful incentives, and should be duly encouraged by appropriate methods of remuneration for services rendered. This could be done under Soviet Communism without the danger of creating new social classes. In the countries in which capitalism had replaced feudalism by plutocracy—notably in Great Britain and the United States—different levels of income, especially when caused by differing private fortunes, with varying inheritances, inevitably result in the creation of markedly different social classes. With the abolition of private incomes from rent and profit, individual remuneration for services rendered might be sufficiently varied without impairing that general condition of social equality which is fundamental to both socialism and communism. An obvious expedient was the adoption of wages according to output; that is to say, the method of piece-work wages, as contrasted with a fixed daily or hourly rate for each employment.

How Piece-work Rates are Fixed

Among the recognised leaders of the trade union movement in capitalist countries¹ there are some who have been surprised,

¹ For the objection to piece-work of about one-half of the British trade unionists, see *Industrial Democracy*, by S. and B. Webb, 1898, pp. 286-304, 328-334. It is there pointed out that what is objected to by those trade unions in which time-work rates are insisted on, is not so much piece-work rates, as individual piece-work where the rates are not safeguarded against undercutting by fixed piece-work lists arrived at by collective bargaining and governing the rates for specified jobs, payable to all those employed on those jobs. Where such piece-work lists are collectively agreed to, and are binding on all employers as on all workmen (for instance, among the cotton spinners and weavers), the British trade unions not only allow, but demand them. Where neither employers nor workmen have been able to prepare such lists (as in the building trade), British trade unions vehemently denounce the individual and unsafeguarded piece-work that cutting employers seek to impose. Other trade unions (such as those of the boilermakers, boot and shoe factory operatives and compositors) willingly accept both systems, working under piece-work lists of rates where such

indeed shocked, that their colleagues in the USSR are wholeheartedly in favour of piece-work, wherever and whenever it can be applied without detriment to the quality of the product or to the health of the workers. "The basic system for the remuneration of labour in our country is the piece-work system, pure and simple", stated Shvernik, the general secretary of the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), to the Ninth Congress of Trade Unions.¹ "The piece-work system makes every worker materially interested in increasing the productivity of labour and raising his own qualifications. We must lay all emphasis on the fact that the piece-work system in our country is radically different from the piece-work system in the capitalist countries. There, the piece-work system is a means of exploitation. Here, where the state is exercising the maximum degree of care in the protection of labour, and where we have a working day lasting seven hours, the piece-work system accelerates the tempo of socialist construction, increases the productivity of labour, and guarantees the improvement of the material and general living conditions of the workers. . . . For this purpose it is absolutely necessary to reinforce our tariff Rate-Fixing Bureaus by enlisting members of the engineering and technical staff, and skilled workers who have had practical experience of technical rate-fixing, to assist them in their work." Nor have the soviet trade unionists, unlike those working under capitalist conditions, any objection to individual piece-work, as contrasted with a uniform piece-work scale for all concerned. "Only by keeping account of the individual production of each worker within the brigade will the growth of labour efficiency of the entire brigade be assured", explains another representative of the trade union movement. "Collective piece-work, without individual accounting within the brigades, brings us back to the wage levelling we have been trying to get away from; it is piece-work only in form, not in substance." . . . "We will take the Rykov shaft, where a 'share' piece-work system was introduced in June and July 1931, to replace the former collective depersonalised piece-work system. It is now possible to keep an individual account of the production of each worker in each shift. This is how work is carried on in the

lists are collectively agreed to and fixed, or on time wages on such jobs as are not (or, like repair work, cannot be) included in the lists.

¹ *Ninth Congress of Trade Unions*, 1932, pp. 57-61.

Rykov shaft. At the beginning of each shift the foreman measures the stope and allots a fixed number of metres to each driller. Whoever finishes his share before the end of the shift takes on an additional lot. The earnings are computed as follows : suppose the stope yielded so and so many trucks per shift, equivalent to so and so many metres stoped. Consequently each metre stoped yielded so and so many trucks. Now, a computation is made of the number of metres each miner stoped, which is translated into a corresponding number of trucks, etc.”¹

This striking difference in outlook between many of the trade unions facing a capitalist employer, on the one hand, and, on the other, the trade unions under Soviet Communism, is easily understood. “Under the conditions of socialist economy”, Kaufman explains, “the working class *determines through the medium of its planning organs*² what part of the products, created by the toil of the workers, is to be handed over to them in the form of individual money wages ; what part is to be expended to meet the requirements of the public, material and cultural needs, such as the construction of dwellings, public health, education, etc., and what part is to be appropriated to develop socialist economy, the construction of new mills and factories, mines, power stations, state farms, etc. Thus *that part of the wages* which is not handed over directly to the individual workers is also spent on raising the living standard of the working class and on the development of socialist economy, which assures the further growth of the material welfare and the cultural standard of the workers.”³ In other words there is, in soviet production, no “enemy party”,

¹ *Why Piecework in the USSR?* by L. Kaufman (Moscow, 1932), pp. 19, 21.

² For the trade union's participation in planning the standard rates of wages, as well as the quantity and conditions of production, see Chapter III. in Part I., “Man as a Producer”, in the section on Soviet Trade Unionism, especially pp. 183-192 ; and Chapter VIII. in Part II., “Planned Production for Community Consumption”, pp. 636-637.

³ *Why Piecework in the USSR?* by L. Kaufman (Moscow, 1932), p. 6. This statement by a trade unionist is put in generalised form by the American observer : “Wages represent that share of the common product which is paid to the worker for the satisfaction of his individual needs ; wage payments are only one of the ways in which he gets his share of the things available for personal consumption, but through them he has some room to exercise his personal choice in what he will buy, so their manipulation to stimulate his productivity is an appeal to him as an individual. The general improvement of material and cultural conditions in which he shares appeals to him as a member of the class whose lot goes up together” (*In Place of Profit*, by Harry F. Ward, 1933, p. 31).

against whom the workmen have to contend. This is, indeed, the essential difference between capitalist and communist production. Where profit-making is the recognised object of industrial undertakings, there is a constant danger of the employer taking advantage of the worker's increased output by "cutting the rate", and so compelling the piece-worker to give increased effort for the old time-work remuneration. Where the profit-making motive has been swept away, the danger of the rate being cut in order to increase the owner's profits is eliminated. Or, to put it in another way, when the one and only purpose of every enterprise is a continuously increasing output, to meet an automatically expanding effective demand for the commodities, there is no objection felt by the management to the workers' increased earnings under piece-work intensity. It is all to the good of all concerned that the workers should increase their speed of working, their economy of material or accessories, and their proportion of product free from faults, and, be it added, their maximum utilisation of labour-saving machinery, provided always that neither the quality deteriorates, nor the workman's health suffers. Accordingly, in the USSR, there are none of the clever piece-work systems by which, in capitalist industry, the workers are made to gain less per unit the faster they work. Under Soviet Communism, the piece-work rates are never degressive. They are, in some cases, even progressive, the rate rising by stages for output beyond the norm. "After a fixed number of units of the items to be turned out has been produced", we are told, "every further unit is paid for at a higher rate than the preceding one. For instance, if a worker is supposed to produce 20 units, each requiring the same amount of work, at 25 kopeks each, his pay for the 21st piece will not be 25 kopeks, but more; for the 22nd unit still more, etc. Thus, material interest is supplied to stimulate the worker to save time and exceed the rates of production. Under the conditions of soviet economy this progressive piece-work system is a method of giving a material incentive to the more advanced producers."¹ . . . "At the Uralmashstroi (Construction of the Ural Machine Works) the rates [of progress] for laying foundations always used to remain unfulfilled; at the present time, since the introduction of the *progressivka*, they are overfulfilling the rates by 64 per cent.

¹ *Why Piecework in the USSR?* by L. Kaufman (Moscow, 1932), p. 22.

The earnings of the workers jumped from 5 roubles a day to 7·56. Many such instances could be cited. Everywhere the system of progressive piece-work wage payment calls forth an increase in labour efficiency accompanied by a simultaneous rise in earnings. . . . This rapid rise of rate was condemned because it would raise cost of each unit of production, but as a matter of fact this is not the case. Everybody knows that the cost of every commodity includes, in addition to the cost of the raw material and labour, all overhead expenses, such as heating and lighting premises, fire protection, maintenance of the executive and book-keeping staffs, depreciation of property, etc. These overhead expenses do not increase with increased output. Consequently the more this output increases, the smaller is the proportional share falling to each unit of production . . . it is essential that a definite relation be established between wage earnings and the quality of production, and not only its quantity. In this respect the experience of several shoe factories, particularly the 'Burevestnik' factory of Moscow, will prove very instructive. There a progressively increasing system of wage rates was introduced, made dependent upon decreasing the percentage of lower grades of footwear. Excellent results were obtained from this system when it was introduced into several brigades in the form of an experiment. Transition to this progressive system required careful preparation, and what is still more important, rigid accounting of output. Every worker must see daily how much he has done and what he is to be paid for it." ¹

The Rate-fixers

It is needless to observe that the working out of these elaborate piece-work schedules over so vast an area as the USSR is far from perfect; and the trade union authorities have been busily engaged during the last few years in appointing and instructing rate-fixers. "A Technical Normalisation Bureau", we are told, "called T.N.B. is to be found in every enterprise attached to the

¹ *Ibid.* pp. 24-25. The importance of publicity as to rates and earnings, both of individuals and of the brigade or shift, is fully realised. "The workers are protected by a minimum income, and the speed is not allowed to menace the worker's health. . . . A rate-fixing expert testified that in his experience 'the speed-up system is totally absent'. The rates are computed for quality as well as quantity of output, and the workers both know and approve the ends for which they are set. They are not allowed to be cut during the job, and instead of

department of labour economics of the factory administration. Its duty is to establish rates of production and rates of remuneration, *i.e.* to fix the standard time required for the accomplishment of certain work with certain equipment, and the wage the worker is to be paid for it.”¹ But unfortunately such a rate-fixing bureau is not yet provided for every enterprise. In 1933, before handing over his department to the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), the People’s Commissar of Labour was complaining seriously of the inadequacy of the supply of rate-fixers. “What we do not have at present is a supply of technicians and skilled workers who are also well acquainted with the processes of production. Such workers must be found at once, and drawn into the work of technical rate-fixing. Thus, in 15 factories controlled by the ‘Stal’ trust, there were 524 workers employed in the rate-fixing bureau in 1930, and only 369 on March 1st, 1931; those with university education numbered 53 in 1930 and 35 in 1931. In the ‘Artem’ mine there is only one rate-fixer for 5000 workers. In 35 mines of the Donets Basin there were 267 rate-fixers in May 1931, but not one of them an engineer or technician. . . . At the present time . . . 7000 rate-fixers are being trained but . . . the students chosen are themselves not of a kind as to guarantee a solution of the problems confronting us in the field of technical rate-fixing. . . . Courses must be organised for workers with at least three to five years’ experience.”²

The inadequacy of the rate-fixers will doubtless continue for some time to be a weakness in the soviet industrial organisation. The complaints of the workmen will, however, ensure that in due time a remedy will be found. At present, writes one of them, “The majority of the T.N.B.’s owe their personnel to casual selection, with no attention paid to qualification, experience in the line of work or social status. At the Dzerzhinsky being lowered with the increased efficiency of the worker because he is making too much, they progressively increase with his output. It is customary to put on huge blackboards the workers’ names, with quota, rates, amount done, wages and premiums earned. At a large construction I have seen one on a tree by the highway for all the world to see” (*In Place of Profit*, by Harry F. Ward, 1933, pp. 32-33).

¹ *Why Piecework in the USSR?* by L. Kaufman (Moscow, 1932), p. 30.

² People’s Commissar for Labour (Tsikhon), speech in *Ninth All-Union Congress of Trade Unions*, 1933, p. 169. British and American trade unionists working by the piece have, outside the cotton trade, hardly begun to develop such a class.

works (Ukraine), for instance, where a special investigation of the staff engaged in technical normalisation was made, there are only 41 workers, instead of the required 64. Among them are former teachers, copying clerks, sanitary workers and letter carriers; the chief rate-fixer was an actor. At the same time the Cadres Department of the plant transferred 20 well qualified workers of the T.N.B. staff with much experience in this line, and 25 specialists, to other departments of the plant. . . . At individual enterprises, promoted workers are left to their own devices. No theoretical instruction is given them. Training courses to qualify rate-fixers are rather rare phenomena.”¹

So keen on piece-work are both workmen and managers in the USSR that it is sometimes objected that the system has been applied to kinds of work to which it is not suited. It has been found dangerous to stimulate railway engine-drivers to make up for lost time. It may not be desirable to tempt workers to work at high speed where extremely precise minute adjustments are required. There are many cases in which the highest quality of workmanship will not be attained if the workman is hurried. There has been, in some cases, even too much willingness to work overtime in order to increase both productivity and earnings. There has been some reluctance to use mechanical safeguards against accidents when they lessened the speed of working. And the incentive of piece-work remuneration has been applied to processes to which it was not suited, such as those requiring extreme precision, or those involved to repair work.² These are errors in industrial administration, which managers in the USSR are being trained to avoid, and trade union officials to look out for to prevent.

The Grading of Wages

What exactly is the basis upon which these elaborate piece-work rates are determined? A short answer would be that the piece-work rate for each job is based upon the time-work wage

¹ *Why Piecework in the USSR?* by L. Kaufman (Moscow, 1932), pp. 30-33.

² “Complaints have been made by foreign mechanics in the USSR against being asked to work ‘by the piece’ in such departments as the making of machine tools. ‘Never before coming to the Soviet Union’, writes one of them, ‘have I seen piece-work in a tool room.’ ‘In spite of the so-called driving methods of the Ford factory [at Detroit] . . . no attempt was ever made to make a saving in the tool room, as all such attempts have resulted in tremendous losses’” (*Moscow Daily News*, September 14, 1932).

current in each category of workers, whether skilled or unskilled. But this simple answer covers up a radical distinction between Soviet Communism and capitalist enterprise. In the USSR there is no such thing as a "demarcation dispute" between men of different crafts as to which craft shall have the privilege of performing a particular task.¹ To begin with, as we have described in our section on trade union structure,² all the workers in each establishment are members of one and the same trade union. Moreover, there is no set of craftsmen that fears discharge because there is no more work to be done of its particular kind. There is, on the contrary, always and everywhere, an almost calamitous shortage of every kind of skill, whether by hand or by brain. It is, in fact, essential to the success of planned production for community consumption, in a land of constantly increasing population, that there should continue to be a rapid multiplication of every kind of skilled workers. How can this much-needed skill be obtained? In all cities of the USSR endless attempts are made to provide all sorts of technical education, free of charge, in evening classes, in higher schools and colleges, and even in special trade schools inside the larger factories, in which the youthful workers are under instruction half time. But it has not always been found easy to induce young men and women to go through prolonged courses of technical training even without having to pay fees; nor is the young workman, earning regular wages at work of no particular skill, in all cases keen to give his evenings to learning a skilled craft. After many experiments, an ingenious system of grading the workers has been adopted, in one or other form, by practically all the trade unions. The grading is not by craft; nor by age or seniority; nor yet simply by any estimate of relative skill; nor of the length of time necessary to gain the skill. The grading is really determined, and from time to time changed, according to the requirements of the enterprise, or of all the enterprises with similar needs, in the various kinds of skill or craftsmanship, and to the extent to which these requirements are being automatically met by the supply of workers competent to perform the various tasks. The number of grades fixed by the trade

¹ The student will find a description of the demarcation disputes which used to plague the employers, especially in the North of England, in *Industrial Democracy*, by S. and B. Webb, 1897, pp. 508-527.

² Chapter III. in Part I., "Man as a Producer", section on Soviet Trade Unionism, pp. 273-275.

union may be anything from 8 to 17—always excluding the apprentices, with the mere porters, cleaners or gate-keepers, on the one hand, and the foremen, technicians and managers on the other. The grades are expressed in the indices denoting the relative time-work rates of wages. We take an example of these time-work wage-rate schedules from the able pamphlet by a trade unionist from which we have already quoted. "We will illustrate this," he writes, "by the wage-rate schedule of the former Metal Workers' Union (now decentralised) :

Category	. 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Coefficient	. 1	1.2	1.45	1.7	1.95	2.2	2.5	2.8

"As may be seen from the above table, all workers who belonged to the former Metal Workers' Union were divided into eight categories. The wage-rate for the workers of the second category was 1.2 times higher than that of the first category, the rate of the workers in the third category 1.45 times higher than that of the first, the rate of the fourth 1.7 times higher, etc. . . . Individual wage-rate schedules are now being compiled, in conformity with the peculiarities of each branch of industry. They are to be drawn up in such a way as to leave as big a margin as possible between the various categories. At the same time, perhaps even before, the qualification manuals will be revised and these revised manuals will serve as a basis for dividing the workers in accordance with the categories listed in the wage schedule, which will depend upon their qualifications, and the difficulty, and the sanitary conditions of the work to be done. These new qualification manuals are compiled in accordance with the directives of the Supreme Economic Council of National Economy and the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions, and are issued separately for each branch of industry by each economic association in conjunction with the respective trade union central committee ; and they take into consideration all the changes which have taken place in the organisation of production during the last few years."¹

The student will observe that what is essential to the device of grading, if it is to fulfil its object of automatically leading to a continuous increase of skilled craftsmen, is that there should be no fixed numbers of the workers to be admitted to the higher

¹ *Why Piecework in the USSR ?* by L. Kaufman (Moscow, 1932), pp. 27-29.

grades. In practice, in the USSR any worker may, at any time, claim to be tried as a candidate for any higher grade. The young worker in the lowest grade (No. 1) may say "I think I can do the work of Grade 3". The invariable answer is "Come and try; a fortnight's trial will be allowed to you. If you show that you can do the work to the satisfaction alike of the management and of the trade union officials in the factory, you will at once receive the pay of your new grade." This practice of rushing up individuals from lower to higher categories is not found to lead to any surplus of supermen. On the contrary, with the perpetual opening of additional factories, corresponding, and more than corresponding, with the annual increase of population, the demand for skilled craftsmen is so overpowering that the directors of factories and plants are always being pressed, and sometimes peremptorily required, by the recruiting department of the AUCCTU, to train each year a given number of responsible and skilled men who can lead and supervise the workers in new enterprises; whilst the directors of these new plants are now forbidden, under severe penalties, to send their own recruiting agents to "steal away", by promises of better conditions, the leading workmen of older establishments. Thus, each establishment is thrown back on producing, from its own rank and file, at least all the skilled craftsmen that it requires. On our own visits during 1932 to works of all kinds, we were everywhere assured by the directors and managers, as well as by the local trade union committees, that the effect of this grading of the workers by different rates of wages had been marvellous. Everywhere we found the younger workers, women as well as men, desperately anxious to "improve their qualifications". The evening classes in technical subjects were everywhere crowded. At one large factory it was reported that 90 per cent of the entire personnel were thus studying. The upward march, from grade to grade, of the more ambitious, the more able, the more industrious, and the more zealous workers in industrial occupations is widespread and continuous. In no other country, not even in the United States, is it so general.

Payment According to Social Value

Very interesting is it to find all this manipulation of wage payments for different grades which always assumes a national

minimum of desirable personal expenditure, becoming gradually more and more dominated by the principle of payment according to "social value". This principle is applied alike in the case of particular crafts, or kinds of skill, of which there is, at the moment, a shortage, or for which there is an increasing demand; and, at the other extreme, to a whole district to which it is desired to attract immigrants. When we asked, in 1932, why the work of coppersmiths had been placed in a higher grade than that of other smiths, we were informed that the rapid development of electrification was hindered by the lack of an adequate number of workers who could do coppersmithing with technical efficiency. In order to encourage more boys voluntarily to take to this particular craft in their apprenticeship, and young mechanics to qualify themselves as coppersmiths in evening classes, the craft of coppersmithing was put into a higher grade. In a remarkably short time the supply of coppersmiths was increased. The application of the same principle on a larger scale was seen, in 1931, when the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions realised in its collective bargaining that, taken as a whole, the "light industries" had, in the annual wage determinations, got ahead of the "heavy industries" in their standard rates of wages, whilst the latter were suffering from an insufficiency of competent workers, together with an excessive turnover of men. "In order to put an end to this evil", Stalin told a conference of leaders of industry in June 1931, "we must set up a wage scale that will take into account the difference between skilled labour and unskilled labour, between heavy work and light work. It cannot be tolerated that a highly skilled worker in a steel mill should earn no more than a sweeper. It cannot be tolerated that a locomotive driver on a railway should earn only as much as a copying clerk."¹ Shvernik, the general secretary of the All-Union Committee of Trade Unions, explained to the Ninth Congress of Trade Unions that "the struggle for the fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan required that the trade unions should completely reorganise the wage system, with a view to abolishing all absence of personal responsibility and all wage-levelling; and to giving each individual worker a material incentive to raise his qualification and increase the productivity of his labour. . . . A firm line was taken by the AUCCTU in the matter of regulating

¹ *New Conditions, New Tasks*, by Joseph Stalin (Moscow, 1931), p. 7.

wages so as to give the leading branches of industry the most favoured position. The AUCCTU, in the instructions issued for the conclusion of new collective agreements for 1931, firmly insisted that the wages of the workers at the various enterprises should be regulated on a basis which will give the workers a material incentive to raise their qualifications and increase the productivity of their labour; the piece-work system must be adopted to the maximum degree, and skilled workers, especially those whose qualification is much in demand, must not be allowed to drift from enterprise to enterprise.”¹ It was in pursuance of this policy that the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions (AUCCTU) resolved that no further increases in the standard wage rates should be allowed to workers in the light industries until those for workers in the heavy industries had been substantially increased. In due course the workers in coal mining, and those in steel production, received a rise of something like 30 per cent; besides, in the Donets Basin, where the turnover was greatest, a steady but necessarily gradual improvement in their housing conditions, together with the provision of greater amenities.

Another instance of the deliberate fixing of wages according to the “social value” of a particular category of work is given by Kaufman, the trade unionist from whose pamphlet we have already quoted. “In an overwhelming number of cases,” he writes, “a foreman gets less pay than a skilled worker. Thus, before the reform decree of October 1931, a foreman in the metallurgical industry, responsible for the performance of considerable groups of workers, was getting 225 or 230 roubles per month, whereas the wages of highly skilled workers at many of our plants amounted to 300 roubles and more. Such a state of affairs resulted in the unwillingness of a highly skilled worker to become a foreman. It was necessary to make a long and persistent search for a man who ‘would agree’ to become a foreman. It happens frequently that a skilled worker, promoted to the position of foreman, after a month or two begs to be allowed to go back to the bench. . . . To prevent any disparity in the systems of remuneration paid to engineering technicians at different enterprises, the Inter-Union Bureau of Engineering Technicians’ Sections, attached to the All-Union Central Council

¹ *The Ninth Congress of Trade Unions* (Moscow, 1933), pp. 53-54.

of Trade Unions, worked out basic principles for the guidance of local organisations in the reconstruction of the system of remuneration of engineering technicians.”¹

The most extensive and most far-reaching application of the principle of payment according to social value was seen towards the end of 1933, when it was decided by the Central Executive Committee of the All-Union Congress of Soviets (TSIK) and the Central Committee of the Communist Party, that special steps must be taken to attract immigrants to the Far Eastern province of Siberia, and also to induce the present residents to remain there. This was inspired by the wish to effect a more rapid increase of the adult population of these regions in view of the possibility of a Japanese invasion. It was emphatically a question of “social value”. Accordingly, a special increment of a substantial amount was made to the standard rates of wages payable to workers in all the industries and institutions in this province, and at the same time all the residents there were exempted from certain specified taxes. Similar concessions were extended to the inhabitants of districts bordering on Mongolia.

The Machinery of Arbitration

Behind all the apparatus connected with piece-work rates and the principle of payment according to “social value” lies the possibility of appeal against the local decisions to an impartial and disinterested authority. It is this right of appeal that prevents, in the USSR, the impatient stoppages of work, and the obstinate trials of endurance between management and wage-earners, that still occur in capitalist countries. There are now, we are assured, practically no strikes in the USSR and certainly no serious stoppages. How is this happy state of things arrived at?

Let us recall the institution of the Triangle that we have incidentally mentioned in our section on Soviet Trade Unionism.² In every industrial establishment or state farm (sovkhos) there is available at all times, a local arbitral authority, ready at any moment promptly to arbitrate on any dispute affecting either individual workers or particular groups of sections of them. This

¹ *Why Piecework in the USSR?* by L. Kaufman (Moscow, 1932), pp. 36-37.

² Chapter III. in Part I., “Man as a Producer”, pp. 190-191.

triangle consists of a representative of the management, a representative (usually the local secretary) of the trade union, and the secretary of the Communist Party cell or committee within the establishment. This arbitral authority almost always succeeds in adjusting the dispute to the general satisfaction of the parties. But if one or other of them is seriously dissatisfied with this immediate local award, it is open to him to make formal appeal against it to a higher authority, indeed to an ascending series of higher authorities which it would be tedious to enumerate, up to a final appeal authority. This final authority was, until 1933, the People's Commissar of Labour of the particular constituent or autonomous republic within the territory of which the establishment was situated. Now, with the abolition of these Commissariats of Labour, the appeal is to the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), acting through its presidium, which is always accessible without delay. The case is thus immediately dealt with, and a final award given, which is, we are assured, invariably accepted without obstruction by the parties concerned.

How can this pacific attitude of two obstinately contending disputants be explained? It is, we suggest, the result of two separate considerations. In the first place, both disputants are aware that, in any recalcitrance, neither of them could obtain any collective support. The manager would not be supported by the state or other trust from which he holds his appointment; nor could it even reproach him for accepting a final arbitral award which he had done his best to avert. The workman, if the final appeal to the AUCCTU has gone against him, will know that his own trade union, which is represented on the AUCCTU, cannot impugn the award, and give him its collective support. But there is another consideration that makes for acquiescence in the final award. Neither the management of the establishment, nor the whole aggregate of workers in it, strongly combined in their trade union, has any pecuniary interest in the particular case at issue, or in the way in which it has been decided. The aggregate total wage fund for the establishment has already been determined, as we have explained, in the complicated series of collective bargainings between the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions, the Central Committee of the particular trade union, and the factory committee of the establishment on the one hand; and

on the other, the representatives of the USSR Sovnarkom, the particular trust to which the establishment belongs, and the management of that establishment. Whether or not the particular workman who is aggrieved gets a higher piece-work rate for a particular job makes no perceptible difference to the yearly aggregate of wages paid during the year in the establishment. If the total cost of production can be reduced in relation to the total output of the year, as by lessening lost time or the amount of waste or scrap, or by improved organisation of work, both management and workers stand to gain, either in bonuses for increased output or in additional expenditure on the amenities that the trade union desires. The worst that can happen, if tempers remain hot, will be that the obstinate workman who feels that justice has not been done to his case may, after due notice, take his discharge. He will get no unemployment benefit, but this does not trouble him, as he knows he can get promptly taken on at another establishment.

The Menace of Foreign Competition

It will be noted that, in Soviet Communism, the representatives of the trade unions have no use for the argument that the acceptance of increased effort for the same wage, or lower wage for the same effort, by particular individuals or groups, tends, through the working of a competitive labour market, to reduce other people's wages. Equally, the representatives of the management have to renounce, once and for all, the argument, so potent in the world of profit-making capitalism, that a raising of wages in one country is impracticable, if other countries pay lower wages for the same grade of effort in the production of identical commodities. Under Soviet Communism, if other countries persist in "sweating" their workers, as a means of producing commodities at a lower cost than is practicable with a high standard of life, this is merely so much the better for the workers in the USSR, enjoying such a high standard of wages and leisure, who will get the Japanese product all the cheaper. Thus, if Japan chooses to "sweat" her own textile operatives in order to be able to export textiles at an exceptionally low price, this will be to the advantage of countries who find such goods attractive to their citizens. From the humanitarian standpoint it may be wrong to connive at

“sweating”; but one country can only with great hesitancy seek to interfere with the economic system of another.

The relative cheapness of the Japanese goods will, in fact, widen the range of alternatives practically open to the People's Commissar of Foreign Trade in the USSR. It may render it more advantageous to the USSR to import whatever kinds of commodities it desires to import in greater quantity from Japan than from other producing countries. It may do more than this. It may render it advantageous to the USSR actually to increase its total imports of particular kinds of commodities as a preferable alternative to establishing additional factories, or making the requisite enlargements of the old ones, within the USSR. In this case, it would be positively more advantageous to employ the annual increment of the workers in additional factories on enlargements for producing more of some other commodities in growing demand. In short, an increased cheapness of imported goods is always advantageous to the consumer of those goods. Under Soviet Communism this cheapness has no injurious effect on the wages of any workers in the importing country, or on any directors of industry. A low level of wages in foreign countries is, under capitalism, a standing menace to higher wages anywhere. Under Soviet Communism it is no menace to any section of the community. It merely enlarges the range of choice of the People's Commissar of Foreign Trade as to what shall be imported and exported.

But this is not all. As a body representing all workers and all grades, the AUCCTU is not concerned with the aspirations or the monthly earnings of any particular person, or any particular grade or craft, or those employed at any particular establishment. Its corporate interest is to secure, for the whole aggregate of its clients, the setting apart in the national budget, of the largest possible aggregate wage fund, as distinguished from the allocations proved to be necessary for other national requirements. In the course of this annual collective bargaining over the national budget, the trade union negotiators discover that the most cogent argument in support of increasing this aggregate wage fund, upon the amount of which the earnings of all their clients ultimately depend, is the prospect of an actual increase in the aggregate net productivity of all the enterprises throughout the USSR in which their clients are all engaged. Hence the rooted

objection of the trade union representatives to any interruption of industry by strikes or lock-outs, or by "demarcation" disputes. Hence the intense public disapproval of "ca' canny", or any other shirking of work by individuals or groups; hence also the persistent desire, in season and out of season, for piece-work rates because this method of remuneration will increase output and diminish waste; hence, also, the promotion of "socialist competition" among groups of workers as to which can do the most work, or save the most expense, within a given period; hence also the eager welcoming of new labour-saving machinery, as of every improvement of industrial organisation that promises to lessen the cost of production; hence, finally, the willing adoption of a system of grading wages in such a way as to lead to a constant increase of the number of skilled workmen in each craft; and the cordial approval of the adoption of the policy of fixing the rates according to the current "social value" of each kind of skill. The capitalist employers in every other country, whilst complacent about their own superior efficiency in profit-making, must now and then envy the industrial directors of the USSR the extraordinary increases of output obtained by the incentives that Soviet Communism supplies to its labour force!

Self-Employment as an Alternative to the Wage System

At this point we turn from the remodelling of the wage system at the hands of the soviet trade unions, in accord with other soviet institutions and with the consumers' cooperative movement, to a corresponding rehandling of the incentive of pecuniary self-interest in the quite different field of self-employment outside the wage system. We have accordingly briefly to survey from this standpoint, not only the operation of individual self-employment, but also such forms of joint self-employment as are exemplified by the industrial cooperative societies (incops) and the collective farms (kolkhosi), of which we have described the constitutional forms in the several sections of our chapter on "Man as a Producer".¹

Now, from the standpoint of the development of character and intelligence, and from that of the production of free initiative,

¹ Chapter III. in Part I., pp. 224-303.

much has rightly been claimed for self-employment, whether in the case of individual peasants or handicraftsmen, or in that of groups of workers in self-governing workshops or cooperative agricultural associations. One school of sociologists, of whom the leading exponents have been Pierre G. F. Le Play, in the middle of the nineteenth century, and such modern propagandists as Mr. Hilaire Belloc and Mr. G. K. Chesterton in our own day, have idealised peasant proprietorship. For the idealisation of the self-governing workshop we can look back to Robert Owen in Great Britain and Dr. Buchez in France ; and, following these utopians, to John Stuart Mill in mid-Victorian days, and the late Professor Alfred Marshall. The trouble is that, when this self-employment, whether of individuals or groups, takes place within a capitalist environment, the self-employers are apt to become the victims, either of the village usurer or gombeen man, or of the neighbouring landlord, or of the capitalist entrepreneur in wholesale or retail trade, all of whom are always ready to assist their clients in bad times in such a way as to bring them permanently into subjection as "sweated" workers. Painful experience has demonstrated how inevitably the individual handicraftsman, as represented by the handloom weaver in the British village, or the maker of the cheap furniture or slop clothing in the slums of London and other cities, becomes enslaved by the wholesale and retail traders, or of profit-making entrepreneurs specialising on "giving out" work to be done at home. Even in agriculture, in these days of wholesale mechanisation and the continuous application of science to the art of cultivation, necessitating large-scale production, with costly equipment, the use of expensive fertilisers and what not, peasant cultivation for sale, even in the more modern form of cooperative farming, fails to maintain itself in a competitive world market.

To-day, in western Europe, few and far between are the associated members of workshops that are genuinely self-governing ; and calamitous is the fate of the individual producer under the sweating system. Even the peasant proprietors of France and Flanders, the most intelligent and the thriftiest of self-employers, are having a bad time. But in spite of a century of discouraging experience, the ideal of self-employment in the self-governing workshop has persisted among manual workers and philanthropists alike ; and many and various have been the

attempts of the trade unions to realise it in practice, always entailing on themselves heavy financial loss. Even the British consumers' cooperative movement owed its origin to the ideal of self-employment as set forth by the Rochdale Pioneers in 1846. The whole movement persisted in regarding this ideal as its ultimate aim long after British cooperation had successfully taken the opposite form of the service of the consumers, entirely managed by representatives of the purchasing members, who employed officials and manual workers at salaries and wages.

For all these reasons the writers of this book have always rejected the ideal of self-employment, whether of individuals or of groups of individuals.¹ We failed to take into account the extent to which the manifest disadvantages of a system of self-employment were connected with its existence in the midst of a capitalist civilisation. It is always unpleasant to admit that one has been wrong in a forecast of the future. But confronted with what is happening in the USSR we are forced to such an admission. But we must consider first self-employment by individuals.

Individual Self-Employment

It is not generally realised how great is the number of instances in which the Soviet Government has left undisturbed the performance of service, and even the making of commodities, by individual producers, under the incentive not of profit but of "price in the market". Such individual producers must not commit the offence of "exploiting" subordinate labour with a view to making a profit. They must therefore themselves render the service or make the commodity, in return for which they may enjoy, by way of remuneration for their own labour, any price that they can obtain in the market. The number and variety of these individual producers in self-employment in the USSR is greater than would be at first imagined. There are, for instance, in the cities, quite a large number of women independently earning a modest living

¹ See *The Cooperative Movement in Great Britain*, by Beatrice Potter (now Mrs. Sidney Webb), 1891. This book was promptly translated into Russian, where it was published in many editions. A subsequent analysis by the present writers of seventy years' experience of the self-governing workshop in western Europe was published under the title of "Cooperative Production and Profit-sharing" as a supplement to *The New Statesman* of February 14, 1914. See also *A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain*, by S. and B. Webb, 1920, pp. 27-58, 154-157.

by working for private customers as dressmakers, or as repairers of clothing, furs, furniture, etc. Others do the household laundry for those who can afford the luxury of putting it out. Similarly there are men who resole the family boots ; others who make or mend household furniture ; whilst others live as " handy-men ", known to a wide circle of families to be able to execute promptly any necessary repairs to pipes or taps, roofs or windows. There are men with a connection among those clients who periodically pay to have their watches and clocks cleaned and repaired. The individual droschky drivers, owning their horses and vehicles, still pick up fares in some cities, or find a livelihood in casual jobs of hauling. There are everywhere shoeblacks plying their humble trade. Quite other cases of individual producers are the " freelance " journalists ; together with the unsalaried authors or translators of books or plays, who sell their manuscripts to the various publishing agencies. Then there are the men and women who pick up a livelihood by giving private lessons in other languages to enterprising Russians, and lessons in Russian to foreign residents, varied by making translations or acting as guides and interpreters. There are musical executants, and actors and singers, not on any salary list, who live by chance engagements. Finally, we must remember that there are a small number of medical consultants not attached to any institution, and engaged solely in private practice and research ; whilst there are a certain number of unsalaried researchers in other branches of knowledge, who supplement by occasional fees for technical articles, or for advice or laboratory work, their modest private incomes.¹ The aggregate product of all these thousands of " self-employed " individual workers in the various cities of the USSR may not amount to more than a fraction of 1 per cent of the total pecuniary value of the national output. But their services add considerably to the amenity of life, whilst the fact that their existence is willingly tolerated in a collectivist society reminds us that such a society easily leaves room for personal freedom and individual idiosyncrasy.

The Cultivation of Allotments

The Soviet Government, however, does not stop at mere toleration of self-employment as an alternative to the wage

¹ In the USSR all these occupations are open to the " deprived " categories,

system under collectivist employment. Along certain lines the Party and the Government are actually promoting and subsidising self-employment on a huge scale. Thus, hundreds of thousands of coal-miners, railway workers and factory operatives have lately been provided with plots of land, free of rent, together with tools and seed for easy deferred payments, in order that they may grow vegetables and other foodstuffs, and keep pigs and poultry,¹ either for consumption by their families or, at their option, for sale to the consumers' cooperative societies, or to the factory kitchens, or in the free markets of the cities.

This governmental encouragement of agricultural production by the industrial wage earners has a threefold motive. The Soviet Government naturally welcomes any increase in the aggregate quantity of foodstuffs, and especially an additional source of supply, both as a further insurance against a bad harvest and as lessening the public responsibility for the maintenance of the population. The product of an allotment is a useful supplement to the family income ; whilst with the working day reduced to seven hours (and in coal-mining to six hours) there is a distinct social gain in providing healthy occupation for the worker's leisure. Finally, the occupancy of a plot of land is a potent means of counteracting the Russian workman's tendency to wander away from his job whenever he hears a rumour that the food supply or the housing accommodation or the factory conditions are better elsewhere. For all these reasons the Soviet Government finds it useful positively to subsidise individual production. The total number of these allotments may be expected to increase rapidly to several millions. It is interesting to learn that they are especially welcomed by the foreign workmen, principally from the United States, who are now settling in the USSR by hundreds

if they will but accept the universal obligation to work for a living, and refrain from any action or propaganda against the régime under which they live.

¹ In 1933, " In the Donbas these vegetable gardens covered an area of 40,000 hectares, and tens of thousands of workers were able to provide themselves with vegetables and potatoes for the winter and to keep seeds for spring sowing. The distribution of plots has spread throughout all regions of the Soviet Union. For instance, in the Dniepropetrovsk Province (Ukraine) the plan of distribution has been completely fulfilled, and all the allotments provided with seeds and the necessary implements. . . . It cannot be said that this work is being successfully carried on everywhere. In the Ural Province, instead of 250,000 workers, only 220,000 were provided with allotments. In the Ivanovo Province 9000 hectares of land have been distributed instead of 18,000 hectares " (*Moscow Daily News*, March 5, 1934).

every year.¹ Moreover, with the long-established habit of the Russians to form groups, which often take the form of cooperative societies for particular purposes, many of the allotment holders have already joined forces for the improvement of their cultivation, as well as for combined marketing of their surpluses.

Self-Employment in Manufacturing Artels (Incops)

We have already described² the structure and activities of the self-governing industrial cooperative societies that have developed out of the ancient Russian artel. Most of these "Incops" (which do not pay wages to their members, but make merely monthly advances, finally sharing among them the whole net produce of their joint labours) are now federated in a complicated hierarchy, designed not so much to control their manifold activities, as to enable these to be carried on with a saving of expense, and with the addition of such common services as their own social insurance fund. What concerns us here is the extent to which use is made of the incentive of self-employment, with its correlative of obtaining for the members the full price in the market of the product of their joint labours. The Incops have now been

¹ "Excellent results of truck gardening in 1933, by foreigners at the Kharkov Tractor Plant, was reported to the foreign Bureau of the Central Trade Union Council by Lapandin, a representative of the trade union committee of the plant. One hundred and two foreign families, consisting of 39 Americans, 47 Germans, 12 Czechoslovakians and 4 of other nationalities, received about 100 acres of land. The lot was divided as follows: 32 acres—potatoes; 25 acres—beets; 12 acres—barley; 7 acres—cabbage; and 20 acres—millet. The garden work was excellent and the crops were extraordinarily good. Families with three people participating in the work got as much as a ton of potatoes and half a ton of other vegetables. Some families sold part of their surplus to the Insab store. Vegetables ranged from 8 to 10 tons to the hectare and cabbage 12 tons. As a result of this the foreigners were able to raise 860 rabbits, and the number is still increasing. The gardens were so excellent in Kharkov that the trade union committee organised several excursions to them. As a result the foreigners became more popular than ever.

"One hundred and twelve families have applied for land this year, and some of them want it assigned to them for a period of six years. Foreigners asked for 300 wagons of manure which the trade-union committee obtained for them. The trade-union committee is getting a special kind of potato, red potato, for seed for the foreigners.

"Gardens this year will be cultivated individually only. Every person will be allotted 205 square metres of land, so that a family of five will get about an acre. No grain will be raised. Many foreigners of the plant helped their state farm last year. One family did exceptionally good work, putting in 880 days of work" (*Moscow Daily News*, February 20, 1934).

² Pp. 223-235.

freed from any obligation to sell their products to the government departments or trusts, except when these have supplied them with their materials, or otherwise entered into agreements for purchase of the product. The Incops may, at their option, have their own retail shops in the cities, or their own stalls in the free markets. Or they may, if they choose, enter into contracts to sell, at a freely agreed price, some or any of their productions, either to the government or municipal trusts, or to the consumers' cooperative societies, or to the supply departments of the factories, or other institutions.

Self-Employment in Collective Farms (Kolkhosi)

But by far the most extensive development of self-employment has been the formation of collective farms (kolkhosi), whether in their simplest form of agreements only for a definite amount of joint tillage ; or in the complete form of the commune, in which every kind of production is a joint enterprise, the proceeds of which are shared among the members ; or in the intermediate form of the artel, now greatly favoured and everywhere dominant, in which only the cereal or other principal crop is a joint enterprise, whilst each member retains for his own benefit his dwelling and garden ground, his bees and poultry, and even a pig and a cow. In this development, now comprehending nearly a quarter of a million collective farms, in which about twenty million peasant holdings have been merged, with a total population of eighty millions, we see, after many experiments, the fullest use made of the incentive of personal ownership and individual gain ; although this is united with the advantages of combined action wherever combination is found advantageous, and is everywhere controlled by an essentially collectivist environment.

We do not need to repeat our description of the successive changes in the financial and other relations between the Soviet Government and the kolkhosi during the past decade. It will suffice to state briefly the position in 1934-1935. Adhesion to the collective farm is entirely voluntary. Once admitted, however, the individual member can leave only upon conditions which he may find inconvenient. He will probably not be able to find land to occupy individually anywhere in the neighbour-

hood ; and he will not be easily allowed to withdraw from the community the whole of the capital that he may have brought in. All the members of the kolkhos collectively determine the conditions of their common self-employment ; and they dispose, at their will, of the whole of the crop that they combine to produce, after defraying expenses and making the stipulated payments to the government. These governmental dues are now all definitely fixed by regulation and agreement at the beginning of each agricultural year ; so much for the agricultural tax ; so much for hire of the tractors ; so much for any other agricultural machinery supplied ; so much in payment for the seed, for fertilisers and for anything else provided by the authorities beyond advice, encouragement and special help in trouble. Thus, the collective farms, in their self-employment, now enjoy the full incentive of retaining for themselves all that results from their additional labour and care. If they can bring more land under cultivation than in the previous year, or sow more hectares than had been arranged for, or do more weeding, or put more skill into gathering all the grain, or more care into the threshing or the storage of it, the payments exacted by the government will not thereby be raised. It is at any rate the fixed intention of the government that the kolkhos members shall themselves jointly enjoy the whole advantage of the increase that they have effected.

The cultivation of the incentive of personal gain is carried still further. At the outset many kolkhosi threw away this advantage, by sharing the produce among their family members according to the number of mouths to be fed. This has now been sternly discouraged, in favour of a distribution proportionate to the amount of work done by each working member, according to the record of the number of "workdays" devoted to the kolkhos service. The tasks are even graded, for computation of "workdays", partly according to their laboriousness or discomfort, but partly also according to their "social value" in managerial or other skill. Moreover, where practicable, the further incentive is adopted of payment according to results. Piece-work rates are given for particular tasks. A whole brigade will be made responsible throughout the year for a particular department of work, and rewarded at the end of the year by a collective payment proportionate to the departmental output ; and at the annual members' meeting all these arrangements will

be revised in the light of experience, with the object of creating the greatest possible incentive to maximum production. To this end the basis of the monthly advances to members and that of the annual sharing may be altered. The grading of "work-day" units may be changed, so as to improve the position of the manager or the accountant, or that of the member responsible for taking the produce to sell in the neighbouring city markets. This or that scheme of organisation by responsible brigades may be adopted, with this or that scale of payment proportionate to output. The policy of forgoing the chances of sale in the free market, in favour of contracting in advance for sales to other institutions, has to be considered and decided. And there is always the main issue to be determined, in the light of its effects on the mentality of the members, whether the whole of the harvest shall be distributed in shares as personal remuneration, or whether this or that allocation should not first be made from the surplus for some common purpose, such as the provision of a crèche or a kindergarten, or that of a club with a dance floor or a cinema.

But this is not the whole of the incentive to increased effort that is now given to the members of collective farms. In all cases there is reserved to each family its own individual production. So keen is the Soviet Government on each member of a collective farm having a cow of his own, that it has already distributed to such members more than a million calves to be thus separately reared.¹ "In the North Caucasus 101,000 peasant households without cows were able to obtain them, thanks to these credits. In the Ukraine 260,000 households bought cows. . . . In the Ukraine there are already many districts, and thousands of collective farms, where there is not one household which does not possess its own cow. Similar achievements have been attained in the Tartar Republic, in the Moscow Province, in Central Asia and so on. In many national republics the plans for supplying cows have been considerably overfulfilled. Thus in Uzbekistan 31,000 cows have been bought for the collective farmers instead of the planned 26,000; in Kirghizia 8600 cows have been bought instead of the 7000 planned,

¹ The method adopted was that the agricultural bank was authorised to issue, without collateral security, credits to enable peasants to buy calves on deferred payments. In the course of a few months of 1933 these credits were actually issued to the amount of 52,300,000 roubles.

and so on.”¹ Stalin had at least some ground for his prophecy to the First All-Union Congress of Collective Farm Udashniks in February 1933 that “In another year or two you will not find a single peasant who does not possess his own cow”. Whatever is gained from the garden ground, the beehives, the poultry run, the piggery and the dairy by the spare-time labours of the member and his family is wholly at his own disposal. He may consume it or any part of it in supplement of his monthly advances and his annual share of the kolkhos surplus. Or he may sell the whole or any part of it to any other consumer, in the neighbouring free market or otherwise. He may even enter into an individual contract to supply the consumers’ cooperative society, or a factory kitchen or any other institution, with eggs or honey, poultry or pigmeat. What he is not allowed to do is to sell to anyone who means to sell again—that is to say, in soviet parlance, to any speculator.

There is much more that could be said about the way in which the incentive of personal gain is now being used in the development of the kolkhosi. Thus, the kolkhosi of shore fishermen on the coasts or in the rivers and lakes, who, besides enjoying the produce of their own garden, grounds and livestock, pursue their fishing as a joint enterprise, share the proceeds, not equally but according to the work done by each member, with a graded scale, in which the “leading hand” in each group gets, for each time unit of work done, a double share of the produce, and each boy apprentice only half a share. The fishery kolkhosi are then enabled and encouraged to contract, for a specified period, for the sale of the whole or any fixed proportion of their catch, either with a government fishery trust, or with any consumers’ cooperative society, or with any department of self-supply in a factory, or other institution. They are thus free, either by sale in the open market, to take advantage of any local and temporary shortage of supply; or, at their option, to obtain by previous contract an assured and regular price for their product. And the members of the “integral” cooperative societies,² in which the professional hunters and trappers of Northern and Eastern Siberia are included, may either limit their cooperation to a joint warehousing

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, February 27, 1934.

² See, for the fishery kolkhosi, Chapter III. in Part I., “Man as a Producer”, pp. 287-290; and for the Integral Cooperative Societies, Chapter IV. in Part I., “Man as a Consumer”, pp. 290-291.

and marketing of their individual captures, or they may, at their option, pool among the members of a local group the proceeds of a season's work, in order jointly to fulfil a contract made with the Government Fur Trust, or with any institution, and share the price among themselves in any way they choose.

The Complicated Network of Agreements for Supplies

The more the student studies the organisation of distribution in the USSR of to-day, the more he will be impressed by the complicated network of voluntary agreements by means of which an ever-increasing proportion of the foodstuffs are being transferred from the individual producers to the individual consumers. This multiformity of the distributing agency has become definitely a principle of soviet policy. "It would be wrong", declared Stalin in his report to the Communist Party in January 1933, "to think that soviet trade can be developed along only one channel: for example, the cooperative societies. In order to develop soviet trade, all channels must be used: the cooperative societies, the state trading system and collective farm trading."¹ The only channel to be avoided is any "revival of capitalism and the functioning of the private capitalist sector in the circulation of commodities"—meaning both the employment of wage-labour for the making of profit, and the purchase of commodities in order to resell them at a profit. "Soviet trade", Stalin continued, "is trade without capitalists, great or small, trade without speculators, great or small. It is a special form of trade which has never existed in history before, and which we alone, the Bolsheviks, practise in the conditions of soviet development."²

This deliberate development of free trade and free contract in a free market, as an incentive to increased production, is further explained in Stalin's address to the Seventeenth Party Congress in January 1934. "The state trading system," he said, "the co-operative trading system, the local industries, the collective farms and the individual peasants must be drawn into this business. This is what we call expanded soviet trade, trade without capitalists, trade without profiteers. As you see, the expansion

¹ Stalin's speech on "The Results of the First Five-Year Plan" to the Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the CPSU, in *From the First to the Second Five-Year Plan*, 1933, p. 47.

² *Ibid.* p. 47.

of soviet trade is a very urgent problem which, if not solved, will make further progress impossible.

"Nevertheless," Stalin continued, "in spite of the fact that this truth is perfectly obvious, the Party, in the period under review, had to overcome a number of obstacles in the way of expanding soviet trade. . . . To begin with, in the ranks of a certain section of communists, there still reigns a supercilious, contemptuous attitude towards trade in general and towards soviet trade in particular. These communists, if they may be called that, look upon soviet trade as something of secondary importance, hardly worth bothering about, and regard those engaged in trade as doomed. . . . It goes without saying that the Party had to give a slight shaking-up to these communists, if they may be called that, and throw their aristocratic prejudices into the dustbin. . . . Furthermore, we had to liquidate the monopoly of the cooperatives in the market. In this connection we instructed all the commissariats to commence trading in their own goods, and the Commissariat for Supplies was instructed to develop an extensive trade in agricultural produce. On the one hand, this led to the improvement of cooperative trade as a result of competition ; on the other hand, it led to a reduction in prices in the market, to the market being put in a sounder condition. A wide network of dining-rooms was established which provide food at reduced prices (' public catering '); workers' supply departments (ORS) were established in the factories, and all those who had no connection with the factory were taken off the supply list ; (in the factories under the control of the Commissariat for Heavy Industry alone 500,000 persons had to be removed from the list).

"The State Bank was organised as a single centralised short-term credit bank with 2200 district branches capable of financing commercial operations. As a result of these measures we have in the period under review :

"(a) An increase in the number of shops and stores from 184,662 units in 1930 to 277,974 units in 1933.

"(b) A newly created network of regional goods bases numbering 1011 units, and inter-district goods bases numbering 864 units.

"(c) A newly created network of workers' supply departments numbering 1600 units.

"(d) An increase in the number of commercial stores for the sale of bread in 330 towns.

"(e) An increase in the number of public dining-rooms, which at the present time cater for 19,800,000 consumers.

"(f) An increase in state and cooperative trade, including that of public dining-rooms, from 18,900,000,000 roubles in 1930 to 49,000,000,000 roubles in 1933."¹

It is not easy to picture the complicated network of free contracting for supplies which now covers most of the thousand cities of the USSR. Thus, a large urban consumers' cooperative society, or Centrosoyus on behalf of forty thousand village societies, or the supply department of such a gigantic factory as Putilov at Leningrad or Selmashstroi at Rostov, may be simultaneously in contractual relations with any number of individual handicraftsmen, journalists or musicians; with various kolkhosi or collective farms, whether artels or communes, for the supply of grain; with many of the members of these same collective farms, or of others, who will supply eggs, poultry and honey; with fishery kolkhosi from which will come daily supplies of fresh fish; with manufacturing associations of owner-producers (artels), who make all sorts of household requisites, all of them striving to produce and sell under the incentive of getting for themselves the highest price that the free competition between crowds of different kinds of buyers and crowds of different kinds of sellers may determine.

The Bazaar

As an alternative to the system of contracting with a particular buyer, the self-employed peasants and handicraftsmen have, after each district has completed its payments to the government, always the option to resort to the free market, or bazaar, which now exists in all the cities. We need not trouble to trace the successive changes of law and administrative practice with regard to buying and selling in this characteristic feature of every eastern city. It must suffice to say that for some time past (1935) the free market, as between producers and consumers—to the exclusion of dealers and speculators—has been not only tolerated

¹ *Stalin Reports on the Soviet Union*, Seventeenth Congress of the CPSU, republished in volume entitled *From the First to the Second Five-Year Plan* (Moscow, 1933), pp. 44-47.

but actually encouraged, and often provided with improved accommodation for its crowd of customers. The Soviet Government, indeed, is now bent on increasing the importance of this free market, and especially on attracting additional supplies, and the regular attendance of the peasantry with foodstuffs to sell. It is calculated that in years of good harvests there is no need for any such insufficiency of supplies as has usually prevailed, now in one urban centre and now in another. It is believed that the failure has lain more in faulty distribution than in actual scarcity. With all the collective farms set free to sell as they choose, with a like freedom to all their members individually to do the same, not only with their separate shares but also with their own family products, and also the millions of industrial allotment holders, all these producers in competition with the surviving independent peasantry, it is hoped that the free markets in all the cities will presently become places in which the citizens can not only find all the foodstuffs they need for their individual housekeeping, but also be able to purchase them at the moderate prices that effective competition should secure. It seems, however, so far, that sellers in the free market are still getting for their wares higher prices than are deemed reasonable by the authorities. The plan of officially regulating prices in a free market has, in the long run, never succeeded. The Soviet Government has therefore tried a new expedient. "In the spring of last year," reported Mikoyan, People's Commissar of Supplies, "when market prices began to rise steeply not only in the Ukraine and other regions, but even in Moscow, Comrade Stalin conceived a remarkable idea and placed in our hands a remarkable weapon, by proposing to develop trading in state grain and other products through our stores, in order to lower prices on the collective farm market by exercising pressure through state economic intervention. The Commissariat of Supplies started selling bread freely in Moscow, Leningrad, Kharkov, Kiev and other cities. Comrade Stalin has already reported to us that the Commissariat of Supplies is selling bread in 330 cities of the Soviet Union, and this leaves out Centrosoyus which is buying grain and is also selling bread in 179 district centres. Besides bread, we started selling meat, butter and milk, and opened stores (mainly large ones) for the sale of other food products of first-class quality in Moscow, Leningrad, the cities of Donbas and Dniepropetrovsk.

To-day, 5600 shops of the People's Commissariat of Supplies are functioning, where food products are sold freely. Of these 5100 are bread shops, 63 special meat shops, 93 are shops selling dairy produce, and 65 shops are selling general food products. We have developed meat trading in 22 cities and the sale of butter and cheese in 34 cities. The influence of this trading on the level of market prices is tremendous. Thus for instance, in Gorki, market prices fell, two or three days after the commencement of the sale of bread, by 61 per cent in the case of rye bread, in Taganrog by 56 per cent, in Kazan by 55 per cent, in Ivanovo by 49 per cent. In the case of wheaten bread, prices fell in Gorki by 45 per cent, in Kazan by 52 per cent. This measure has thus immediately reduced the level of market prices by almost half. The free sale of bread also brought about a drop in prices of meat, butter, vegetables and other commodities. The influence of these stores on the collective farmers and collective farm market may be illustrated by one example which I cited a few days ago at the Moscow Province Party Conference. In June of last year, we began to sell milk in Moscow and Leningrad with the object of influencing market prices. We fixed the price 30 to 40 per cent below that ruling on the market. The market price immediately declined to the level of the state price, and even below. Prices being equal, the consumer bought his milk more willingly in a state shop, knowing that in the state shops there is a full guarantee against adulteration and that the milk is stored in hygienic conditions. In one of the bazaars the collective farmers decided to 'go one better', and fixed prices considerably below ours, nevertheless they did not sell their milk readily. Upon this they got their salesman to put on a white apron, compelled him to wash his hands, and then the consumers began to buy from the collective farmers more readily than from us. Against such 'competition' with the state we could, of course, have no objection; and we on our part again reduced the price, thereby reducing the collective farm price still more. When I told Comrade Stalin of this, he burst into laughter and said: 'This is what you have brought the collective farmer to—a white apron'. . . . 'By means of our economic lever . . . we both reduced prices and taught the collective farmers to trade in a more enlightened manner.'”¹

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, February 3, 1934.

This remarkable employment of the characteristic capitalist incentive of free competition in the open market does more than prevent monopoly prices and set a new standard of cleanliness. It has greatly widened the customer's field of choice. "The trading network and stores", declared Mikoyan, "must become champions for the good quality of commodities, must take upon themselves the defence of the interests of the consumers against some of the factories which are worsening the quality of their production. The recently opened department stores of the Mostorg (Moscow Trading Organisation), under the People's Commissariat of Supplies, may serve as an example of how a shop should fight for better quality of industrial commodities. In the department stores of the Moscow and Kharkov Trading Organisations we now have over 10,000 different kinds of industrial commodities, while the usual department stores contain no more than 4000 sorts. You thus see, comrades, that the stores for free sales are simultaneously also a lever in the struggle for the good quality of commodities on the market. . . . In this way, the free sale of products, organised by the People's Commissariat of Supplies on the initiative of Comrade Stalin, besides being a most important lever of economic intervention, is creating a school of soviet trading; this trading gradually extending and reducing market prices in future, will replace the system of closed trading." ¹

Socialist Emulation

From the remodelling of old incentives we pass to the adoption, by the Soviet Government, of new incentives, practically unknown, or at least unutilised, in the capitalist world. The first of these is what is often called "socialist competition". It was an interesting observation of John Stuart Mill that there was nothing to be objected to, by those who looked to the supersession of capitalism by a new social order, in competition among individuals. It was, he declared, not competition that was "the deepest root of the evils and iniquities that fill the industrial world, but the subjection of labour to capital, and the enormous share which the possessors of the instruments of production are able to take from the produce". ² Socialist competition—we

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, February 3, 1934.

² *Principles of Political Economy*, by John Stuart Mill (People's Edition), p. 477.

prefer, in English, to use the phrase socialist emulation—is a communist invention which plays a large and apparently an ever-increasing part in the social organisation of the USSR. Everyone is familiar with the desire to “do the other fellow down” in games and sport, in solving cross-word puzzles, in aerial flights and automobile records of speed. What is original and, so far as we know, unprecedented is the transfer, in the USSR, of the sporting instinct to the everyday operations of industrial and agricultural production.

This application of the motive of emulation has the social advantage over tennis or golf, cricket or football, in that it is indissolubly linked up with the active participation of large numbers. There is no pleasurable excitement for the mere spectator! The only way to enjoy the sport of socialist emulation is to be actually on the playing field, and incidentally rendering a social service. Lenin it was who foresaw the use to which this might be turned in socialist construction. “Socialist emulation” (*Soc-sorevnovanie*), he wrote in 1918, “ought to become one of the important tasks of the Soviet Power in the sphere of economic life. . . . Socialists never denied the principle of emulation as such. Socialist emulation is a very important and noble task in the reconstruction of society. . . . If we establish socialist emulation as a state function, we shall be able to find the future forms of socialist construction.”¹

It was, however, a long time before Lenin’s words were turned into deeds. It was not at first realised that there may be just as much pleasurable excitement in trying which team can lay the most bricks, or the greatest length of railway track, or erect the greatest number of automobiles or tractors, or execute the greatest acreage of ploughing in a given time, as in the game of knocking little balls into holes, or in forcing a larger ball against all defences into the enemy’s goal.²

¹ Lenin’s *Works*, vol. xxii. pp. 412-417 of 3rd edition (Russian); dictated by Lenin on March 28, 1918. It should be noted that there are, in Russian, different words for the competition characteristic of capitalism (*concurentisia*) and for the emulation unconnected therewith (*sorevnovanie*). Lenin observed this distinction, but other Russians writing in English, or their translators, often use “competition” for both meanings.

² This social discovery may, perhaps, be ascribed to Mark Twain’s Huckleberry Finn, who, when refused leave to go to play with his boy friends, and ordered by his aunt to “paint the fence”, introduced this to his comrades as a new game of trying who could most quickly paint so many yards of fencing.

Socialist emulation is said to have begun in the USSR in 1927. "The first year of the Five-Year Plan", remarked Shvernik, the secretary of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), "witnessed a widespread development of socialist competition, which has become a mighty force in the struggle for a Bolshevik tempo in the industrialisation of our country. . . . The old trade union leaders disregarded this enthusiasm of the working masses. The fact that they tried to avoid assuming the leadership of socialist competition, as a function 'not proper to the unions', most strikingly reveals the rotten, opportunist character of the old leadership. On January 1, 1932, 65.6 per cent of the total number of workers were taking part in socialist competition. . . . The tremendous wave of productive energy and creative enthusiasm among the working class has enabled us to achieve wonders in the construction of socialism, and proves that in the USSR labour has already become for the vast masses of workers (in Stalin's words) 'a matter of honour, a matter of glory, a matter of valour and heroism'." ¹

There is no end to the variety of tasks to which socialist emulation is now applied in the USSR. In the factory or mine the different brigades or shifts will formally arrange competitive struggles with each other as to which will, within a given time, complete the largest amount of product, or produce with the lowest percentage of breakage, waste or scrap. Factory will compete with factory, under conditions formally agreed upon by their respective factory committees, as to which will accomplish soonest the quota assigned to each of them by the Five-Year Plan. In the soviet mercantile marine, ship will elaborately compete with ship in the speed of the common voyage, in economy

¹ *Shvernik's Speech in Ninth Trade Union Congress, 1933, p. 28.* Stalin's words are worth quoting in full: "The most remarkable feature of competition is the radical revolution it has wrought in men's views of labour, because it transforms labour from a disgraceful and painful burden, as it was reckoned before, into a matter of *honour*, a matter of *glory*, a matter of *valour* and *heroism*. There is not and cannot be anything similar to it in capitalist countries. There, under the capitalists, the most desirable end which earns social approval is to have an income from investments, to live on interest and to be freed from toil, which is regarded as a contemptible occupation. Here in our USSR, on the contrary, the most desirable course, which earns social approval, becomes the possibility of being a hero of labour, a hero of the shock-brigade movement, surrounded with the glamour of the respect of millions of toilers" ("Socialist Competition and Shock Brigades an Integral Part of the Bolshevik Offensive" to the Sixteenth Party Congress; included in *Lenin and Stalin on Socialist Competition*, Moscow, 1933, pp. 41-42).

of oil consumption over a given period, and even in the net profitability of particular trips. The entire personnel of a Volga steamboat will challenge all the similar Volga steamboats as to which can show the best balance sheet for the round trip, or for a whole season. In the construction of the great Dnieper dam, where an enormous amount of concrete building has to be done, it was regularly made a matter of emulation, as to which could do the greatest aggregate in a given period, between the brigades belonging to one side of the river and those of the other side, the result of the struggle being proclaimed to the whole population by the display of different coloured lights. Occasionally city will compete with city. "The deputies and section workers of the Moscow City Soviet", we read in September 1932, "have issued an appeal to soviet deputies and workers of the Soviet Union to join the competition among the three capitals—Moscow, Leningrad and Kharkov—for the fulfilment of the fourth final year of the Pyatiletka, as well as for the fulfilment of the decisions made by the Soviet Government pertaining to municipal economy and socialist reconstruction of cities."¹ The pleasurable excitement of socialist emulation was actually brought into play in 1931–1933 among the tens of thousands of convicted criminals, "politicals" and kulaks employed, as we have already described, on the gigantic civil engineering works of the White Sea Canal. Brigade competed with brigade as to which could shift the greatest amount of earth, lay the greatest length of rail or construct the greatest amount of embankment within the prescribed period—sometimes, it is recorded, refusing to stop work when the hour for cessation arrived, in order to complete some particular task. Nor do the agriculturists escape the contagion. "Competition", wrote an enthusiast in 1932, "has swept the towns and is now penetrating the villages. Every newspaper speaks loudly of this fact. Every day brings glad tidings from the villages. Throughout the length and breadth of the country, the peasantry is answering the call to competition. Here are one or two facts which prove it: Vyatka has challenged Kostroma. Kostroma has taken up the challenge, mustered all its forces and has in its turn challenged Yaroslavl and Ivanovo-Voznesensk. The Volga region, the Northern Caucasus and the Ukraine are competing for the best organised harvest campaign and for collectivisation.

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, September 20, 1932.

The Samara workshops manufacturing agricultural implements have challenged the peasants of the village Vladimirevko and the collective farm Green Grove. The workers have promised to raise the productivity of labour by 1 per cent, lower the cost of production and improve the quality of their work. The peasants in their turn promise to fulfil the norm for harvest collection and organise a collective farm to sow the land with best quality seed.”¹ “More and more republics and provinces”, we read in July 1933, “are joining the nation-wide competition initiated by the Tartar Republic for model organisation of the harvest and early delivery of grain to the state. The latest entry is Kharkov province, which has accepted the challenge of North Caucasus to compete with it on the following points :

“1. The speediest harvesting and threshing of grain in the state and collective farms. 2. The earliest delivery of grain to the state and machine tractor stations, filling the year’s quota ahead of the dates fixed by the government. 3. Securing the highest crop per hectare by combating theft and losses of grain during the harvest.”²

Socialist emulation in the factory incidentally put new life into the “production commissions and production conferences”, a particular form of “participation” in which the whole body of workmen were supposed to “improve production”. Professor Harper described these in 1929 as lacking in interest to the workmen so long as the element of sport was wanting.³ Socialist emulation immediately wrought a great change. “In all these activities”, writes Mr. Joseph Freeman in 1932, “the trade union finds an effective instrument in the production conference, which

¹ *Socialist Competition of the Masses*, by E. Mikulina (Moscow, 1932), pp. 59-60.

² *Moscow Daily News*, July 20, 1933.

³ “General conditions of work and policy of management of a given enterprise are also subject to discussion and a measure of control, through the production commissions and the more recently instituted production conferences. Production commissions are one of several commissions of a factory or local committee. They are expected to follow in a general way the working of the enterprise and to report suggestions for improvements of a technical or general character. The inactivity of these commissions led to the introduction of larger conferences, to discuss the conditions and problems of production. The conferences are open to all workmen and employees of the given enterprise, and the management and technical staffs are urged to attend. The percentage of participation in these conferences has not been large, and recently a campaign was started by the trade unions to give to these conferences more importance and authority and thus secure a larger attendance of workmen” (*Civic Training in Soviet Russia*, by S. N. Harper, 1929, p. 150).

has become the basic method for drawing the workers into the management of industry. The production conference is also the organising centre for 'socialist competition' and the various types of 'shock brigades'. It reaches every department and every individual worker at his bench. The members of the 'shock brigade', the 'Udarniki', are the backbone of the production conference. Since they are the most advanced workers, they set an example to the others, and draw them into more active participation in production. More and more workers are participating in the conferences. Thus, at the beginning of 1932 about 75 per cent of the industrial workers in Moscow were participating in production conferences, as against 35 per cent in 1931. During the same period the percentage in Leningrad rose from 45 to 75." ¹

Socialist emulation became, too, a marked feature in the "counter-planning" by which, as we have described, the workers in any establishment insisted on increasing the quota of output that Gosplan had provisionally assigned to them. Thus, in constructing the great dam across the Dnieper, according to the programme, 427,000 cubic metres of concrete had to be laid, but the workers put forward a counter-plan of 500,000 cubic metres. The workers' brigades put up a heroic struggle and actually laid 518,000 cubic metres as against the 500,000 proposed in their own counter-plan! The assembling of the first turbine in Dnieprostroy was accomplished in 36 days, instead of the 90 days provided for by the programme of the administration." ²

It is, of course, easy to suggest that any such enthusiasm can be no more than partial and short-lived. This would, it may be admitted, be the experience in capitalist countries, where the fundamental conflict between the wage-earners and their employers invariably brings to an early end any such spurt of unremunerated effort. Under Soviet Communism it has been demonstrated that the increase in productivity can be maintained, and even progressively increased. Thus Shvernik reports that a copper-rolling shop which, before the revolution, with a ten hours' day, used to produce 150 ingots, raised this daily output to 360 or 373 ingots; and then under counter-planning inspired by socialist emulation,

¹ Report of All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU) in *Pravda*, April 12, 1932; *The Soviet Worker*, by Joseph Freeman, 1932, p. 132.

² *Ninth Congress of Trade Unions* (Moscow, 1933), pp. 29-30.

the shifts went from 400 to 500 ingots, and then further progressed to 665 and 700 ingots ; whilst in one case a shift triumphantly produced 832 ingots, "in honour of the Ninth Trade Union Congress and to celebrate the third anniversary of socialist competition".¹ Here again, the fact that any increase in the productivity of labour not merely increases automatically the earnings of piece-workers, but also either the annually determined wage-fund or else the allocation to social services, seems, to the workers concerned, a sufficient justification for using the sporting instinct to augment the wealth of the nation.

Shefstvo, or Patronage

There is one fundamental characteristic of socialist emulation which is entirely absent in capitalist competition, and rare even in the devotion to competitive games to which the British and American world have been so much addicted. In the USSR, the winners in any competition habitually turn to and help the losers, in order that these may attain at least an equal ability. The winning factory in socialist emulation with other factories will often send a shock brigade to one or other of the losing factories, to the great appreciation of the latter, in order to instruct the whole personnel of the defeated factory how to attain a level of production as great as, or even greater than, that of the winning factory. It is difficult to imagine the successful teams at cricket or football in England, or at baseball in the United States, feeling it a matter of honourable obligation to endeavour to teach those who had been defeated how they could turn the tables on their opponents on the next occasion. This interesting impulse towards mutual aid runs all through the recent life of the USSR. One of its most extensive developments is the patronage agreement, which often hardens into a patronage society, the members of which agree to contribute, besides their personal work, a small sum towards the incidental expenses. "The mutual-aid aspect of socialist competition", we are told, "comes to its fullest expression in the shefstvo, or patronage agreements, in which some institution or organisation becomes the patron of another. This is also spoken of as the process of adoption. . . . To-day this means an agreement for competition and mutual aid in fulfilling the Plan. The

¹ *Ninth Trade Union Congress, 1933, p. 40.*

most universal form of such agreement is between factories and nearby collective farms and communes. For instance, the oil industry at Baku has 66 such agreements, the harvester plant at Selmash has 33. In working out this patronage, the Party supplies political education, the labour union technical aid, the Comsomol youthful leaders. The kolkhosi to be adopted are divided between the departments ; even the gas station takes one. The work is done through a shefstvo (patronage) society organised in each department, with a membership fee of ten kopeks a month.”¹ Professor Harper tells us that “ there are many varieties of patronage societies. The underlying principle of all of them is that a group which is better organised, economically stronger, and politically more conscious, assumes, with respect to a group which is less well organised, economically weaker, and politically backward, the special responsibility of material and moral assistance. The first and the largest field for patronage activity is that of the relations between the proletariat and the peasantry. Workman groups assume the patronage of peasants. The patronage of a regiment by a factory is a special expression of this type, because of the predominance of the peasants in the Red Army. But a regiment may become the patron of a Pioneer brigade. Soviet administrative institutions also assume patronage of a peasant community, so that the toiling intelligentsia may also help and influence the culturally backward village group. An educational institution ‘ adopts ’ another group on cultural grounds, and in turn becomes the object of special solicitude for an industrial group so that it may be brought into closer touch with the processes of production. . . . A Central Patronage Commission for the workman-peasant societies was introduced. The patronage of regiments has been coordinated under a department of the War Commissariat. For the Red Fleet the Comsomols assumed direction of all patronage activity among the sailors. . . . Within the patronage movement a workmen’s society of patronage of peasants is the most important type. . . . The leadership of the workmen with respect to the peasants, and the general policy of ‘ face to the village ’—all these principles or policies underlie the activities of these particular societies.”² “ It was ”, reports Professor S. N. Harper, “ from the communist cells that the first

¹ *In Place of Profit*, by Harry F. Ward, 1933, pp. 122-123.

² *Civic Training in Soviet Russia*, by Professor S. N. Harper, 1929, p. 189.

workmen's patronage societies developed. Among the commissions of a cell there was formed a patronage commission for the Party cell of a rural district. Through this contact the factory cell was to help the rural cell in the latter's activity among the peasants. Then the factory committees took up the idea on the initiative of their communist fractions. In the first stages of the movement the principle of voluntary membership was frequently nullified by the practice of collective decision of the whole group to assume the patronage responsibility. In order to give the movement a mass character among the workmen, the factory committee became the accepted basis for all societies. The patronage society as finally developed is organised with a directing board, composed of representatives of the Party cell and the factory committee or of the 'cult-commission' of the latter. The original Party leadership is thus retained. Co-ordinating bodies are limited to provinces, as a patronage society never goes outside the province in its activities. . . . The workmen of the cities, in their manifest eagerness for education, clearly welcome the patronage activities in their behalf on the part of the intelligentsia. The Pioneers, of course, are proud of being adopted by a regiment. For the sailors the patronage comes from members of their own classes, the youth of the workmen and peasants. It is in the patronage activity of workmen with respect to peasants that a political problem may develop. The general formula given by the communists is that whereas antagonism between rural and urban elements is inevitable under the capitalistic system, it is possible but not inevitable under the soviet order. The patronage societies, by the very character of their activities, are believed to make less possible an antagonism between workmen and peasants. The workmen's societies are being constantly pushed by the leaders to more organised effort and greater activity."¹ "Another form of patronage agreement", states another observer, "is that which the textile factory Trehgorka, for example, signed with a kolkhos, promising to train effectively for trades the surplus workers whom the kolkhos promised to send to the factory. There are also the usual mutual agreements to increase production. In the lumber industry the saw-mill workers constitute themselves patrons over neighbouring villages, giving them aid in farming, repairing machinery, organisa-

¹ *Civic Training in Soviet Russia*, by Professor S. N. Harper, 1929, p. 191.

tion of socialist forms of labour, and cultural activities. This method reaches down to the children. Sometimes a young Pioneer takes patronage over a certain machine in a factory. He then has to see if the worker carries out his agreement not to drink, be late or absent, and to keep the machine clean and oiled. On the other hand the Pioneer assumes obligations in his school days.”¹

There are endless varieties and developments of the idea of patronage. “ Besides binding the factory workers to send skilled men to put in order the agricultural machinery before seed-time and harvest, and to carry on specified cultural work in the villages, such as organising kindergartens, libraries, nurseries and playgrounds, these agreements bind both sides to fulfil, and sometimes to surpass, the norms in their respective plans. For example, in the agreement between the drill department and the Pervaya Pyatiletka kolkhos, the latter agrees, among other things, ‘ to increase the area of spring sowing by adding 4015 hectares [?]; to increase the crop over last year by 11 per cent; to lower production costs 15 per cent; to increase working oxen to 50, horses to 55, milk cows to 51, pigs to 31, and to get 2 full-blooded sows ’. The drill department for the factory agrees, among other things, to lower production costs 15 per cent from the previous mean; to reduce absence without reason to .03 per cent, and drifters to 3 per cent; to get 50 of all workers on *hozraschet* (cost-accounting) by January 1st and 75 per cent by May 1st.”²

“ Another example is the association of the AMO Automobile Works (Moscow) for the help of the Novo-Annensk district in the Lower Volga. The AMO sent to this district 30 highly skilled workers for the ‘ Amo Worker ’ state farm. Ten workers are now

¹ *In Place of Profit*, by Harry F. Ward, 1933, pp. 154-155.

² *Ibid.* p. 153.

The Leningrad shipyard workers “ patronised ” the 1933-1934 Arctic expedition.

“ A socialist patronage contract with the workers of the Leningrad Northern Shipyards was recently signed by Professor Otto J. Schmidt, commander of the Chelyushkin expedition. ‘ The moral support of our patrons, and of the toilers of the Soviet Union in general, will enable us to tackle the biggest obstacle met by Arctic expeditions—loneliness ’, said Professor Schmidt in his speech delivered at the Udamnik Square of the Central Park of Culture and Rest on Talagin Island.

“ Two thousand Leningrad workers crowded the square, and the warm applause with which Schmidt and Vorosin, captain of the Chelyushkin, together with the heroes of the Sibiryakov, were greeted, was a good illustration of Schmidt’s statement that ‘ in the Soviet Union every new venture personally concerns all the toilers ’ ” (*Moscow Daily News*, July 22, 1933).

presidents of village soviets, etc. There are altogether 106 AMO workers in the district, some of whom occupy responsible party and soviet posts (district-committee secretaries, executive committee presidents, etc.). . . . Six motor lorries, sowers, two ploughs, spare parts and other equipment have been sent to the state farms under the special care of the AMO. The Works organised 26 crèches for the spring-sowing campaign. AMO Y.C.L. members [Comsomols] made 500 cots for the crèches out of scrapped metal in the Works, and a cinema-automobile was sent to the district. It is thanks to the energetic work of the AMO association for the care of the district that it was completely radiofied and telephonised by the time of the spring sowing. As well as this, an editing staff was sent to the district for the organisation on the spot of a permanent collective farm newspaper.”¹

It is very largely by means of this patronage by the industrial workers that the vast network of primary school buildings all over the USSR is being completed. “With the school season about to commence, factories are right now concerned with the completion of new structures and the re-equipment and repair of existing buildings. *Patronage over elementary schools has assumed truly colossal proportions.* The industrial enterprises of the machine-building industry have alone taken patronage over 4350 schools, the railroad workers over 3400 schools, textile mills over 2600 schools, while other industries are to a similar extent engaged in assisting large numbers of elementary schools to cope with their problems. . . . A shortage of materials and labour sometimes prevents completion of schools on time. In such an event the factory that has patronage over the particular school is in a position to give invaluable assistance.”²

The principle of patronage is, of course, not confined to factory workers or to the industrial trade unions. A rising young official in one of the higher grades of the soviet civil service described to us how, when he was serving in one of the leading government departments in Moscow, about a score of his colleagues in the office formed a patronage society in order to help a struggling kolkhos some fifty miles distant. This society, of which our informant was elected president, supplied this collective farm with elementary manuals on book-keeping, a type-writer and

¹ *Bolshevism for Beginners*, by P. Kerzhentsevy, 1931, p. 68.

² *Moscow Daily News*, August 21, 1933.

other office requisites. The members of the patronage society arranged to spend their annual holidays, in batches extending over three or four months, on the collective farm itself, where they helped in the farm work, looked after the accountancy, and generally educated the agriculturists of all ages. It is hard to imagine the "gentlemen of the Foreign Office" or of the War Office, in London, even those who used to work at Toynbee Hall, rendering, as a matter of course, this kind of service to an agricultural community of small holders in Essex or Kent.¹

A curious development of this idea of patronage is seen in the custom of some of the trade unions of selecting a considerable number of their ablest members to enter, with the consent of the management in each case, the offices of the enterprises in which they have been working, in the capacity—in most cases temporarily—of departmental vice-managers, or inspectors, or even assistant directors. The object is manifold. It is thought that, by this means, something can be done to counteract the ever-present tendency of the office-workers and managers to get out of touch with the feelings of the men at the bench and the forge. It is thought also that some check may thereby be put to "bureaucratism". Moreover, the practice may serve a useful purpose in enabling the best men and women to be picked out for substantive promotion. In 1933 it was reported to the Ninth All-Union Trade Union Congress that not fewer than 5000 such industrial workers were at that moment serving temporarily as assistant or vice-managers in 1500 enterprises, whilst as many as 40,000 more had been drawn into lower positions in the offices of these enterprises.²

"The furthest reach of patronage work", it is said, "is where it becomes a productive bond between the biggest factories and the agricultural district which supplies them with raw materials. For example, the textile workers have 'adopted' the cotton district of Central Asia. Through such agreements, the organisational experience of industry is transmitted to agriculture; it

¹ We may note as typical that this particular kolkhos started in 1929 with 17 members; then in 1930, under the influences of unduly enthusiastic Party members, bounded up to 95 members. Upon Stalin's manifesto entitled "Dizzy with Success", 50 members withdrew. But in 1932 and 1933 the membership rose to about 80 members. The dozen or so remaining outside were then not allowed to join, out of resentment at their previous withdrawal. But it was believed that they would all be gradually admitted, one by one.

² *Ninth Trade Union Congress, 1933.*

learns how to develop shock tactics, the new socialist forms of labour and the methods of socialist competition ; it becomes socialised as well as mechanised.”¹ The position, to the westerner, becomes bewildering when, as is now frequently happening, one part of the constitutional machine is called upon voluntarily to inspect and supervise, and thereby render assistance to, another part. Thus during 1933 the village soviets in the North Caucasus were officially incited to look into the management and efficiency of the collective farms in their neighbourhood ; and to show them the way they should go. And the rural soviets of the Ukraine in the Don Basin were told to take under their patronage the coal mines in that region, which were seriously falling behind in their output, with a view to finding out what was wrong, and showing the workers and technicians how to get more coal. We shall later describe how it is impressed as a social duty upon every factory worker that he ought, through the trade union, to make his own suggestions to the factory manager as to how the running of the factory could be improved, including every new invention that he can think of. This form of voluntarism is open to the citizen at large. During the Moscow municipal election in 1932, it is said that more than one hundred thousand specific criticisms of the municipal administration were handed in, each one embodying a different suggestion for improvement. “ Patronage of the workers over the state apparatus [*sic*] was of special importance during the reconstruction period. It arose through the initiative of the Moscow Electric Works during the period of the purge of the state apparatus ; and it received immediately general recognition and became widespread. Half a year after the initiative of these Works, the Sixteenth Party Congress, according to the report of TSIK, expressed itself as follows : One of the most important achievements in the struggle with bureaucratism is the new form of workers’ control from below, *patronage by the works over the state apparatus*. The system of patronage, and the transfer of the execution of certain functions of the state apparatus to the workers, are an important step towards the realisation of Lenin’s view to the effect that ‘ our aim should be an unpaid performance of state functions by each worker after his eight hours’ task has been fulfilled ’. The seven hours’ working day opens the possibility for the realisation

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, November 5, 1932.

of these views of Lenin. The primary task of patronage must consist in the daily control on the part of the patronage works as to the proper carrying out of the most important Party and government directives by the apparatus under patronage. It is just this familiarisation of the workers with the practical work of the departments which creates a powerful reserve of new proletarian staffs for the continuing of work in the soviet apparatus."

It would, we think, be hard to exaggerate the educational influence on the millions of the Soviet Union of the great and varied development that has been described under the heads of socialist emulation, voluntary work, and all the forms of patronage. An American observer rightly calls attention to some moral and intellectual by-products. "One is", says Mr. Ward, "that it is removing the former inferiority complex of the Russians as they acquire strength in and for the technique of socialist construction. Another is that it develops joy in work; it brings back into labour the song that the coming of industrialism drove away. . . . Often they go forth to the sowing or the harvest, and to their free work in cities, with banners flying and with songs. Also this joyous, competitive, mutual work promotes solidarity. It gradually ties the whole diverse multitude into a fellowship, including nationalities who were formerly at each other's throats in pogroms and race wars. . . . Thus socialist competition, instead of dividing people into classes, like its antecedent in the capitalist world, is one of the shuttles running back and forth between the various sections of the population, weaving them into a unity of knowledge, purpose and accomplishment." ¹

The Udarniki (Shock Brigaders)

The Shock Brigaders (udarniki) are workmen, and, occasionally, working women, not confined to Party members or Comsomsols, who voluntarily undertake to give more and better service in their occupation, or to perform special tasks outside their occupation, in order to build up the socialist state, or, specifically, to ensure the fulfilment of the General Plan. They set themselves to raise the standard output, to diminish scrap or

¹ *In Place of Profit*, by Harry F. Ward, 1933, pp. 151-152, 155.

breakages, to put an end to time-wasting or unnecessary absenteeism, and to make the utmost use of the instrument of socialist emulation. The first brigade of udarniki was formed by Comsomols in the Listvensky factory late in 1928. This example was boomed in the soviet press, and was quickly imitated. By April 1, 1929, there were already seventy industrial enterprises in which shock brigades were at work. Ideas spread like wildfire in the USSR. In December 1929 an All-Union Congress of Shock Brigaders was held at Moscow, when it was reported that there were already 300,000 of them in all parts of the country. This was confirmed by investigations made by the Central Executive Committee (TSIK), which revealed no fewer than 1534 enterprises, having 1,101,000 workers, among whom the new spirit had shown itself, and of whom 60 per cent had actually taken part in socialist competitions, and 29 per cent were definitely enrolled as members of shock brigades.¹

The activities of the shock brigaders take a great variety of form, always with the common object of increasing output and

¹ Extracted from article entitled "Socialist Competition and the Practice of Udarniki" (in Russian), *Materials annexed to Report of TSIK to the Ninth Congress of Trade Unions*, 1932, pp. 22-26. The following statistical tables were then given :

Number of Udarniki on March 1, 1930, in the principal trade unions :

Trade Unions	Number of Workers	Percentage of Udarniki
Metal workers .	567,250	60.0
Paper „ .	26,342	58.2
Textile „ .	181,231	48.8
Chemical „ .	29,641	47.1
Railway „ .	206,752	41.4
Carpenters .	88,516	41.0
Building workers .	150,858	38.0

Number of Udarniki on January 1, 1932, in industry and railway transport :

	Number of Workers	Number of Udarniki
Industry . . .	5,040,600	3,236,100
Railway Transport .	1,253,300	643,000
Total . . .	6,293,900	3,879,100

Average percentage of Udarniki on January 1, 1932 :

Amongst workmen	64.2
Amongst members of the Communist Party	75.3
Amongst members of Comsomols	68.7

diminishing cost. They work with furious intensity, shaming the other workers in the shop into putting more regularity and continuity into their efforts. They do not habitually exceed the normal factory day, except for the completion of special tasks, when a shock brigade may work continuously all night. They do not usually receive or expect extra payment for their quite exceptional efforts, although on a piece-work basis their total earnings at the standard rates are naturally greater than those of the average workman. They find their reward in the public approval and the honours accorded to them, and in the special consideration frequently shown to them. They get the best chance of receiving theatre tickets or being sent on holiday excursions. In 1931 select companies of *udarniki* were given a cruise around European ports, and even to the Far East. *Udarniki* are apt to be elected to the various representative soviets and committees. They often enjoy the amenity of a separate dining-room in the factory restaurant, sometimes with flowers on the table, electroplated spoons and forks, and special dainties.¹ The student of social organisation will not fail to appreciate the effect of such a movement, not only upon the psychology of the *udarniki* themselves but also upon that of the whole mass of the wage-earning class, which, besides being stimulated to a universal increase in production, is, by the very approbation and honour that it gives to these exceptional members of its own community, unconsciously being educated in a higher and nobler motive for work than merely the wage that it yields. The numbers enrolled in the shock brigades continued to grow rapidly. By January 1933 the editor of *Izvestia* could claim that in the vanguard of the labouring forces there was an "army of three

¹ In some places, we are told, "the shock [brigade] workers get special books entitling them to buy goods not available for ordinary workers, sometimes at the factory cooperative, and in the larger centres at special stores for their use. Also they do not have to wait in line to get their quota of staples, but are served ahead of the crowd. On the collective farms and in the lumber camps, where there is often a shortage of manufactured goods, the best workers get the first chance at them" (*In Place of Profit*, by Harry F. Ward, 1933, p. 33).

"At the initiative of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, the question was raised of according a preferential supply of goods to all shock-workers. During the first quarter of 1931, the funds assigned for the supply of shock-brigaders amounted to about 20.4 per cent of the total fund of workers' supplies and in the fourth quarter this figure had risen to 39 per cent.

"It is a principle that those who fight in Bolshevik manner for increased production should be placed in the best positions as regards supplies" (*Shvernik's Speech in Ninth Congress of Trade Unions*, 1933, p. 69).

million shock brigaders who had become inseparable from the Five-Year Plan, inseparable from Bolshevism and the soviets, because they were the sinew and bone of socialist construction. The udarniki, he concluded, represent the proletariat which is being remoulded in the process of the reconstruction of the world.”¹

Cost-Accounting Brigades

A particular form of the shock brigade, called cost-accounting brigade, makes special use of the device of “costing”, in checking up the production of its own members, as a means of discovering in what way output may be increased and costs lessened. As already mentioned, this took its rise by the practice of a few udarniki in a Leningrad factory at the beginning of 1931, who found that a dissection of the labour time that they expended in the various stages of particular jobs enabled them to devise methods for considerably reducing the total labour-cost. They described their experiment in *Trud*, the weekly journal of the AUCCTU, which made it the subject of successive articles. The idea was taken up with avidity by shock brigades all over the USSR. “On February 1, 1931,” reported the secretary of the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), “we could number only ten business accounting brigades in the USSR, comprising 130 persons. By April 1, 1932, their number had increased to 155,000, comprising about one and a half million workers. . . . It was in Leningrad that the first initiative towards organising accounting brigades took its rise, and now no less than 70 per cent of the workers there are included in business accounting brigades. In the Moscow district there are 30,000 business accounting brigades, comprising about 400,000 workers. There are 25,000 business accounting brigades in the Ukraine, comprising 300,000 workers. . . . These figures bear eloquent testimony to the fact that the working class is creating new and higher forms of labour organisations, which make it possible to enlist even larger numbers of the working masses in the direct control of production. There is not a single branch of industry where business accounting brigades are not developing as the basic form of socialist competition, as the most highly perfected form in which the labour of a given enterprise can be organ-

¹ *Izvestia*, January 1933.

ised. . . . Business accounting brigades fully assure that the worker exercises due influence upon the course of production, and solve the problem of teaching millions of workers how to control the national economy. . . . At the Dzerzhinsky Metallurgical Plant, in the Bessemer shop, where the work of the business accounting brigades has been excellent, 17 out of 22 business accounting brigades fulfilled their programme for January 1932 to the extent of 107 per cent, while the plant as a whole failed to fulfil its industrial programme. . . . In some cases the cost-accounting brigades effected veritable triumphs of economy. In the assembling shop of the Stalingrad Tractor Plant one brigade contrived to reduce the amount of bad work turned out by five times more than was specified in the programme. They thus saved 3800 roubles in three months. Cases of workers being absent from work without due cause were totally eliminated; and the number of workers was reduced from 72 to 32 by giving one worker charge of 3-4 machines. . . . Volokitin's business accounting brigade in the 'Red Putilov' Works (Leningrad) fulfilled its allotted task in 775 hours, instead of the 924 hours provided for by the programme. Such a miscalculation on the part of the technical administration in estimating the time required for performing a definite task could never have been discovered had not socialist competition and its highest form—the business accounting brigade—developed a genuinely socialist attitude to labour on the part of the workers. . . . Calculations made by the members of the business accounting brigades of this shift have shown that, provided the stoppages are eliminated, it may be possible to increase the assignment of work so as to fulfil the industrial programme by 150 per cent. Demin's brigade of roller-hands in the Stalin Metallurgical Plant, after adopting business accounting, is now working with a gang of 45 workers, instead of the 60 formerly employed. . . . With the active participation of business accounting brigades, the technological process in the screw shop of the 'Red Profintern' Plant has been reorganised, the result being a considerable increase in the productivity of labour, better organisation of control, and above all, a doing away with all absence of personal responsibility in the control of production, which is now registered for each separate machine.”¹ “In March 1932, a numerously attended

¹ *Shvernik's Speech in Ninth Trade Union Congress, 1933, pp. 33-35.*

All-Union Congress of Business Accounting Brigades analysed the condition of this particular movement, revealed the obstacles that hindered its further development, and outlined a programme for the improvement in quality of the work of the brigades.”¹

The social utility of these cost-accounting brigades has been freely recognised. “In the struggle for the development of socialist competition”, declared Shvernik, “the initiative of the workers has taken various forms: social tugboats, chain brigades, brigades to fight for higher quality, brigades to reduce the cost of production. But the two forms of labour which have done most to raise socialist competition to a higher level are the counter-plans worked out by the individual shifts and the business accounting brigades.”²

Naturally all these millions of *udarniki* are not all equally enthusiastic, or equally faithful to their undertaking to excel the ordinary worker in productive efficiency. But the slackers are watched and, in due course, reprimanded, warned and if necessary expelled.³ There is even some good to be got out of this dealing with the slackers. It is part of the social evolution of the idea, and not its least valuable part. “The determination to see that contracts are carried out means that the workers are to be subjected to the same discipline of keeping one’s word that capitalism, in its best days, instilled in the traders and bankers. Also, when the kulak becomes transformed, he finds a new meaning for some of the habits which before made him a social enemy. In their changed form, they make him a valuable asset to the socialist cause. Truth-telling also becomes obligatory in a planned system, in order that the planner may not be deceived and misled.”⁴

Subbotniki, or Voluntary Labourers

The forerunner of shock brigades and socialist emulation was the practice of voluntary social work, undertaken gratuitously in order to achieve a particular object. It began during the civil war, in the form of “*subbotniki*”, or “*Saturdayers*”, in

¹ *Shvernik’s Speech in Ninth Trade Union Congress, 1933, p. 37.*

² *Ibid. p. 28.*

³ “The worst thing about the shock-brigade movement is that there are those who parade the thing, who make solemn assemblies and mutual greetings, assurances and vows before one another, and nothing more” (*The Comsomol—One Shock Brigade* (in Russian), by the General Secretary of the Comsomols).

⁴ *In Place of Profit*, by Harry F. Ward, 1933, p. 61.

which spontaneously formed groups of workers gave up their free time to toil in an emergency at some special task.¹ The workers on the railway at Kazan first made this sacrifice of their leisure, when Lenin publicly hailed their action as "the great start" of genuine communism. It rapidly became a regular practice among all sorts of workers, in offices and institutions as well as in industrial establishments. Now "every fall in Moscow a large part of the population turns out to help unload potatoes and vegetables, and again in the winter to dig the city out of a snowstorm which has stopped traffic". The *Moscow Daily News* reported that a group of villages had organised subbotniki to construct the rough wooden furniture required for a school in which illiterates were being taught by volunteer teachers. An American lumber specialist writes that in an emergency in the woods, 120 men turned out and, "by free work, did in four and a half hours what would ordinarily have taken those responsible for it eighty working days".² Whilst the huge tractor works in Kharkov were being constructed, mountains of rubbish accumulated all around the buildings; and the inhabitants of the city made it a point of honour to clear it away, without diverting the regular staff from the building and equipping of the new plant that was so urgently required. Whole crowds assembled on their free days, and swarmed around the premises, eventually completing the entire task. On some afternoons, it was reported, it looked like a big holiday excursion getting off the tramcars, and it is estimated that from first to last the participants numbered at least thirty thousand. At Leningrad, the correspondent of a French newspaper was impressed by the crowd of volunteers whom he saw helping to repave the streets. "It was on the Ligovskaia in Leningrad, near the railway station, early in the

¹ "In 1919, the year of cold and starvation, the first communist 'subbotnik' was organised. Workers and Red Army men volunteered to repair locomotives, to load wood, coal, etc., after their day's work. When the civil war came to an end the workers organised 'subbotniks' to repair the factories. The miners of the Donbas, standing up to the waist in water, starving, and freezing, pumped the water out of the pits that had been flooded by the White Guards. In the years of reconstruction the enthusiasm of the workers found expression in a powerful movement of socialist competition and shock brigades. The correctness of Lenin's thesis that the socialist order does not diminish initiative, but creates a large field for it, was proved by this movement. The socialist epoch has given birth to a new type of men and women, to a new attitude towards labour" (*Socialist Industry in the USSR Victorious* (Moscow, 1931), pp. 22-23). See also p. 758.

² *In Place of Profit*, by Harry F. Ward, 1933, p. 113.

summer, that I saw hundreds of men, women and children even, pulling the granite blocks up from the road. It was obvious that they could by no stretch of imagination have been navvies. Laughing crowds surrounded them and cheerfully urged them on. Girls who seemed more accustomed to typewriters were doing their best to pull up the heavy setts which were then passed from hand to hand. Men dressed as office-workers lent a hand too. And children also were loaded with their own small burdens. At intervals lorries would drive up with new reinforcements. . . . And all these improvised navvies had their hands protected with padded gloves. . . . That spectacle, unforgettable by me, is one of the most moving things I saw in the USSR, and I can vouch for it there was no element of forced labour in all this. Only the noblest enthusiasm spurred on these workers to partake in a task, the rewards of which would accrue to them later.”¹ The Lugansk locomotive works were made ready for opening in time only by the mass efforts of a volunteer army made up of every sort of worker in the town.² The observer in the USSR runs up against this “free work” at unexpected points. A woman interpreter remarked that she was tired because, the night before, forty per cent of the Intourist staff had been sorting potatoes from 8 to 12 in a dirty, wet basement, as their free work. I asked why. “They belonged to everybody and should not be wasted.” “The same method is used even with the work of the children. In one small school they were asked, for their social work last spring, to sort potatoes for planting. Only five stuck to the job until evening. These had their names put on the red board and were given an order on the cooperatives for a pair of shoes.”³

The outstanding case of the use of voluntary labour during 1933–1934 was that of Metrostroi, the construction of the Moscow underground railway—a herculean adventure, pursued without faltering in times of food scarcity and intense domestic overcrowding, as a matter of “glory and heroism” by the ardent “builders of the socialist state”. In addition to the tens of thousands of workers regularly employed in this great engineering construction, more than two hundred thousand men and women

¹ Article by M. D. Perret in *Le Travail* (Paris), translated in *Soviet Culture* for February 1934.

² *Moscow Daily News*, August 27, 1933.

³ *In Place of Profit*, by Harry F. Ward, 1933, p. 34.

of all ages, Party members and non-Party alike, from practically all the factories and offices of Moscow, volunteered their services on various free days during nine months from January 23, 1933, in order that the first twelve-mile section could be opened on the seventeenth anniversary of the October Revolution. These subbotniki included, on some days, such leading figures as L. M. Kaganovich, one of the principal secretaries of the Communist Party; the officials and members of the Moscow city committee of the Party; and the commander of the Moscow military zone, who was seen "working all day in shaft No. 36-7". Nor was this voluntary labour limited to Moscow residents, or to the loading and discharging of materials, and the removal of mountains of earth. The workers in a great Leningrad machine shop undertook to give one free day a month to repairing gratuitously all the machines "put out of service on Metrostroi". The men in other factories pledged themselves voluntarily to see that all orders for Metrostroi were speeded up. "The shock brigades of the Krasny Proletary Plant put all their energy into a drive for supplying Moscow with cars ready to run on the opening day. The graphs displaying the daily and weekly progress of Metrostroi were publicly shown, not only throughout Moscow but also in all the leading industrial centres. During the summer months the 'curve of results' swung steadily upward."¹ The workers all over the USSR took pride in thinking that it was this "devotion to the cause" which guaranteed that the railway—superior to anything existing in Paris, London or New York—should be in operation as scheduled.

A Universal Obligation

What was begun by exceptionally zealous subbotniki has become generalised as a social obligation incumbent on all good citizens. Everybody is now expected, as a matter of course, to undertake, in addition to the occupation for which he receives a wage or a salary, some active social service in his free time, the gratuitous and zealous performance of which is required by "communist ethics", and enforced by the public opinion of his associates and neighbours. Nor is this merely the "one good

¹ See the numerous descriptions of the voluntary workers on Metrostroi in *Izvestia* (Russian) and *Moscow Daily News* during the spring and summer of 1933.

deed a day" that is expected from the English boy scouts. Quite apart from little acts of courtesy and kindness, what is expected from the good citizen in the USSR, and astonishingly widely rendered, is hard manual labour for hours at a stretch, in whatever direction the work is, in the public interest, required. The Pioneers habitually spend long days in the harvest fields helping the members of the kolkhosi. Thousands of Comsomols turned out in 1931 to help in the repairing of the Moscow thoroughfares; and they were prominent in 1933 among those who worked on the Moscow underground railway. Others, of all ages and occupations, regularly spend so many hours per week in teaching illiterate men and women to read and write.¹ A large part of the routine work of municipal administration in Moscow and Leningrad, such as sanitary inspection and the collection of local contributions which would be performed in England by a salaried municipal staff, is regularly done gratuitously in these cities under the various municipal commissions, by fifty thousand or so volunteers, as part of the "free work" which they feel it their duty to perform.

This new obligation imposed by communist ethics, whilst never enforced by law, is not left altogether without sanction. The performance of some free work is expected from every citizen, though the choice of service is freely left to him. It is specifically a duty of the Party member, and of the candidate for membership, of the Comsomol and of the Pioneer. With all these, any non-performance may be remembered at the periodical "cleansings", and is likely to be visited with reprimand, and, eventually, even with expulsion. It is definitely required also of the trade unionist, and failure to perform it may be brought up against him when he is proposed for election to any soviet or trade union committee; whilst it will militate against him in the allocation of holiday journeys to rest houses, and even of theatre

¹ Shvernik, the secretary of the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), claims that "The trade unions have enlisted millions of volunteers in active service for the liquidation of illiteracy. During 1931, 80 per cent of the 1,304,000 illiterate persons and 1,895,000 semi-literate persons were taught free of charge by these volunteers. In the trade union of the cotton-textile industry, where there are 22,958 illiterates, 17,085 of these are already being educated. The factories 'Communist Vanguard,' 'Krasny Perekop' and 'Bolshevik', and the Yarzevsky Plant in Ivanovo district, have achieved all round general literacy" (*Ninth Congress of Trade Unions*, 1933, p. 84).

tickets. Such social service is now being increasingly expected from the members of collective farms, and its non-performance is remembered when there is any distribution of surpluses, or any allocation of favours. It has not escaped notice that the idea may be pushed too far. Official warnings have been given that the Pioneers must not be allowed to do too much manual work ; that the Comsomals had better apply themselves to educational services rather than to industry, and that school teachers should preferably improve their own qualifications in their hours of leisure.

An International Comparison

It is interesting to recall, in this connection, the large amount of social work done in Great Britain and (apparently to a smaller extent) also in the United States,¹ notably in the administration of charitable institutions, in the unpaid magistracy, and in serving on the committees of local authorities of all kinds. How does the voluntary work, in free time, in the USSR, compare with that so faithfully and disinterestedly performed in some other countries ? First of all, as to the relative extent of this participation in active social service. In western countries, this voluntary service is almost entirely confined to the middle and upper classes (apart from the "activists" in trade union and friendly society work), probably not enlisting in any country as many as one or two hundred thousands of active participants. In the USSR it is the recognised social obligation of many millions, all of them living on wages or exiguous salaries. In the western countries, it is done, very largely, as a matter of philanthropy, and it is not enforced by public opinion as a universal duty ; moreover the duty is done, usually, for the benefit of "the poor". In the USSR there is no thought of charity in the matter ; and personal service, which is expected from all in proportion to their faculties, is done for the community as a whole. In the western countries, the social service, performed mainly by the small minority who have enjoyed exceptional educational advantages, almost always

¹ It would be unfair not to mention also the persistent devotion to voluntary public service in pre-revolutionary Russia, especially after 1900 ; not so much by the aristocracy or the wealthy, as by many of the intelligentsia, notably doctors, teachers of all grades, and those who worked in the zemstvos. During the war, especially in its first years, there was also widespread voluntary service in connection with loans, supplies, medical aid, etc.

takes the form of voluntary participation in the exercise of authority ; in fact, in the function of governing, and practically never in that of manual labour. In the USSR, on the other hand, the greater part of it is the performance of hard and monotonous manual labour, usually of the unskilled variety, in supplement of that of the regularly employed building or engineering operatives. Lastly, it is perhaps not unfair to say that, in the voluntary social service characteristic of the more public-spirited members of the upper and middle classes of the western world, there is the very smallest sense of fellowship with the masses of the people, whom the service is presumably intended to benefit. In the USSR a conscious fellowship is everything.

Looking back on the persistence and ever-increasing development of this voluntary gratuitous labour, rendered during the past fifteen years by literally millions of workers, it is impossible not to be impressed by its social significance. Lenin, who was not its originator, at once acclaimed its importance. Writing in 1919, he said that "The communist 'subbotniks' have an enormous historical importance, precisely because they demonstrate to us the class-conscious and voluntary initiative of the workers in increasing the productivity of labour ; in passing on to a new labour discipline ; in creating socialist conditions of economy and of life. Labour productivity is, in the final analysis, the prime and most important factor in the triumph of the new social order. Capitalism has created a degree of labour productivity unknown to serfdom. Capitalism can be finally overthrown, and will be finally overthrown, by the fact that socialism will create a new and much higher productivity of labour. This is a very difficult matter, and will take a long time ; still, *it has been started*, and that is the main thing. If, in hungry Moscow, in the summer of 1919, hungry workers, who had gone through four hard years of imperialist war, and then through a year and a half of still harder civil war, could begin this great venture, what will be the further development when we shall have won the civil war and shall conquer the world ? Communism means a higher labour productivity, as compared with that of capitalism, on the part of voluntary, conscious, united workers employing progressive technique." ¹

¹ Article by Lenin, 1919 : "Excerpts from the Great Initiative", *Lenin and Stalin on Socialist Competition* (Moscow, 1933), pp. 26-27.

Public Honour and Shame

For thousands of years, in practically all countries of high civilisation, the public award of honours has been found a powerful incentive to social service. At all times the soldier and the statesman—during the past century or so, also the explorer and the inventor, and even the scientist and the genius in literature and the arts—have been rewarded by specific manifestations of public honour and esteem. In the USSR this award of public honour to outstanding merit, which is made chiefly in respect of the performance of “common” labour, takes many forms. In the factory there are “honour boards” of one or other kind—recalling Robert Owen’s use of this very device at New Lanark a century and a quarter ago—on which are displayed the names of the workers who have excelled and the nature of their achievement. The winning *udarniki* in socialist emulation may be called to the platform at a public meeting, amid the applause of the audience, and the playing of the “Internationale”. On a higher level are the portraits of the heroes of labour that are painted for public exhibition, or the plaster statues designed to keep alive their renown in the local “park of culture and rest”. But honours are given also in forms common in the western world. The scientist whose work is appreciated by his colleagues may be specially coopted into the Academy of Science. The successful writer, poet or dramatist will be honoured by public receptions, or gala performances or readings of his works. There have even been established, for the outstanding heroes of labour and other social service, analogues of the orders of chivalry, of which European monarchies and republics have long made use.

The Soviet Orders of Merit

Of these orders there are now several. The Order of Lenin is awarded for exceptional public service, mainly in the field of manual labour, notably to men or women who have distinguished themselves in leading their fellow-workers to the successful fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan within four years. The Red Banner of Toil is awarded “by special decision” of the Central Executive Committee (TSIK) of the All-Union Congress of Soviets, or of a federated republic, at the request of the labour

organisation, for outstanding service in the field of production, for scientific work, or for service to state or community. As a rule, persons are rewarded with this rank who have 35 years of service, but in exceptional cases this condition may be waived. . . . The Red Banner of Toil entitles the owner to a free pass on Moscow trams, a pass to travel once a year to any point in the USSR, and a pension of 30 roubles a year. Also it brings the regular pension nearer by adding so many years to the service record.¹ Among all the millions of trade unionists, "the best group", declared the General Secretary of the AUCCTU in 1933, was "the group of Comrade Yanovsky, comprising 34 mill-cutters and drillers, of the Karl Marx plant in Leningrad. This group has been awarded the Order of the Red Banner. . . . This group systematically overfulfilled its industrial and financial plan—110 per cent in production and 119 per cent in productivity of labour. Bad work has been done away with altogether. This group has effected economies in metal to the value of 1336 roubles. Each member of the group has been awarded a bonus."² There is also a third distinction, the Order of the Red Star.

The completion, earlier than had been arranged for the construction programme, of the Baltic and White Sea Canal, was made the occasion of a special award of these distinctive orders as well as other honours. Thirty-one of the best workers received either the Order of Lenin, the Order of the Red Banner or the Order of the Red Star. The award was all the more remarkable in that the 200,000 workers on this huge enterprise were almost wholly made up either of convicted criminals or of political offenders, or of kulaks deported from the areas in which collective farms had been formed. The thirty-one selected for the highest honours included on the one hand, G. G. Yagoda, the vice-president of the OGPU, under whose direction the entire labour force had been assigned to the work; L. I. Kogan, the chief of the canal construction; and C. G. Firin, the chief of the "Labour correction camp", and, on the other, a number of the ex-criminals, who were held, by good services, to have expiated their dishonourable past.³

¹ *In Place of Profit*, by Harry F. Ward, 1933, p. 81.

² Shvernik's speech in *Ninth All-Union Congress of Trade Unions*, 1933, p. 94.

³ At the same time, nearly 60,000 persons had their sentences reduced; over 12,200 more were exempted from the operation of "further measures of social defence", and another 500 were restored to the rights of citizenship. (See

Public Dishonour

What is novel is the extensive use made of the incentive of organised public shaming of those who have fallen below the currently accepted standard of productive efficiency. This, too, recalls some of the devices of Robert Owen's administration. Thus, the "honourable mention" of exceptional merit in the factory, is often balanced by the "dishonourable mention" in the wall-newspapers or on dishonour boards, of workers who have betrayed their trust by drunkenness, unnecessary absenteeism or culpable negligence resulting in breakage, wastage or accident. Sometimes such dishonourable workers are required ignominiously to seek their monthly pay at a separate place, perhaps shaped like a gigantic vodka bottle, covered with coloured posters denouncing the offence, and also the disadvantages of habits of drunkenness.¹

This deliberate shaming of delinquents is sometimes the spontaneous outcome of the public opinion of fellow-workers. One of the foreign mechanics has described some illustrative examples. "Not long ago on the square near the dining-room at the Moscow (AMO) Auto Plant we observed a miniature graveyard consisting of six small coffins. On each was inscribed the name, date and machine broken by carelessness in the central machinery room. Naturally those responsible for this carelessness were cured long before the factory paper carried pictures of the coffins with articles

Moscow Daily News during August 1933, especially the issues of 6th, 17th and 20th, and the Russian newspapers during that month.)

¹ "At Selmash I was stopped one day by a sign over the washroom: 'This is where the lazy fellows smoke the machines away'. Another day, on a black-board in the plough shop were three columns headed 'Drunkards', 'Absentees', 'Lazy fellows'. Underneath were the names of the delinquents. They were caricatured—the drunkard with a big bottle, and the absentee sleeping in bed, and the lazy man with his head tied up, pretending a toothache. The big scoreboard in the harvesting machinery department contained each man's name and his record for fulfilling his quota in the plan; for scrap, idleness and absences; his classification as *udarnik*, and his premium. In front of the plant a giant worker was pictured with an enormous hammer under the slogan: 'Smash the drifting and careless, the false *udarniki*'. The drunkards and slackers have to get their pay at a special 'Black window', where they are jeered at by onlookers. Sometimes the place for receipt of wages is a hole cut in the middle of an enormous black bottle. At Selmash it was the mouth of an enormous red-nosed drinker, with a sign 'At the Black Pay window all the lazy absentees, drunkards and snatchers will get their pay on (such a date)'. To get it they had to mount steps and pass along a raised platform in full view. The children added to this publicity by coming into the factory and drawing caricatures of drunkards for the notice boards" (*In Place of Profit*, by Harry F. Ward, 1933, pp. 82-83).

by the other workers in the department. They expressed their opinions in no mild terms of their fellow-workers who had caused this damage. Some of the workers in the tool and die room found caricatures of themselves on the dining-room door one sunny noon. One was depicted as a wage-hog with his hoof over his heart, merrily chasing an elusive rouble which the wind kept blowing away. Another was pictured dreaming how he could spend his high wages, while a third was investing his in a whisky joint, a rouble at a time. Of course, those caricatures didn't like it at all. But their fellow-workers had decided to keep their pictures on public view until they have made good in the shop. Many workers on seating themselves in the dining-room take a spoon or fork and start pounding and yelling for service. One picture in the factory paper with some sharp comment stopped all competition for the "Dining-Room Spoon Band".¹

The "wall-newspaper", which is seen displayed in a prominent place in practically every factory, institute or office in the USSR, is frequently used for the expression of popular judgments, not only on fellow-workers, but also on foremen, technicians and the managers or directors themselves. The visitor is assured frequently by the workmen themselves that, however much such criticisms or caricatures may be resented, their authors are never punished or victimised, even if the accusations are incorrect or unwarranted. They are, in fact, officially regarded as a form of "self-criticism", which is, on the whole, socially beneficial in its effects. It is, we think, characteristic that neither the pain suffered by the individuals thus held up to public odium, nor the possible weakening of discipline when foremen and managers are publicly criticised by subordinates, is allowed to stand in the way of an influence regarded as advantageous to the community as a whole, encouraged by occasional public exhibitions of chosen specimens of bad work, and even by the award of a banner to the establishment turning out the best issue of a wall-newspaper within the district or province.

The wall-newspapers themselves, and the factory newspapers, or "house organs" into which they develop in large establishments, are remarkable in their proletarian spontaneity. Unlike most, if not all, of the "house organs" of British or American industry, they are not, in the USSR, so far as we have been able

¹ Article by J. Mullens in *The Moscow Daily News*, January 3, 1933.

to ascertain, edited or managed, or in any way directed, by the management of the establishment ; nor yet confined to the topics or opinions that may be supposed to be agreeable to the management. They are officially recognised as organs of public opinion. " At a recent conference of worker-correspondents of the October district of Moscow, about 500 worker-writers from factories of the district crowded the hall of the KUTV club to listen to and participate in the discussion. Competition for the red banner to be awarded to the best factory paper in the district has been keen this year. The results of this competition—hundreds of printed and wall-papers—were proudly exhibited in the lobby of the club. These papers, some of them crude, partly hand-written, are a lesson in soviet political economy.

" The struggle for fulfilling factory production plans is illustrated by photos of the best udarniks. Drawings of turtles and crabs illustrate the weakest departments, those that are lagging behind. Biting satire lashes the bureaucrat who refuses to heed the warnings of the paper. In one case a factory newspaper succeeded in forcing heads of departments to investigate every complaint as soon as it appeared in the factory paper. This happened in the Peter Alexeyev Textile Factory, where Director Sharonov issued an order to all heads of departments to this effect. The head of the factory control commission, Richagov, is personally responsible for carrying out this order. In all serious cases he must report to the director the results of the investigations.

" The paper of this factory is 'For Tempo and Quality'. With 1390 workers, the factory has one printed daily paper, two daily wall-papers and fifteen weekly wall-papers. During 1932 the printed daily received 598 letters from the workers. It has 176 worker-correspondents. When a letter is received a copy of the complaint is sent to the Party secretary of the department with a definite date set for a reply. After investigation, the letter is printed and the head of the department is expected to remedy the situation immediately and report the results to the paper. If he does not reply soon enough, a reminder is printed or a cartoon. Usually the heads of departments do not wait to be reminded. In serious cases, the guilty ones are removed from the factory or even put on trial.

" In order to eliminate ' brak ' [spoilage], the newspaper has introduced a diary among the weavers in which they mark down

everything that interferes with their work. As a result of this diary all causes were removed, 'brak' eliminated, productivity increased and earnings as well. That is one of the many reasons why the workers are so active in their factory press. Systematic educational work is carried on among the worker-correspondents in the factory, a special date set aside for their conferences. The other factory papers are carrying on similar work but not so successfully. The nearest competitor for the red banner, 'Regulator', of the brake factory (Tormaznoi Zavod) has 300 worker-correspondents, but is lagging behind in the fight for better quality and educational work. The decision by the jury to award the banner to the Peter Alexeyev Textile Factory was greeted with applause and the 'Internationale' played by the band of one of the factories."¹

The organisation of the incentive of public shame reaches its highest point in the "comradely courts" which exist in nearly all large factories, and to which, not the workers only, but also the management, submit a large proportion of the "discipline cases", from which no community of individuals is free. A session of such a court in the gigantic Putilov works in Leningrad is vividly described by a woman who was a participant.² We find a more detailed account of the constitution, powers and working of these courts in a pamphlet by "comrade Busin" of the Kharkov Electro-Mechanical Factory (formerly AEA).

"These workers' factory courts arose in the hard fight against the former opportunist trade union leaders, who had declared that it was impossible for the trade union organisations to exercise functions as a court. The courts are competent to deal with the following cases :

"A. Fight against everything which disturbs the normal development of socialist production :

- (1) Violation of workers' discipline, coming late to work, idling, coming to work in an intoxicated condition, changing place of work without reason.
- (2) Systematic neglectful treatment of socialist property (machines, tools, etc.).
- (3) Turning out faulty work involving waste of material.

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, May 29, 1933.

² *Eine Frau erlebt den roten Alltag*, by Lili Korber (Berlin, 1932), translated as *Life in a Soviet Factory*, 1933, pp. 132, 155-160.

" B. Fight against the remnants of the old way of living. This includes :

- (1) Insult, slander or libel, assault not involving serious bodily injury.
- (2) Theft within the factory up to the value of 50 roubles, rowdyism, various kinds of unsocial acts, etc.
- (3) Various actions which hinder the work of social organisations.

" How are the judges elected ? The judges are elected in the departments, with the active participation of the staff, after a careful examination of the candidates. In our factory 381 judges have been elected. These consist of the best shock brigaders, with many years' experience in productive work. Among them are 80 women. They are divided into 26 ' senates ' with 26 chairmen and 51 deputy chairmen.

" Not only the judges and the parties to the dispute, but every worker in the works, has the right to be present at the proceedings and to express his opinion regarding the case being dealt with. Contrary to bourgeois courts, applause or expressions of dissent on the part of the public, are not only not prohibited, but are desired.

" Here are a few typical cases :

" L., turner in the motor department I. Called to account for systematic loafing. When he saw how indignant his workmates were on account of his conduct, he declared that he realised how criminal was his conduct, and promised not to idle any more. The court ordered him to be placed on probation for six months. Since this sentence, L. has completely changed. He has not loafed for a single minute, and already before the expiration of his period of probation he performed such good work as a shock brigader that he received a premium of 100 roubles.

" K., instructor, was accused of insulting and systematically pestering the working women. The sentence was the same as that in the case of L. To-day he is likewise one of the best shock-brigade workers.

" T., watchman in the factory. Accused of refusing to work and disorganisational activity. He was let off with a warning. He took this warning to heart, and under the influence of the class-conscious portion of the masses became another man. Six weeks later he was advanced to a better-paid position.

"St., a woman book-keeper, was likewise warned by the court on account of being continually late in coming to work. Since then several months have passed, and St. has never been late.

"The worker Ch. was called to account for using insulting anti-semitic language towards a waitress, a Jewess. The proceedings were attended by more than 300 workers, and became a passionate demonstration for the policy of national freedom observed by the Soviet Power. With tears in his eyes the worker Ch. acknowledged his fault. The court administered him a severe reproof.

"A few statistics : In October 1932, the Workers' Factory Court dealt with 61 cases, namely, 18 cases of idling, 7 cases of leaving the work-place during work-time, 7 cases of stealing in the factory, 6 of turning out bad work, 6 of being asleep at work, 5 of insulting fellow-workers, 4 of systematically coming late, 3 of falsifying the work records, 2 of rowdiness, one case of assault, one of anti-semitic attacks, and one of wrongful use of cooperative food ticket.

"In 7 cases a comradely warning was given ; in 37 cases a severe reprimand was administered, in 3 cases fines were imposed, the proceeds to be employed for social purposes ; in 3 cases the accused were placed on probation, in 2 cases the accused were expelled from the trade union, and in 9 cases the accused were immediately dismissed.

"The Factory Workers' Courts were thoroughly reorganised in August, and the fight for socialist discipline made the chief object of their work. The result was that the production and financial plan, which before August was fulfilled only up to 70 per cent, on a monthly average, rose to 75 per cent in the month of August, and to 105 per cent in October, chiefly owing to the activity of the Factory Workers' Courts.

"Of course these methods of bringing influence to bear on backward workers are not always effective. There are still many cases in which the old habits and the unsocialist attitude to socialist work is so deeply rooted in the consciousness of the new workers, or in those sections of the factory staff which consist of declassed elements, that it is necessary to exert a 'special pressure', such as is provided in the new law against slacking."¹

¹ *International Press Correspondence*, March 9, 1933.

We can imagine nothing in which the soviet factory stands in sharper contrast with the British or American than the universal acceptance by the workers, and the cordial adoption by the management, of this system of "comradely courts", to which we recur in our Chapter XII. on "The Good Life".

Encouragement of Suggestions and Inventions by the Workers

One of the new incentives adopted by Soviet Communism that is most difficult for capitalist enterprise to appreciate is the deliberate mass invitation of suggestions for industrial improvement, as well as actual inventions of novel methods and processes, by the rank and file of the workers.¹ So extensive is the response to such encouragement in the USSR that it is open to the objection that the mere examination of these proposals, let alone any adequate investigation and experimental testing of even the most plausible of them, necessarily involves a considerable expenditure of time and thought by the management, and, occasionally, some confusion in the smooth running of each enterprise. The communist rejoinder to this objection—one actually expressed by more than one foreign expert in soviet service—is, first, that experience demonstrates the economic value of a very large number of the suggestions and inventions thus submitted. Not only in the USSR but also in capitalist countries, it has repeatedly been found that, whilst scientific discoveries and inventions of the first order of importance have usually been made by scientists equipped by training as well as inspired by genius, many of the smaller improvements in processes, notably in connection with friction and the heating of moving parts, with the prevention of waste, or with tricks of manual dexterity, unnoticed in the laboratories, have sprung from the practical experience of the workmen at the bench or the forge.² But however this may be,

¹ We do not forget the practice, latterly adopted by capitalist undertakings of exceptional enlightenment, of putting up suggestion boxes, publicly inviting their own employees to submit suggestions for the improvement of their own processes, and even promising to reward by money premiums suggestions that prove of value in increasing their own profits. This practice, whilst it may be quoted in support of the wisdom of the Soviet Union's encouragement of proletarian inventiveness, seems to us to lack the social value of the mass appeal.

² An American workman cites a whole series of minor improvements, all of them eliminating waste, that he has seen suggested, and many of them adopted. His comment is illuminating. "Maybe in America I would pay no attention to the same waste as I see here, because of the fact that I am not interested in

Soviet Communism finds an even greater social value in arousing, among the whole mass of manual workers, the desire to improve the processes of industry ; the urge to invent ; indeed, the mere consciousness of active participation in the intellectual side of the work of socialist construction. Even if the proletarian suggestions and inventions proved to be of slight economic value, communist statesmen would still hold it well worth while to evoke them, and to expend time and thought in considering them, for the sake of the psychological effect. To render the manual workers inventive, and desirous of improving processes, is one way, and as communists hold, a successful way, of making the social order genuinely democratic. The capitalist profit-maker may see no advantage in this ; but no economist of intelligence, who thinks it worth while to spend money on public health and universal education, can altogether reject the argument.

It is, however, clear that, apart altogether from the social value, there has resulted from this new incentive, a great increase in the number of inventions and suggestions of which use has been made. In 1933 the secretary of the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions (AUCCTU) declared that " during 1930, in 57 syndicates under the control of the Supreme Council of National Economy, 273,000 rationalisation suggestions were sent in by the workers ; and in 1931 the figure had risen to 542,000. The economy effected by the application of these suggestions amounted during the first quarter of 1931 to 5,000,000 roubles ; during the second quarter to 6,247,000 roubles, and

saving the capitalists' wealth. But in the land where the workers rule and own everything, this waste of wealth hurts me." We quote some of his instances : " We had our lubricating oil standing in a can with the lid open. It stood near the emery wheel where the workers grind their tools. Grit from the emery wheel flew into the oil, which was afterwards used to lubricate the machines. Instead of lubricating the bearings, this oil acted as a lapping compound. Surprise was expressed that the machines needed so much repairing. . . . The workers feeding (a costly concrete mixer) use the most primitive method of carrying a few shovel-loads of material on a board with four handles which requires two workers. A wheelbarrow could be used, requiring one worker and holding three or four times as much material per load. . . . As I walk out of my house I see two beams lying in the gutter almost covered with earth . . . a six-inch iron pipe . . . going to waste. . . . All kinds of iron junk rusting away . . . about 20 or 30 pieces of machines that look like small pumps covered with rust. . . . Many piles of scrap metal lying around. . . . All this metal should find its way into a smelting machine. . . . Carelessness in the operation of machines is another form of waste. It is not uncommon to see an auto driver bounce over a hole in the road at full speed, or run up the side of a hill on high gear, or crash his gears when changing them " (*Moscow Daily News*, September 15, 1933).

during the third quarter to 11,574,000 roubles. . . . The First All-Union Congress of the Society of Inventors (VOIZ) undertook to save the country one billion roubles during 1932 by means of inventions and improvements, whereas the programme drawn up by the Supreme Council of National Economy calls for only 300,000,000 roubles of economy from inventions and improvements throughout our entire industry. . . . Our trade unions do not always take a sufficiently strong attitude in the struggle to have the workers' suggestions put into effect, and to have bonuses awarded. They have thus failed to give an incentive for the development of the rationalising movement among the broad masses of the working class."¹

The apparatus for encouraging suggestions of improvements and actual inventions in the USSR is varied and all-pervading. The importance, indeed, the positive social duty, of making suggestions and inventions is part of the teaching of school and college, part also of the special instruction of Pioneers and Comsomols. It is repeatedly insisted on in the speeches of statesmen, in the press, on the radio, and at the cinema. The preparation of the Five-Year Plan, and especially the drawing-up of counter-plans by the workers of particular establishments, is made the occasion of evoking suggestions for improvements literally by thousands.² Occasionally a "month's drive" for additional suggestions and inventions is proclaimed, when conferences of soviet officials, works representatives, delegates from local inventors' societies and leading trade unionists report on the volume and character of the workers' proposals, and on the action to be taken to ensure their respectful consideration.³ A

¹ *Ninth Congress of Trade Unions* (Moscow, 1933), pp. 44-45.

² Thus it was reported to the Ninth Trade Union Congress that "The drawing up of the counter-plan for the Urals-Kusbas Combine was attended by a mighty wave of workers' initiative, by the spread of socialist competition and shock-brigade work, and by the fulfilment and overfulfilment of industrial plans. Tens of thousands of workers took part in discussions of the plan, in the work of the planning groups at the enterprises, in production conferences, etc.

Over 5000 rationalisation suggestions were received in response to the special "loan of workers' suggestions" (issued by the Urals Trade Union Council) and some of these suggestions effected an economy of over one million roubles" (*Ninth Trade Union Congress*, Moscow, 1933, p. 43).

³ At such a conference in May 1933 the chairman of the Central Committee of the All-Union Inventors' Society (VOIZ) reported that "hundreds of suggestions" made by workers in the various great factories had not yet been considered for adoption. The representative of the AUCCTU "suggested that two or three public trials be conducted in large workers' centres, bringing

unique congress of "collective farm inventors" specially interested in flax machinery, held in August 1933, was honoured by the presence of a member of the presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR, who brought with him a letter of encouragement from the president (Kalinin) of the USSR. Kalinin wrote that "the village inventors were destined to equip the collective farmers with technical knowledge, unloose a wave of creative initiative, and stimulate the productive forces of agriculture to an unprecedented degree."¹ Approbation is given to proletarian inventors by the trade unions, by factory committees at public meetings, and in the choice of candidates for elective offices. Frequent newspaper paragraphs keep the interest alive by seizing every opportunity to expose any alleged lack of interest by managements or experts in these proletarian suggestions, which the Workers and Peasants' Inspection Commissions are urged to investigate and rectify. The Council of Labour and Defence (STO) has a standing commission (BRIZ), or Bureau of Workers' Inventions, whose sole duty is the stimulation of inventiveness by careful consideration of the workers' suggestions.² Also financial encouragement is not lacking. In the aggregate a very large number of small premiums, together with some of considerable magnitude, are awarded annually to those, mostly manual workers, but not altogether excluding scientific technicians and professors, who have made the most valuable suggestions or inventions. These premiums, of the total amount of which we can find no record or estimate, are given by all sorts of

bureaucrats and suppressors of rationalisation suggestions before a prosecutor". This was welcomed by the secretary of TZIK, who said that "methods of persuasion, pressure and force" would be used in future against any intentional holding up of proposals. It was reported that, in the Leningrad district, 138 out of 700 postponed suggestions had now been adopted in the electric apparatus plant alone; whilst at the shoe factory 34 suggestions out of 83 had been put in practice; and at another plant 61 suggestions (*Moscow Daily News*, May 27, 1933).

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, September 3, 1933.

² In order to relieve this Bureau of Workers' Inventions, which is overwhelmed by the flood of proposals, it has recently been ordered that, in particular industries, the work should be done by the management. Thus, in the important Donbas area, "brigadiers and chiefs of shafts and of mine administration will in future be responsible for the acceptance, approval and realisation of rationalisation suggestions and inventions" made by coal workers and specialists. This was suggested by the All-Union Inventors' Society (VOIZ) for all industries (Decree of April 8, 1933, of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and Council of People's Commissars of the USSR; *Moscow Daily News*, July 11, 1933).

organisations, by trade unions and cooperative societies, by sovkhosi and kolkhosi, by trusts and particular enterprises, and occasionally even by People's Commissars of the USSR or of the several republics. It is, perhaps, not the smallest part of the social value of this encouragement of workers' inventiveness that it is not merely a governmental but a mass encouragement, in itself a remarkable feature of the new motivation of production.

Multiformity in Employment

We need hardly refute once more the strange assertion of there being in the USSR, because it is a collectivist state, only a single employer of labour. The case is quite the contrary. The very multiformity to which Soviet Communism is addicted, in the organisation of wealth production and distribution as in other public matters, may be cited, if not as itself a new incentive, at least as a necessary condition of the fullest application of the new incentives that we have described. It is true that, apart from the nomadic tribes, and the surviving five or six millions of independent peasant households, working very largely for self-subsistence, the greater part of the production and distribution of commodities is collectivised and community-owned. But this does not involve anything like uniformity of system or of organisation. There are several hundred USSR trusts and combines, and no one of them is exactly like the others. More diverse still are the thousands of separate enterprises, whether factories or institutes, mines or farms, oil-fields or power stations, which are independently conducted for their peculiar purposes, unassociated with any trust or combine, and responsible to one or other higher authority. There are also village enterprises, rayon (district) enterprises, municipal enterprises, oblast (provincial) enterprises, enterprises of the several constituent or autonomous republics, none of them identical in management or organisation with the corresponding enterprises directly subject to the People's Commissars or Sovnarkom of the USSR. The trade unions and factory managements themselves now conduct quite extensive productive enterprises outside their primary occupations, in the shape of farms, dairies, piggeries, etc., for "self-supply". So also do many of the forty odd thousand cooperative societies, whose business now far exceeds mere distribution, and those pro-

ductive undertakings differ markedly in system and organisation one from another. It is among these different employments, all of them separately taking on additional staff, that the individual worker, and notably the boy or girl leaving school, has the utmost possible freedom of choice.

It is a condition alike of the free exercise of this choice of occupation and of the full play of various incentives, that, as we have ourselves found at various parts of the USSR, the thousands of separate employers are actively competing with each other in their search for this or that kind of skilled worker, whilst each is habitually struggling against all the rest for an adequate supply of unskilled and even raw peasant labour. So injurious to production became this competition for workmen among employing agencies that it had to be specifically forbidden by government decree, and superseded by regulated recruiting. Further action had to be taken to check the injurious habit, ingrained in the Russian worker, of wandering from place to place, and from job to job, often on mere rumour that there was a better food supply or more liberal housing accommodation in some other place, at which he could rely on finding an unsatisfied demand for labour. This has indirectly been the incentive to all sorts of local and particular improvements in conditions, from higher standard rates in occupations found to be specially unpopular, and increased expenditure on housing in particular areas from which wandering is found to be more than usually persistent, up to a special provision of clubhouses and cinemas and free allotments for the coal-miners of the Donets Basin, in order to induce them to remain in the employment that they had chosen.

But this is far from completing the picture of multiformity and diversity that the USSR presents. An opening is found for special incentives for those who are individually or jointly their own employers, necessarily differing from those operating on the wage-earners. These incentives are found, in great variety of development, among the manufacturing associations of owner-producers (the incops), into which so many of the ancient handicraftsmen's artels have been grouped. In agriculture an analogous development has merged some twenty million peasant holdings into about a quarter of a million collective farms which, as we have seen, differ indefinitely among themselves in the degree of their collectivisation, from mere joint-tillage, through more or

less elaborate artels, up to wholly communised associations whose members share equally in board and lodging as well as in work and product. There is even a survival of isolated individual production, and that not only among the nomadic tribes and the independent peasantry. The twenty million families in the collective farms nearly all have their own individual garden plots, poultry runs, piggeries, beehives, cowsheds and what not. The Donets Basin coal-miners are not the only industrial workers who cultivate their own allotments. There are, in the wide spaces of the USSR, thousands of hunters and trappers and fishermen, who hunt and fish mainly for the subsistence of their families. There are still tens of thousands of individual handicraftsmen, unassociated in artels or incops, who produce by hand labour more or less artistic commodities of various kinds. Thus, there is an almost endless variety of kinds and methods and systems of production. In short, the characteristic feature of wealth production in the USSR, far from being identity of economic relation or industrial structure, is that of extreme multiformity.

This characteristic of multiformity, which is seen in nearly every department of soviet structure, is not an accidental development. Lenin, in his proposals and forecasts, more than once alludes to this very feature of multiformity as a positive advantage in the socialist community, and specifically as enabling the utilisation of many incentives in evoking the utmost participation by different kinds of individuals. And this conception appears among the soviet leaders of to-day. Shvernik, in his speech to the Ninth Trade Union Congress, quoted Lenin as declaring that "multiformity is a guarantee of vitality. It is a pledge that the single aim will be successfully achieved. The more varied, the better and the richer be the common experience, the truer and greater will be the achievements of socialism, the easier will be the practical work; and only practical work will be able to evolve the best methods and means of struggle." ¹

The Practice of Self-Criticism

Nowhere in the world outside the USSR is there such a continuous volume of pitiless criticism of every branch of government, every industrial enterprise and every cultural estab-

¹ *Ninth Trade Union Congress, 1933, p. 30.*

lishment. This perpetual campaign of exposure, which finds expression in every public utterance of the leading statesmen, in every issue of the press, and in every trade union or cooperative meeting, is not only officially tolerated, but also deliberately instigated, as a powerful incentive to improvement, alike in direction and in execution.¹ Thus, the public speeches by Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich and other soviet statesmen—in striking contrast with those of British, French or American statesmen—nearly always lead up to a tirade of criticism of some part of soviet administration. They usually begin with a glowing, and, as we may think, an optimistic account of the successful progress of the department or institution under discussion, of its remarkable achievements and of the valuable services of those working in it towards the “building of the socialist state”. This is rendered all the more alluring by a vision of the dismal failure of capitalism in Europe and America. But invariably the speaker descends presently to an outspoken criticism of the technical shortcomings of the particular enterprise, with a detailed exposure of its partial or temporary failures, and often a scathing denunciation of particular cases of slackness or waste or other inefficiency, and similar criticism is invited from below. Official speakers will often blame conferences and congresses for their failure to criticise their own superior councils and committees, as well as their own officials, for their shortcomings and their failures. Thus Shvernik, the secretary of the All-Union Central

¹ Speaking on Socialist Emulation and Shock Brigades, in his Report to the Party Congress in 1933, Stalin said: “First the Party developed wide *self-criticism* concentrating the attention of the masses on the defects in our work of construction, the defects in our organisation and institutions. As early as the Fifteenth Congress, the necessity of developing self-criticism was proclaimed. The Shakhty case, and the sabotage in various branches of industry, which revealed the lack of revolutionary sensitiveness in individual sections of the Party, on the one hand, and the struggle with the kulaks and the defects in our village organisations which were revealed, on the other, gave a further stimulus to self-criticism. In its appeal of June 2, 1928, the Central Committee gave final shape to the campaign of self-criticism, calling upon all forces of the Party and the working class to develop self-criticism ‘from top to bottom and from the bottom to the top’, without respect of person. Condemning the Trotskyist criticism, which came from the other side of the barricades, and was intended to discredit and weaken the Soviet Government, the Party proclaimed the task of self-criticism to be the merciless exposure of the weaknesses in our work in order to *improve* our construction and *strengthen* the Soviet Government. It is well known that the call of the Party aroused the most lively response amongst the masses of the working class and the peasantry” (*Lenin and Stalin on Socialist Competition*, Moscow, 1933, pp. 39-40).

Committee of Trade Unions, in his concluding speech to the Ninth Trade Union Congress, complains that the congress itself had not criticised the mistakes made by the AUCCTU. "In our work there are still many weak spots, and it would have been quite right for the comrades to have criticised more energetically the work of the AUCCTU, central committees, trade union councils, factory committees, and the lower representative trade union organisations. The basic defect of the discussion was the weakness of the criticism, especially of concrete criticism, which must be particularly emphasised here. We can reorganise ourselves quickly and properly only if our work is accompanied by the severest criticism of our defects. This does not mean that we must engage in self-flagellation. Nothing of the sort. I am speaking of proletarian self-criticism which must attend our work at every step. We are doing a great work; we have a huge army of workers; the work is becoming more and more complicated daily. Our shortcomings and mistakes must be revealed by us more quickly and more fully in order to remove successfully by joint effort all the obstacles impeding our forward movement."

The newspapers, whether *Pravda*, *Izvestia* or *Trud* on the one hand, or the local and specialist organs on the other, take a similar line in their editorials. But their principal contribution to "self-criticism" is the publication of a perpetual stream of news items, partly from their extensive corps of "village correspondents", describing particular instances of inefficiency or wrongdoing by managers, officials or manual workers anywhere in the USSR. Sometimes there will be a statement (as in *Pravda* in August 1933) from "a group of Leningrad workmen", appealing to their fellows to get rid of wastage of time now that they enjoy a seven hours' day. "The decisive and important task of the Second Five-Year Plan", the statement continues, "is to increase labour productivity. But we must admit that in this endeavour we have left much undone. We are not utilising our time to a sufficient extent: we often waste working hours because of organisational inefficiencies in production, and also because we fail to hold ourselves to a code of strict labour discipline."¹

These news items are naturally of different degrees of accuracy

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, August 23, 1933.

One of the workers at the Baltic Plant in Leningrad, writing for the same issue of *Pravda*, pleads for a "solid working day". "There was a time", he says, "when I myself as well as all my fellow-workers, strove to kill as much

or authority. Sometimes they are little more than complaints of aggrieved citizens about official incivility or neglect ; or about the short supply or inferior quality of commodities. Sometimes they are reports of cases in the local courts of justice, or of proceedings of the local soviets. They afford just the kind of publicity to official shortcomings that is useful as a check on wrong-doing and as an incentive to improvement. But, as they leave out of view all the instances in which the officials are working to the public satisfaction, and also the successful achievements of the various institutions and enterprises, they do not present an accurate picture of the administration. They are accordingly misused when they are uncritically made the basis of books attacking the Bolshevik Government. So abundant is this material that whole volumes have been published in foreign capitals by adversaries of Bolshevism, entirely made up of extracts from the " official newspapers ", proving, as it is claimed, the complete and hopeless failure of every branch of soviet administration.¹ The " wall newspapers ", which we have described as an institution of every soviet establishment, give local and particular expression to this " self-criticism " in their caricatures, denunciations and jocular references about managers, foremen and workmen. There is similar unbridled expression in the trade union meetings and production conferences.

The soviet faith in the value of " self-criticism " is shown by the publicity often given to the severe animadversions of foreign experts whose professional criticism has been specially invited. What other government would give to the newspapers such a scathing revelation of technical incompetence as is contained in the report of an American consulting engineer on the First Factory Building Trust, from which we copy the following extract ? " In this trust each project is left to the discretion of the group desig-

time as possible in a nine or ten hour day. Now, of course, the case is quite different. To kill time on the job at present is equivalent to theft—theft from your own self, from your comrades, and from the entire working class " (*ibid.*).

¹ See, for instance, *In the Land of Communist Dictatorship*, by A. V. Baikalo (1929); and *La Russie nue*, by Panait Istrati (1929), translated as *Russia Unveiled* (1932); as to whose perfidy, see *Russia's Iron Age*, by W. H. Chamberlin, 1935, pp. 333-334. The recipe is easy. The author has only to take a year's file of several soviet newspapers; classify the extracts under a dozen or a score of headings; and describe the array of several hundred breakdowns and offences as a picture of the whole 170 millions of the USSR. What a revelation could be made of the " state of the nation " of Great Britain or the United States by a similar analysis of, say, the popular Sunday newspapers!

nated to prepare it. Interchange of complete information with the field engineers is not arranged. The date for completion of the work program is vague. Knowledge of available equipment and material is lacking. Building plans are not obtained in time from the planning trusts. In some cases they are not obtained at all. Plans are not received and studies are begun, and in some cases completed, without accurate information. These studies, the work of weeks of time of several engineers, are then rendered useless. Conditions prevailing at the site are not discovered until elaborate plans for the work are made in ignorance of them. Technical councils held to pass upon these studies do not deserve their name. As many as 20 men are present, none familiar with the project or its detail problems. Economic studies are rarely presented and never investigated or checked. Strength calculations occasionally needed were never demonstrated.

“Actual examples of such disastrously inefficient work are illuminating. At Lubertsi a large lumber storage plant was planned. The construction of the storage platforms was dependent on the length of the timber to be stored. Information on the length of this lumber was never obtained. The storage platforms were designed, wasting thousands of roubles and badly needed material. Several attempts by the consultant to find the lumber lengths were unavailing because of the lack of cooperation from other elements in the trust.

“A large grain distillery and an electric power station are under construction at Efremov. Thousands of cubic metres of excavation have to be dug, transported, and redistributed. A complete plan for elaborate mechanical excavation and loaders was prepared, requiring weeks of time of several engineers. In the end it was discovered that horses and scrapers were available at the site. Only after I had discussed the project with the client's representative was it found that the excavation for the machinery foundation could be made at the same time as that for the building itself, saving considerably in time, cost of labour, and use of equipment.

“Complicated bricks and reinforced concrete design of the electric power station required plans of falsework and scaffolding. By request I developed these plans, and alternate designs were prepared by the trust's design department. One of my most important drawings of the scaffolding was turned over to the head

of the department. There it was lost, and could not be found for the technical council. Nevertheless, I explained the methods proposed and they were favourably received by the majority and the client's representative. The latter then informed the council that the job had complete scaffolds built and ready for use!

"A critical factor in the construction schedule of the power station was the relative time of installation of the boilers. If they were to be placed during erection of the building, special precautions would be required for several critical elements of the work. If they were to be placed after the structure itself was built, the clear space would simplify the work. The department planned all the work on the basis of the former arrangement, with elaborate and uneconomical methods for excavation, concrete transportation and truss erection. I learned from the client's representative that the boilers would be placed later when the building was finished. The expensively prepared work program then had to be discarded as quite useless.

"The grain bins of the distillery building presented a problem in form design for reinforced concrete. More than a month's time was spent by the department in preparing these plans. I was also asked to prepare form designs for this purpose and concreting methods as well. Using original suspended forms, my designs showed a saving of 7000 roubles. These plans were approved by the majority of the technical council present. The Chief Engineer had been absent practically the entire session and had not seen my design nor heard it explained. He rendered a hasty opinion that the design required skilled labour, which made it undesirable. The superficiality of this judgment was visible by one glance at the two methods, the department's being very much more complicated and difficult than mine. But it was then discovered that no steel and cement were available for the bins at all and that they would have to be built of wood. Thus the entire month's work was wasted."¹

In this reliance on "self-criticism", the governing order (the Communist Party) does not spare its own members. These are, indeed, all subjected periodically to a peculiar and very effective form of "self-criticism", which forms the basis of the periodical examination or "chistka" that we have already described.² It

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, November 15, 1932.

² Chapter V. in Part I., "The Vocation of Leadership", pp. 375-387.

is a fundamental condition of the Communist Party, which takes upon itself the function of public leadership, that its members should be held to a higher standard of personal conduct than is expected from the ordinary citizen. It is very largely by the instrument of self-criticism at the periodical purging of the Order, that this high standard is maintained. Every member (apart from the Politbureau of fewer than a dozen), from the highest to the lowest, has to stand up in open meeting, before the appointed commission of three or five well-tried members of long standing, together with a crowd of members and non-members alike, and make a full confession of his own failures and shortcomings as a worker for Communism. He is required to recite the principal circumstances of his life, to describe the work that he has done for the cause, and what he is now doing; and to state frankly and faithfully where he feels that he has fallen short. Then he has to answer the questions, often of a critical and even incriminating character concerning his public and private conduct, whether put by the commission, or by his fellow-members or colleagues, or by anyone in the meeting, which is open to the public, and may be reported in the press. The commissioners then have to decide, subject to appeal to a higher tribunal, whether the person under examination is worthy to be continued as a member, or whether he should be reprimanded and suspended for a term, or reduced to the lower grade of candidate or sympathiser, or altogether expelled from the Party.¹

Universal Measurement

At this point there must be emphasised an indispensable requisite, of far-reaching social importance, for the smooth working and the continued success of the various incentives to production - that Soviet Communism substitutes for the making of pecuniary

¹ The student will recall the analogous proceedings of some of the religious orders from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries. But their self-criticism and public examinations related only to their observance of the rites and performance of the duties required by the Deity and the Church.

In the peculiar communistic community of Oneida (New York State) in the nineteenth century, outspoken criticism of life and conduct, by all the members in meeting assembled, of each of them in turn, was a regular instrument of discipline and training. But no non-members were allowed to criticise, or to be present; and the member under criticism, far from being expected to confess, was not permitted to speak (*History of American Socialisms*, by J. H. Noyes: Philadelphia, 1870).

profit by the individual entrepreneur. To the experienced administrator it needs no demonstration that upon the practice of coercion and terrorism, as the principal factor, no efficient production can be established. Nor can it be maintained on wages alone. Apart from the tiny minority of moral geniuses, men and women require, for long-continued efforts and sacrifices, something more than mere subsistence. Except in moments of exaltation, they need assurance that their work is worth while. One of the ways in which this assurance can be given to them is the recognition, by their fellow-workers and neighbours, of their disinterested service. This is the social justification of the award of honours, to which we have already alluded. Public honours, however, can only usefully be bestowed upon the best and most devoted workers. For the mass of men and women something can be done by systematic record of what they are individually producing. All this involves, as one of the corner-stones of socialist construction, an all-embracing system of measurement.

It will be seen that many of the incentives that we have described in this chapter themselves require systematic measurement and publicity. To take first the most elementary example, all systems of remuneration by piece-work rates require the continuous accurate measurement, preferably by disinterested persons, of the amount of each worker's output. The success of socialist emulation similarly depends on accurate and impartial measurement of the achievements of the several competitors. The beneficial influence on the mass of workers of the performances of shock brigades and cost-accounting brigades—perhaps even the continued self-satisfaction of their own members—is absolutely dependent on the exact and detailed recording of their results, and on the publicity accorded to them. Any successful application of the principle of "Payment according to Social Value" must necessarily be based on statistical demonstrations of the need for additional workers of particular kinds in order to achieve some social end. The effect of any grading of wages must equally be checked by statistics, in order to justify any change, or to warrant the continuance of the grading, or its adoption elsewhere. Even the allocation, by the Soviet Government, of labour force and raw materials to the construction of new capital works, rather than to the production in greater quantity of commodities for immediate consumption, demands consider-

able statistical measurement, and accurate comparison between the estimated costs of rival enterprises, if a reasonable decision between competing uses for the available capital resources is to be arrived at. The capitalist profit-maker, especially the entrepreneur on a small scale, may choose to dispense with measurement and to ignore statistics, content only with the net result in his profit and loss account. The small retail shop-keeper may even keep no accounts at all; although that way bankruptcy lies, even if he is content when there is money left in the till after he has paid for his stock and all his current expenses, and fed his family out of it.

It is interesting to trace, in the USSR, the gradual realisation of the importance of precise and accurate statistics of the working of every part of the social structure. The statistical apparatus of the USSR has, in fact, during the past decade, become far and away the most extensive and the most comprehensive in the world. So vast are its operations, in the immense area with which it is concerned, that, whilst much has to be left unprinted, the mere volume of the statistics periodically published appears to exceed that of the British Empire or the United States. And it is constantly increasing in magnitude and minuteness. In a recent speech by Molotov, the president of the USSR Sovnarkom, he emphasised the importance of developing, what few governments have yet seriously undertaken, namely, universal "cost accounting" in every corporate undertaking.¹ "The work of

¹ It may not be necessary or desirable, where the capital outlay is found from the nation's income, rather than from loans bearing interest, to debit the working account of each capital enterprise with the interest on its cost. But the omission so to debit each capital undertaking with the interest on its cost, deprives the government of a useful index of its economic net advantage relative to that of other capital undertakings. For this reason the British Cooperative Movement, especially in the vast enterprises of the English and Scottish Wholesale Societies, has rigidly adhered to the practice of actually charging each separate business undertaking with the full interest on its capital cost, even if this has been entirely found out of income, in order that the directors and members may have always before them this useful guide as to the relative profitableness of the several undertakings. The Soviet Government, whilst not troubling about the original capital costs of undertakings dating from pre-war days, which may fairly be held to have been long since written-off as depreciation, now holds each economic enterprise responsible for all new or additional capital invested in its undertakings, and for actual repayment of loans, and payment of bank interest, with a system of accounting of great strictness and complexity. (See the detailed article on "Industry and Accounting in the USSR", by V. A. Diakonoff, in *Harvard Business Review* for January 1933.)

A calculus of this kind is, of course, inapplicable where the object and purpose of the enterprise is to produce something pecuniarily "invaluable", and

our economic organisations", he reminded the All-Union Congress of the Communist Party, "develops in accordance with the national economic plan. On this basis, agreements are concluded between them at prices fixed by the state. At the same time, the Party demands the inculcation of cost accounting in economic practice—cost accounting, the enforcement of which should bring about greater initiative and a certain independence of the economic organisations, defining at the same time their exact responsibility for the fulfilment of the state tasks in accordance with agreements. Not every economic organisation succeeds at once in correctly carrying out these tasks as a whole. It often happens that cost accounting is reduced to mere formality with references to existing plans and contracts, while in practice the economic organisations sink to the level of merely employing methods of office work. On the other hand, sometimes cost accounting is interpreted too 'freely'. . . . Indeed, is it not a fact that we have cases in which those who direct trusts, cooperative organisations, factories, or soviet farms, sell their produce more profitably, upsetting the fixed prices, and fail to meet their obligations to the state, taking in reality the unclean path of speculation? And yet, the plan and the agreements and cost accounting, all of these are elements of Bolshevik economic policy, the realisation of which demands, of course, a Bolshevik attitude."¹

The Improvement in Accounting

The trend towards more complete and more specific statistical accounting in the USSR—in supplement of all that has already been achieved—was described five years ago by a German critic. Herr Feiling in 1930 pointed out that "The whole organisation is making strenuous efforts, within the limits of the centralised, monopolistic, industrial and trading constitution, to provide opportunities for checking and comparing the returns of all the business establishments, and by means of the data thus supplied to assess the returns from any particular concern; exactly as in the case of private enterprise, which is here faithfully copied. The trusts, and individual concerns inside the larger trusts, even immeasurable quantitatively; such as the health and pleasure for which a park is provided; or the education given by a school or college; or the national security afforded by an adequately mechanised defensive force.

¹ *From the First to the Second Five-Year Plan* (Moscow, 1933), p. 120.

prepare and publish balance-sheets just like joint stock companies. The capital for which they are responsible has, since the currency reform, been approximately ascertained for the first time, despite the expropriation without compensation of the previous owners, and the amounts transferred to the individual concerns by the state or arising from their own reserve funds are likewise added to this responsible capital. To ensure clarity in the balance-sheet, and to facilitate the comparison of results, no use is made of the opportunity which presents itself of treating as written-off the new capital created by taxes or by prices. An ordinary profit and loss account, as with private undertakings, is also prescribed. No provision is made for bad debts, for writing down doubtful assets, or for interest upon the credits to which the business has resorted, and which are, in fact, often granted free of interest. The profit realised, however, is distributed according to a uniform scale: 10 per cent is straightaway allocated to income tax and 3 per cent to the support of technical education. Of the balance, 10 per cent is assigned to a fund for improving the situation of the works, especially in respect of housing, 10 per cent is placed to reserve, and a similar amount to a further special fund; whilst 25 per cent serves for the expansion of industry, that is, for the expansion in various ways of the special branch of industry to which the concern in question belongs. The remaining 40 to 45 per cent, after contributions to funds for scholarships, profit-sharing, bonuses, etc., goes as the real dividend to the revenue authority, which for its part spends it within the limits of the budget upon the maintenance of industry generally. Thus, in the distribution of profits, there is revealed a characteristic division between the interests of the individual concern, the individual branch of business, and the economic system as a whole.”¹

But it is not only for the purpose of avoiding eventual bankruptcy, or even for that of getting the best out of the working population, that a socialist community must, perforce, have the most scientific system of accounting, and notably one more searching, more candid and more public than that with which the capitalist system contents itself. There is, in our opinion, another and an even more important reason why a socialist com-

¹ *The Experiment of Bolshevism*, by Arthur Feiling (English Edition, 1930), pp. 105-106.

munity may be expected to base all its operations of wealth production and distribution upon the corner-stone of the principle of what we have called "measurement and publicity". The adoption of this principle in all industry affords, as we see the matter, the only safe means of dispensing with the personal exercise of authority by one man over another—by the manager over all the factory personnel, by the foreman over his gang, by the inspector over the enterprises that he inspects. It is this personal exercise of authority that is everywhere resented by those subjected to it. When the criticism or blame is suggested or implied by statistics impartially arrived at upon objective measurement, presented by trained experts *unconnected with the persons actually wielding power over others*, there may be annoyance, but there is no room for resentment. We may take as an example the independent audit of cash accounts and balances which has, within the past hundred years, become almost universal in Great Britain. The independent auditor exercises no authority. He comes in; scrutinises the accounts; makes his report, and then departs. He blames no one; he reprimands no one; he dismisses no one; he merely states the facts. We foresee a time when the technical inspector will be an equally independent expert. We can imagine a standing commission of independent statisticians and technicians called in to report successively on the working and results of each large enterprise in turn, merely for the information of the government and the public. When the report is made, the directors and managers of the enterprise, together with the factory committees and the meetings of trade union members, the managements of other enterprises of the same kind, and even the other government departments, would be invited, *before any publicity was given to the report*, to make their own observations upon it, including the considerations which the investigating commission may be thought to have overlooked, and not at all excluding the further explanations that might show that substantial errors had been made. The reforms that the independent expert report had shown to be necessary could then be determined on by the appropriate superior authority, with the general support of public opinion, and (because they would be divorced from any exercise of personal authority) with the least possible resentment or obstruction on the part of those who might think themselves

aggrieved by the decision.¹ To this advantage we recur in our Chapter XII. "The Good Life".

Communist Shortcomings and Achievements

What are we to think of this extensive array of incentives, old and new, which Soviet Communism substitutes for the motive of profit-making on which the capitalist world relies for the direction of industry?

The Wasteful Costs of Inexperience

One shrewd friend, to whom the draft of this chapter was submitted, was led to ask why, with so potent a set of incentives to efficiency, the industrial enterprises in the USSR, in comparison with those of western Europe and the United States, still presented so general a picture of inefficiency? The same question had already occurred to the present writers. The first answer is found in the unprecedented low level of industrial aptitude in the mass of the population of the USSR, out of which the new industrial community had to be constructed—their illiteracy, their lack of acquaintance with machinery of any kind, their habitual unpunctuality and irregularity, the dirt and squalor in which they lived, with the consequent frequency of disease and disablement, their addiction to drunkenness and sloth, and many other characteristics incompatible with any high degree of organisation and of any continuous industrial efficiency.² In fact, a diplomatist of long experience among the peoples of eastern Europe confidently declared, on the inauguration of the First Five-Year Plan, that it was absolutely impossible to make, out of the peasants of the Russian steppe, any large scale organisation of industry at all, and that to get out of such a mass anything like efficiency, even in a whole generation, was simply out of the question. It stands, we think, actually to the credit of the soviet system that, with something like twenty million raw peasants

¹ We may refer to *A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain*, by S. and B. Webb, 1920, pp. 186-187, 195-199, 239, 269, 272, 286, 309, 328, 356.

² To cite only one authority for this adverse judgment, out of the many that might be given, see *Russian Characteristics*, by E. B. Lanin (Dr. E. J. Dillon), 1890, which we cite in Chapter X. in Part II., "The Remaking of Man".

drawn into mass production on the largest scale, there has been attained, in a single decade, even a moderate degree of average efficiency ; and that there should have already emerged a very satisfactory proportion of highly skilled mechanics and machine operators.

To the present writers it seems that the industrial shortcomings of the Soviet Union are to be seen, less in the work of the individual operative than in the manner in which his labour is coordinated and directed in mass production. It happened, quite accidentally, that the first great industrial enterprise in the USSR that was visited by the present writers was the Molotov automobile factory at what was then Nizhny Novgorod, which has since been named after the favourite soviet author Gorki. After a widely advertised opening of the factory on May 1, 1932, the whole enterprise obstinately stuck ! The huge buildings, copied from Ford's works at Detroit, were filled with expensive machinery. Tens of thousands of workmen had been collected and placed upon the pay-roll. But the "conveyor"—the long belt on which the automobiles were to be assembled, and from which they were to drop off, completed, at the rate of one every five or ten minutes—refused to move. This was due to no inefficiency among the thousands of workers. The bed on which it rested had, in various places, sagged owing to insecure foundations. The pretentious buildings of concrete and glass were open to the blasts of wind blowing loose sand into the machinery. And even if the conveyor could be made to move, there was nothing like a complete stock of the varied series of components which had to be successively affixed one by one, as the great belt passed along. Yet without the presence, all day long, of every one of these components no single automobile could be completed. After a whole morning's inspection of the mess and muddle, and a tireless cross-examination of the officials, from the director and the local Party secretary, down to the humblest English or American mechanic who could be found, it was impossible to avoid the impression that the case was hopeless. No wonder the Riga correspondent of *The Times* reported that the works would never be reopened, and that the whole enterprise, in which many millions of dollars had been sunk, would have to be abandoned !

A fortnight later the present writers were at Stalingrad, going

over the great factory of tractors, which had been opened two years before. It was instructive to learn that it had had much the same experience as the Molotov factory at Gorki. After the official opening, the machinery stuck! Everything seemed to be wrong. But the enterprise was not abandoned. Months ensued before even one tractor could be satisfactorily completed. A full year elapsed before such tractors as were delivered could be regarded as anywhere near the standard of quality of the imported article. Yet within two years of patient readjustment at Stalingrad, 144 efficient tractors were dropping off the conveyor every twenty-four hours. It was therefore not surprising to learn subsequently that the Gorki factory was working equally well, and that by the end of 1934 it had actually delivered 85,000 motor cars and motor lorries.

Less than two years later than at Gorki, a corresponding great factory for producing similar vehicles was opened at Kharkhov. By this time the lesson had been learnt. The equipment and organisation of the Kharkhov factory was made completely ready before the start was made. With no better workmen than those at Stalingrad and Gorki the conveyor worked from the beginning, and some tractors were finished on the opening day. Presently the output rose to a steady average of several hundreds per day, the number varying according to the degree of complication of the machines called for.

A similar lesson was enforced in the vast constructions now working at the new city of Magnitogorsk. More than one serious explosion, or other fatal accident, occurred during the first year of operation, due to the failure to prevent the mishandling of dangerous machines by inexperienced young workmen. These fatalities, essentially the result of bad organisation of labour known to be wholly untrained, involved heavy repair and replacement costs. But the experience was not wasted; and Magnitogorsk is already (1935) regularly turning out, without accident or other check, a satisfactory output.

The Bolshevik authorities are fully aware that the inefficiency with which nearly all their industrial enterprises start, and the length of time taken to remedy patent deficiencies, is economically wasteful, and excessively costly. Stalin himself has publicly described both the soviet authorities' blunders and their difficulties. "We were", he said, "faced with the dilemma:

either to begin by teaching people in technical schools ; and to postpone for ten years the production and mass exploitation of machines, while technically literate cadres would be trained in schools ; or to proceed immediately with the creation of machines and to develop their mass exploitation in the national economy, so as to teach people technique ; [and] prepare cadres in the very process of production and exploitation of machines. We chose the second course. We openly and deliberately agreed to the inevitable costs and extra expenditures involved in the shortage of technically prepared people capable of handling machines. True, no small number of machines was smashed during this time. But to make up for this we have gained what is most precious—time—and have created what is most valuable in economy—cadres. In three to four years we created cadres of technically literate people, both in the field of production of various machines (tractors, automobiles, tanks, airplanes, and so on), and in the field of their mass exploitation. What was accomplished in Europe in the course of decades, we succeeded in accomplishing, roughly and in the main, in the course of three to four years. The costs and extra expenses, the breakage of machines and other losses, have been more than compensated. . . . Men must be grown as carefully and attentively as a gardener grows a favourite fruit tree. To educate, to help grow, to offer a prospect, to promote in time, to transfer in time to another position if the man does not manage his work, without waiting for him to fail completely ; carefully to grow and train people ; correctly to distribute and organise them in production ; to organise wages so that they would strengthen the decisive links of production and prompt people on to higher skill—this is what we need in order to create a large army of industrial-technical cadres.”¹

The Inefficiency caused by Overlapping of Control

There is, however, a more serious shortcoming in soviet industrial organisation, even when an enterprise gets fairly started, and when those concerned have acquired some technical experience. The very multiformity that is otherwise so useful in the Soviet Union, often results in a wasteful disunity in direction, with noise and confusion in the workshops, much chatter-

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, December 29, 1934.

ing and arguing, and sometimes repeating or undoing what has already been done. We insert a vivacious and lifelike description of a conversation in a railway train, in which these shortcomings of soviet industrial administration are commented on. This is taken from what is avowedly a work of fiction, not in itself evidence. But the present writers have several times heard much the same criticism from German engineers returning from the USSR.

"You have begun to do a great many things and to talk a great deal about the things you do", said the foreign specialist. "But we've been doing the same things very well for a very long time now, and we say nothing about them; we can't spare the time. . . . You collect people in different places so that they can do things, and then what happens? Then everybody begins to hinder these poor people, to get in their way, and annoy them—and this happens in every single case. . . . The place where work is going on is the front, say. The people who are working are soldiers, for the time being, soldiers. The superintendent of the works is the commander, for the time being. The first question is—now that you have collected people together—how to give them good forage, good food, otherwise they will not be able to do the maximum of work. And what did I see? Inspection of cooperatives was going on everywhere, because all the cooperatives were short in their accounts. Obviously it would be better to do things well at first, and well afterwards, instead of doing them badly at first and then having to have a general investigation afterwards. The second question is, whom are the people to obey? Where there are many masters there is no master. One poor worker does the work, and over him there are eight or nine or even ten commanders: the engineer, the director, the workers' committee, the secretary of the Party local, the workers' control, the workers' inspection, the factory inspector, the district executive committee, the workers' press, visitors—and then the worker himself wants to be a commander and reports people to the Ogpu, and shouts and tries to make himself bigger than he is. One frightens another; he frightens the next man; work goes first this way and then that way; everything goes wrong, and much more time and strength and money is spent than is necessary. I've seen this; I've heard it myself. There is one very good rule that says: If you want to command,

you must first learn to obey. But here everyone wants to command and no one wants to obey.”¹

The reply made to this scathing criticism in the course of the same conversation in the train is, we think, illuminating. “You have said that we were uneconomical, and we were very wasteful in our attitude towards people and in the employment of their strength. . . . Some very eloquent facts have been produced showing how anyone who isn’t too lazy can visit a works and hinder people from working. He called the visitors—very aptly—tourists. But this is really a very new principle—the principle of general education. We lose, it is true, in one way, but we gain in another. These millions of molecules that have been raised and heated by us cannot study in schools. No Commissariat of Education could possibly cope with them. The Commissariat of Education has a huge budget, but even this is painfully small in comparison with our requirements. Now there is an extra expense—the education and enlightenment of the masses. We teach these masses by this system of free tourist excursions, and we ourselves are always learning from them, from their presence, their criticism, their demands. You say we are doing things that Europe does better, cheaper, cleaner and quicker than us. Yes, Europe is making things—but *we are by no means merely making things!* That’s the whole point, and that’s what you don’t see; therein lies the new principle, therein lies the explanation!”

“Not doing things? Then what is it you’re doing?”

“We’re doing planned things, my dear sir! See the difference. It’s a tremendous difference. In every factory, every new construction that you visit, you can see things being done or worked out—plus a new society, plus the trade union, plus the training of adolescents, plus club work, plus production meetings, plus control, plus calculations, plus plan! The thing plus plan comes from above, the thing plus control—that’s from below. It seems to you that there are scores of masters here. You’re mistaken; there are scores of factors, not masters. And the expansion of every single factor at the cost of another is part of a struggle for measures, for a system, a struggle for a new society. If when we examine a given segment, we discover an extra shoot

¹ “Heard in the Train”, from the novel *Hydrocentral*, by M. Shaginyan (Moscow, 1934).

which has entered a circle where it doesn't belong, this shoot is the extra expense for education. Thanks to this we are building up a new mechanism, making a new source of power available, setting up new landmarks. That is the new principle that you sought and did not find—an economic system minus private owners ! It isn't that we have scores of masters, but scores of factors and people who represent them. An attractive world, and you visited it and did not notice this ! "

Where are the Captains of Industry ?

The incentives "in place of profit" described in the foregoing pages, whether old ones remodelled, or new ones made practicable by planned production for community consumption, cannot, in themselves, produce a body of "captains of industry" able to supply the best possible organisation of the masses of operatives which is required in production on a large scale. Unlike the motive of making profit, the soviet incentives act upon the entire mass of those engaged in the work. No participant altogether escapes their influence. Accordingly, these incentives, whilst they may momentarily exalt this or that hero of industry, create no separate class in the community. Moreover, though these stimuli usually bring some tangible additions to personal income, and increased creature comforts, they do not lead to the accumulation of private fortunes. They create, in industry, nothing like a virtual governing body of self-made millionaires, passing into an hereditary upper stratum of wealthy families.

It may be said that, just for this reason, the whole array of soviet incentives, whilst it may stimulate universal industry and vastly increase the productivity of labour, fails to evoke the industrial leadership which, in other countries, is assumed to be the function of the capitalist entrepreneur or director, the improving landowner or stockbreeder, or the company promoter or financial magnate. This comment is largely justified. For leadership in industry, as in all public affairs, Soviet Communism relies, as a substitute for a capitalist class, not on the incentives that we have analysed, but on the peculiar Order that we have described in our chapter on "The Vocation of Leadership",¹ namely the Communist Party, together with its probationers

¹ Chapter V. in Part I., "The Vocation of Leadership", pp. 339-418.

called candidates, and its junior branch of Comsomols. These extensive organisations, under their self-denying ordinance of individual poverty and implicit obedience to their own corporations, have assumed the leadership of the community, to the well-being of which they undertake to devote their lives. It is they who, as a corporate body, formulate industrial, as all other policy, and decide both the General Plan and its execution in thousands of productive enterprises. It is one moiety of them who individually fill nearly all the directing and managerial positions, whether these are reached by election from below, or by appointment from above. It is the other moiety of them, as individual wage-earners continuing to work at the bench or at the forge, on the farm or in the mine, whose personal character and public judgments insensibly direct the mass of fellow workers among whom they live. It is very largely they who man the shock brigades that set the pace; they who are elected to trade union offices; they who constitute the "activists" by whom the whole mass is set in motion. What are the incentives, "in place of profit", that spur the membership of this self-selected vocational Order to the zealous performance of their function of leadership, in which they show a devotion certainly not less than that of the capitalists of the western world? We can only repeat our survey of the diversity of motives by which they are moved. There is the pleasure, or the persistent glow of satisfaction, which every person of ability and character feels in the successful exercise of his vocation; none the less when this vocation is obviously and directly exercised in the service of the community than when it is in pursuit of his own wealth, or, as we may add, in the expression of his own personality in art, or in the promotion of his chosen branch of science. Scarcely distinguishable from this is the sense of achievement, which some may call the sense of success or the sense of power, in directing or influencing the actions of others. Further, the sustained emphasis on the application of science to every problem of society which, as we shall describe in a subsequent chapter,¹ is implicit in Marxism, is a perpetually recurring stimulus to intellectual curiosity and invention. Nor can we doubt—though communists vehemently disclaim it—that we have here something analogous to the feeling of the devotees of the old re-

¹ Chapter XI. in Part II., "Science the Salvation of Mankind", pp. 944-1016.

ligions, who are irresistibly impelled to the performance of duty by influences which non-believers find unintelligible or merely mystical.

But there is a further factor in the maintenance of a high level of character, ability and zeal of this vocational Order. As we have described elsewhere, its entire membership is not only constantly watched from the centre, but also subjected, every three or four years, to a drastic purging, by which something like 20 or 30 per cent of the members are actually expelled from the Order, or relegated to the lower degree of candidates or sympathisers. Every member has thus to stand his trial; make confession of his shortcomings, in private life as well as in public office; and answer the accusations that will be publicly brought against him. This is not merely a deterrent to weaklings or wrongdoers. It has a great effect in keeping the whole Order always up to the mark, by continual elimination of those falling below its standard.

This leadership in Soviet Communism differs essentially, in two all-important features, from that of the capitalist class in western nations. Its constant and deliberate purpose is not the enrichment of any individual, any family or any social class—not even the non-pecuniary advantage of individual, family or class—but exclusively the lasting benefit of the community as a whole. And the policy, which from time to time it adopts and puts in operation with a view to securing the advantage of the whole community, is always one in which the entire Order, unlike any capitalist class, works together in unison to achieve the common end.

The Substitute for Profit-making

It is in the intimate combination of the array of incentives which Soviet Communism has known how to employ, and the peculiar organisation by which leadership is provided—and not in the one without the other—that we find the working substitute both for the profit-making motive and for the class of capitalist directors of industry, neither of which is allowed in the USSR. What can be said of the results of this substitution? Leaving aside any demonstration by statistics, which few people find convincing, we suggest that Soviet Communism has to its credit the undeniable economic and industrial recovery and

advance of the USSR since 1921. From the lowest depths to which the country was reduced, after the Civil War and the Great Famine of 1921, the transformation in every branch of social life is unmistakable. This in itself affords no evidence that the recovery and advance have been actually caused by the new motivation or by the new leadership. It might conceivably have taken place in spite of them. But it is conclusive proof that the new leadership and the new motivation have not been incompatible with the recovery and the advance. The Bolshevik experiment has, in the course of the past decade, demonstrated beyond all denial that neither the incentive of profit-making nor the existence of a capitalist class as the leaders and directors of industry is indispensable to wealth production on a colossal scale, or to its continuous increase. Such a result is worth consideration in detail.

Continuous Initiative and Risk-taking

There are two necessary conditions of advancing wealth-production which the western economists have continued to regard as belonging exclusively to a régime of the pursuit of individual riches, under the direction of a relatively wealthy capitalist class. Under any other system, it was argued, and notably under any form of government ownership of industry, there could be no courageous initiative, and no venturesome incurring of risk in new developments. Without a wealthy class, in receipt of incomes substantially in excess of the capacity to consume, there could be, it was said, no such accumulation of capital as would permit of great new enterprises yielding only distant, and therefore necessarily uncertain, returns. Both these economic assumptions have been, we suggest, conclusively disproved by the past fifteen years of USSR history. Far from showing any lack of initiative, in great matters or in small; far from any refusal to incur risks in new developments, Soviet Communism has proved to be, in all fields, almost wildly initiating. It has shown itself adventurous even to a fault in incurring risks. It has gone to the limit in sacrificing the present to the future. It has been experimenting restlessly, if not recklessly, in new developments in all directions. No student of the USSR can fail to be impressed by what seems to be even excess in the desire

for change and in the spirit of adventure, in industry, in science, in various forms of art and in social institutions, as compared even with the United States.

With regard to the rate of creation of new capital by means of saving out of income, Soviet Communism has, in the past decade, left all the world behind. Most capitalist countries are content to "save"—that is, divert to capital investment what might otherwise be immediately consumed in commodities and services—2 or 3 per cent of the total national income. Great Britain, at its wealthiest time, just before the Great War, was saving as much as 9 or 10 per cent of the total national income. But the Soviet Union, during most of the years since 1927, has "saved" from the national income, and invested in new enterprises, and in works and machinery of the nature of capital, at least 20 per cent, and sometimes as much as 30 per cent, of the total national income. In fact, under the leadership of the Communist Party, the amount of "saving" (meaning allocation to capital investments instead of immediate consumption) has kept pace with the intellectual initiative.

This is not to assert that Soviet Communism, within little more than a decade, has yet succeeded in raising the standard of life of its 170 millions of people from the appallingly low level of 1921 (to say nothing of the unplumbed depths of tsarist poverty) to anything like the normal standard, *when in employment*, of the British or the American, the Swiss or the Scandinavian people. What can be said with some confidence is that there is nothing in Soviet Communism to warrant the assumption that a communist nation must always remain below the level of any capitalist community in the world. Yet, at the present time, there is, in the USSR, undoubtedly a relatively low level of industrial efficiency compared with the best that the United States and Great Britain can show. In particular there is an unevenness of achievement, and not a few breakdowns in administration, which make it useful to analyse further the various participants in production.

An Analysis of the Producers

We may divide the economic and political organisation of any society into three sections or layers, according to the character of their respective functions. The smallest in magnitude

of these three sections, and some would say the most important, is that on which falls the task and the burden of intellectual leadership, whether in economic production, in national policy, or in cultural developments. The largest in magnitude, to which it has been part of the cult of Marxism to attribute the greatest importance, is that of the mass of workers whose life is spent in manual labour. Intermediate between these two sections there is a third; an extensive and heterogeneous class, somewhat analogous to the non-commissioned officers, and to the staffs at the base or depot of a modern army; or to the mass of routine clerical workers in the national and municipal offices. This intermediate category includes all sorts of subordinate deputy managers and routine executants; foremen and inspectors; secretaries,¹ clerks and shop assistants; and men and women in sole charge of minor posts or distant offices. They are alike in no other feature than that of not being manual-working producers, and yet not being burdened with responsibility for policy, or required to come to any decision as to what should be the end or purpose of the particular function entrusted to them.

Now, it is part of the peculiarity of Soviet Communism that these three sections or layers in the USSR do not to-day constitute distinct social classes, and least of all, hereditary classes. Whatever differences there may be in personal or family incomes—and such differences are far less than in any other country—these differences do not correspond with differences in heritage, rank, education, manners, or habits of life, or even with the particular functions which the individuals fulfil. It is nevertheless possible, we venture to suggest, to compare, with substantial general accuracy, the degree of success with which, in the USSR, each of the three sections or layers as a whole, exercises the social function ascribed to it.

The first-named section or layer, that of the intellectual leaders of the community in policy and direction, appears to us, as a whole, to have shown consummate ability and a devotion

¹ Sometimes it is irresponsibility of the enormous number of secretaries that is complained of. Thus a novelist remarks of the present day: "I must say, by the way, that secretaries are the crying evil of our soviet existence. Enormous power is centred in their hands, since they are the nearest intermediaries between the executives and the population, and are at the same time never held responsible for their actions. They are the 'responsible irresponsibles' or those irreplaceable people who cause to groan both the government and the unfortunate public" (*Semi-precious Stones*, by A. I. Voinova, London, 1934, p. 358).

beyond all praise. In both respects it is certainly not inferior to that of the corresponding group of persons in any other country, either in initiative and courage, in economic or social policy, in the utilisation of the knowledge of expert specialists or in the direction and supreme management of the nation's production and social life.¹ In all these respects, we venture to say, the soviet statesmen are markedly superior to the common run of business men in England or America, intent on their narrow aim of making profit.

The largest section or layer, that of the mass of the workers, mostly recruited very recently from the peasantry, has reached, in a short time, considering the low level from which it started, a creditable degree of mechanical skill and factory discipline, though, for the most part, still falling short of that of the most highly skilled workers of the most advanced capitalist countries. This shortcoming, is, however, more than compensated for by the intense enthusiasm for production which Soviet Communism has known how to inspire in them. In no other country does the mass of the manual workers throw so much energy into an actual increase of the output of industry. In no other country has trade unionism achieved so much in improving the processes of industry, diminishing waste of time or material, speeding up labour, and generally increasing the net productivity of each enterprise. We know of no working class, in any of the countries in which there has been no such elimination of the capitalist employer, that, taken as a whole, cooperates so cordially and so strenuously in wealth production as the industrial wage-earners of the USSR.

It is with what we have called the intermediate section or layer that Soviet Communism has so far achieved the least

¹ It is, we think, of distinct advantage that none of these leaders in the USSR can be distracted from his work of leadership by great personal possessions in the form of luxurious mansions or steam yachts, or by conspicuous expenditure on amusements or travel. The very concentration of their energies may encourage gigantic projects. This has been suggested in a clever novel: "I knew that, in spite of the most severe sobriety of our epoch, and perhaps because of the complete absence of anything fantastic in our life, one could in our country attain the confirmation of some fancifully magical plan far more quickly and painlessly than the confirmation of, say, some small, ordinary project, conceived to cover the most crying needs of our industry." "Yes", I thought, crossing streets and going out of one crooked alley into another, "we are accustomed to thinking on a large scale, in the plane of eternal, not temporary problems, and the swing of our life requires something gigantic. All else seems boring and tasteless!" (*Semi-precious Stones*, by A. I. Voinova, London, 1934, p. 405).

success. We venture the judgment that, taken as a whole, this section falls considerably below, in honesty and efficiency, both the leaders above and the mass of the wage-earners underneath. This is what is sometimes expressed by the criticism that, in the USSR the policy, the project or the plan is always superior to the execution of it. The subordinate officials such as the inspectors, the rate-fixers and the foremen ; the clerks and shop assistants ; the chairmen of local soviets and the directors and book-keepers of collective farms ; the station-masters, train conductors and other leading transport workers ; the men and women in charge of small posts or distant offices—taken as a whole, and with many honourable exceptions—have not yet acquired the habits of punctuality, honesty, regularity, exactness and above all, absolute fidelity to the trust necessarily placed in them, upon which the most successful administration depends. This is not a new complaint about the countries east of the Vistula. We believe that those who knew the Russia of twenty years ago recognise an improvement in these respects. Much may be hoped for when the children now at school have taken the places of their parents. But at present the human links between the policy-makers and the primary workers are, as a whole, inferior in loyalty and efficiency both to the leaders and to the industrial wage-earners, and far behind those of Great Britain ; and it is to this deficiency that the patent defects of soviet administration are very largely to be attributed.

We trace the continued shortcomings of this intermediate class to the failure of the soviet incentives to reach the particular occupations by which the whole class earns its living. To take certain cases as illustrative, the work of the salesman in a government retail shop or a cooperative store, or that of the station-master of a provincial railway depot, cannot easily be put on a piece-work basis. It cannot well come under the influence of "socialist competition", or be made the subject either of public honour or of public shame. There is even a great difficulty in bringing such occupations within the sphere of stock-taking and audit. Their work cannot be accurately measured, and without exact measurement it cannot be made the subject of useful publicity. Inspection is a clumsy instrument, and one particularly difficult to use in so vast an area as the USSR. Moreover, in order to prevent collusion, who is to inspect the work

of the inspectors? It may be said, too, that there has been an indisposition on the part of the members of the Communist Party, and of the Comsomols, to enlist in many of the occupations comprised in this intermediate section or layer. The enthusiastic young communist will throw himself vigorously into the manual labour of making things. He or she will go down into the mine, or voluntarily spend arduous days completing the new Moscow underground railway. Male and female alike will, with equal enthusiasm, undertake a special mission involving hardship or danger. They will be happy and zealous in commanding even the smallest detachment on any service whatsoever. But they dislike the function of trading, and the handling of goods, even when it is designated the social service of the distribution of commodities. Far from seeking such a sheltered occupation as that of salesman in a cooperative store, or that of a clerk in the office of a government trust, communist youth frequently refuses to recognise this as part of the necessary service of the community. This lowers the common level, in such occupations, of fidelity, zeal and efficiency.

How have the leaders tried to overcome the inertia, the lack of zeal, and in some cases the dishonesty or the active sabotage, of this intermediate layer in the organisation of Soviet Communism? Lenin's idea was to cure these evils, which he summarised as "bureaucracy", by bringing the common sense of the mass of the people to bear on every branch of administration. Under the system of "workers' and peasants' inspection" every office was periodically visited, sometimes without notice, by a sort of jury, drawn from the common people, who insisted on having demonstrated to them the practical utility of every piece of "red tape". Stalin, who was placed at the head of what became an extensive organisation extending all over the USSR, fortified these indiscriminate juries of inspection by a staff of officials trained in administrative routine, who tactfully directed the jurymen's eyes to matters needing reform and put into useful shape the jury's criticism and suggestions. We have elsewhere described the extent to which this great organisation of "workers' and peasants' inspection" was thought to be effective and useful.¹ After more than a decade it was, in 1933-1934, superseded by

¹ For the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, see Appendix VI., pp. 474-478 of Part I.

other devices. Whilst it had served to increase the feeling of participation and control among the workers at large, it was held to have very largely failed in changing the character of what we have styled the intermediate category. Moreover, it became recognised that, however valuable might be this irresponsible popular inspection, together with the perpetual inventiveness and discussion about the factory or office organisation to which the mass of workers were stirred, the whole thing added considerably to the work of the managers and directors, involved them in constant loss of valuable time, and definitely lowered the efficiency of the enterprise. Rykov brought this aspect of "industrial democracy" forcibly before the Fifteenth Party Congress. He quoted the protest of a manager interfered with in his duties by nine separate control commissions and committees of inspection. He says: "My time is wasted on reports, conference negotiations. The trade union organisations formed three factory councils, three organisations for discussing production and three commissions for setting up standards and settling disputes. When am I to find time for my work?" Finally this manager was haled before the secret police by "a childish whim of an official of the GPU who wished to show that he was a person of authority". Rykov concludes: "This whole system of revision and control combined with a lack of personal responsibility is hardly calculated to ensure successful work. Our system is still centralised to a degree based on mistrust of every minor link of the chain."¹

The administrative expedient to which the Soviet Government was driven, with regard to a large part of the intermediate class—notably between 1928 and 1931—was that of punishment. Those detected in breach of trust or neglect of duty, those suspected of disaffection or disloyalty, and even those in whose sphere of work there had occurred any glaring breakdown or failure from any cause whatever, were summarily removed from office, or relegated to less responsible and more disagreeable work. In many cases the offenders were severely dealt with by the OGPU and sentenced to imprisonment or relegation to Siberia. In extreme cases, where "counter-revolutionary" activities such as sabotage have been proved or suspected, men have been summarily shot. In defence of this policy of punishment, communists

¹ *Russia To-day*, by Sherwood Eddy, 1934, pp. 7-8.

assert that it is just in this intermediate category that a large proportion of the people who were opposed to the Bolshevik régime found refuge. Many of the offices and institutions swarmed with ex-officers, ex-professors, ex-employers, and others formerly living on incomes derived from securities. Some of these, at least, remained permanently disaffected; and even if, for the most part, they ceased actively to intrigue against the government, they continued to be centres of disloyalty, not really trying to fulfil their functions with anything beyond the very minimum of efficiency.¹ But when this state of things is met by drastic and summary punishment, necessarily without meticulous regard to the degree of individual guilt, the matter is made worse rather than better. The universal fear of dismissal, if not of more severe punishment, is not an atmosphere in which there can be produced either fidelity in service or energy in its performance, and still less, intellectual initiative and inventiveness. The Soviet Government would do well to set on foot a scientific study of the effect, alike on opinion, on judgment and on will—and therefore upon administrative efficiency—of the emotion of fear. If the practical irremovability of the British civil servant has its drawbacks, it has at least the advantage that he can give his whole mind fearlessly to his function. It would be a serious drawback if it had to be accepted that the soviet technician, inspector or foreman must always be subject to the paralysis caused by the fear, not only of losing his job, but of exemplary punishment; and punishment devised not to improve his character but merely to deter others from doing likewise!²

Some appreciation of these considerations seems to have penetrated to those responsible for soviet policy. In 1931, as we have already mentioned, Stalin took the opportunity, in his address entitled *New Conditions—New Tasks*, to call for a new

¹ One of their own colour has admitted their offence. "If we ignore for the moment", writes Boris Brutzkus, "the self-accusations wrung from the morally or physically tortured intellectuals at their public trials, we can see that there is some truth in the complaints made against them. They were undeniably hostile to the existing régime. . . . They could not possibly connive at such cruel measures. . . . They endeavoured to put a brake on these activities, relying for support on the Right Wing's disaffection" (*Economic Planning in Soviet Russia*, by Boris Brutzkus, 1935, pp. 233-234).

² To this subject of punishment and the scale of moral values which it entails, we shall return in Chapter XI., "Science the Salvation of Mankind", and Chapter XII. "The Good Life". See also Chapter VII., "The Liquidation of the Landlord and Capitalist", pp. 550-560; all these in Part II.

attitude towards "the old technical intelligentsia". Very characteristically, Stalin began by justifying what he proposed to abandon. These people, he said, had, during the past year or two become "infected with the wrecking disease. In fact," he declared, "wrecking had become a sort of fashion; while some of them directly engaged in wrecking activities, others abetted the wreckers; others washed their hands of them and maintained a position of neutrality, while others vacillated in their adherence between the soviet power and the wreckers. Of course the majority of the technical intelligentsia continued to work more or less loyally." But, at the present time, Stalin went on to say, the position had changed. The Soviet Government had demonstrated its strength. There could be no longer any delusion as to its permanency. The great majority of the intelligentsia were now working loyally, and the few remaining wreckers had been driven underground. Consequently, he declared, "it follows that we must change our policy towards the old technical intelligentsia. . . . It would be foolish and unwise to regard almost every expert and engineer of the old schools as an undetected criminal and wrecker. . . . Our task is to change our attitude towards the engineers and technicians of the old schools, to show them greater attention and solicitude, to display more boldness in inviting their cooperation. . . ." ¹

In 1933-1934 the whole apparatus of "workers' and peasants' inspection" was, as we have said, superseded by a new administrative device. Following the decision of the Seventeenth Party Congress, two new "Control Commissions" were established, one for the Party working directly under its Central Committee, and the other (for which the Party equally suggested the membership) for the USSR Sovnarkom, under whose directions it was to act. The special function of both commissions was systematically to "check up" the execution of all decisions and orders from the centre. Each commission was to appoint a staff of confidential officials who were systematically to compare what was actually done with what had been ordered to be done. The agents of the Party Control Commission would scrutinise the conduct and efficiency of Party members, whilst the agents of the Sovnarkom's Control Commission would consider specially the results themselves. By these means it was hoped to assess with greater

¹ *New Conditions—New Tasks*, by Josef Stalin (Moscow, 1931), pp. 15-18.

accuracy and promptitude the manner in which every branch of administration was working, and to bring to bear on all grades a strong incentive to improvement. It remains to be seen what will be the effect of this new apparatus upon what we have called the intermediate category.

To end this chapter on the communist incentives "in place of profit" we may be permitted to draw the student's attention to its strangely ironic conclusion. The one striking superiority of the capitalist organisation of industry over that of Soviet Communism is not found in the profit-makers' control and direction of production and distribution, in such a way as to secure the most perfect satisfaction of the whole community's needs or desires. Nor does any such superiority manifest itself in the capitalists' capacity to evoke, from the mass of the manual workers, either that universal continuous participation in the work of production, or that assiduity and inventiveness, which are both indispensable to the maximum output of the community as a whole. Alike in directing industry so as to satisfy the needs and desires of the entire community, and in obtaining from the whole mass of manual workers the utmost useful participation in production, Soviet Communism bids fair actually to surpass the achievement of profit-making capitalism. Yet, as we have suggested, there is one part of the structure of wealth-production in which the organisation of capitalist industry has so far shown itself superior in efficiency to that of Soviet Communism. This is in the zeal, honesty, punctuality and loyalty to be counted on in Great Britain and some other countries of western Europe in the large and heterogeneous category of salaried workers who fill the intermediate positions between the directors and controllers of policy on the one hand, and the manual workers engaged in direct production on the other. It is in this middle section of the organisation, comprising the clerical and accounting staffs, the foremen and overseers who combine high craftsmanship with managerial capacity, the chiefs of railway depots and local repair shops, the train conductors, the multitude of store managers, shop assistants and cashiers—the human links between those few who plan and direct and the many who actually produce—that the capitalists' industry at present shows its greatest superiority. It is owing to the manifest shortcomings of this intermediate section in the USSR that the aggregate results of soviet industry

have not been all that might have been expected ; that there has been in so many soviet enterprises such a terrifying wearing out and breaking of machinery, such a waste of material and components, and such an amount of production of inferior quality. In the industrial organisation of Great Britain, we venture to say, this intermediate section is markedly superior to the corresponding section in the USSR. And yet it is exactly this salaried "lower middle class" that has been, under modern capitalism, most assiduously excluded from the incentive of profit-making ! In the USSR, improvement in this intermediate section is looked for in quite a different direction. As Stalin said, "man must be grown as carefully and attentively as a gardener grows a favourite fruit tree". In the following chapter we shall describe how strenuously and how systematically the Bolsheviks have tackled this problem of the "remaking of man".

CHAPTER X

THE REMAKING OF MAN

IN no direction does the purpose and policy of the Soviet Government stand in sharper contrast with the purpose and policy of any other administration than in its attitude towards the character and habits of the citizens at large. Monarchs and parliaments, humane oligarchies and enlightened democracies, have often desired the welfare of their subjects, and have even sometimes sought to shape their policy towards this end. But at best this has been more of a hope than a purpose. The Soviet Government from the first made it a fundamental purpose of its policy not merely to benefit the people whom it served but actually to transform them.¹ Far from believing that human nature could not be changed, Lenin and his colleagues thought that the principal object and duty of a government should be to change drastically the human nature with which it dealt. Rightly or wrongly, they ascribed the physical and mental characteristics of the Russian people almost wholly to the influence of the environment in which, for so many generations, it had lived. They duly recognised the influence of heredity. But they held that even the characteristics inherited genetically from the parents, and through them from all previous generations, are themselves, if not wholly at least very largely, the results of the successive environments to which their endless series of ancestors had been subjected. Even if further scientific investigation should prove indubitably that most acquired characteristics are not transmitted by genetic inheritance, and if it should reveal in man

¹ The following slogan of the Moscow Sports Clubs is significant: "We are not only rebuilding human society on an economic basis: we are mending the human race on scientific principles".

something which is certainly not the accumulated result of past environment, however remote, this would not lessen the importance of providing new environmental conditions which would be potent in effecting in each generation the further improvement that was desired. Clearly there is a social heritage as well as a physical one. Every child is certainly to no small degree moulded by the material and mental conditions of the parental home; and, through these, by the structure and working of the society within which infancy and childhood, adolescence and manhood are passed. Not without reason therefore did the Bolsheviks hold that, among all the environmental conditions which go to the shaping of man, those created by social institutions are alike the most potent and the most easily transformed. It was for this ultimate reason that Lenin's Government undertook the liquidation of the landlord and the capitalist, and replaced profit-making by community service as the mainspring of wealth production.¹ It was with this object that the Soviet Government has transformed both industry and agriculture into what we have called "Planned Production for Community Consumption".² This creation of a new environment is what is sought in the establishment of a "classless" society in which every person would be equally free from "exploitation", and every child equally enabled to develop whatever ability it possessed, in a service of the community effectively open, on equal terms, to both sexes and all races. Finally, the same object and purpose is to be seen in the determined concentration of all the energies of the community upon the universal improvement of the social conditions of each successive generation during this life, to the complete exclusion of any "other-worldliness", and of any diversion by what is regarded as a mythical supernaturalism for which science can find no warrant.

Why have other governments, in Europe or America, not had a like devouring eagerness and persistent purpose for the deliberate raising of their peoples to a higher level? A thousand years ago, in the age of faith, man's improvement was regarded as the function, not of the civil government, but of the Christian Church. The rise of national governments, and the Protestant Reforma-

¹ See Chapter VII. in Part II., "The Liquidation of the Landlord and the Capitalist," pp. 529-601.

² See Chapter VIII. in Part II., "Planned Production for Community Consumption," pp. 602-696.

tion, combined to make the state machinery essentially worldly. Whilst remaining professedly Christian, it became more and more governed in its policy and purpose by an individualism which left a free hand to profit-making capitalism. In the eighteenth century, under the influence of Rousseau, it came to be thought that government, far from having as its function the improvement of man, was in itself an evil influence—to be as far as possible limited in its interference with the freedom of the individual. From this creed nineteenth-century liberalism deduced the idea that it was positively wrong for the government to retain any organic connection with religion, or to encroach on the domain of the church or churches, which included the whole conception of “a good life” in obedience to the commands of an omnipotent deity. With the decay, over a large part of Europe and America, of belief in any supernaturalism, “the bottom has dropped out” of the code of behaviour which the churches had formulated.

It is a distinctive feature of Soviet Communism that the organised society which it establishes deliberately and avowedly assumes the function of promoting, among all its participants, what it conceives to be “the good life”; a life to be spent, not in the worship of a mythical deity, or in preparation for some future existence, but, during each successive generation, in the promotion of the well-being of the whole community of men. For the worship of God Soviet Communism substitutes the service of man. Man, after centuries of oppression a poor image of what he might be, has accordingly to be remade, and a new civilisation established.

One of the puzzle-questions for the historians of society is how new civilisations arise. Do the successive new species of social institutions, exhibiting new relations between man and man, changed processes of production, a fresh destination of property, a novel conception of the relation of the individual to the universe, and a new code of conduct, spring directly from the highest of existing civilisations, or from more primitive types, less differentiated, less minutely elaborated, and less stabilised in structure and function? Without doubt Soviet Communism, for good or for evil, sprang from a low type of society, if we judge it by the standards of western civilisation—its masses illiterate, superstitious, exceptionally diseased, and in places actually barbarous; its governing classes, largely of foreign origin, degenerate, and in

more than one sense corrupt ; with a political constitution hopelessly inefficient and obsolete. Here is a succinct account of tsarist Russia in 1917 when Lenin assumed office, by a cosmopolitan observer,¹ whom we take leave to characterise as quite the best informed of all whose books are on record ; and one at that time contemptuous of Bolshevism, and all the more to be trusted, as without partiality for that creed, in that the October revolution had swept away his savings. Dr. E. J. Dillon, after describing the extreme heterogeneity of race and religion among the inhabitants of tsarist Russia, continued as follows :

“Turning from the nationalities to the bulk of the Russian people—the agricultural population—one was struck with the circumstance that it was mediaeval in its institutions, Asiatic in its strivings and prehistoric in its conceptions of life. The peasants believed that the Japanese had won the Manchurian campaign by assuming the form of microbes, getting into the boots of the Russian soldiers, biting their legs, and bringing about their death. When there was an epidemic in a district they often killed the doctors ‘for poisoning the wells and spreading the disease’. They still burn witches with delight, disinter the dead to lay a ghost, strip unfaithful wives stark naked, tie them to carts and whip them through the village. It is fair, therefore, to say that the level of culture of the peasantry, in whose name Russia is now being ruined, is considerably lower than that of Western Europe. And when the only restraints that keep such a

¹ Dr. Emile Joseph Dillon (born in 1856 in England, the son of an Irish father and English mother ; educated at French and German universities) ; lived in Russia from 1877 to 1914, and revisited the country in 1918 and 1929 ; was a student and afterwards a professor at Russian universities, long editor of a Russian newspaper, travelling extensively during his nearly forty years’ stay ; knowing many languages, and personally acquainted with almost every phase of Russian life, from ministers of state, the nobility and the bureaucracy, through successive generations of revolutionaries, down to the artisan and the peasant. He was for nearly thirty years a consummate “foreign correspondent” of British and other newspapers, and author of many books in Russian and other languages. The student should compare his three books on Russia, spread over thirty-nine years. In 1890 he published (as E. B. Lanin) *Russian Characteristics* (604 pp.), a penetrating analysis which the ex-minister Miyukov once declared to be the most accurate description of the Russian people. In 1918, on viewing the situation just after the Bolshevik assumption of office, he published under his own name *The Eclipse of Russia* (420 pp.), in which, altogether disbelieving in the Bolsheviks, he expressed his despair. In 1929, he came again, and published *Russia To-day and To-morrow* (338 pp.), bearing eloquent testimony to an immense improvement in almost every respect. He was so much impressed that he was intending to revisit Russia when he unfortunately fell ill, dying at Barcelona in 1933.

multitude in order are suddenly removed the consequences to the community are bound to be catastrophic. The peasantry, like the intelligentsia, is wanting in the social sense that endows a race with cohesiveness, solidity and political unity. Between the people and anarchism for generations there stood the frail partition formed by its primitive ideas of God and the Tsar ; and since the Manchurian campaign these were rapidly melting away. . . . Too often the Russian peasant dwells in a hovel more filthy than a sty, more noxious than a phosphoric match factory. He goes to bed at six and even at five o'clock in the winter, because he cannot afford money to buy petroleum enough for artificial light. He has no meat, no eggs, no butter, no milk, often no cabbage, and lives mainly on black bread and potatoes. Lives ? He starves on an insufficient quantity of them. At this moment [1917] there are numerous peasants in Bessarabia who for lack of that stable food are dying of hunger. At this moment in White Russia, after the departure of the reserves for the seat of war, there are many households in which not even a pound of rye corn is left for the support of the families who have lost their bread-winners. And yet those starving men, women and children, had raised plenty of corn to live upon—for the Russian tiller of the soil eats chiefly black bread, and is glad when he has enough of that. But they were forced to sell it immediately after the harvest in order to pay the taxes. And they sold it for nominal prices—so cheap that the foreigners could resell it to them cheaper than Russian corn merchants ! . . . Wholly indifferent to politics, of which they understood nothing, but cunning withal and land-greedy, the peasants were only a long row of ciphers to which the articulate class, mainly officialdom, lent significance. All that they wanted was land, how it was obtained being a matter of no moment to them. Their view of property was that their own possessions were inviolable, whereas those of the actual owners should be wrested from them without more ado. This simplicist socialism was the crystallisation of ages of ignorance, thralldom and misguidance. It was manifest that the complete enfranchisement of these elements would necessarily entail the dissolution of the Tsardom. . . . Eleven years ago [*i.e.* in 1907] I wrote : ' The agrarian question in Russia is the alpha and omega of the revolution. It furnishes the lever by means of which the ancient régime, despite the support of the army, may be heaved into the

limbo of things that were and are not. So important is the land problem that, if it could be definitely suppressed or satisfactorily solved, the revolution would be a tame affair indeed. . . . For it must not be forgotten that fully 80 per cent of the population are illiterate, and that millions of them are plunged in such benighted ignorance and crass superstition as foreigners can hardly conceive of. Hence they sorely need guidance. . . . The cry, "the land for the peasants" intoxicates, nay, maddens them. They are then ready to commit any crime against property and life in the hope of realising their object. The explosive force that may be thus called into being and utilised for the purpose of overthrowing the present social and political order is enormous. The formidable army of the Tsar dwindles into nothing when compared to it, because itself is the source of the army to which it imparts its own strivings and tendencies. . . . The resultant is an easy-going, patient, shiftless, ignorant, unvarnished and fitfully ferocious mass . . . half a child and half an imperfectly tamed wild beast . . . whom the German writers flippantly connect, by an isocultural line, with the Gauchos of Paraguay!'"¹

On leaving Russia in 1918 Dr. Dillon dismissed Lenin and his colleagues in these terms: "In the Bolshevik movement there is not the vestige of a constructive or social idea. Even the Western admirers of Lenin and Trotsky cannot discover any. Genuine socialism means the organic ordering of the social whole, and of this in the Bolshevik process there is no trace. Far from that, a part is treated as the whole, and the remainder is no better off than were the serfs under Alexander I. and Nicholas I. For Bolshevism is Tsardom upside down. To capitalists it metes out treatment as bad as that which the Tsars dealt to serfs. It suppresses newspapers, forbids liberty, arrests or banishes the elected of the nation, and connives at or encourages crimes of diabolical ferocity."²

Ten years later [1928] Dr. Dillon revisited the USSR, and was lost in amazement at what he saw. "Everywhere people are thinking, working, combining, making scientific discoveries and industrial inventions. If one could obtain a bird's-eye view of the numerous activities of the citizens of the Soviet Republics one

¹ *The Eclipse of Russia*, by E. J. Dillon (1918), pp. 13, 15, 372-374, 383.

² *Ibid.* p. 388.

would hardly trust the evidence of one's senses. Nothing like it ; nothing approaching it in variety, intensity, tenacity of purpose has ever yet been witnessed. Revolutionary endeavour is melting colossal obstacles and fusing heterogeneous elements into one great people ; not indeed a nation in the old-world meaning but a strong people cemented by quasi-religious enthusiasm. . . . The Bolsheviks then have accomplished much of what they aimed at, and more than seemed attainable by any human organisation under the adverse conditions with which they had to cope. They have mobilised well over 150,000,000 of listless dead-and-alive human beings, and infused into them a new spirit. They have wrecked and buried the entire old-world order in one-sixth of the globe, and are digging graves for it everywhere else. They have shown themselves able and resolved to meet emergency, and to fructify opportunity. Their way of dealing with home rule and the nationalities is a masterpiece of ingenuity and elegance. None of the able statesmen of to-day in other lands has attempted to vie with them in their method of satisfying the claims of minorities. In all these, and many other enterprises, they are moved by a force which is irresistible, almost thaumaturgical. . . . Bolshevism is no ordinary historic event. It is one of the vast world-cathartic agencies to which we sometimes give the name of Fate, which appear at long intervals to consume the human tares and clear the ground for a new order of men and things. The Hebrews under Moses and Joshua, the Huns under Attila, the Mongols under Djinghis Khan, and the Bolsheviks under Lenin, are all tarred with the same transcendental brush. Bolshevism takes its origin in the unplumbed depths of being ; nor could it have come into existence were it not for the necessity of putting an end to the injustice and iniquities that infect our superannuated civilisation. It is amoral and inexorable because transcendental. It has come, as Christianity came, not for peace but for the sword ; and its victims outnumber those of the most sanguinary wars. To me it seems to be the mightiest driving force for good or for evil in the world to-day. It is certainly a stern reality, smelling perhaps of sulphur and brimstone, but with a mission on earth, and a mission which will undoubtedly be fulfilled." ¹

¹ *Russia Today and Tomorrow* (1929), pp. 328, 336, 337. The three books of Dr. Dillon should be read together.

The Woman

In their remaking of the Russian people, Lenin and his followers began, not with Adam, but with Eve! For the October Revolution meant to the scores of millions of peasant or wage-earning women, not merely liberation from the exploitation of the landlord and the capitalist, a liberation which could only be made effective in the course of years; but also an immediate release from the authority of the father or the husband. From thenceforth the woman was to be in all respects of equal status with the man; whether as a citizen, as a producer, as a consumer, or even as a member of the Vocation of Leadership.¹

The piecemeal emancipation of women has been proceeding for nearly a century over a large part of Europe and America. But, as has been rightly observed, "the process of emancipation now going on in Russia differs from all earlier ones in the recorded history of mankind in that *it is carried out according to plan*, and on an unprecedented scale. And however that process may turn out in the course of historical development, one thing has already been attained: the humanisation of woman. A fundamental remoulding and reordering of all human relations is being attempted in the Soviet State on a hitherto undreamt-of scale. . . . Here for the first time the feminist question is conceived as part of the great social question and is being brought near to its solution through *the conscious will of the community*."²

How great and startling was this emancipation of the Russian women will be plain when we remember that in 1917 something

¹ For the position of women in the USSR, apart from such Russian works as *The Historical Development of Women's Life, of Marriage and the Family*, by K. N. Kovalyov (Moscow, 1931); *History of the Women Workers' Movement in Russia*, by A. U. Kollontai; *Women in the Struggle for a New Society*, by F. Nyurina (Kharkov, 1930); and innumerable practical manuals, the reader may conveniently consult *Women in Soviet Russia*, by Fannina Halle, 1933, 405 pp.; with extensive bibliography; *Protection of Motherhood and Childhood in the Soviet Union*, by Dr. Esther Conus, Chief Physician of the State Research Institute for the Protection of Motherhood and Infancy, Moscow (1933, 117 pp.); *Woman in Soviet Russia*, by Jessica Smith (New York, out of print); *Protection of Women and Children in Soviet Russia*, by Alice Withrow Field (1932, 263 pp.), with bibliography; *Red Virtue*, by Ella Winter (1933, 320 pp.); *The New Russia*, by Dorothy Thompson (1929), chap. x.

A convenient survey is given in the recent Russian work *The Protection of Motherhood and Childhood in the Country of the Soviets*, by V. P. Lebedeva (Moscow, 1934, 263 pp.).

² *Woman in Soviet Russia*, by Fannina Halle (1933), Preface, p. ix.

like one-tenth of the whole population of what is now the USSR were Moslems, among whom women were veiled, and scarcely regarded as human beings. They were sold to their husbands, even as young as eleven, and made to work just as if they were chattel slaves. On the husband's death the widow became legally the property of his nearest relative, along with his domestic utensils, his live stock and the rest of his possessions, all alike saleable to anyone willing to buy. But even those who belonged to the Orthodox Church were little better off. They had practically no legal rights against their husbands. The civil code of tsarist Russia laid it down in express terms that "a wife is bound to obey her husband in all things, and in no wise to be insubordinate to his authority" (Section 107, Volume X). She could undertake no employment for hire without his permission (Section 2202, Volume X). A woman who became a teacher, a nurse or a telegraph operator was immediately discharged on marriage. Passports were not usually issued to married women, the wife's name being inscribed on that of her husband. Hence she could not leave home without him. A wife who went away without his permission might be brought back by the police as if she were an escaped convict. Only in exceptional cases, on special application, with the husband's express permission, could any passport be issued to a married woman. The law left to women almost no outlet of escape from the control even of the worst husband, not even if he consented to a divorce. Nearly all the peasant women, and three-fourths of the women of the wage-earning class in the cities, were wholly illiterate. Such was the lot, right down to the revolution of 1917, of half the adult population of the country.

The purpose of the Bolsheviks was not emancipation for its own sake, but the raising of women as part of the humanity which had to be remade. It was seen that the first step in this elevation, so far as the women were concerned, was to set them free. It is for this reason that the Russian Social Democratic Party had always made the emancipation of women one of its fundamental principles. Marx had pointed out at the first congress of the International at Geneva in 1866 that the struggle of the working class against capitalism would be unsuccessful unless women were freed from their various economic bondages. The tiny Bolshevik Party had always admitted women as professional

revolutionaries on the same terms as men ; and women sat on its most responsible and most secret committees. Within a year after the Bolshevik revolution, "in November 1918, the first All-Russian Conference of proletarian and peasant women met in Moscow, with almost 1200 delegates, even then representatives of nearly a million working women in Soviet Russia".¹ This was largely a spontaneous movement among the women whom the revolution had stirred ; and Lenin held, from the first, that the women's organisation should be on no narrow party basis. The Bolsheviks saw to it, indeed, that the delegates were practically all of the peasant or wage-earning class, and adherents of the revolution. Organisers went all over the country to secure the election of delegates. "Hundreds of working women from the remotest factories and villages had come to Moscow with complaints, grievances and doubts, with all their cares, great and small. They all wanted to hear from Lenin why peace had not come immediately after the October revolution, why hunger and cold were still rampant throughout the country. The mass of the women, wholly inexperienced, had hardly an inkling at that time how hard and long is the path of socialist construction, how many obstacles must be overcome before the final victory of the proletariat. . . . The Party succeeded in organising a revolutionary storm troop from the masses of women, and [was able] to direct their activities towards constructional work. From this moment steady systematic and purposeful work began upon the masses, designed to create the prerequisite condition of equal rights for working women. Women began to be drawn into the work of the socialist construction, and trained leaders were called in. . . . The conference was variegated and brilliant."²

The emancipation was never thought of as merely the removal of legal disabilities, or even of electoral disqualifications. The economic and even the household subjection of women had

¹ "What is a peasant woman ? Nothing but trash. They are all as blind as moles. They know nothing. A peasant woman (a baba) has neither seen nor heard anything. A man may learn as he meets others casually in a tavern, or perchance in gaol, or if he serves in the army. But what can you expect of a woman ? Does anyone teach her ? The only one who ever teaches her is a drunken moujik when he lashes her with the reins—that is all the teaching she gets" (the words of the peasant Mitritch, in Leo Tolstoy's play *The Power of Darkness* ; quoted in *The Protection of Motherhood and Childhood in the Soviet Union*, by Dr. Esther Conus, 1933, p. 4).

² *Women in the Struggle for the New Society*, by F. Nyurina (1930, in Russian), quoted in *Woman in Soviet Russia*, by Fannina Halle (1933), pp. 94-95.

equally to be abolished. "A victory for socialism", Lenin had said, "is impossible, until a whole half of toiling mankind, the working women, enjoys equal rights with men; and until she no longer is kept a slave by her household and family". The complete equality of the sexes became the basis of all laws and executive decrees. Whether married or single, women voted on the same qualification as men, and enjoyed equal eligibility for public offices. They freely became members of trade unions and cooperative societies, and of every other association. They were, as a matter of course, accorded the same standard rates of wage or salary as men for the same tasks, and they became eligible for employment of every kind or grade. They retained, in marriage, the ownership of whatever they had possessed; they shared during marriage in the ownership of whatever was subsequently acquired by either member of the partnership. They had the same rights as men to terminate marriage by divorce, with equal obligations, according to means, for the maintenance of any children of the marriage and of a necessitous spouse. And from this initial sweeping emancipation there has been no retreat or withdrawal. Already, in 1920, Lenin could claim that in no country in the world were women so completely and unreservedly freed from sex disability, whether legal or customary, as in the USSR. "The Government of the proletarian dictatorship", he said, "together with the Communist Party and the trade unions, is, of course, leaving no stone unturned in the effort to overcome the backward ideas of men and women, to destroy the old uncommunist psychology. In law there is naturally complete equality of rights for men and women. And everywhere there is evidence of a sincere wish to put this equality into practice. We are bringing the women into the social economy, into legislation and government. All educational institutions are open to them, so that they can increase their professional and social capacities. We are establishing communal kitchens and public eating-houses, laundries, and repairing shops, infant asylums, kindergartens, children's homes, educational institutes of all kinds. In short, we are seriously carrying out the demand of our programme for the transference of the economic and educational functions of the separate household to society. That will mean freedom for the woman from the old household drudgery and dependence on man. That enables her to exercise to the

full her talents and her inclinations. The children are brought up under more favourable conditions than at home. We have the most advanced protective laws for women workers in the world, and the officials of the organised workers carry them out. We are establishing maternity hospitals, homes for mothers and children, mothercraft clinics, organising lecture courses on child care, exhibitions teaching mothers how to look after themselves and their children, and similar things. We are making the most serious efforts to maintain women who are unemployed and unprovided for.”¹

The testimony is universal, and we think unchallenged, that the result of this emancipation has been, within less than a couple of decades, a rapid and almost sudden bound forward, not merely in the practical freedom of the woman but also in her mental and physical development; and this not only in her health and longevity, but also in her intellectual attainments and in her achievements in nearly every branch of human activity. Though in 1917 the extraordinarily great percentage of illiterates among women was far higher than that among men, it could be estimated in 1934 that nine-tenths of all the adults throughout the whole of the USSR, and quite as many women as men, could at least read and write. In the same year the proportion of girls in attendance at school was practically as high as that of boys. In the USSR women’s emancipation has made a sorely needed addition to the labour force, not only in offices and in the light industries, but also in agriculture² and the heavy industries.

The women of the USSR now (1935) supply not only two-thirds of all the teachers but also two-thirds of all the doctors, and a large proportion of the specially trained agronomists. They often fill a majority of the places in the numerous research insti-

¹ Lenin, as quoted in *Reminiscences of Lenin*, by Clara Zetkin (1929), p. 57. A slightly different translation is given in *Woman in Soviet Russia*, by Fannina Halle (1933), pp. 97-98.

² It was stated in the Seventh All-Union Congress of Soviets in January 1935 that, in the Ukraine alone, a quarter of a million peasant women, members of collective farms, had been selected by their male and female colleagues, for positions of responsibility; over 12,000 for membership of the management boards of the collective farms, in more than 8000 cases as chairmen; some 3000 were chosen to be brigade leaders, and 30,000 to be assistant leaders; nearly 200,000 had been appointed organisers; 2577 had been elected as the managers of kolkhosi; over 18,000 had become inspectors of quality, whilst there were nearly 3000 women in charge of tractors (speech by P. P. Lyubchenko, joint-president of Council of People’s Commissars of the Ukraine, in *Moscow Daily News*, February 1, 1935).

tutions in every branch of science. They furnish nearly one-third of all the qualified industrial technicians, who are, after a five years' university course, now annually recruited for the incessantly growing engineering, machine-making, chemical and electrical plants. They supply a large contingent of the train-working and railway administrative staffs. They are to be found, in fact, working in every occupation, not excepting the army, or the mercantile marine, or the extensive aviation service. One (Alexandra Kollontai) has had a successful career in diplomacy, and is now (1935) Soviet minister at Stockholm. Another (Varvara Nikolaievna Yakovleva) is (1935) finance minister of the RSFSR, with its hundred millions of inhabitants. More than a hundred women have been awarded, for distinguished service, the Order of Lenin or that of the Red Banner.

Motherhood

It is, however, not enough to set women free from legal and political fetters, and even from the economic disabilities due to ancient prejudices. There is one function exclusively feminine, of supreme public importance, the due performance of which imposes on women, not only a serious strain on health, but also, in capitalist countries, a heavy financial burden. The mere expense of motherhood, coupled with that of infant care, is one of the potent causes of the chronic poverty of large sections of the wage-earning class. For centuries this was succoured only by private philanthropy, and sometimes (especially in England) as part of a system of public Poor Relief to which a stigma of disgrace was attached. Only in the present century have some countries included, in their national systems of social insurance, a scanty and inadequate "maternity benefit". In the Bolshevik conception of the Remaking of Man a large place was found, from the outset, for the maintenance of the pregnant woman so that she might fulfil her function as mother, worker and citizen. Just as the man in any office or employment is repaid, as a matter of course, over and above his wage or salary, the various "functional expenses" which he has to incur in the performance of his duties, so it is held that the woman who fulfils her peculiar function of child-bearing, although it is impossible to enable her altogether to avoid the pain and discomfort, should at least be permitted

to escape from the exceptional pecuniary burden that is involved. In the USSR the whole cost of child-bearing is, as far as possible, treated as a functional expense of the woman in the performance of her public duty.

The purpose of Soviet Communism in this matter is not merely to be kind to the sufferers—not even chiefly an improvement of the health of the community, or the reduction of the frightful rate of infant mortality of tsarist Russia—but specifically the promotion of equality of conditions between men and women. It is in order to go as far as possible towards raising women to an equality with men in the performance of work, with equal opportunities in the choice of occupation, that so much more is done collectively for maternity and infancy in the USSR than in any other country of the world. What is new in the USSR is, of course, not the maternity hospital, nor the crèche, nor any similar service, which were not altogether unknown in tsarist Russia, and are to be seen, in tiny numbers, sporadically and capriciously provided by private philanthropy, in nearly every other country to-day. What is unique under Soviet Communism is the universality, ubiquity and completeness of the provision made at the public expense for all the mothers in so vast a country, where over six million births take place annually. This universality of provision was not an invention of Lenin and his colleagues. It was one of the many revolutionary social proposals of Karl Marx nearly seventy years ago,¹ which capitalism has left to the first collectivist state to put in operation with any approach to completeness.

For the woman about to become a mother (*whether or not her union is legally registered*), who is employed at a wage or salary in any kind of work in town or country, or who is the wife of anyone so employed, the USSR offers, entirely free of charge, without any individual contribution, wherever the system is in full operation, medical care during pregnancy; admission for confinement to a maternity hospital; twelve or sixteen weeks'

¹ "As early as sixty-five years ago, at the Geneva Congress of the First International under the chairmanship of Karl Marx [1866], this question was discussed. Marx insisted on the introduction of state protection of motherhood and childhood in the programmes of all the workers' parties of the world. He pointed out that unless women were freed from the old economic bondages the struggle of the working class against capitalism would be unsuccessful" (*Protection of Women and Children in Soviet Russia*, by Alice Withrow Field, 1932, p. 23).

leave of absence from her work ¹ on whatever wages she has been earning ; constant medical supervision and aid ; the right to be reinstated in her job when medically fit, with regular intervals every three and a half hours in which the infant can be breastfed ; a grant of money for the infant's clothing, with a monthly grant for the first year towards the infant's food ; and the provision of a crèche in which from two months to five years old the infant may be safely cared for during the mother's working hours.²

¹ Mothers receive leave of absence before and after childbirth in two categories, one being entitled to eight weeks before and eight weeks after, whilst the other has six weeks before and six weeks after. In the first category by the regulations of 1921 stand factory workers and manual labourers, all women working at night including office employees, women employed in commerce, post office workers, instructors, teachers in village schools or boarding schools and similar institutions, athletic instructors, educational workers in prisons, staff workers in colonies for defective children, artists and theatrical people and newspaper writers, doctors and nurses in villages or in surgical, maternity and infectious disease hospitals and lunatic asylums, and those working in famine districts or in epidemics, with dentists and masseuses. In the second category stand all other women earning their living, other than those subject to night work, and including stenographers, secretaries, teachers in city day schools, cooks and housekeepers and other domestic workers, and women who work in kolkhosi (collective farms). Students holding scholarships in university or educational institutions of like grade are for this purpose treated as workers in the second category. Women who have had abortion performed have a right to three weeks' vacation with pay. (*Ibid.* pp. 65-67.)

At the congress of udarniks from collective farms, in February 1935, a woman delegate proudly stated that, in her kolkhos, the members' meeting had gone even further in care for maternity. Every member bearing a child was allowed three months' absence from work before and three months after confinement, without any diminution of her share in the common produce. (*Moscow Daily News*, February 1935.)

² In a satirical novel we read an amusing reference to the privileged position which women occupy as employees owing to the provision of maternity benefit :

“ ‘ She's pregnant again.’ ”

“ ‘ Who ? ’ I asked in surprise, unable to make head or tail of the events which had transpired during my brief absence.

“ ‘ What do you mean, who ? Kokina, of course ! Just look at her red head ! ’ ”

“ Kokina sat, leaning over her desk and smelling out the latest news. Her face was thoughtful, but calm.

“ The instructor whispered :

“ ‘ I assure you, she's already a document of protection in her pocket. Can't undermine her ! ’ ”

“ ‘ What's the matter ? ’ I asked, looking round at my colleagues. There was a feeling of utter gloom, and our department resembled an undertaker's parlour rather than a decorous soviet institution.

“ ‘ The devil knows ! There's talk of dissolving us,’ said the instructor, with an envious glance at Kokina. ‘ There's no sorrow or sighing in that quarter ! It's too bad I'm not a lady. . . . They get their pleasure, and then a three-months leave with full salary, and no fear of being dismissed ! . . . It's a great life ! ’ ” (*Semi-Precious Stones*, by A. I. Voinova, 1934, p. 61.)

This seems, to the foreigner, an astonishing list of maternity benefits. But every one of them is covered by the conception of freeing the woman from her "functional expenses", and from the "economic bondage" in which her fulfilment of her exceptional function, so vital to the community, would otherwise tend to place her. The aim is, so far as this is physically possible, to set her as free to work in any occupation, to be as productive in her work, and to make as good an income from it, as if she did not become a mother. In short, in the view of Soviet Communism, maternity is never to be treated (as it sometimes is elsewhere) as if it were a misdemeanour, punishable either by summary dismissal from the job (as in the British and some other government services, and also in some private employments), or at least, in all cases, by a substantial pecuniary fine. It is in fact held that the least that should be done for the mother is to relieve her of all the pecuniary cost involved in the fulfilment of her exceptional function. The whole cost is borne, partly by the commissariat of health of each constituent or autonomous republic, and partly by the service of social insurance, in which there is no individual contribution.

We do not need to describe in any detail the maternity hospitals to be found in every city of the USSR, and, on a smaller scale, to an increasing extent in the rural centres. What is extraordinary is the degree to which this institutional provision for childbirth has already been made throughout the USSR. To supplement the large, and sometimes magnificent maternity hospitals, in the principal cities,¹ there is, in most rural areas, less ambitious provision for smaller numbers. Thus "at Kazan, the capital of the Tartar Republic, we found in 1932 that in each ambulatorium [throughout that republic] there are two beds for confinements. . . . On state and collective farms in this republic hospital provision [for childbirth] is rapidly increasing." Speaking generally for the whole USSR, it can be said that in the cities nearly all the confinements of wage-earning mothers, and at least 90 per cent of the whole, now take place in maternity hospitals. In the rural districts, which still contribute four-fifths of the total

¹ Is there any maternity hospital in the world for public and gratuitous treatment, other than that at Moscow, where every woman has not only ear-phones provided so that she can listen to the music broadcast by wireless, but also a telephone by her bedside which permits her, free of charge, to converse with her husband and children, or with friends?

number of births, about 20 per cent are officially stated to take place in institutions, small or large, a fraction which is rapidly increasing year after year.¹

A distinctive feature of soviet policy in this field is the high degree of "unification of all the related provisions for mothers and their infants", which is universally aimed at, and in the institutions of the larger cities, achieved to a remarkable degree. Thus, at the Leningrad Institute for the Protection of Motherhood and Childhood, "there are prenatal clinics; clinics at which contraceptive advice is given; and clinics for the various periods of infancy and childhood, all these being co-ordinated with arrangements for domiciliary medical care as needed. . . . The nurses appear to be acquainted with every mother and child in their respective subdistricts. On attending a prenatal centre the expectant mother receives a card which entitles her to (a) the right of precedence in tramcars and a sheltered place in them; (b) service in shops without waiting in a queue; (c) a supplementary food ration; (d) lighter work in the office or shop in which she is employed; and (e) . . . two months' rest without loss of wages."² Another instance of this administrative unity is the fact that a usual adjunct of a well-organised maternity centre is a legal department, in which a qualified lawyer is always in attendance, ready to give gratuitous advice to any woman who seeks it, about her legal remedy against any man who has wronged her, or against the factory management which has withheld any of her rightful privileges, or against any person who has injured either her children or herself.

Of the quality of the provision thus made for maternity we may content ourselves with quoting the latest and most authoritative British and American report. "Leaving aside the provision for abortion" [presently to be considered], Sir Arthur Newsholme and Dr. J. A. Kingsbury sum up the extensive survey that they made in 1933 in the following terms: "Our observations of

¹ *Red Medicine*, by Sir Arthur Newsholme and Dr. J. A. Kingsbury (1933), pp. 175, 178, 179.

In London the proportion is about 10 per cent.

The number of beds in "somatic and lying-in hospitals" in the cities of the USSR was, in 1935, officially given as 89,200 in 1913, 143,000 in 1928 and 230,000 in 1932. Those in rural localities were given as 49,400 in 1913, 60,000 in 1928 and 107,000 in 1932 (*The USSR in Figures*, Moscow, 1934, p. 211).

² *Red Medicine*, by Sir A. Newsholme and Dr. J. A. Kingsbury (1933), pp. 176-177.

soviet arrangements for the medical and hygienic care of mothers and their children have filled us with admiration, and with wonder that such good work, scientific and advanced work, should be undertaken and successfully accomplished in the period when the finances of the country are at a low ebb. The maternity and child-welfare institutions and arrangements seen by us gave us the impression that they were nowhere being stinted or restricted because of financial stress.”¹

Infancy

We have still to describe the extensive provision for the care of infants, from birth to the entry into kindergarten or elementary school, which, though still very far from completely covering the whole area, is rapidly extending from urban to rural districts of the USSR. And here we need not trouble the reader with any description of how these institutions feed, clothe, wash, teach, train and amuse the babies. What has significance for us is the extent to which this service² is being organised as an ubiquitous public function; its universal supervision by local public committees representing the trade unions and all other groups of citizens, the doctors concerned and the district authorities; the high degree of unification that it attains; and the

¹ *Red Medicine*, by Sir Arthur Newsholme and Dr. J. A. Kingsbury (1933), p. 177.

² The service of infant care in the USSR has been described, usually without adequate realisation of the system as a whole, by many recent observers. Among their books, the most informative and complete seem to us to be *Women in Soviet Russia*, by Fannina W. Halle (German edition, 1932; English translation, 1933); especially the chapter entitled “Mother and Child”, from which we have drawn largely. See also in corroboration the relevant chapters in *Health Work in Soviet Russia*, by Anna J. Haines (New York, 1928); *Protection of Women and Children in Soviet Russia*, by Alice Withrow Field (1932); *Twelve Studies in Soviet Russia*, edited by Margaret I. Cole (1933); *Red Virtue*, by Ella Winter (1933); *Red Medicine*, by Sir A. Newsholme and Dr. J. A. Kingsbury (1933).

An official authority is the valuable survey entitled *Protection of Motherhood and Childhood in the Soviet Union*, by Dr. Esther Conus, chief physician of the dispensary of the State Research Institute for the Protection of Motherhood and Infancy (Moscow, 1933, 118 pp.). A convenient survey (in Russian) will be found in the later work, *The Protection of Motherhood and Childhood in the Country of the Soviets*, by V. P. Lebedeva (Moscow, 1934).

Among German sources may be noted the article by A. Dworetzky, “Der Säuglings und Mutterschutz im neuen Russland”, in *Münchener medizinische Wochenschrift* (1926), pp. 463-464; and *Der Schutz der russischen Arbeiterinnen*, by Vera Rappoport (Berlin, 1934, 64 pp.), with bibliography of over 100 items.

psychological effect of making the whole work not a matter of charity but a function of citizenship.

There is first the system of "advisory centres" for mothers with infants, which are already claiming, in the cities, to be able to bring every mother, and especially every solitary mother, after her confinement, within the range of their advisory and welfare activities. In 1930 there are reported to have been nearly 2000 such centres at work; and by the end of 1931 the number had grown to about 3000. Most of them have "milk kitchens" attached, where the infants' rations of milk are distributed daily. The whole system is directed by local bodies called the Commission for the Betterment of Labour and the Standard of Living (KOTIB). This commission is formed in each place by the local soviet. In addition to the representatives of this soviet, and the medical staffs of the advisory centres, the commissions include men and women delegates from the factory committees of all the industrial plants of the district, as well as from every administrative or trading institution. These commissions supervise not only the advisory centres, but also the crèches, the schools and the maternity homes of the district. They have also the duty of "combating the abandonment of infants", by keeping a watch on all pregnant women who have no one to help them; and to arrange for the prompt admission to children's residential homes of all children actually abandoned, as well as of others for whom the mothers cannot properly care, and who might otherwise be abandoned. The mortality in such children's homes, which was formerly excessive, has been greatly reduced.¹ But wherever possible, abandoned children are now "boarded out" with carefully chosen and closely inspected families of city workers, by whom, in fact, they are in many cases ultimately adopted as their own.

For the rural areas there are an increasing number of advisory centres in the sovkhosi and kolkhosi. A remarkable feature is the itinerant advisory centre, a system of "flying squads" of doctors, nurses and legal consultants (usually women), with one or two delegates of the commission, who are sent, especially in the busy time of harvest when the local organisations are overwhelmed with work, to villages as yet unprovided with a per-

¹ We do not give the apparently satisfactory death-rates that were quoted to us, as institutional death-rates are of no statistical value without a precise tabulation of the ages and length of stay of all the inmates.

manent centre. The itinerant advisers stay a month or two in such a village, holding exhibitions and distributing leaflets, and giving to all the women hygienic and medical advice and assistance, together with "social and juridical consultations" to enable the mothers to overcome destitution, to discover paternity or to obtain alimony; in addition to seeing that she gets milk for her infant, and all her other rights as a citizen.

The next stage in the organisation of infancy care is the provision of crèches in which, from two months old, the infant may be cared for whilst the mother is at work. This was one of the ideas on which Lenin most strongly insisted. He described the crèche, in setting free the mother from the burden of a constant care of the young children, and thus enabling her to earn an independent livelihood, as being the "germ cell of the communist society". Accordingly, there has grown up in the USSR during the past decade a vast network of crèches of different kinds. There are factory crèches attached to practically all industrial enterprises, as well as to all offices and other places in which as many as a few scores of women are employed. There are, in the cities, also district crèches for the infants of women employed in smaller establishments of all kinds. There are, in many cities, also evening crèches, in connection with working women's clubs, and other recreational centres. A beginning has been made with crèches at the larger railway stations, so as to enable mothers visiting the city, or waiting for a train, to get through their shopping or other business, without the children suffering. There are night crèches for the convenience of mothers engaged in night work. There are now even special compartments on some of the long-distance trains, in which passenger mothers may leave their young children in charge of trained nurses. In the rural districts there are summer crèches in all state farms (sovkhosi), and in an ever-increasing number of the collective farms (kolkhosi), as well as in all the communes. These rural summer crèches are specially useful in combating the great mortality among young children in the hot weather, whilst the mothers are set free for harvest work. "In the new Russia", we are told, "it is impossible to imagine any industrial establishment, any undertaking, any kolkhos, any tractor station, any collective undertaking, without such a crèche."¹ In the industrial districts there were reported

¹ *Women in Soviet Russia*, by Fannina Halle, 1933, p. 161.

to be 33,000 beds in crèches in 1928, and by 1931 the number had grown to about 130,000. In the kolkhosi, there were 135,000 beds in summer crèches in 1928, and no fewer than a million and a half in 1931, whilst during 1932 and 1933 this vast number is said to have been doubled.¹ It still (1935) continues to grow by leaps and bounds. And wherever there is a crèche—whether or not a nominal charge is made to the mother for some particular service—the maintenance and care of the infant during something like one-third of the day, without any charge, becomes, not only a collective function but also a matter of collective provision. Under the Second Five-Year Plan the network of advisory centres, milk kitchens, crèches, infants' nurseries, nursery schools and kindergartens is being, year by year, made more nearly co-extensive with the whole area of the USSR, with the corollary that a considerable proportion of the feeding, some part of the clothing, and the whole of the medical care of a great majority of all the young children, from birth up to the age of seven or eight, will have become a public charge. And this without withdrawing the children from the home or from maternal care, and without any idea of pauperism or charity; and, as it seems to us, without any more lessening of the sense of parental responsibility than is involved in other countries in the almost universal provision of free primary schooling for children of larger growth; and, indeed, with actually less supersession of the domestic home than is effected by the British middle-class and upper-class boarding school.

¹ For the RSFSR alone, the following statistics indicate a more than twenty-fold growth in the provision of crèches in five years:

	1928	1929	1933
<i>In Cities :</i>			
Crèches	499	953	3,355
Beds in them	31,955	39,016	161,822
<i>In Rural Districts :</i>			
Permanent crèches	66	313	11,599
Beds in them	1,640	7,534	267,958
Seasonal crèches	3,704	6,731	109,392
Beds in them	100,306	175,000	2,734,804

For the USSR the number of places in the crèches was officially given in 1934 as, in 1913, 550 regular and 10,000 seasonal; in 1928, 59,300 regular and 197,800 seasonal; and in 1932, 623,900 regular and 3,920,300 seasonal. (*The USSR in Figures*, Moscow, 1934, p. 210.)

Birth Control

With a birth-rate and a rate of increase of population both larger than in any other great nation, it might have been expected that contraceptive practices would be widely adopted in the USSR. We do not gather that this is the case. Neither the official reports nor private conversations, and more convincing than either of these, none of the indications that can be drawn from the vital statistics, support the inference that intentional contraception is even as commonly practised in the USSR as in Holland or Australia, France or Germany, England or the United States. There are various reasons for this difference. There is still, we think, a greater degree of popular ignorance on the subject than in western Europe. There is greater difficulty in obtaining the means. There is a more intense overcrowding of the dwellings. There is much less assurance, alike among the statesmen and scientists and among the mass of citizens, that any reduction in the total number of births would be advantageous to the community, or desirable on any public grounds. And probably one of the results of the extensive and elaborate provision for maternity and infancy, which is a distinctive feature of Soviet Communism, is to lessen the personal dislike of repeated maternity, which is nowadays felt by more women than is commonly acknowledged.

But there is, in the USSR, no public objection to contraception, still less any restriction of its propaganda, or any prohibition of the sale of the means of contraception, or any ban upon the subject. On the contrary, it is freely discussed in the cities among young and old. It is made the theme of instructive posters and medical advice, especially in connection with the marriage offices, on the one hand, and with the treatment of venereal diseases on the other. The "points of consultation", the ambulatoria and the clinics, are all free to give advice and instruction on the subject, and they habitually take advantage of this freedom. We do not find that there is, in the USSR, any criticism upon this attitude of frankness and freedom.

The Control of Abortion

There remains to be described what has excited, perhaps, greater surprise in the western world than any other of the social

experiments of Soviet Communism, namely, its candid recognition and sympathetic control of the practice of abortion. It is common knowledge that this practice, in spite of its danger to the individual, and its almost universal condemnation by the churches, by the criminal law, and by public opinion, has been—apparently at all times and in all countries—extensively resorted to. We have no materials for judgment as to whether it was actually more prevalent in tsarist Russia than in other European countries. Nor can we form any opinion upon the accuracy of the whispered estimates, running into hundreds of thousands, and even to a million, of the number of abortions during a single year in the United States, or in the France and Germany of the present generation. What is indisputable is that, in each country, there have been, and still are every year, literally thousands of cases in which death promptly follows the illegal operation—in Germany about 10,000—whilst in tens of thousands of others serious damage results to health. Equally certain is it that, apart from illegal operations, a number of different abortifacients are, even in the England of to-day, where the practice is believed to be less frequent than on the Continent, commonly known, easily obtained, and, in fact, purchased in large quantities. It will, we think, not be questioned by anyone acquainted with the facts that there is here a social problem of grave import and serious difficulty.¹

After the revolution the question was forced upon the atten-

¹ Among the more recent and more important references to this subject we may cite *Red Medicine*, by Sir A. Newsholme and Dr. J. A. Kingsbury (1933), chap. xiv. and pp. 21, 49, 176-177, 182-185; *Protection of Women and Children in Soviet Russia*, by A. W. Field (1932), chap. iv. and p. 67; *Women in Soviet Russia*, by Fannina Halle (1933), pp. 139-144; *Health Work in Soviet Russia*, by A. J. Haines (1928), pp. 66-67; *Twelve Studies in Soviet Russia*, edited by M. I. Cole (1933), pp. 153-154; "Medicine in Soviet Russia", by Dr. Somerville Hastings, in *The Medical World*, January 15, 1932; "Abortion in Russia", by Henry Harris, M.D., in *Eugenics Review* for April 1933; "La Médecine en Russie soviétique", by Dr. Raymond Leibovici, in *Enquête au pays des Soviets*, in the illustrated journal *Vu*, special number for November 1931, pp. 2582-2584. Another French statement will be found in the article entitled "L'Évolution démographique et les résultats de l'avortement légal en U.R.S.S.", par Fernand Boverat, Vice-président du Conseil Supérieur de la Natalité, in *Le Musée social*, July 1932. The latest Russian view is given in the relevant chapter of *The Protection of Motherhood and Childhood in the Country of the Soviets*, by V. P. Lebedeva (Moscow, 1934), 263 pp.

Two articles by Dr. A. Gens will be found in the *Archiv für soziale hygiene demographie*, "Der künstliche Abortus als soziale und Milieu-erscheinung", in 1928 (pp. 554-558); and "Die Ergebnisse einer statistischen Untersuchung über die Fehlgeburten in Moskau im Jahre, 1925", in 1926-1927 (pp. 336-339).

tion of the Soviet Government by the women themselves. We give the facts as stated by an able American woman who has made a special study of the subject.¹ "When the working woman became aware that she was living under a government which claimed that it not only believed that women should share equal rights with men, but would, to the best of its ability, help women to become men's equals, one of the first things she asked was the right to refuse to give birth to children that she did not want. Because birth control was practically unheard of in the Russia of 1918, it was legalised abortion for which the women asked. The question was discussed at great length in all places where women met together, and in the newspapers, as is the Russian custom since the October revolution. The points on both sides were numerous and strong. The women were almost unanimous in the feeling that they could never be socially or economically independent so long as they had to bear continually recurring pregnancies. They were also very decisive in the opinion that as long as they were forced to bear children every time they became pregnant, they could never be strong enough nor have sufficient enthusiasm to bring up a family as they should. . . . The doctors in Russia were faced with more difficulties than were the Russian women before committing themselves as to the way of solving the question. As one of the doctors in the maternity hospital which is connected with the Institute for Protection of Motherhood and Childhood in Moscow told me, 'the question is one of the most difficult with which any doctor, or any human for that matter, could be faced'. Waiving the moral issue, the physicians were under no illusions as to the harm abortion can cause, even when performed under the finest conditions and by the best medical experts. But we were faced with the undeniable fact that Russian women would continue illegal and underhand abortions as long as they were faced with many unwanted pregnancies. At that time there was, and even now there is, no absolutely safe and harmless contraceptive. We were convinced that it was not the young healthy women who wanted abortion, because the Revolution had banished the illegitimate child, making marriage and cohabitation practically synonymous; it was the

¹ *Protection of Women and Children in Soviet Russia*, by (Mrs.) Alice Withrow Field (1932), pp. 81-84. The testimony is similar of Dr. Raymond Leibovici in *Enquête au pays des Soviets*, the special number of *Vu*, November 1931, pp. 2582-2584.

poor woman with children who was unable to support more, who wanted and needed relief, and we were still more convinced that if she did not get it from the state she would do the best she could for herself. It gradually grew to seem logical in the eyes of the medical profession that the best way of fighting abortion was to fight it openly ; and I do not think we took a false step when we did so, for we now have not only cut down the number of deaths due to underhand abortion, but we are also in a position to fight abortion by well-advised birth control."

The public discussion, with frequent debates among the doctors, and a long fight in the various legislative committees—strange though this must seem to those who believe that Soviet Communism works by a dictatorship—lasted over two years (1917–1920). When at last a decision was arrived at by the highest legislative authority, the law was changed in a manner that was, and still remains, unique in all the annals of legislation.¹ The decree of November 1920 for the RSFSR, which has since been copied in the other constituent republics, substituted, in the case of abortion, for the age-long policy of prohibition of a practice that could not be stamped out by repression, the unprecedented policy of converting it into a social service under strict public control. Fifteen years' experience, whilst steadily developing the service, has left the law unchanged.² Abortion may only be performed by licensed surgeons in institutions of the nature of hospitals ; and save in very exceptional circumstances, must always be the result of a surgical operation, not by administration of drugs. After the operation the woman must remain in bed for three whole days, and must not be permitted to resume work for two weeks. Abortion must not be performed for a first pregnancy, unless childbirth would seriously endanger the mother's life. It must not be performed if the pregnancy has continued for more than three months. It is recommended that the operation should be performed in a state hospital wherever there is a section devoted to maternity. It is prescribed that abortions should be discouraged if the woman concerned has had fewer than three children, or if she has adequate means for supporting another child, or if her health

¹ In Sweden similar legislation is now (1935) contemplated.

² Except for a minor amendment in 1926 specifically fixing three months as the maximum period of pregnancy at which the operation is permitted.

would not be impaired by another pregnancy, or if her living conditions constitute a good environment for the children, or if, in general, there is no social, physical or economic reason for abortion.

Subject to these conditions, no qualified doctor may refuse to perform the operation, although he remains free to discourage it to any extent. In state hospitals no charge will be made to women who are within the range of social insurance, or whose husbands are within the range. This includes all persons employed for wages or salary, without limitation of amount or kind of occupation; and also all members of collective farms (*kol-khosi*) or federated manufacturing artels (*incops*). To other women the usual hospital charge, which is small, may be made. Any person producing abortion otherwise than under the prescribed conditions—whether an unlicensed medical practitioner, a *feldsher*, a *babka*, a midwife even if qualified and licensed as such, or any other person—will be prosecuted for manslaughter if death results.

We may now describe the service as it may be seen at work in Moscow or Leningrad. The woman goes first to her Point of Consultation, the ambulatorium or medical station for her district, where she is entitled (if a wage-earner or the wife of one) to free medical advice. She gives the nurse in attendance particulars as to her name, address and occupation, and those of her husband, and the matter on which she seeks advice. Unless the case is urgent, an appointment is fixed for her at a time convenient to herself. A nurse is at once despatched to visit her home, where she has a friendly conversation with the applicant, in which she elicits as much as possible of her history and circumstances. The visiting nurse then fills up a form for the doctor's information, giving all that has been noted as relevant to his diagnosis and treatment. He is thus prepared for the woman on her visit at the appointed time. She will be received, not in any bare office, but in a pleasantly furnished consulting-room equal to that usual in British private practice, and fitted with every medical convenience. An invariable practice in the USSR is that no one, whether officer or patient or friend, enters such a consulting-room, any more than a hospital ward, without being clothed with a white apron or overall. After examination and enquiry, if the woman definitely asks for an operation for abortion,

the doctor always seeks to discourage her, unless she is very poor, having already not fewer than three children, and not more than twelve weeks advanced in pregnancy. He will, in any case, warn her that abortion is prejudicial to health ; and that there are ten times as many deaths from abortion, as hitherto commonly practised, as from childbirth. If, however, the woman insists, he may, if he is satisfied, give her an order on the state hospital, where the operation may be performed. If the doctor is not satisfied of the necessity of the operation he will send an insistent woman to the hospital for examination. It is reported that, of the pregnant women who enter for examination, about one-sixth desire an abortion ; but it is found that about one-half of these can be dissuaded from it. The result is that the number of abortions actually performed is a small percentage of the cases in which enquiry is made. When the operation is performed, and the three days' rest in bed has expired, the woman is definitely instructed to seek advice from her local doctor as to methods of prevention of another pregnancy ; and it is said that most of them who have undergone the operation are willing to try their use.

It remains to be said that exact statistical records are kept by the public hospitals (and there are no others in the USSR) of all operations for abortion ; and that the results thus shown fill foreign medical experts with astonishment. The surgeons employed have developed the highest possible skill. The cases are carefully selected. The conditions under which the operations are performed are the very best. Consequently the results of the operation are so uniformly good as to be almost incredible. Already in 1920 it was said that the deaths from the operation were 0.74 per hundred cases (less than one per cent). "Dr. Alexandre Roubakine of Moscow University informed us that of 11,000 abortions induced in the Moscow hospitals in 1925 not a single case proved fatal. In the same year, he said, there was not a single fatal case out of 2366 abortions in Saratov. . . . Dr. Gens informed us that in twelve years, legalised abortion had saved the lives of 300,000 women [as compared with the illegal practice which, it is assumed, would have continued] ; and he considered that hygienists should, from this viewpoint, strongly support it. He added that special skill had been developed in the operation, which now occupied only three to five minutes,

instead of half an hour as formerly.”¹ Two French doctors who investigated the subject in 1932 report that, out of 52,412 abortions in Moscow within the year, only 2139 or less than 4 per cent had any untoward incident whatever.²

Meanwhile, it is believed that illegal operations for abortion, which are severely punished by the criminal courts, have, in the USSR, almost entirely ceased to occur. Thus the paradoxical result has been obtained that in the USSR, where abortion is permitted under strict control, it is to-day far less frequently practised than it is in Germany and France where it is a criminal offence! “In the Soviet Union,” declared Dr. Gens, the director of the department for abortion of the Moscow Institute for the Protection of Mothers and Infants, “in spite of legalisation there are relatively few abortions: *we are the country in which abortion is least practised.*”³

To complete this survey of the position of Soviet Russia with regard to the control of births, it must be added that whereas the annual number of permitted abortions in the whole of the USSR is apparently well under a quarter of a million; and the practice of artificial contraception is believed not to be at all widespread, the annual number of births is over six millions, whilst the infantile mortality under one year has been halved. The birth-rate for the USSR is still round about 40 per thousand, which is more than double the figure of most European countries and the United States. “A Russian woman who wishes to relinquish her social function of maternity, and is unwilling to fulfil

¹ *Red Medicine*, by Sir A. Newsholme and Dr. J. A. Kingsbury (1933), p. 182. “‘Years of scientific work’, we are assured by Dr. Gens, the director of the department for abortion of the Moscow Institute for the Protection of Mothers and Infants, ‘have proved that abortion performed in a hospital is practically never fatal. There is one death among 25,000 abortions. In Western Europe an average of one or two per cent die. In Germany, where about a million abortions are performed annually, at least 10,000 women die every year from artificial abortion. In the Soviet Union it would be 30,000 a year if abortion were not legalised. But if that is the case—and there is no doubt of it—then 300,000 women have been saved in Soviet Russia during the last ten years, in which a hundred thousand have come to grief in Germany. All comment is superfluous’” (*Women in Soviet Russia*, by Fannina W. Halle, 1933). The article by Dr. Gens in the 1926–1927 volume of *Archiv für soziale hygiene demographie* gives more detailed statistics (“Die Ergebnisse einer statistischen Untersuchung über die Fehlgeburten in Moskau im Jahre 1925”).

² “État actuel de la médecine anti-conceptionnelle en URSS”, by Dr. Hamant and Dr. Cuenot, in *Gynécologie et Obstétrique*, October 1932; quoted in *Red Medicine* by Sir A. Newsholme and Dr. J. A. Kingsbury (1933), pp. 183–184.

³ *Woman in Soviet Russia*, by Fannina Halle (1933), p. 144.

her civic duty, need bring no children into the world. But for the most part she does it, and without the compulsion to bring to birth which is still sacrosanct in Western Europe, because it is her will to have children, if only in respect of her own healthy instincts. Besides, the Russians are crazy about children, and the love of children in the people, which is still—in spite of technical developments, mechanisation and Americanisation—in close touch with nature, and in a sense still in its own childhood, is an aspect of its character illustrated by many touching instances.”¹

Creating Health

Many medical men of different nationalities have in the last few years explored the health services of the USSR.² They have

¹ *Woman in Soviet Russia*, by Fannina Halle (1933), p. 144.

² The latest and most authoritative of descriptions in English is *Red Medicine*, by Sir Arthur Newsholme, K.C.B., and Dr. J. A. Kingsbury (1934), 324 pp. This does not, however, supersede the very complete survey entitled *Health Work in Soviet Russia*, by Anna J. Haines (New York, 1928, 177 pp.), which remains the most useful introduction for the layman. An authoritative later summary is afforded by the volume entitled *Health Protection in the USSR*, by Dr. A. Semashko, who was People's Commissar of Health for the RSFSR from 1918 to 1930 (1934, 176 pp.); compare also his twelve articles entitled “Das Gesundheitswesen in Sowjetrussland”, in *Deutsche medizinische Wochenschrift* (1924).

Other accounts are: “A Review of Medical Education in Soviet Russia”, by Dr. W. Horsley Gantt, in *British Medical Journal*, June 14, 1924; “Doctors in Soviet Russia”, by R. A. Reynolds, *The Nation* (New York), September 24, 1930; “Russia in Reconstruction, Population, and Birth Control”, by L. Haden Guest, in *Lancet*, December 5, 1931; “Medical and other Conditions in Soviet Russia”, by L. F. Barker, in *Scientific Monthly* (New York), July 1932; “Medicine in Soviet Russia”, by Dr. Somerville Hastings, in *The Medical World*, January 14, 1932; “Health and Social Welfare in Soviet Russia”, by “a distinguished doctor” who withholds his name, in *Progress*, Nov.-Dec. 1932; and *A Physician's Tour in Soviet Russia*, by Sir James Purves-Stewart, 1932. Precise information as to the health services in sample rural areas is succinctly given in *Village Life under the Soviets*, by Karl Borders (1927), “The Village Doctor”, pp. 163-169.

Among German reports see “Zehn Jahre Sowjet-Medizin”, by A. Dvoretzky, in *Munchener medizinische Wochenschrift* (1928), pp. 455-456, 497-499; and nine articles entitled “Eindrücke einer Arztreise nach Russland”, by H. Rosenhaupt, in *Soziale Medizin*, 1929.

The articles relating to Russia in the successive annual issues of the League of Nations *International Health Year Book* contain useful surveys.

The publications in Russian on various aspects of the problem of health, and the organisation of medical services, are literally innumerable. We need cite only *Five Years of the Soviet Medical Services, 1918-23*, with portrait of Dr. Semashko, 256 pp., issued by the Commissariat of Health, RSFSR, 1924. The successive reports of this commissariat to the All-Union Congresses of Soviets describe the progress made.

For maternity, infancy, and abortion, see separate list at pp. 822 and 827.

seen many hospitals and medical research institutes that seemed to them amazingly well equipped and competently staffed. Scarcely any of them has failed to expatiate on the contemporaneous existence of insanitary conditions reminiscent of the England of a century ago.¹ Equally general is their recognition of the inadequacy of the medical provision for the millions of inhabitants of the vast spaces outside the urban areas. But the unevenness of development, and the incompleteness of achievement, of a health service not yet twenty years old, making its way among an extremely heterogeneous population of 170 millions, spread over one-sixth of the world's land-surface, needed no journey to reveal, and calls for no further comment. More instructive is it to discover by what ideas the health service of the USSR is inspired, and towards what goal it is developing.

The most significant and perhaps the most novel feature in the medical profession in the USSR is that its ideal is less that of curing individual patients than of creating a healthy community. In comparison with the medical profession in the United States or Great Britain, that of the Soviet Union is more vividly conscious that it is engaged in the Remaking of Man. This is partly a result of the communist point of view, although, as mentioned elsewhere, only a minority of the doctors are members of the Communist Party. But it is doubtless due in part also to the exceptionally bad state of the people with whom the soviet doctors have had to deal. "The tsarist Government", as Dr. Semashko has pointed out, "left to the soviet power a terrible heritage of insanitary conditions. The exceptionally bad material conditions of the working masses of town and country; the police oppression which stifled all public activity; the merciless exploitation of the workers and poorer peasants; the low cultural level of the population, and the consequent low sanitary culture, all combined to create a favourable soil for epidemic diseases . . . which took an annual toll of millions of lives. . . . One-fourth of all the diseases was directly due to bad economic and living conditions. . . . The rate of mortality among the

¹ We usually forget to-day how recent is the British and American devotion to baths, open-air living and scientific plumbing! Equally do we ignore the terrible overcrowding and insanitation that prevailed alike in town and country in the England of a hundred years ago. Chadwick's monumental reports on the "Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population in Great Britain" (1842) should be referred to.

population . . . during the last decade before the war . . . was 28.4 to 30 per 1000. . . . The general economic conditions, and consequently the sanitary conditions of the population became still worse. . . . The war completely undermined both the health of the population and the medical organisation.”¹

The same reason partly accounts, we think, for an equally significant feature of the soviet health service, that of its universality. The health service of the USSR, unlike all other public health services, has never been principally a means of combating the most infectious diseases that threaten the rich as well as the poor. It was, from the start, just as much concerned with the ailments causing suffering only to the individuals immediately affected. Nor was the design merely that of dealing with illnesses that were specially prevalent, or exceptionally disabling, or unusually dangerous. All the imperfections that mar the human being are equally within its sphere. From the start it has been free from the historical distinction between preventive and curative treatment, which, especially in England, still cramps the organisation of medical services. Moreover, the controversy elsewhere raging between those who ascribe our physical and mental ills to “nature” and those who deem them the result of “nurture” seems almost irrelevant in the USSR, where the evil effects of an age-long environment of terrible destructiveness are only too patent, whilst the boundless possibilities of changing it, alike for parents and for offspring, open up an endless vista of betterment, both for the present sufferers and for the generations to come. The health service of Soviet Communism has always sought to cover the whole span of human life, not, indeed, excluding even the period that is antenatal. Its beneficent work has never known any limits of age or sex, of race or nationality, of religion or occupation, or rank or opulence. And, in marked contrast with such other empires as the British, the French and the Dutch, internal boundaries matter as little to the sanitarians of the USSR as other differences, for are not all the scores of races from ocean to ocean equally citizens of the Soviet Union, and equally entitled to restoration to perfect health? Such being the case, there has, from the first, never been any idea of philanthropy or charity about the care for the sick, which,

¹ *Health Protection in the USSR*, by Dr. N. D. Semashko (1934), pp. 11, 12, 14, 15.

like every other branch of the public services, is given to all the wage-earners, and also the poorest peasants, free of charge, and even to those with the means of payment for the most part equally gratuitously.

We trace this unprecedentedly wide conception of the sphere of a public health service, first to the fundamental conceptions of the communism of Lenin, and, under his inspiration, to the outstanding personality of Dr. Nikolai Alexandrovich Semashko, who was, from 1907 to 1917, a medical associate of Lenin in enforced exile ; and to whom was entrusted, in July 1918, the organisation of the Commissariat of Health for the RSFSR. His aim, as he expressed it, was the actual "socialisation" of medicine ; that is, "the taking over by the state of the responsibility of providing for everyone, at his earliest need, a free and well-qualified medical treatment. Only then will disappear, like a shadow before sunlight, all private hospitals and all commercial private practice. This is the perspective of communist medicine."¹ It is noteworthy that the new ministry that Dr. Semashko was called upon to organise had, in its title, no reference to sickness or disease, none to poverty and none to philanthropy. The first article of the statute of 1921, regulating the Commissariat of Health, expressly made it "responsible for all matters involving the people's health, and for the establishment of all regulations promoting it, *with the aim of improving the health standards of the nation*, and of abolishing all conditions prejudicial to health".² What the new department of government had to conduct was a campaign for the restoration of the whole population to health, not specifically for the treatment of disease ; and for raising to a higher level the health of all, not merely that of the persons actually stricken down by illness. Dr. Semashko saw his main task as the construction, throughout the length and breadth of the land, of a comprehensive and united health service based on all practicable prophylactic measures ; on the promptest discovery and diagnosis of any person falling below a prescribed standard of physical and mental fitness ; on the establishment of

¹ *The Foundations of Soviet Medicine*, by Dr. N. A. Semashko (Moscow, 1926, in Russian) ; quoted in *Health Work in Soviet Russia*, by Anna J. Haines (New York, 1928), p. 15. See also *Health Protection in the USSR*, by N. A. Semashko (1934, 176 pp.) ; and his series of twelve articles, "Das Gesundheitswesen in Sowjetrussland", in *Deutsche medizinische Wochenschrift* (1924).

² Article I. of decree of Sovnarkom of the RSFSR, 1921.

extensive research in every department of medical science ; on the provision, in genuine accessibility, of the wisest treatment not only for the doctor's patients but for the entire population at all ages, in whom "positive health" had to be "created". We have automatically put these four branches of a complete health service in the order in which we think that an up-to-date and enlightened British or American medical expert would place them. But what is significant—and all of a piece with the revolutionary transformation of ideas characteristic of Soviet Communism—is that, in Dr. Semashko's mind, and in the impress that during more than a decade his powerful personality placed on the health service that he created, the order of these four branches is reversed. The last is placed first. "The goal of Soviet medicine," he declared, "the reason it works not only for the healing but for the prevention of ill-health, is *to create the positive health of the population.*"¹ It is needless to say that not all Dr. Semashko's energy and tact, for which he acquired a great reputation, and not even the constant support that Lenin, so long as he lived, constantly afforded to his work, could immediately cover so vast an area as the USSR with anything like the complete service at which the Commissariat of Health aimed. Nor could he, in the first quinquennium, obtain funds sufficient to create the great staff, and build and equip all the institutions, general or special, that the service required. What seems to us remarkable, in the eighteen years' records of this, in mere magnitude the greatest health administration in the world, is its continuous progress, year after year, in every branch of its work, and the ever-growing financial resources which it has been able to command, in a period in which nearly all other health departments in the world have been cut down

For the first three years after his appointment, in the midst of war and famine, Dr. Semashko could do little more than make a start with whatever was most urgently needed ; plan for the future ; and meanwhile attend, very imperfectly, to the Red Army, to the victims of the epidemics that followed the war, and to famine relief. But from 1921 onward, the work of the commissariat, in all its main lines, began a rapid development. "All doctors, feldshers,² nurses and pharmacists", it is reported,

¹ *Foundations of Soviet Medicine*, by Dr. Semashko (1926, in Russian).

² "The feldsher originally came from the army, where he had received his

"became civil servants, and all hospitals, sanatoria and drug stores became state institutions; unified schemes of medical work appropriate to rural conditions, as well as others for towns and cities, were drawn up and fitted into the general plan of *volost*, *uyezd* and *gubernia*.¹ A standardisation of duty and of salaries, based on professional responsibility and local economic conditions, was worked out, to be applied throughout the country; programmes of child-welfare work and campaigns against venereal disease and tuberculosis were prepared on a nation-wide scale; central institutes were established for research and teaching in various branches of medical science, to which provincial doctors could come for postgraduate study; the wholesale preparation of drugs and the purchase of those produced abroad was carried on as a state business, without the cost incident to private production and advertisement."²

How the Health Service is Administered

The nation-wide army engaged in this campaign for creating positive health, now (1935) approaching half a million of all ranks, is not, as might easily be imagined, wholly centralised. There is, in fact, no commissariat of health for the USSR. Not only each of the seven constituent republics, or rather nine, including the three members of the Transcaucasian Federation—but also each of the fifteen autonomous republics within these nine—has its own commissariat of health, working under its own sovnrakom. Each makes, by its own legislature, and administers by its own officials, its own sanitary laws and regulations. But, by Lenin's foresight, the RSFSR was first in the field, and has remained pre-eminent, both in activity and efficiency; whilst its relative magnitude has enabled it continuously to lead the way in develop-

training as a surgeon's assistant, but the zemstvo finally established schools for the production of this half-baked medico, which assured him a little more systemised training than he had received in the army" (*Village Life under the Soviets*, by Karl Borders, 1927, p. 163).

Down to 1921 the feldsher was often, over areas of hundreds of square miles, the only source of medical aid. We can hardly count, in this connection, the efforts of the *babka*. ("The *babka* is the ancient village herb-woman, known to all lands at some stage of their history, and particularly sought as a midwife." *Ibid.* p. 164.)

¹ Now *selosoviet*, *rayon* and *oblast*.

² *Health Work in Soviet Russia*, by Anna J. Haines (1928), p. 26.

ments which are universally followed.¹ If we describe the organisation in the RSFSR, which contains a large part of the backward regions, as well as the most advanced, it may be taken as typical of the other parts of USSR.

The People's Commissar of Health of the RSFSR is not, within his own sphere, even so much of an autocrat as the minister at the head of the health department of some of the countries of western Europe. Down to 1934 his immediate assistants constituted a collegium with whom he was bound to take counsel on all issues of lasting importance, and before coming to any important decision not called for by actual emergency. On this collegium there sat the Assistant Commissar (who in 1928 was also the President of the Red Cross organisation for the USSR and head of the separate health department for the defence forces); the president of the medical workers' trade union; the head of the finance bureau of the commissariat; and a representative of the peasants. Moreover, this collegium habitually called into council particular experts specially qualified to advise upon the issues under discussion, whether they were heads of departments or institutions, or scientific experts or representatives of other commissariats or of trade unions. A standing committee of the collegium was the planning commission, which worked out in detail the suggestions or decisions and submitted them, in the form of a Five-Year Plan, for the final approval of the collegium, before the plan was approved by the Commissar, and communicated to the State Planning Commission.

In 1934, as we have elsewhere described, the collegiums of the various commissariats were all abolished on a general reorganisation of ministerial departments. In the Commissariat

¹ So much is this the case in practice that, in the summary of health services which Dr. Semashko had to condense into 176 pages (*Health Protection in the USSR*, 1934), he treats the constitutionally independent health services of the couple of dozen constituent and autonomous republics explicitly as "those of subordinate authorities". This is probably justified by the fact that the 1923 fundamental law of the USSR gives to the federal organs the right to "draw up common regulations in the sphere of health". The People's Commissar of Health of the RSFSR is the principal adviser, within this sphere, of the federal authorities. "Of more practical importance than formal laws in coordinating the health activities of the different parts of the country," it is well observed, "are the frequent congresses on many phases of public health work. These congresses are usually held in university towns irrespective of their political or geographic situation, and are attended by doctors and other medical workers from all parts of Russia" (*Health Work in Soviet Russia*, by Anna J. Haines, New York, 1928, p. 58).

of Health full provision was made for the continuance of the practice of expert consultation before important ministerial decisions of policy. In particular, the Commissar continued to be made aware of the latest conclusions of medical science, and kept in the closest touch with the best scientific experts that the USSR could supply. Down to 1934 there had been, parallel with the collegium but without its ministerial responsibilities, a Supreme Medical Council, described as a group of "about thirty specialists in various branches of medical science, who must give their expert advice regarding the scientific foundation for all the health regulations drafted by the commissariat. Almost all of the members of this council are directors of the various state scientific institutes, and have back of their decisions the results of research in the best laboratories of the country. They may invite to the council meetings any person whose services they may consider necessary for the better understanding of the matter in hand. Besides its advisory functions the council is authorised to call congresses of medical workers, to institute debates and discussions, and to appoint commissions to study any phase of health."¹

This consultative medical council has now (1934) been enlarged up to seventy persons, who are invited to serve by the People's Commissar, usually on the recommendation of the council itself. They include, in addition to the principal heads of departments of the RSFSR Commissariat of Health, and those of the autonomous republics, krais and oblasts of the RSFSR, the leading doctors at the head of medical research institutes and hospitals and representatives of learned societies, and—be it noted—also of the trade unions concerned. This council meets regularly every few months to discuss the most important problems arising in the work of the commissariat.

The work of the Commissariat of Health of the RSFSR is divided among a dozen departments, many of them subdivided into three to eight bureaux, making in all over thirty separate branches. A summarised list will serve to indicate the width of range of the administration. There are departments for organisation and administration, including personnel, coordination, central library, statistics, foreign information, etc.; for therapeutic institutions, including hospitals, out-patient departments, sanatoria, medical aid to insured persons, etc.; for epidemiology, covering

¹ *Health Work in Soviet Russia*, by Anna J. Haines, New York, 1928, pp. 46-47.

the campaigns against infectious diseases, including tuberculosis, venereal disease, epidemics, etc.; for hygienic education, and therapeutic mechanics; for protection of motherhood and infancy, including maternity homes, crèches, consultations, etc.; for protection of children's health from 3 to 18; for pharmacies and supply of drugs; for health work along routes of travel by waterways (river, canal, lake and harbour), with its own regional centres independent of the local authorities (although its local representatives usually sit upon the local soviets); for state sanitation inspection, including food, industry, housing, schools, transport and health resorts; for medical education; for medical research institutes; for convalescent and holiday homes; and for finance, including the capital construction of medical institutions, and the book-keeping and preparation of the estimates, together with control and audit of all expenditure.¹

Provision for Health in the Budget of the USSR

The financial arrangements of the soviet health service are, in one sense, simple, for the whole of the expenditure, and also the revenues connected with health administration, of all the nine commissariats of health of the constituent republics are ultimately included in the combined budget of the USSR, as are those of the commissariats of health of the fifteen autonomous republics; and thus they all form part of the finances of the Soviet Union. But since 1922 the cost of most of the hospitals and other institutions, together with the salaries and expenses of the local medical staffs, are included, in the first instance, in the various local budgets, which have to be made to balance. Their cost is thus met, to begin with, from the charges and taxes locally levied, together with the locally collected social insurance contributions and other special funds. At least 75 per cent of the whole expenditure on health is thus met. The Commissariat of Health for the RSFSR finds the cost of the "flying squad" despatched to cope with serious local outbreaks of disease; of the laboratories preparing vaccines and sera, as well as of certain

¹ It may be noted that the department concerned with health work among the various branches of the defence forces has been transferred to the Commissariat of Defence. That for health work along routes of travel is confined to waterways, health work on the railways being under the Commissariat of Means of Communication.

research laboratories ; of institutions maintained as models in each branch of the work ; of particular hospitals of non-local character, such as those for crippled soldiers, psychiatric patients, sufferers from leprosy, etc. ; of medicines procured from abroad ; and of the staff of medical experts retained for service in criminal investigations and the courts of justice. The commissariats of health in the other republics have similar though smaller services to maintain.

The Staffing of the Service

The special point of interest in the health service of the USSR is the fixed determination of the soviet authorities, without too narrowly counting the cost, to provide the whole country, and not the cities only, with a medical staff numerically adequate to the need, however great that may prove to be, and however difficult the task of recruiting. Tsarist Russia, within the present frontiers of the USSR, had fewer than 13,000 qualified doctors, or less than one per 7000 of the whole population ; and this, in the rural areas, meant less than one per 21,000.¹ Soviet Communism has had in mind a standard everywhere of something like one for each thousand. Naturally this has not yet been attained. Since the end of the civil war the number of medical practitioners, nurses and other officers, two-thirds of them women, has been increasing year by year. By the tenth anniversary of Dr. Semashko's entrance into office the total had doubled. In 1928 the qualified medical practitioners stood at one to 4000 of the population. By the middle of 1935, whilst the total staff had risen to three times the figure of 1918, the qualified medical practitioners throughout the whole USSR had been multiplied seven times, and had become one to every 2000 of the population.² Unfortunately there is manifested among the doctors the same attraction to the cities as among the population at large, and the annual increase in their numbers was, for some time, not many

¹ "According to available statistics for 1912 there was one graduate physician for every 21,900 of the village population of all Russia" (*Village Life under the Soviets*, by Karl Borders, 1927, p. 163).

² "In that part of Russia now included in the RSFSR there were, in 1913, 12,677 doctors" (*Health Work in Soviet Russia*, by Anna J. Haines, 1928, p. 94).

"In 1931, according to Dr. Roubakin, the total number of physicians [in the USSR] was about 76,000" (*Red Medicine*, by Sir A. Newsholme, K.C.B., and Dr. J. A. Kingsbury, 1934, p. 219). In the middle of 1935 the estimated number exceeded 80,000.

more than were immediately absorbed in manning the institutions and special services, notably those in connection with the factories and schools, actually started in the rapidly growing urban areas. But each year the number of men and women completing their five years' course for qualification as medical practitioners increases; and this now enables an ever larger contingent to be annually assigned to the villages. As is usual in the USSR for all occupations, the maximum number of candidates admitted to each of the medical colleges for training is necessarily decided by the government, actually by the Council of Labour and Defence (STO), if only because each involves a subvention from public funds. In the absence of parental fortunes there was no way of creating anything like enough additional doctors; and moreover, no other way of making the training effectively open to all suitable persons, than providing every one who was chosen, not only with free tuition, but also with an annual stipend or scholarship varying with his means, so as to ensure at least sufficient for maintenance. Candidates for training, who may be of any age, are nominated by all sorts of bodies, mostly by trade union and school committees, though individual applications are not excluded. "On these applications", to take the instance of the medical school of Rostov, "the local soviet first sits, and their recommendations come before a commission consisting of a representative of (1) the administrative medical faculty; (2) the professorial staff; (3) the trade unions; and (4) the student workers."¹ Admittedly, young men and women actually engaged in manual work in industry or agriculture still enjoy some preference, and the more so if they are also of proletarian parentage. But there is now no exclusion of sons and daughters of the intelligentsia, especially if, as is usually the case, they have been temporarily engaged in manual labour. Other things being equal, those more advanced in education stand a better chance of admission than those with only elementary schooling. The mixed commission rejects candidates who are plainly unfitted for the training or for the occupation, but is naturally concerned to enrol the full number permitted.

The training for the medical practitioner in the USSR combines, from the first, an unusual amount of practical work with theoretic teaching. "In his first year he must assist in

¹ *Ibid.* p. 213.

minor medical and surgical work, including cleaning up after the work is finished. In his second year the medical student has to help in actual nursing ; and in his next three years the student likewise engages in practical medical work at various hospitals, polyclinics and ambulatoria, while continuing his scientific training. When qualified, the doctor is offered a post at once. He may have specialised from the end of his third year, though this is a debatable policy. He is required to be fairly competent in all branches of medicine, as he may have to practise alone in a country district. . . . A recent regulation has made the conditions . . . more stringent.”¹ Something like 9000 new students are now admitted annually to the sixty-two institutions in the USSR giving medical training, which have, in the aggregate, nearly 50,000 men and women students. There were only six such institutions in 1912. There were then no medical research institutions, whilst in 1935 there are a couple of hundred. It looks as if it may be nearly another decade before the far-flung millions, from the Baltic to the Pacific, from the Arctic Ocean to the mountains of Central Asia, can be all supplied with a fully qualified doctor for each 250 families. Yet this is the goal at which the Soviet Government steadfastly aims, and for which it persistently plans.

The reader will ask about the quality of the training thus supplied wholesale, and about the efficiency of the gigantic health service so created. Tsarist Russia, whilst it had relatively few doctors, and generally neglected nine-tenths of the population, gave the nobility and the wealthy a medical attendance that was, by contemporary standards, fairly efficient. It produced also a certain number of men of outstanding genius, such as Mechnikov, Speransky and Pavlov, who gained international reputation in various branches of medical science. It is difficult to measure against this a medical profession which, under Soviet Communism, grapples with a different task. It is almost too freely admitted to-day by the older doctors that the average of medical attainments throughout the profession, and especially the average schooling of the medical student, are below the pre-war level. On the other hand, there is said to be a change for the better in the spirit in which the work is generally done, notably as regards enthusiasm in practice and scientific research, and in

¹ *Red Medicine*, by Sir A. Newsholme and Dr. J. A. Kingsbury, 1934, p. 214.

the almost universal desire "to improve one's qualifications". Every country practitioner now gets six months' "study leave" on full pay every three years, an opportunity not generally provided in any other country, and one which the soviet doctor eagerly embraces. "Even now", in the latest and most authoritative judgment, "it is indubitable that, although the average individual standard of medical students of to-day is lower than that of the fewer students in pre-revolution times, the aggregate quantity, as well as the quality, of medical aid available for the mass of the people is being enormously increased and improved."¹

Hospitals

It is characteristic that increased and improved provision for the sick does not exclusively or predominantly take the form—in Great Britain and the United States the favourite form alike of benevolent donors and of progressive municipal councillors—of a multiplication of hospitals. Indeed, so serious and widespread was the destruction caused by the six years of warfare and the famine of 1921, that there were in the USSR, until 1924, actually fewer hospitals regularly accepting in-patients for treatment of specific diseases than there had been before the war.² In this,

¹ *Ibid.* p. 212.

It should be stated that the hours of work of the doctor in the USSR are restricted to a maximum of six per day; with annual vacations on full pay, in addition, for those practising in rural areas, to the "study leave" already mentioned. Many of them in the cities hold two appointments and draw two salaries. Others employ their leisure in scientific research. Private practice is not forbidden, but only a small proportion—chiefly some of the elder men in the larger cities—enjoy any appreciable income from this source. There appears to be also a tiny handful who hold no salaried appointments, but divide their time between private patients and research.

Students, on obtaining their qualification, are immediately appointed to posts, by the Commissariat of Health, very largely for an initial term of three years, to a rural district, from which they may be promoted after a few years' service. It may be added that medical men who are members of the Communist Party (including candidates for membership and Comsomols) may be, at any time, required by the Party authorities to accept appointment anywhere, in accordance with their pledge of obedience. This may be largely the reason why only a minority of them become Party members, although an additional reason for not joining is their feeling that the considerable amount of voluntary "social work" expected from members may be, as they say, inconsistent with their duties to their patients.

² It is only fair to remember that the later decades of tsardom had seen some improvement in hospital provision. The sanitary and other reforms of the zemstvos, in the generation preceding the Great War, are nowadays seldom adequately realised. "All the public health work done was inaugurated by the

as in other matters, it took something like seven years even to get up to the level of 1914. But during the past decade the advance has been great. By the end of 1934 the number of hospitals, properly so called, in the cities of the RSFSR had more than doubled, the total for the RSFSR being now (1935) between five and six thousand. In the other constituent republics, including especially those inhabited by the more backward races, the increase in hospital provision during the past decade has been, relatively to the population, even greater than in the RSFSR. Since 1917 the total number of hospital beds in the USSR has been trebled. The great hospitals in the principal cities are among the largest in the world. "During our visit", writes Dr. Somerville Hastings, "we were taken over two large general hospitals, each with approximately 2000 beds, the Metchnikov at Leningrad and the Botkin at Moscow. Both were well-built, well-equipped modern hospitals, and in each case, as far as we could see, the standard of work was high."¹ It is, however, not for general hospitals that the health service under Soviet Communism can claim particular distinction, so much as in the relation that these bear to the research institutes on the one hand, and to the more specialised institutions and the remainder of the health organisation on the other; and to the measures taken for the promotion of more perfect health among the larger part of the whole population who are not yet patients.

Medical Centres

The question may be asked, how, in the vast population of the USSR, does the individual find the medical aid that the Commissariat of Health provides for his particular benefit?

Zemstvo and maintained by that semi-social, semi-political organisation. From 1872 to 1911 they had increased the expenditure for public health from two to forty-eight million roubles annually. . . . A network of very creditable hospitals had been spread over the country, stationed in most of the provincial towns and district centres, and even in many of the smaller villages. But by far the greater part of the population of Russia in need of medical attendance never came in touch with a physician at all" (*Village Life under the Soviets*, by Karl Borders, 1927, p. 163).

The number of hospital beds was officially given in 1934 for the whole USSR as 179,300 in 1913, 317,100 in 1928 and 526,900 in 1932. (*The USSR in Figures*, Moscow, 1934, p. 208.)

¹ "Medicine in Soviet Russia", by Dr. Somerville Hastings, in *The Medical World*, January 15, 1932.

True to the principle of multiformity, soviet arrangements allow of no single answer to such a question.

The highest degree of organisation is naturally found in the largest cities. "In Moscow and Leningrad", as a medical observer reports, "the population is divided for medical purposes into units of between 40,000 and 80,000 people; and all the health activities of each of these units are (or will be as soon as possible) centred around what is described as a prophylactorium. Each unit . . . is divided again into groups of 2000 or 3000 persons, and in medical charge of each of these groups are two or three doctors and one or more nurses or health visitors. In Leningrad one doctor deals with the adults and one with the children, but in Moscow, the work is further subdivided so that one doctor attends to the mothers and children under 3, one to those between 3 and 16, and one to the remainder. In addition to these clinicians, there are also sanitary officers, who deal with factory hygiene as well as sanitation. The members of the clinical staff see their patients in their homes if necessary; but if well enough they come to the health centre (prophylactorium).¹ We were shown over one of these centres in Leningrad, and told that 2000 patients were seen there every day, all by appointment. . . . Where it is necessary for a patient to see a specialist an appointment is made and the district nurse goes with him, first collecting his personal and family medical history sheets. The specialists see their patients in the health centre (prophylactorium), and the medical records are retained and filed there also. . . . But the function of the Russian health centre is not only to deal with declared disease. It is in the true sense a prophylactorium. In it is a large hall in which lectures are given on health subjects. On its walls are posters and diagrams concerning health matters. . . . There are also wall cases containing samples of the proper food, clothing and even toys of children of various ages. In the prophylactorium is the birth control clinic, with, of course, samples of the apparatus required; and a lawyer attends at stated intervals to give advice, especially to women concerning their rights and those of their children.

¹ In some places the present writers were informed that a simple rule as to attendance existed. If the person seeking medical aid is physically able to walk to the doctor, he is expected to do so, provided that his temperature is not noticeably above normal. But if he "has a temperature" he is entitled, and expected, to notify the doctor, who must promptly visit him.

At the prophylactorium the bottles of milk—unfortunately sterilised as a rule [that is to say, not pasteurised]—are given out two or three times a day to parents of all children under four ; and a psycho-technical examination [is] made of children when they leave school to determine what vocations they are most suited for.”¹

The high degree of organisation of all the various agencies in the soviet health service is emphasised in a description by an American specialist. “The medical profession in Moscow”, writes Dr. Frankwood E. Williams,² “can be taken as an example of the type that is being worked out in all parts of Russia, though still far from being realised throughout the country. Moscow is divided into fourteen districts. Each district is covered with a network of community clinics, leading usually from a central district clinic, through neighbourhood clinics, to the factories, the schools and other institutions within the district. Lines in the other direction lead from the central clinic to the hospitals, general and special, located in Moscow, and its environs. Passage up and down these lines is easy. *The organisation functions as a whole, not as a loosely jointed series of clinics and hospitals, each jealous and ambitious, but ‘cooperative’.* An individual can be passed effectively through the entire chain from factory, home, school, to hospital if that is necessary ; or his case can be attended to at various points in the chain if that is all that is required. The aim is efficient and prompt treatment of *anyone* who is ill, to the full extent of his need ; the restoration of the individual’s effectiveness as quickly as can be done with safety ; the teaching of hygiene and the prevention of illness.

“The central clinic in each district is a large organisation not only for general medicine but for the handling of special problems. The neighbourhood clinic is naturally smaller, and devoted to general medicine and the specialities most likely to be needed. From all clinics both general clinicians and specialists

¹ “Medicine in Soviet Russia”, by Dr. Somerville Hastings, p. 7. This generalised account does not sufficiently stress the fact that the consultations of women and children include both periodical inspection of those who are well as well as preventative and curative treatment of those who are ill. Also that, whilst the therapist and paediatrist play the principal part, it is they who call in the gynaecologist and other specialists, thus ensuring an all-round service, in combination with the most advanced medical technical equipment.

² “Russia, a Nation of Adolescents”, by Frankwood E. Williams, in *Survey Graphic*, New York, for April 1932 ; largely reproduced in his book *How Soviet Russia Fights Neurosis* (1935).

are 'on call' to visit the sick in the homes. In addition to psychiatrists daily 'on call' at the clinics, there are two psychiatrists 'on call' during the night.

"The work and plan of the Ordintea Street General Prophylactic Dispensary, [and that] in the name of Prof. Rein, in the Lenin District of Moscow, are good examples of community clinic organisation and planning. In this district there are 60 neighbourhood clinics. In 1927-1928, when the clinic was organised, there were 33. They were increased to 38 in 1929, to 47 in 1930; and the plan calls for a further increase in 1932 to 70, and in 1933 to 80. In 1929 there were 80 general physicians visiting in the homes from this clinic; in 1930, 100; 1931, 130; the plan calls for an increase to 160 during 1932-1933. In 1929-1930 the pediatricians on the staff were increased to 31 . . . in 1931 to 36. The plan calls for 42 in 1932, and 46 in 1933. In 1933 the staff is to consist of more than 236 physicians, 160 general, 46 pediatricians, 20 tuberculosis specialists for adults, and 10 for children, with the addition of nose and throat specialists, and so on. . . . The plan for this district calls for a medical unit for each factory employing 400 or more workers; for smaller factories a nurse, first-aid unit."

But extensive organisation of this kind, and elaborate institutions with any amount of equipment, often fail to carry conviction to the sceptical of the actual working of the machine. We can realise it better by the artless testimony of an English workman engaged on constructing the new underground railway at Moscow, who had, as he thought, merely a bad cold. "I wish", he writes, "to describe what happened a few months ago when I had a bad cold and went to the Metrostoi Medical Station (I am working on the construction of the subway). . . . A few questions and I was given the number of the doctor's room. A few minutes' wait, during which I had time to observe the medical propaganda charts and models in the hall, and my name was called. 'A cold', the doctor said. 'Let me examine your throat; now your nostrils, and your ears.' I discovered that I had a slight nasal catarrh, and some foreign matter in my ears. After a syringeing I could hear ever so much better. Then I got two prescriptions, one for my nose, and the other for my throat. She also said she had better examine my lungs; I laughed, but realised how thorough the soviet doctor was. After giving me

an O.K. she sent me to the dentist. I have not had a toothache for years, but nevertheless she insisted it would be better. Then I got one tooth stopped and two pulled out. The extraction was the most painless I have experienced. When the gums were set I was warned I would have to go back and get fitted for a set of false teeth. This would be given free, as is also the medicine. I left the clinic with my prescriptions, and a great respect for the soviet doctors and the system.”¹

In smaller cities, whilst there may be one or more highly organised prophylactoria on the model of those at Moscow and Leningrad, these are usually not used for the ordinary consultations, which take place within stated hours, at the smaller public offices known as points of consultation or ambulatoria, provided for the doctor in charge of each unit of population in the locality concerned.

Health Centres in Factories

The term “health centre” is used in the USSR for only one kind among the many to which it is applied in America and Great Britain. But that kind is one in which the USSR has gone far ahead of every other country. This is the medical unit established inside the factory or industrial plant, exclusively for the service of the operatives of the establishment and their families. It is primarily a “first-aid” centre, as known in England and the United States, for immediate treatment which cannot be postponed. But in any but the smallest undertakings, it develops into much more highly organised institutions. In establishments having fewer than 1000 operatives, the health centre may be little more than a “first-aid” post, in immediate communication with the district hospital. In factories and plants counting between 1000 and 6000 operatives, there will be various “first-aid” posts, with a “polyclinique” with several qualified doctors in attendance, dealing with a constant stream of out-patients. In larger establishments with between 6000 and 10,000 employees there will be several such departments, with specialists in attendance on certain days. In undertakings exceeding 10,000 workers, the medical organisation will include scores of “first-aid” posts, various “polycliniques”, and sometimes more than 100 qualified doctors, with all sorts of specialists

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, February 21, 1934.

in periodical attendance, and extensive medical equipment, sometimes superior to that of the local district hospital. Thus, in the immense Stalingrad tractor works, with over 40,000 operatives, the present writers found, in 1932, the principal medical officer in charge of a staff of no fewer than 110 qualified doctors (four-fifths of them women), together with 135 more or less trained women nurses. They took as their sphere the daily health of a population of workers and their families, numbering between 70,000 and 80,000 persons. The well-equipped premises of this factory health centre were adequate to the daily average of some 2500 visits. It confined itself to "out-patient practice", sending cases requiring institutional treatment, including all confinements, to the hospital of the city of Stalingrad. But the treatment of these 2500 daily applicants went far beyond the "bottle of medicine" that was supplied where necessary. The centre itself gave, gratuitously, many forms of treatment, including, for instance, radiant heat-therapy, psycho-therapy, mud-baths, and special baths for rheumatism in sand brought from the Caucasus, along with home nursing and various applications of massage. The arrangements for special diets for patients were elaborate. The immense restaurant of the factory provided daily six different invalid diets in separate dining-rooms, for which the patients presented the doctor's orders. For the infants between two months and three years old there were six separate crèches in as many houses, admitting children in shifts corresponding with the factory hours for women operatives. But children could, by arrangement, be left for the whole day so as to permit the mother to go shopping in the city, or to complete some task of work at home. The children were divided among different rooms according to age, there being about one attendant to every ten children present.

Rural Consultation Points

Outside the cities, apart from the scattered factories with their own extensive workers' settlements, the medical arrangements are necessarily less elaborate. Each doctor, or small group of doctors, has an extensive district to cover, mostly with make-shift premises, incomplete equipment and scanty means of locomotion of every degree of inadequacy in different districts.

The level from which Dr. Semashko started was appallingly low. "In many districts the proportion of physicians to inhabitants was one to forty thousand. It was no uncommon case for a man with a broken leg to have to drive two days to reach a doctor to set it.¹ But even for the rural areas a comprehensive plan was promptly drawn up; and this is being, year by year, ever more adequately carried out. Already in 1927 a careful observer of the life of the villagers could report that "The medical plans of the country supply free service to all regularly employed workers and peasants. To this end every village centre of considerable size, or at least every township centre, has its public health clinic. In most cases these clinics are housed in former peasant houses remodelled to meet the needs of the work. . . . Particularly on market days the ante-rooms are crowded with all manner of bandaged and stricken humanity. We found the chief clinic receiving seventy patients a day in the summer season. . . . In the winter this number is doubled."²

We get a glimpse of the rural health administration from the doctor's point of view, in a record of the conversation of an English observer, who penetrated into the province of Vladimir as early as 1920. "With the medical staff of the department of health [of the province of Vladimir, Mr. Brailsford reports], I had a memorable talk. Only one doctor in the whole province was a communist [meaning a Party member], and he was not in a responsible position. On the other hand, not a single doctor had fled in the general exodus of the wealthy class. Every man and woman had stuck to his post. . . . All medical service is free, and the doctors live like any other workers of the highest category. . . . There was a shortage of every sort of drug, disinfectant and instrument. . . . None the less the department of health had gone to work with courage, intelligence and the Russian talent for improvisation. It had set up fifty delousing and disinfecting stations against typhus; and there was, in consequence, no epidemic last winter [1919]. It had got typhoid down below the pre-war average. It had opened four new sanatoria for tuberculosis. It had organised perambulating lectures for the villages on hygiene, and the care of children and the sick, and was using the cinema for the same purpose. These doctors

¹ *Health Work in Soviet Russia*, by Anna J. Haines (1928), p. 10.

² *Village Life under the Soviets*, by Karl Borders (1927), p. 165.

told me that open prostitution had wholly disappeared since the Revolution. . . . Doctors as a whole were happy, they insisted, because they were devoted to their work, and felt they could 'serve their ideal'. They were 'realising the dreams of a life-time', which had seemed visionary hitherto. So long as they felt that the soviet was 'working for civilisation and health' they would serve it loyally, though none of them were communists (here one of them repeated much the same thing in German to make sure that I had understood). Under the old régime they had met with continual obstacles, but now they received every possible encouragement. As he shook hands with me at parting the director said emphatically, 'I have never asked the Soviet Government in vain for anything whatsoever'." ¹

We have little measurement of the further improvement that has undoubtedly taken place in the rural districts during the past seven years ; and we can venture no statement about the general average of the health services in the rural areas of the USSR. But there is a consensus of opinion that it is very considerably better than before the Revolution, and that it is, in all respects, and in the great majority of districts, steadily improving year by year. Between 1927-1928 and 1931-1932 the number of hospital beds available in the villages increased from 43,590 to over 80,000, and the number of qualified doctors at work in rural medical districts from 4667 to over 7000.² In 1933, the number of beds available in village institutions for the sick, in the RSFSR alone, was given to us as 78,046, being an increase on the number of 1928 of no less than 62 per cent. The increase in the total number of beds in institutions for the sick (including maternity) in the whole of the USSR, between 1917 and 1932, has been stated as from 109,630 to 355,240. The Second Five-Year Plan provides for an even greater increase by 1937 ; but it is clearly foreseen that it will then still be far from a completely adequate provision for so vast a population.

The Flying Squad

A feature of the rural health service is the flying squad of doctors and nurses which is sent for a limited time into one rural

¹ *The Russian Workers' Republic*, by H. N. Brailsford (1921), pp. 67-68.

² *Red Medicine*, by Sir A. Newsholme and Dr. J. A. Kingsbury (1933), p. 244.

district after another, either to cope with special needs for trachoma, malaria or venereal disease ; or exceptional outbreaks of smallpox, enteric or scarlet fever ; or where, owing to the sparseness of population, there is only a poorly organised medical service ; or merely to make a sanitary survey of specially backward districts. These "flying squads", which do not yet use aeroplanes (although doctors urgently needed occasionally do, and patients are sometimes brought in from outlying villages by an aeroplane ambulance), are equipped with the means of setting up temporary clinics, including primitive laboratories and extensive medical supplies. "Treatment is carried on for a time, and an intensive educational campaign adapted to the peasants' understanding and living conditions. Then the active cases are turned over to the regular local medical organisation for a continuation of the treatment ; and the flying squad moves on to another neighbourhood. The permanent stations for certain specialised services, as well as the squads themselves, are usually supported by non-local funds."¹ The bureaux for venereal diseases and for the campaign against tuberculosis, which are permanent branches of the Commissariat of Health, have similar organisations. Special medical brigades are also sent into country districts during the sowing and harvesting seasons to reinforce the local organisation for the service of workers engaged in the fields.

The Campaign Against Tuberculosis

We cannot dwell upon all the various developments of the struggle to restore the whole population of the USSR to normal health. But it is noteworthy that, as mentioned above, in addition to the geographically dispersed medical units for general work, some of the principal diseases are systematically made the subject of special campaigns. Plague and typhus, enteric and smallpox, venereal disease and malaria, all have their organised concentrations of medical forces, not only temporary but in some cases continuously in service, and effectively articulated with the general scheme. We take as an example the campaign against tuberculosis, for many years past the greatest scourge of the Russian people, and still the cause of more days lost through illness than any other single ailment.

¹ *Health Work in Soviet Russia*, by Anna J. Haines (1928), p. 56.

Specialising in the prevention and treatment of tuberculosis in its various manifestations there are, at the top, in the USSR, more than a score of institutes definitely applying themselves to scientific research. Central institutes at Moscow and Kharkov, with others at Minsk, Tifis and Samarkand, direct and coordinate over a dozen local research centres in the several constituent and autonomous republics, the workers in which meet periodically in All-Union congresses. The records of all this scientific work are published, month by month, since 1923, in the voluminous journal (in Russian) entitled *Problems of Tuberculosis*, in addition to numerous monographs.

At the other end of the chain, in immediate contact with the sufferers, are the special tuberculosis dispensaries, of which a far-reaching network has been gradually spread all over the USSR. In 1918 they numbered only 4; in 1921, only 15; but in 1924 they were 84; in 1928, 233; in 1929, 273; in 1932, 365; and in 1933 as many as 404. "An anti-tuberculosis dispensary", said Dr. Semashko, "differs from a simple out-patient clinic in this, that it aims not only to cure the sick person, but to examine into his living and working conditions; if his apartment is not sanitary it tries to help him to find another more sanitary; if the patient needs some kind of material help the dispensary finds this help. The dispensary inspects the factories and warehouses in its neighbourhood, and if it notices something dangerous to health on the premises (if they are full of dust, if there is poor ventilation, if poisonous gases are emitted), the dispensary tries, by bringing pressure to bear on the administration of the business, to eliminate that danger. The dispensary carries on a widespread propaganda . . . by means of lectures and reports. . . . Finally the dispensary maintains close relationship with the workers' organisations . . . at the dispensary there is always a Council of Social Aid . . . made up of representatives of these organisations. Thus a dispensary not only prescribes for sick people and sends them to sanatoria and hospitals, but also prevents disease . . . it works . . . to create the positive health of the population."¹

Serving alike the research institutes on the one hand, and the

¹ *The Foundations of Soviet Medicine*, by Dr. Semashko (Russian) (1926), quoted in *Health Work in Soviet Russia*, by Anna J. Haines (New York, 1928), pp. 20-21.

special dispensaries on the other, there has been developed an astonishing array of tuberculosis hospitals large and small, for every manifestation of the disease; of sanatoria for patients at all stages, in all suitable localities, chosen for their height above the sea-level, or for their location in mild climates, or for special reasons such as that of the koumiss cure; and of auxiliary institutions of all kinds, such as forest schools, open-air centres for sun bathing, night sanatoria, etc. In 1928 there were 2757 tuberculosis hospitals, and in 1933, 4007; in 1928, 10,505 institutions classed as tuberculosis sanatoria, and in 1933, 15,242; in 1928, 7447 localities providing convalescent homes in suitable localities, and in 1933, 10,556; whilst the auxiliary tuberculosis institutions of all sorts grew from 7637 in 1928 to 10,181 in 1933.¹

The Night Sanatorium

We cannot trouble the reader with further descriptions of this persistent campaign against tuberculosis in the USSR. Work of this kind can, of course, be paralleled in other countries, though, as we imagine, not often with equal unity, coordination and persistent energy. But one of the institutions is apparently a unique speciality, as far as we can ascertain not in use elsewhere. This is the night sanatorium, which commands the enthusiastic approval of all medical visitors, and is now a prominent feature of the health service of Moscow and various other cities. In populations so thickly crowded together as those of the cities of the USSR, or those of the working-class quarters in other countries, where whole families inhabit single rooms, which are seldom adequately ventilated, the insanitary conditions in which the night is passed are a potent factor of disease. Where it is not practicable immediately to move such families to healthier quarters, the soviet authorities have discovered that temporary

¹ *La Lutte contre la tuberculose dans la RSFSR*, par Dr. Nesline (Commissariat of Health, Moscow, 1934). Among other articles, the following may be consulted: "La Lutte contre la tuberculose en Russie", par A. Starobinsky, in *Revue de phthisie et de la médecine sociale* (Paris, 1924), pp. 243-256; "Die Tuberculosebekämpfung in Sowjetrussland", by S. Bagotsky, in *Zeitschrift für ärztliche Fortbildung* (Jena, 1924), pp. 532-534; Dr. E. G. Munblitt's paper "The Tuberculosis Campaign in the USSR" (in German) in *Russian-German Medical Journal* for April 1926; and ch. xii. "The Anti-Tuberculosis Campaign in Russia," in *Health Work in Soviet Russia*, by Anna J. Haines, New York, 1928, pp. 200-223.

provision may be made to ensure for the wage-earners healthier conditions during more than half the twenty-four hours. "When there is a sick child at home that might disturb the breadwinner's sleep, or where, for instance, consumption is threatened, the doctor gives the necessary certificate, and, instead of going home, the worker leaves the factory for the night sanatorium. There he is given a hot bath, changes into fresh clothes, has a hot meal, after which he listens to music or a propaganda lecture, and goes early to bed in a well-ventilated room.¹ Night sanatoria have proved themselves of the greatest value in Russia, and "we were assured", reports another medical expert, "that in many cases incipient disease, both mental and physical, had been aborted by their use".² A French doctor describes a night sanatorium "at Krasnaya Presnya, in one of the suburbs of Moscow, which may correspond to St. Denis near Paris. There we find 70 persons, all women, who are able to work, not ill, but at the moment in a weak state. Here they will stay for two months, in better sleeping-quarters than they have at home, supplied with exceptionally nourishing food, under medical supervision. They go out to their work. The state loses nothing by them; and they profit. At the end of two months they will resume their home life, considerably set up in health. Their places will be filled by 70 men."³ Moscow has 10 of these night sanatoria, admitting not only sufferers from tuberculosis in its early stages, but also those in whom tuberculosis is latent or only suspected; persons suffering from nervous exhaustion or digestive troubles; and occasionally merely from overwork or neurasthenia, together with convalescents of all kinds.⁴

Leningrad uses for these institutions several of the mansions of the former wealthy. "So successful and popular are these night sanatoria among the workers that many other industrial centres have copied Moscow in opening them. [In 1926 in the USSR] there were over 5000 beds offering this temporary service

¹ In these night sanatoria "the windows of the bedrooms are nailed open even in the coldest weather, and in Moscow this often means 30 degrees below zero Fahrenheit" (*Health Work in Soviet Russia*, by Anna J. Haines, 1928, p. 107).

² "Medicine in Soviet Russia", by Dr. Somerville Hastings, in *The Medical World* (January 15, 1932), p. 9.

³ Translated from *Oui, mais Moscou*, by Pierre Dominique (Paris, 1932), p. 177.

⁴ *Red Medicine*, by Sir Arthur Newsholme, K.C.B., and Dr. J. A. Kingsbury (1933), pp. 14, 22, 27, 102, 111, 229, 236, 250, 251, 252, 254, 256.

to patients still able to carry on their ordinary working duties if their leisure time could be a period of recuperation.”¹ By 1934 their number had been greatly increased. The night sanatoria are, of course, no substitutes for hospitals and convalescent homes for advanced tuberculosis cases ; and as we have described, the soviet provision of such institutions is extensive and increasing. But the night sanatoria have proved invaluable, not only as “ therapeutic-prophylactic institutions ”, in which patients are found to improve even more quickly whilst they can still continue at work than when they are reduced to idleness in hospitals ; but also as “ schools of sanitary culture ”.

We cannot pretend to be able to judge from the available statistics, how the undoubted improvement in the USSR, as regards all forms of tuberculosis, compares with the experience of other countries. The deaths ascribed to tuberculosis in Moscow, which rose to the high number of 39·7 per 10,000 in the population in the year of distress, 1920, fell to 16·1 in 1924 ;² and to no more than 11·6 in 1931 (in Leningrad to 16·3). The days lost through tuberculosis in Moscow, per 100 workers in nine principal branches of industry, fell from 8·9 in 1925 to no more than 2·3 in 1931. We were informed that the improvement had steadily continued.

Provision for Street Casualties

The very serious consideration that is now being given in Great Britain to casualties on the roads may serve as an excuse for dwelling on one particular field in which Moscow city may have something to teach the health services of the great cities

¹ *Health Work in Soviet Russia*, by Anna J. Haines (1928), p. 107. “ These part-time sanatoria are also provided for school children. The children are recommended for the institution by the school and tuberculosis dispensary doctors through the ward, because of their incipient tuberculosis or state of especial malnutrition. As many more children need this care than there are institutions to receive them, two or three nurses take the lists recommended by the doctors and visit the homes of the children, selecting those whose home surroundings are such as would preclude the possibility of their improvement in health at home. . . . This institution is run as a day sanatorium between the hours of 8 A.M. and 5 P.M. for both boys and girls from 4 to 14 years, and as a night sanatorium between the hours of 5 P.M. and 8 A.M. for girls only from 9 to 14 years. . . . Both night and day children receive a full ration of food from the sanatorium ” (*ibid.* pp. 108-113).

² *Health Work in Soviet Russia*, by Anna J. Haines (New York, 1928), p. 115 ; *La Lutte contre la tuberculose dans la RSFSR*, par Dr. Nesline (Moscow, 1934), p. 20.

of the western world. Its provision for the victims of casualties in the streets and urgent surgical cases in public places stands unrivalled in prompt and all-embracing efficiency.

The Sklifassovsky Institute, situated near the centre of Moscow, occupies the buildings of an ancient mansion which Napoleon, in 1812, diverted to army uses, after which it remained as a hospital in which the distinguished medical professor, Dr. Sklifassovsky, latterly spent both money and time in establishing an embryonic "first-aid" organisation for the city. This has been greatly enlarged and elaborated by its present chief, Dr. Serge Judine, under the Commissariat of Health of the RSFSR, with the idea of ensuring the instant rescue from the streets, and also from other public places, such as factories or theatres, at any hour of the day or night, of any person the victim of accident or assault, or otherwise urgently requiring medical aid, in any part of the city. The institute is now a fully equipped hospital which will presently have more than 600 beds (two-thirds always reserved for urgent surgical cases), with a qualified medical staff of fifteen, including six "internes", besides students in training. But more interesting than the hospital, because more unique, is the efficient use made of the telephone and the motor ambulance. Seven medically equipped motor ambulances, with stretchers attached, stand constantly ready to start at a moment's notice, with driver, doctor and male attendant standing by, who are always prepared to give urgent first-aid treatment actually during transit. Eleven other motor ambulances, carrying each a woman nurse, stand ready for cases in which immediate conveyance is alone required. Half a dozen motor-cabs are also available for "sitting cases". Among the seven doctors, who are at all times on duty solely for this service of fetching a patient, one is always a psychiatrist, prepared to handle patients suffering from manias, etc. But all this little army of services waiting to be called is not concentrated at the central station. In order to save time in so large a city area, two-sevenths of the force waits at local stations in the distant suburbs. The telephone is the nerve-centre of the whole organisation. Seven separate lines (five from as many geographical districts, one from the central police office, and one from the central transport office) converge in a special listening chamber, in which three young doctors share among themselves the twenty-four hours' continuous vigil.

What happens when someone is in any way injured at any hour of the twenty-four, in any part of Moscow? Any person whatsoever who witnesses the injury goes at once to the nearest telephone box and calls first-aid, giving the locality. Much the same happens in surgical emergencies such as acute appendicitis, ulcerous perforations or dangerous haemorrhage. Any doctor—indeed any person whatsoever—may telephone at any hour stating the need and the address. Whether or not the call is warranted by the circumstances, the response is instantaneous and invariable. The doctor at the telephone instantly signs a brief order to go, and at the same moment sounds an alarm bell. The doctor next for service seizes the order through a hatchway in the wall, and goes at once to the waiting motor ambulance. At the same moment he presses an electric button, which lights a signal lamp in the listening-room, indicating that he is waiting to start. A second lamp instantly glows to indicate that the attendant is also waiting. A third lamp promptly shows that the driver is at the wheel. A fourth lamp almost immediately reports that the porter at the gate has seen the ambulance leave the yard. Meanwhile the index of the alarm has been moving to register the time that has elapsed. This time-lag may be only 40 seconds. It never exceeds 2 minutes. When one of the present writers watched the proceedings in 1934 none of the doctors took more than one minute to get actually started. How many calls are thus attended to in the 24 hours? During a busy period of 10 days there may be 650 day calls and 550 night calls, making an average of 120 in each 24 hours, or one every 12 minutes. The ambulances make about 2000 journeys per month, bringing back more than that number of acutely sick or wounded. One-fifth are traffic accidents, others are urgent surgical cases. Not published, as a fixed principle of soviet policy, are the numbers of suicides, poisonings and murders. But the lunatics number 500 a year, the dangerous epileptics over 200, and the drunkards suffering from delirium tremens nearly as many. What other city in the world can show so well organised or so expeditious a service? ¹

¹ Summarised from the eloquent account by Dr. Raymond Leibovice, hospital surgeon of Paris, in the special number "Enquête au pays des Soviets" of the French illustrated journal *Vu*, November 18, 1931. See also *Oui, mais Moscou*, by Pierre Dominique (1931), pp. 173–174. One of the present writers

Medical Research

From one end of the immense health service to the other in the cities of the RSFSR and the Ukraine, and to a lesser extent in the other constituent republics, and in the villages generally, the medical observer notices the great stress laid on, and the great part played by research in the science and art of health. There are now over 200 organised medical research institutes of one kind or other. Every aspect of physical or mental health, as well as every disease or abnormality, seems to have its own intellectual centre—and usually more than one—in which a group of doctors are engaged, during some part of their time, on specialised investigations with a view to new discoveries. The lay observer is inclined to think that the Russian doctors follow more closely the scientific journals of Western Europe and the United States than the doctors of those countries follow the discoveries of their Russian colleagues. The difficulties preventing such inter-communication between medical investigators of different countries are to be regretted.

A City of the Science and Art of Health

There is no limit to the far-seeing schemes in the USSR for the creation of an altogether new level of positive health in the whole people. As a part of the Second Five-Year Plan, the Soviet Government has allotted a site of more than a square mile in the went specially in 1934 to verify these accounts, and found them even understating the efficiency of the work.

The following statistics were supplied :

	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934, six months
Number of calls .	18,838	23,464	29,963	36,808	16,979
Of these, Accidents were .	8,849	11,951	15,719	16,742	8,747

The accidents were stated to be principally street traffic casualties, and it was pointed out that during the past three years their number had only slightly increased, in spite of a continuous increase both of city residents and of motor vehicles.

It should be added that a First Aid and Ambulance Service, on lines similar to those of the Sklifassovsky Institute at Moscow, although less extensively equipped, is now maintained at Leningrad and Rostov in the RSFSR; and at Kharkov, Kiev and Odessa in the Ukraine, at Tashkent in Turkestan (where an aeroplane ambulance brings in patients from the villages), and in various other cities of the USSR.

Silver Forest on the Moscow River, a ten-minutes' drive from the capital, for "Medical City", designed to be the largest and most modern medical institute in the world. The actual construction of the great network of buildings, which are planned to cost 150,000,000 roubles, is scheduled to begin in 1935. The organisation that will use the new plant is already functioning as the All-Union Institute of Experimental Medicine. It is under the direct authority of the USSR Government, by which its findings are turned over to the commissariats of health for application in hospitals throughout the Soviet Union. The director is Professor Lev Nicolaevich Feodorov, pupil of the great Pavlov. The enlarged institution plans to cover all kinds of health and medical work, both practical and theoretical. A feature will be the "Clinic of the Healthy Man", where observations will be made of the behaviour of normal men and women after working, eating, resting, etc. There will be special chambers, where the temperature, air-pressure and other conditions of different climates—arctic, sub-tropic and even submarine and stratospheric—will be reproduced and their effects on living organisms studied. The institute will constitute a whole city in itself, with a technical personnel of 5500 doctors, nurses and research workers, and 600 patients, each of the latter in a private room; and with almost one laboratory per patient! There will be blocks of apartment houses for the staff; and shops, theatres, libraries and other features of a complete town.

This grandiose conception of a "City of the Science and Art of Health" may well take a whole decade to come fully into operation, at a total expense that staggers imagination. On the other hand, its possible results, not only to medical science but also in the daily health of a population which may then have reached two hundred millions are immeasurable. To this intense interest in research we recur in the following chapter, dealing with the place of science in the communist conception of the universe.¹

The Establishment of Economic Security

Lenin seems to have realised from the very outset of his government what is still only imperfectly understood by statesmen in other countries, namely, that the condition of chronic insecurity in which a capitalist wage system keeps the mass of the

¹ Chapter XI. in Part II., "Science the Salvation of Mankind."

workers is, in itself, a grave social evil. Not from men living always in danger of reduction to destitution by any interruption of their wage-earning can the community expect either perfect zeal or maximum development. One of Lenin's earliest announcements after assuming office promised an immediate expansion of the timid and tentative social insurance that had been introduced in 1912. The result was the transformation of this small and limited insurance fund into a system of unlimited and universal security to the entire wage-earning population, which stood in constant danger of being bereft of an income by any of the hazards of life. In our judgment this provision of economic security has been, during the past eighteen years, an important factor in making each workman conscious, not only of his soviet citizenship, but also of his joint ownership with his fellows of the whole of the means of production. The soviet worker realises, as the wage-earners of no other country do, that the future maintenance, in any adversity, of his wife and children, together with his own, have become a direct charge upon the community's yearly production, and a charge of which the administration is now entirely in the hands of his trade union organisation.¹

¹ Apart from the numerous reports and statistics published in Russian, detailed information as to social insurance is not easy to pick out of the most available books (already cited) which usually treat generally either of the conditions of labour or of the administration of medical aid. There is a useful bibliography of Russian sources, which are numerous and varied, in *Labor Protection in Soviet Russia*, by Dr. George M. Price (1928, 130 pp.), which is still the most convenient general survey; superseding the author's previous studies of 1913 and 1922 which were published among others on *Administration of Labor Laws and Factory Inspection in certain European Countries* (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin No. 142, and *Monthly Labour Review*, vol. xvi., June 1923); *The Trade Union Movement in Soviet Russia* (1927), and *Studies and Reports on the Medical Inspection of Labour* (both by the International Labour Office), should also be consulted, together with *Russia after Ten Years* (report of the American Trade Union Delegation to the Soviet Union, 1927, 96 pp.); and *Soviet Russia in the Second Decade*, edited by Stuart Chase, Robert Dunn and R. G. Tugwell (New York, 1928, 374 pp.); especially chap. ix. on "Labor Legislation and Social Insurance", by Paul H. Douglas; together with *The Condition of Labor in the USSR*, by L. Ginsburg (1927). Some information as to the administrative organisation of the past few years may be obtained in English from the volume entitled *The Ninth Trade Union Congress* (1933, 226 pp.), being the speeches of Shvernik and Kaganovich; and from the pamphlets entitled *Speech of Welcome to Foreign Delegates* (1933, 28 pp.) and *New Functions of the Soviet Trade Unions* (1933, 50 pp.), both by N. M. Shvernik. A useful article by Vassili Afanasi Kotov, collegium member and chief of the Social Insurance Bureau of the RSFSR appeared in the *Moscow Daily News* (weekly edition), June 5, 1933; see also his books on the subject (in Russian), *Social Insurance in Socialist Construction* (Moscow, 1933, 136 pp.) and the diagrammatic statistics entitled *Social Insurance in the USSR, 1928-1932*.

On this path of providing economic security, the Soviet Government at once boldly struck out, immeasurably beyond anything that had been contemplated by Prince Bismarck and Mr. Lloyd George under the name of social insurance. Thus, there is, in the USSR, no attempt to build up a capital fund from which the future benefits will be met ; there is consequently no question of charging high premiums to young and healthy people in order to accumulate reserves out of which to meet the increasing cost of their sickness and superannuation as they grow older ; and there is accordingly no idea of limiting the benefits by the amount of any fund so accumulated. There is, in fact, except for book-keeping purposes, no separate insurance fund ; the benefits each year are, in the main, provided from the collections of the year. Soviet Communism makes the discovery that the community does not grow older year by year, and therefore more liable to break down, as each individual does ; and with this fact, so successfully obscured by individualism, all necessity for the actuarial complications involved in the European and American conception of insurance simply disappear. Incidentally, the need for exacting, week by week, an individual contribution from each workman also disappears. Under Soviet Communism thrift recovers its primary meaning of a wise allocation of present resources. The provision for those who are at any particular time out of health, for the consequences of accidents whenever they occur, and for a socially beneficent and humane treatment of those who may be involuntarily unemployed, on the one hand ; and for the permanently disabled, the widow and the orphan, the aged and the superannuated, on the other, becomes part of the allocation of the annual income of the community, instead of a burden upon each individual or each locality. It may then be recognised that any such communal provision can most properly be made, not by accumulation and investment in securities, but year by year, out of income as the need occurs.¹

¹ We do not need here to discuss whether the advantageous effects upon character, of individual saving through personal contributions to separate insurance funds, are sufficient, in the capitalist countries, to outweigh the cost and complications of such funds. It is a mistake to suppose that there is no room for individual saving under Soviet Communism. There are other channels for saving which, in the USSR, allow for relatively large amounts being thus accumulated. The state savings banks, the successive internal loans, the growing share capital of the consumers' cooperative movement, the steady increase of capital accumulations of the manufacturing associations of owner-

How the System of Economic Security Developed

It would be hard to unravel, and tedious to recount, the various stages through which, between 1917 and 1935, both the administration and the benefits of soviet social insurance have passed.¹ It must suffice to note that the representatives of the workers in the cities pressed, persistently if sporadically, both for universality in the range of the scheme, and for generosity in the amount of its provisions. It was, from the first, agreed that no contribution should be collected from the workers themselves, whether managers or labourers. What is significant is the character of the consideration given to the continued demands for increase in the range and amount of the benefits. It is not too much to say that we find, in the discussions, no "enemy party". There has been no association of profit-making employers bringing pressure to bear on the Soviet Government to resist such encroachments on capitalist interests! No one objected to the trade unions, which include, it will be remembered, the most highly salaried directors and technicians, as well as all grades of manual labourers, obtaining all the net product. Whether the demand was for the inclusion, from the very first day of employment, of all sections of workers engaged at wages or salaries; or for full wages during temporary sickness without limit of time, from the first day of incapacity to work; or for the most complete and costly medical treatment; or for relieving the mother from the whole financial burden of maternity; or for promptly succouring the household left desolate through the death of the bread-winner, the issue raised was, not one of a division of the surplus between profits and wages, but merely the distribution of an agreed aggregate wage-fund between what should be spent as "personal wages" and as "socialised wages"

producers (incops) and of the collective farms (kolkhosi) and communes, the increasing ownership of the members of cooperative housing societies in the cities, and the policies taken out in the state life insurance department, together with the growing personal possessions in small livestock and household furniture of the members of the collective farms and those of the wage and salary earners in the urban areas, represent in the aggregate a large amount of individual savings. This, however, is doubtless still far behind the personal accumulations of the wage-earning class in Great Britain or in Scandinavia.

¹ These stages, down to 1926, are summarised, somewhat harshly, in *The Trade Union Movement in Soviet Russia* (International Labour Office, 1927); and, between 1927 and 1933, in the pamphlet *New Functions of the Soviet Trade Unions*, by N. M. Shvernik (1933, 50 pp.).

respectively. If the mass of the workmen preferred an enlargement of the socialised wages rather than further increase in the personal wages, the managements of the industrial trusts, or the Soviet Government, had no reason to object. The socialised wage, which came to the workmen and their families in their days of special need, at the time when they required exceptional succour, and in the form that was most advantageous to them, plainly "went further", from the standpoint of the community, than a like aggregate expenditure in monthly cash wages all round. What the administrators had to consider, with regard to each demand, was not so much what it would cost, as what would be the effect of this or that modification of the scheme of economic security upon the productivity of industry. In so far as the desired change made for increased protection against destitution, or improved health among the working population, or among the mothers, or among the children, and did not necessitate an actual reduction of personal wages, it was, from the standpoint of the Soviet Government, as of their administrative advisers, all to the good. On the other hand, any enlargement of benefits that tended to decrease the working efficiency of the individual worker, or the aggregate productivity of the establishment, had to be resisted, even if its direct cost could easily be afforded. If the rates of personal wages were not sufficiently high, in all grades above the lowest, to create the most general striving in the lower grades for an improvement in their several qualifications; and, if the rates in the higher grades were not sufficient to evoke the utmost effort from their members, the maximum productivity would not be attained. If the distribution of insurance benefits could be made such as would encourage the shock-brigaders and the "activists", whilst discouraging the merely apathetic members, this again would be all to the good. What had specially to be resisted was any change that threatened to increase slackness or absenteeism, or promote malingering. The alterations that the workmen sought in the machinery of administration had to be scrutinised in the same dry light. The factory committee, elected by the trade unionists, could be trusted to decide strictly on admission to benefit only if the committee, supported by the public opinion of the factory, realised that every day lost by the absence of a slacker or a malingerer involved a distinct lessening of output, from which

the entire staff of the establishment would suffer in a diminution of the expected increase of wages. Nothing but such a public opinion would enable the doctors, responsible to the People's Commissar of Health, to be sternly rigid in refusing medical certificates to those who failed to convince them of a genuine incapacity to continue at work. It is in the light of these considerations that the latest reforms in administration, now in course of being put in operation, and also the distinctive features of soviet insurance, must be viewed.

In the detailed administration there has been manifested a decided increase in the tendency to decentralisation. This has been going on during the last few years.¹ An important step was the establishment, mostly in the new enterprises started under the First Five-Year Plan, of local paying centres run by salaried officials in particular industrial areas. These grew rapidly in number, with the upgrowth of new industrial plants, state farms and machine and tractor stations, until in 1933 there were no fewer than 3500 of them. A still more important development was the establishment of 11 divisional offices, to keep separately the accounts, for the whole social insurance work throughout the USSR, of as many particular trade unions. These divisional offices in 1933 covered 6 million workers, and issued annually in benefits 930 million roubles, thus relieving the central social insurance office of a quarter of its accounting functions. The third step, decided on in 1932, was to extend this decentralisation of account-keeping to all the 47 trade unions (presently becoming 154), involving the setting up of many more divisional offices, one for each trade union; and making each of the 47 (now 154) trade union central councils severally responsible for the supervision and direction of the divisional office dealing with its own members from one end of the USSR to the other. At the same time the determination of policy, and, indeed, all general questions, were actually further centralised by the abolition of the several People's Commissars of Labour of the two dozen constituent and autonomous republics, and the transfer of all their functions, notably the administration of social insurance, to a single authority for the USSR as a whole. This was effected by concentration of these functions in the supreme trade union

¹ This is succinctly described (in Russian) in *Social Insurance in Socialist Construction*, by V. A. Kotov (Moscow, 1933, 136 pp.).

authority, the All-Union Congress of Trade Unions, in its triennial sessions ; and, between these sessions, in the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), which that congress elects. The whole edifice of health insurance is now administered, so far as the actual performance of medical services is concerned, by the professional staffs of the several People's Commissars of Health of the couple of dozen constituent and autonomous republics, who are largely dominated by the People's Commissar of Health of the RSFSR. With regard to everything else, including all the money payments, whether in personal benefits or in refund to the Health Commissariats of the doctors' salaries, the administration is in the hands of the several hierarchies of councils of the 154 trade unions, responsible in each case to the central council of the particular union, under the general direction, for the whole USSR, of the central committee representing all the 154 trade unions. The detailed work, including the admission to benefit, and even the fixing of its amount, is entrusted, under the instructions and supervision of the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions, to the factory committees, together with their subordinate insurance committees, elected by the trade unionists in the several establishments. Against any of their decisions there is an appeal to the higher authorities of the particular trade union, and, in need, even to the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions ; but to no outside authority. This was described by Shvernik, the secretary of the AUCCTU, as "The trade unions . . . passing over from control to direct administration".¹ The factory committee is even made respon-

¹ *New Functions of the Soviet Trade Unions*, by N. M. Shvernik (1933), p. 18.

As Shvernik explains, normally, in all enterprises, the authorities to decide upon the payment of benefits under social insurance, and to fix their rates, will be the factory committees of the several enterprises, in accordance with the instructions of the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions (AUCCTU). "The actual payment of benefits will be made by the management on the order of the factory committee, from the contributions paid by the management in accordance with the social insurance law. This will avoid delays and generally improve social insurance service for workers and office employees. In enterprises employing over 5000 workers these functions may be transferred from the general factory committee to the local committees in various shops or departments of the plant. In regard to workers and office employees in small enterprises or institutions, the trade-union district or local committees authorise the payment of the social insurance benefit, actual payment being made by the management of the enterprise. In the case of individuals working for private employers (household servants and so on) insurance benefit is determined and paid by the local district committee of the trade union.

"The instructions contain a further provision under which appeals against

sible for seeing that the management pays its contribution to social insurance with due regularity.

Distinctive Features

The first feature of social insurance in the USSR that will strike the student, and one that warrants the name of a system of economic security, is the wide range of its activities and the variety of its benefits. In contrast with the modest funeral benefit and exiguous sick-pay that began to be provided two centuries ago by the scanty pence of exceptionally provident groups of workmen—the British friendly societies—out of which the whole European system of social insurance may be said to have developed—we find in the USSR very nearly the whole wage-earning population, men, women and children (although not all peasants), provided, irrespective of any limit set by actuarial calculations or individual contributions, with an astonishingly long list of protective advantages, meeting, as they occur, not only the exceptional and occasional, but also many of the periodical needs of life, from birth to burial.¹ Only a part of these

refusal of benefit or rate fixed are submitted to the higher authority of the trade union, whose decision is binding. Appeals against incorrect payment or delays on the part of the management are submitted to the factory committee, which makes the final decision" (*Moscow Daily News*, November 18, 1933).

It will be noted by the student that the admission of the trade union to administration, in social insurance, as in taking over the "closed cooperatives" (see pp. 334–335), amounts to giving to the producers the administration, *not of what they produce, but of what they consume*. The trade union, in these cases, acts as an association of certain groups of the consumers of particular commodities or services.

¹ The considered judgment of an American expert in social insurance which he had studied in all the countries of Europe is impressive. Dr. Price in 1928 declared that "There are several distinctive features in the social insurance law of Soviet Russia which render this law much more beneficial to the workers than any other law extant. In the first place, the benefits of the social insurance act embrace *all* workers, members of labor unions, engaged for hire. . . . Secondly, the organisation and control, the collection of the insurance and its expenditure and distribution are all in the hands of the labor unions . . . and the workers themselves. Thirdly, while in all countries the workers are obligated to contribute a certain proportion of the insurance funds, ordinarily from thirty to forty per cent, in Soviet Russia the workers contribute nothing, but all the funds are collected from the enterprise—the establishment. In other words, a certain per cent of the wages, but not from the wages, is added by the enterprise, and is devoted to the purposes of social insurance. Fourthly, the rate of insurance contributions is larger than in any other country, for while in other countries it ranges from two to four per cent of the wages, in Russia it amounts on the average to not less than fourteen per cent, thus giving three and a half times as much protection as other countries. Finally, the soviet social insurance

protective advantages of the system of economic security are now commonly referred to as social insurance; indeed, many of them we have already described in our sections on maternity, infancy and health. It adds to the confusion that, on the usual principle of multiformity, many of these protective advantages are supplemented by additional provisions, made, in the USSR, not only by the government, central or local, but also by all sorts of organisations, out of all sorts of funds, and largely from voluntary collections.

A second point of interest in the social insurance provided by Soviet Communism is the simplicity of the machinery by which the collection of funds and the distribution of cash "benefits" is effected. On the revenue side the whole contribution is made, as part of its own working expenses, by the management of any establishment, of any kind whatsoever, employing persons at wages or salary. This contribution avoids all reference to the individuals concerned, and consists of a definitely fixed percentage of the aggregate of wages and salaries, including bonuses and other extra payments. This has automatically to be paid over at stated periods, by direct placing of the amounts to the credit of the social insurance authority at one or other branch of the State Bank, thus involving the very minimum of expenses or makes the most generous and extensive provisions for payments during temporary and permanent disability, for maternity and child welfare, and especially for medical care" (*Labor Protection in Soviet Russia*, by Dr. George M. Price, 1928, pp. 98-99).

The members of the federated manufacturing associations of owner producers (industrial cooperatives), who are technically not "employed", and who are consequently excluded from trade union membership, have a system of social insurance very much on the lines of that administered by the trade unions and managed by their supreme council. See, in Russian, *A Collection of Regulations on the Industrial Cooperatives and Kustar Industry*, by I. A. Selitzky and R. I. Khoysky, edited by Professor D. M. Genkin (Moscow, 1932); *On Treasuries of Mutual Insurance, and Mutual help in the Incops*, by Vsekopromsovietskass (1933); *The Mutual Insurance of the Incops on the New Road*, by A. Baulin and L. Heiftz (Moscow, 1934); *The Monetary Types of Benefits*, by R. Kats (Moscow, 1934); *The Bolshevik Tempo in Reconstruction of Treasuries*, by Vsekopromsovietskass (1934).

The members of the collective farms (kolkhosi), who are also as owner producers excluded from trade union membership, are now beginning to develop a similar system of economic security for orphans and the sick, including maternity and also accidents within each farm. This takes the simple form of allowing those unable to work nevertheless to receive their share of the joint produce. Only the nomadic tribes and the individual hunters and fishermen, and the surviving individual peasantry, together with the dwindling categories of the "deprived" and the non-wage-earning families of those sections, are now altogether outside the range of social insurance.

trouble for collection. On the expenditure side, nearly the entire medical service is, as we have described, rendered by the professional staff employed by the commissariat of health of each constituent or autonomous republic, and thus does not trouble the administrators of the money benefit. Admission to benefit, and the distribution of the money allowances, are both now entrusted to the several trade unions. The work is done in each factory, office or institution for its particular employees, for the most part gratuitously, as voluntary service, by some 50,000 "active" members of the trade unions concerned, under a special insurance commission appointed by each factory committee. This consists partly of members of the factory committee itself, but mostly of other trade unionists volunteering to serve. Under the reorganisation announced in the speech of L. Kaganovich at the Ninth Congress of Trade Unions in April 1932, and in that of N. M. Shvernik to the plenum of the AUCCTU in June 1933, the factory committee is responsible, for the proper performance of its social insurance work, to the central committee of its own union. But the supreme authority, which alone deals with general questions of social insurance policy, is not any one trade union, even in its highest council, but the All-Union Congress of Trade Unions, in its triennial sessions; and, between these sessions, the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions (AUCCTU) which the congress elects.¹

It is a remarkable feature of social insurance in the USSR that the contributions which the management of every establishment, whether "economic" or "cultural", employing persons at wages or salary is required to make, are not and have never

¹ Prior to 1933 the supreme administrative authority for special insurance in each constituent republic was shared between the People's Commissar of Labour and the People's Commissar of Health, responsible to the Sovnarkom (cabinet) of that republic. All these People's Commissars were, however, under the necessity of keeping their administration of health and of the labour laws in line, which meant, in substance, following the lead of that of the RSFSR under the directions of the USSR People's Commissar of Finance, in whose budget for the USSR their own several budgets had finally to be incorporated. The reform of 1933, which abolished the People's Commissars for Labour, and transferred all the functions of their commissariats in the several constituent republics to the trade union organisation of the whole USSR, headed by the AUCCTU, which acts for the whole country, may therefore—whilst further decentralising the administration of each function of the trade unions within each constituent republic—have amounted to a measure of centralisation for the USSR as a whole, in trade-union administration generally, including all the services of social insurance and labour protection.

been uniform, either in amount or in the rate per worker. They have, until 1933, been assessed, on the management of each establishment by the People's Commissars of Labour of the several constituent and autonomous republics, at a rate fixed for each enterprise in consultation with the trade unions, the several commissariats of health, and other experts and organisations conversant with the conditions. From 1933 onward they fall to be assessed by the presidium of the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions (AUCCTU) in similar consultation. The considerations to be taken into account are not strictly defined. They naturally include the particular hazard to health and liability to accident of the several occupations, but the economic and even the organisational position of each enterprise is not excluded. It could be stated in 1927 that "the average cost of insurance is about 14 per cent of the wages of the insured, and ranges from 10 to 20 per cent of the wages. Industrial and other establishments are divided into four groups. The first pays 16 per cent; the second, 18 per cent; the third, 20 per cent; and the fourth, 22 per cent, of the wages towards the insurance funds. Certain public institutions which are in bad financial condition enjoy privileged rates which amount only to 10, 12 and 14 per cent of the wages. Thus, certain state industries pay but 10 per cent, railroad and river transportation but 12 per cent, and forest industries but 14 per cent."¹ Whilst some of the rates vary from one year to another, no change in principle with regard to these contributions seems to be called for.

With the rapid and continuous growth of "industrialisation" the figures become ever more colossal. The total assessments for social insurance mount steadily year by year. In the fiscal year 1925-1926 the receipts were about 700 millions of roubles; in 1927-1928 they exceeded 1050 million roubles; in 1931 they were 2849 million roubles; in 1932 they seem to have reached 4399 million roubles; and in 1933, after the completion of the First Five-Year Plan, they attained no less than 4610 million roubles. This, as it was proudly remarked, was not far short of twice the aggregate budgets for all governmental expenditure whatsoever of four neighbouring states, namely, Italy (1870 million roubles), Poland (510 million roubles), Roumania (280 million roubles) and Latvia (48 million roubles). In 1934 the totals of

¹ *Labor Protection in Soviet Russia*, by George M. Price, M.D. (1928), p. 101.

social insurance reached 5050 million roubles, whilst the corresponding budget for 1935 was over 6079 million roubles, being more than five times as much as in 1927-1928. It is the administration of this immense sum of receipts and expenditure that is entrusted to the committees, councils and congresses of the 18 million members of the soviet trade unions. One-fourth of the total is distributed in cash benefits for temporary sickness ; about one-fourth repays the cost of medical aid supplied by the People's Commissars of Health, including hospitals ; more than a third is distributed in pensions to the aged and permanently disabled, and to widows and orphans ; whilst no inconsiderable fraction is spent in aid of housing accommodation on the one hand and the maintenance of rest houses on the other, both of them being regarded as directly benefiting the workers' health.

The elaborateness of the various benefits payable in cash, and the extent to which they are adjusted according to individual needs, are alike marks of a system of economic security. It is indeed a distinctive feature of the social insurance of the USSR that these cash benefits and other advantages, like the contributions of the several managements, exhibit no systematic or complete uniformity, either between district and district or between man and man. In many cases, as we shall see, they are given in proportion to the ascertained need of the particular family.

Death Benefit

In the history of what in Great Britain are called " friendly " benefits, the first to be adopted is always that of the cost of funerals. This is naturally included in the USSR scheme of economic security, actually in a much more liberal way than in any other country, but without any uniform or specified amount. On the death of any person included within the range of social insurance, including any dependent member of his household, the whole cost of civil interment is provided as a matter of course, to an amount varying from district to district according to the local charges. For a child, the payment is half as much as is allowed for an adult. In 1927 the average allowance was 28 roubles. But much more than burial is done for the bereaved family. The condition of the household is considered, and if the survivors (including those of deceased old-age pensioners) are

without adequate means of livelihood, their immediate needs are promptly met from the social insurance funds. The household income is temporarily increased according to what is required ; and steps are taken to find employment for those members who are capable of earning. If the total earnings, together with the provision for children made in the crèche or nursery school, kindergarten or elementary school, do not suffice for maintenance, the widowed mother may be further relieved. In fact, the primitive funeral benefit has been developed into an extensive provision, free from any taint of charity or pauperism, for the dependants of the deceased who are left in need. " If a worker leaves dependants who have no other means of support they are entitled to pensions from the social insurance department. A husband or wife of the deceased will be regarded as dependent provided they are unable to work, or have children below the age of 8 who claim their attention. Children under 16 years, and those over 16 who have been disabled before they reached that age, are also classed as dependants. If a worker dies from an industrial accident or disease, his dependants will receive somewhat more than if he dies from non-industrial causes. The scale for the first class of cases is one-third of the previous earnings for one dependant, one-half for two dependants and three-fourths for three or more ; while for the second class the scale is two-ninths, one-third and four-ninths respectively." ¹ There is accordingly no room in the USSR for the enterprise of the so-called industrial insurance corporations which extract so many millions annually from wage-earners of Great Britain and the United States.

Sickness Benefit

In all countries the most costly benefit in times of normal employment is that payable when the worker is certified to be

¹ *Russia after Ten Years* (Report of the American Trade Union Delegation to the Soviet Union, 1927), p. 49.

" Funeral benefit is paid on production of a death certificate, and in the case of a dependant a certificate of relationship must also be presented " (Provisional Instructions, issued November 1930, by the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions (AUCCTU) in *Moscow Daily News*, November 18, 1933).

On July 1, 1926, the number of relatives of deceased persons in receipt of pensions from the Social Insurance Funds was 246,273 (*Trade Union Movement in Soviet Russia*, International Labour Office, 1927, p. 91). In 1932 it had risen to 432,800. (See the diagrammatic statistics (in Russian) in *Social Insurance in the USSR, 1928-1932*, by V. A. Kotov (1934).

temporarily unable to pursue his or her occupation, whether from ordinary illness, or in consequence of an accident, or from an occupational disease; or because the family is placed in quarantine owing to the presence of infectious disease, or merely because the worker is required to absent himself or herself from work to care for a sick dependant. Any worker within the range of social insurance, and being a member of a trade union, becomes eligible for this benefit irrespective of the amount of salary or wage, and also irrespective of the means of the family, as soon as he or she has completed two months' service in any one establishment, obtains a certificate from the establishment doctor and does not refuse or neglect to conform to the medical treatment prescribed.¹ Unlike the practice elsewhere, in the USSR the cash benefit becomes payable, not after any waiting period, but from the very first day of incapacity for earning. The amount of the cash benefit is not any arbitrarily fixed and uniform sum, but full wages—meaning, however, only the standard time rate, not the piece-work earnings, and subject to a maximum of $7\frac{1}{2}$ roubles per day or 180 roubles per month. "The worker is in addition furnished with free medical attendance throughout the period of his disability. This medical service is not confined to the general practitioner as is the case under the British Health Insurance system, but carries with it the services of such specialists as oculists, dentists and surgeons. Free hospital care is also provided, as are drugs, medicine and appliances such as artificial limbs. It should be emphasised that this medical care is not confined as under the British system to the wage-earners alone, but is also extended to their families."²

Invalidity and Old-Age Benefit

Where a worker within the range of social insurance is wholly or partially unable to work, not by reason of an illness assumed to be temporary, but by infirmity of an apparently permanent character, including that due to old age,³ he or she is entitled

¹ "Under the most recent arrangements the factory committee determine the right to benefit, its amounts and period, on the basis of medical certificate, period of work (total and in the given place of work, statement whether insured, member of trade union, shock worker)" (*Moscow Daily News*, November 18, 1933).

² *Russia after Ten Years* (Report of the American Delegation to the Soviet Union, 1927), p. 42.

³ The old-age pensions, apart from those for premature disability, have been

to claim an examination by a small commission of medical experts for the determination of the degree and character of the disability and infirmity. This, according to the scheme in force in 1927, is divided into six groups as follows, three involving total and three partial disability. The highest is that of total disability coupled with a condition requiring the constant attendance or assistance of another person; such is the condition of the blind, the paralysed or the bedridden. A second group is that of those totally disabled but not requiring personal attendance, such as those seriously crippled, but able to get about on crutches. This is distinguished from the third group, where the disability to perform remunerative work is total, but is without personal disability apart from work, such as the extreme infirmity of healthy old age. The three other groups are defined by degrees of partial inability to perform remunerative work of some sort, which may be assessed at one-third disability, one-sixth disability or one-tenth disability. The amount of cash benefit, which is payable whatever the amount of salary or wage latterly earned, and also irrespective of means, is made to depend on whether the disability is due to industrial accident or occupational disease on the one hand, or on the other, to general causes, such as old age, or chronic infirmity unconnected with the occupation. If falling within the former class, after a prescribed minimum of service varying from 6 to 9 years, according to occupations, Group I. receives full wages; Group II. two-thirds wages; Group III. one-half wages; Group IV. one-third wages. If within the latter class, no cash benefits are payable for Groups IV., V. and VI., but Group I. gets two-thirds wages, Group II. four-ninths wages, and Group III. one-third wages. "The average monthly payment in March 1927 for the first grade of disabled from industrial causes was 45 roubles; and 34 roubles for the non-industrially disabled."¹

recently increased. They are now given to workers with 20 to 25 years' service (varying according to occupation), at the age of 60, or for women 55. In specially onerous or dangerous trades, such as coal mining, the age for pension is 50, and the qualification only 15 or 20 years' service. The pension is usually 75 per cent of wages, varying according to occupation, but in no case less than 50 per cent.

In 1931 the number of pensions paid to "the invalids of labour" for premature retirement from illness, accident and occupational diseases had risen to 705,000 besides 40,500 old-age pensions and 26,700 for long service (*Social Insurance in the USSR, 1928-1932*, by V. A. Kotov, 1932, p. 25).

¹ *Labor Protection in Soviet Russia*, by Dr. George M. Price (1928), p. 104.

On July 1, 1927, the number of persons receiving pensions in respect of

It must not be assumed that such liberal provision for infirmity and old age prevails for all workers all over the USSR, even in the case of trade union members. The scheme is, however, steadily extending both its geographical and its industrial range. In 1927-1928 the total paid in cash benefits in respect of permanent disability was stated as 204 million roubles, with something like 300,000 beneficiaries. In 1932 the total payments from social insurance funds under this head had risen to 480 million roubles.

Maternity Benefit

We have already seen that women, whether trade union members themselves, or the wives of members,¹ receive free medical attendance in pregnancy and childbirth; and those earning wages or salary are required to take either twelve or sixteen weeks' leave of absence from their employment during which they receive full time-work wages, all regardless of the amount of salary or wage, and also irrespective of family means. They must further be set free from work for half an hour, without loss of wages, at intervals of three and a half hours, in order that the infant may be breast-fed. But they also receive a fixed money grant for the infant's requirements in clothes, etc., now amounting to 32 roubles. There is even a further grant toward the infant's maintenance, now amounting to 20 roubles per month, sometimes issued in kind, for the first nine months of the infant's life.

disablement in the USSR was 309,589 (*The Trade Union Movement in Soviet Russia*, International Labour Office, 1927, p. 191).

In 1933 the scheme of invalidity pensions was stated as follows: "Under the Soviet social insurance legislation labour invalids are: workers and employees who have partially lost their ability to work at their trade and are forced to engage in easier occupation (third category); those who have completely lost their ability to work but are not in need of outside care (second category); and those who have completely lost their ability to work and are in need of being taken care of by another person (first category). Workers employed in the leading industries (metal, coal, chemical, mining, machine building, etc.) may under certain conditions receive pensions up to 90 per cent of their wages, if classed under the first category; up to 70 per cent if belonging to the second category; and up to 56 per cent if belonging to the third category." For workers in other industries the percentages of pensions to wages are 80, 60 and 46 respectively. If the disability has occurred by accident or occupational disease, the percentages are 100, 75 and 50 respectively (article by V. A. Kotov, head of the Social Insurance Bureau of the RSFSR, in *Moscow Daily News* (weekly edition), June 5, 1933).

¹ Whether or not the mating had been legally registered as a marriage. See the Russian work *The Protection of Motherhood and Childhood in the Country of the Soviets*, by V. P. Lebedeva (Moscow, 1934), 263 pp.

" This payment . . . is used by the Commissariat of Health as a means of keeping in touch with these mothers and getting them to follow medical advice in caring for their children."¹ In 1925-1926 the cash benefits in connection with maternity payable from social insurance funds amounted to no less than 93 million roubles, including " 24 million roubles for the period before and after confinement, 23 million to buy necessities for the infants, and 46 millions to feed them ".² In 1934 these amounts had risen nearly sixfold.

Unemployment Benefit

As we have already mentioned, no unemployment benefit has been payable in the USSR since October 1930, as the trade-union officials, in supersession of the former labour exchanges, can now undertake promptly to find employment at trade union rates of wages in an occupation within the capacity of any able-bodied man or woman, although not necessarily in their own trade or at their present place of residence. He or she can be assisted to move to the place where the vacancy exists. In the case of young men or women, who may be deemed eligible for training for work requiring some degree of skill which they do not possess, the necessary training may be provided free, accompanied by allowances for maintenance. Anyone incapable of work must be medically certified, and is then dealt with under the heading of sickness or infirmity. It is believed that through the operation of Planned Production for Community Consumption as explained in our previous chapter, there need never be any involuntary mass unemployment of wage-earners in the USSR.

The severe limitation of the previous unemployment cash benefit in the USSR is in contrast with the extreme liberality of the payments to the sick, the infirm and the aged. It may be instructive to set out the arrangements for unemployment benefit as they existed between 1925 and 1930.

¹ *Russia after Ten Years* (Report of the American Trade Union Delegation to Soviet Russia, 1927).

" On the presentation of a birth certificate, a wage certificate of the previous month, and a certificate from the child's place of residence, the factory shop committee issues an order for payment to the mother of 32 roubles for baby clothes, and a first payment of 20 roubles for infant nursing. As soon as the latter has been paid, an order is issued for the second part of the benefit (Provisional Instructions issued November 1933, by the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, in *Moscow Daily News*, November 18, 1933).

² *Labor Protection in Soviet Russia*, by Dr. George Price (1928), p. 105.

The unemployment benefit of the USSR differed, in fact, so long as it was in operation, substantially from all the other forms of social insurance developed by Soviet Communism. It was so far from being a system of economic security that only a fraction—perhaps one-fifth, or even less—of the workers actually without employment in any month obtained any money payment.¹ Unlike the sickness and maternity benefits, it was limited (by a stringent “means test”) to those without any income whatsoever. It never amounted to anything like full wages, being only between one-fifth and one-half of the applicant’s previous earnings. Moreover, the applicant, although not required to be actually a trade-union member, had to prove a definite minimum of previous industrial employment.

Down to 1930, members of trade unions unable to find employment, whose membership was of one year’s standing, could register as unemployed and as claimants for unemployment benefit, either with their trade-union unit or at the government labour exchange. If they had for any valid reason dropped out of trade union membership, they could, on production of evidence of previous trade union affiliation and of their last employment, be registered at the government labour exchange. There was also, for all but skilled workers and juveniles, a qualifying period of employment; in the case of unskilled manual working members of trade unions, one year’s service in some non-agricultural occupation; for non-members, three years’ service. For other salaried employees the qualifying period was, for members three years’ service and for non-members five years’. No unemployment

¹ The number of men and women receiving unemployment benefit during 1925–1926 varied from 236,000 to 587,000. “It will be seen that only a little over a fourth of those who were out of work were given unemployment benefit. The amounts distributed are, however, considerable, amounting to 30·5 million roubles in 1924–1925, and approximately 41·5 million roubles in 1925–1926 (*Soviet Russia in the Second Decade*, edited by Stuart Chase, Robert Dunn and R. G. Tugwell, New York, 1928, p. 235).

It is, however, to be noted that: “The unemployed are also given in addition very great reductions in rent so that in the cities they are virtually given free housing. Another interesting method of relief is the establishment of cooperative labour societies where the unemployed who are not eligible for benefits are employed for six months’ periods in producing articles of a handicraft nature. At the end of six months one worker is replaced by another unemployed worker. The goods are sold on the open market but there is a slight deficit which is met by grants from the social insurance fund amounting to 6·5 million roubles in 1925–1926. Construction work in government projects absorbs still more of the unemployed, and in all about 110,000 were cared for by these methods during the last year” (*ibid.* p. 235).

benefit was payable to workers in agriculture, even if they had been employed at wages.

The amount of unemployment benefit varied in a complicated way according to the category of the applicant, the average time-work wage in his district, and the number of persons dependent on him. "The country", we read, "is divided into six belts and the average earnings of all workers computed for each. Skilled manual workers and salaried employees with a higher education (Class A) are paid one-third of the average earnings in their belt. Semi-skilled manual workers and higher grade salaried employees (Class B) are paid one-fourth of the average; and unskilled manual workers and all the remaining salaried employees (Class C) are paid one-fifth. This is an interesting compromise between the flat-rate system of benefits irrespective of earning power, as in the British system, and the payment of percentage of individual earnings. . . . Since Class C, however, when at work, earned much less than Class A, this in practice means that the members of Class C receive a higher percentage of their earnings than do Class A. The average monthly payments in March 1927 to the unemployed in the first group was 17 roubles; the average for the remainder was 11 roubles 40 kopeks. The usual practice of increasing the amount of unemployment benefits according to the number of dependants is also followed. Those with one dependant are given an additional sum amounting to 15 per cent of the sum paid in benefits; those with two dependants are paid an additional 25 per cent, and those with three or more, 35 per cent. The entire amount received by the worker in benefits, however, must not exceed one-half of his previous earnings."¹

The period during which unemployment benefit would be paid was also strictly limited. It was payable only for a period of nine months in any one year in the case of skilled workmen, and six months in the case of the unskilled; but no more than eighteen monthly payments were made over any length of time to any skilled man, or twelve to any unskilled man. On the other

¹ *Russia after Ten Years* (Report of the American Trade Union Delegation to the Soviet Union, 1927), pp. 46-47. The total disbursed in unemployed benefits in 1928-1929 was only 136 million roubles, when there were 10,540,000 insured persons. Thus the average unemployed benefit drawn in that year by each insured person was only 13 roubles, which probably represented something like one month's average unemployment benefit (article by V. A. Kotov, head of the Social Insurance Bureau of the RSFSR, in *Moscow Daily News* (weekly edition), June 5, 1933).

hand, the unemployed were entitled to receive, during their unemployment, the usual cash benefits in respect of sickness, pregnancy or confinement; free medical attendance; the allowance for new-born infants; and death benefits—just as if they were employed.

Other Benefits of Social Insurance

We have even now not exhausted the ramifications of social insurance in the USSR. Out of the social insurance monies collected from the managements of all the enterprises, economic or cultural, employing persons at wages or salaries—in all cases assessed as a percentage upon the aggregate wage-bill—various miscellaneous advantages are provided or subsidised for the benefit of the wage-earners. With one of these, that of improved dwelling accommodation, we deal separately as part of the transformation of the environment.¹

Rest Houses and Sanatoria

An interesting adjunct of the social insurance departments is the vast array of trade union “rest houses” (holiday homes) and sanatoria (convalescent homes), largely provided by the various governments in the allocation for this purpose of royal palaces and mansions of the wealthy, from the Tsar’s immense residences at Peterhof (near Leningrad) and Livadia (in the Crimea), down to the rich homes on the islands of the Neva, and in the suburbs of all the cities, as well as at various spas in the Caucasus and the luxurious villas that line the shores of the Black

¹ The financial contribution thus made to housing is important. “The social insurance departments”, it could be said as early as 1927, “have invested large sums of money in [the] building of workers’ houses; 60 million roubles, or 10 per cent of the total capital, has been invested in these workers’ houses.” More generally, the social insurance contribution takes the form of subsidising other schemes of providing improved dwellings. “In 1926–1927 there were invested 340 million roubles in these undertakings. In 1926–1927 there were 380,000 workers supplied with new houses” (*Labour Protection in Soviet Russia*, by Dr. George M. Price, 1928, p. 106). In 1933 the amount to be spent on the construction of new dwellings from social insurance funds was estimated at 600 million roubles (*New Functions of the Soviet Trade Unions*, by N. M. Shvernik, 1933, p. 20).

In 1932 the total expenditure on housing from social insurance funds was no less than 700 million roubles (article by V. A. Kotov, head of the Social Insurance Bureau of the RSFSR, in *Moscow Daily News* (Weekly Edition), June 5, 1933; and see his *Social Insurance in Socialist Construction* (Russian), Moscow, 1933).

Sea. Many of these residences are wholly or partly maintained, whilst new ones are being built and furnished, out of social insurance funds, with the object of eventually having sufficient accommodation to allow every worker to spend his or her annual holiday, and every sick person to enjoy the necessary period of convalescence, in the most advantageous surroundings. At present only a fraction of the working population can be so accommodated. But already "in 1925-1926, 455,286 persons were housed in rest homes, constituting 5.11 per cent of the workers. In 1925-1926 nearly eight million roubles were paid by the insurance funds; and in 1927-1928 nearly twelve million roubles."¹ In 1933 the estimated amount to be so spent from social insurance funds was 20 million roubles. In 1933 "the social insurance bodies have at their disposal 311 rest homes, accommodating 73,000 people; 98 sanatoria, some of which are situated in watering-places, accommodating 19,925 people. The value of these rest homes and sanatoria, including their equipment, exceeds 130 million roubles. The rest homes can receive 1,140,000 people [yearly] on a basis of fortnightly vacations, while the sanatoriums, on a basis of monthly vacations, can receive 141,330. . . . The new construction is also put at our disposal. At present 50 rest homes calculated to accommodate 16,745 people, and 29 sanatoriums calculated to accommodate 10,925 people, are being built. The capital invested in this new construction amounts to 158 million roubles . . . but this does not exhaust the assets. The rest homes and sanatoriums have large subsidiary farm lands whose total sown area exceeds 41,000 hectares. Also these farms already own over 5000 head of milch cows, over 10,000 pigs, over a quarter of a million head of poultry, and so on. . . . This farming is still new to the social insurance bodies, for the business is not yet two years old."²

Personal Credit

A remarkable adjunct of soviet social insurance, a characteristic example of the extent to which, in the USSR, voluntary cooperation is intertwined with collective organisation, is the vast network of "mutual aid" societies with which the greater part

¹ *Labor Protection in Soviet Russia*, by Dr. George M. Price, (1928), p. 160.

² *New Functions for Soviet Trade Unions*, by N. M. Shvernik, (1933), p. 21.

of the USSR is covered.¹ This is wholly a growth of the past ten years. The societies are practically personal credit associations, having as their main purpose the grant of small loans to their members, without any security whatsoever. The societies are not of the nature of the cooperative credit societies, so widely extended in Germany, India and other countries, where the members usually have to find sureties guaranteeing the repayment of their loans, and where the loans are almost always to enable the borrower to extend his own profit-making enterprises. The loans made by the Soviet mutual aid societies are seldom, if ever, secured by the guarantee of sureties; they are free of interest; and they are wholly unconnected with any profit-making enterprise of the borrower. These societies meet a common need of the wage-earning class in all countries, in cases when there is nothing on which the pawnbroker will make the necessary advance, of an opportunity of borrowing a small sum for some extraordinary expenditure—it may be a necessary journey, or some outlay incidental to illness, or some requirement of an adolescent son or daughter, or even the payment of a fine incurred for some petty misdemeanour. In Great Britain and the United States there is little or nothing to stand, in such needs, between the borrower and the unscrupulous money-lender. The soviet mutual aid societies make loans without interest for such purposes as taking a holiday; or paying a visit to Moscow for shopping; or for a journey to visit sick relatives; or for laying in cheaply the winter's stock of fuel and other household commodities; or even for buying one of the state lottery bonds. Moreover, in some cases the mutual aid society makes charitable gifts to its members in special distress; and it frequently supplements the social insurance sickness benefits in the cases of low-paid workers receiving sums inadequate for the support of their families.² It was, in fact, out of the insufficiency of the social

¹ For Mutual Aid Societies see *Soviet Trade Unions*, by Robert W. Dunn (1928), pp. 220-221. The circular relating to their organisation issued by the AUCCTU in 1925 is mentioned in *The Trade Union Movement in Soviet Russia* (International Labour Office, 1927), p. 186; *The Ninth Congress of Trade Unions* (1933), pp. 166-167.

² They are recognised as the organ of benevolence of the trade unions. "At the same time", said the People's Commissar of Labour in 1932, "there are some workers in low qualification who are the only breadwinners of the family. The material condition of such workers is not very satisfactory. We must help these workers, pay special attention to them, raise their qualifications so that they can increase their wages, and help them by giving places to their children

insurance benefits in its earlier years that these mutual aid societies arose in 1932-1933 among the trade unionists themselves. They are still closely associated with them, but are formally quite independent. They are open to all workers, whether trade unionists or not ; but most of the members belong to one or other trade union. In 1927 it was estimated that as many as 40 per cent of all the trade unionists belonged also to a mutual aid society, of which there were estimated to be 20,000 in the USSR. They are mostly under the influence of the trade union to which most of the members belong, and they may even be said to be under its general direction. They are fully recognised by the All-Union Central Committee of the Trade Unions, which has issued a decree regulating their activities. Their members pay regular contributions, usually of one-half of one per cent of the wage earned, the amount being fixed by the general meeting of members, by which the society is governed.

Imperfections of the System

The scheme of economic security by way of social insurance in the USSR is so general in its character, so elaborate in its provision and so liberal in its treatment of all classes of sufferers ¹ that it is hard to describe it otherwise than in terms of eulogy. It is none the less necessary to think deliberately of its imperfections and shortcomings, and to attempt some measurement of them. Let us note, in the first place, that the scheme of social insurance is still very far from extending to the whole population of the USSR. Excluded from nearly all its benefits are the nomadic tribes, and indeed also many of the numerous backward peoples of Siberia and the Caucasian highlands and those within the Arctic circle or in remote parts of Central Asia ; the surviving individual peasantry throughout the whole Union, representing a population of nearly twenty millions, and the isolated families up and down the land living upon hunting or fishing. The population of the quarter of a million collective farms (kolkhosi), numbering

in the crèches, kindergartens, etc. *We also have a very good method of assisting these workers by means of the Mutual Aid Societies.* All these methods must be studied and investigated, both by the department of Labour and by the trade unions" (*Ninth Congress of Trade Unions, 1933, report by the People's Commissariat of Labour (A. M. Tsikhon), pp. 166-167.*)

¹ Except the able-bodied unemployed.

something like seventy or eighty millions, have, in their communal support of invalids or orphans among their membership, a system of economic security of their own. But apart from the above-named exclusions, which cover a very large part, perhaps one-seventh of the whole population, it must be realised that, as we have elsewhere described, the whole service of health can be considered adequate only in the urban or industrialised areas. In the vast Ural plains all the social services are improving year by year, but measured against British or Swiss or Scandinavian experience, the medical aid, good as it is in particular cases, cannot at present be said to reach a high degree of promptitude or accessibility, even compared with the ubiquitous medical service under the English Poor Law.

The money benefits are expressed in scales of great liberality, with remarkable adaptation to individual needs. But the total payments during the year seem to indicate that the sufferers do not all get the benefits to which they appear to be entitled. The insurance machinery is apparently not so comprehensive at the periphery as it is in the great centres of population. It looks as if there were, in the great open spaces of the USSR, a good many hapless individuals, mostly among the dwindling number of independent workers, who are pressed down by want and sickness, and who fail to secure either the medical treatment or the pecuniary assistance that the system of social insurance provides for those who are members of one or other kind of collective organisation.

From the standpoint of British and German experience the gravest defect in the system of Soviet Communism might be thought to be its encouragement of malingering. It is hard to believe that with so generous a scale of benefits there are not many persons receiving them who are not rightly entitled to do so. The "wall newspapers" of the factories often contain allusions to this or that person as a notorious "slacker", too often staying away from work on one pretext or another. The payment of full time wages from the very first day of absence through illness, and therefore even for the slightest and most transient indisposition, must certainly (it would be said elsewhere) produce a whole crowd of malingerers. This is declared not to occur. Many people, who ought to know, assert that there is very little malingering in the USSR, and that the medical inspection and

supervision is so thorough, and so completely disinterested and impartial, that the certification may be implicitly trusted. We cannot pretend to judge. In support of the contention it is to be noted that there is no "free choice of doctor". It seems to us that unusual authority is accorded to the certificate of inability to work given by the medical officer, who is employed by the People's Commissar of Health, and is in no way amenable to pressure from the patients or claimants of sickness benefit. Moreover "sick leave after ten days is only continued after consultation between the doctor treating the case and a medical board composed of several doctors. If differences of opinion arise, the case is referred to the medical supervisory committee. There are thus", reports Sir Arthur Newsholme, who speaks as an expert, "ample safeguards against malingering, which is said not to exist."¹

American observers tend to confirm the judgment of eminent British authorities on this point; and supply more interesting grounds for their belief. "There are," it is said, "no doubt, cases of malingering, but social consciousness of the workers and the effective medical service combine to keep it within minor dimensions. This is proved by the fact that the average number of days lost in the USSR, exclusive of time lost by childbirth and nursing, was only 8 in 1924-1925, 8.8 in 1925-6, and a yearly rate during the first six months of 1926-1927 fiscal year of only 7.8."² This low rate seems to have been maintained even whilst the social insurance benefits have been increasing in generosity. The head of the social insurance bureau of the RSFSR, V. A. Kotov, stated that "while in 1929, for 100 insured persons 885 days were lost through sickness, in 1932 this figure dropped to 754".³ The

¹ *Red Medicine*, by Sir A. Newsholme and Dr. J. A. Kingsbury, (1933), p. 190.

² *Russia after Ten Years* (Report of the American Trade Union Delegation of the Soviet Union, 1927), pp. 43-44. It may be observed that these statistics of days lost through sickness among twenty millions of insured persons, representing a quarter of the whole population of the USSR, do not lend support to the wild assertions of widespread starvation, or even of universal insufficiency of food, during recent so-called "famine years".

³ Article by V. A. Kotov, in *Moscow Daily News* (Weekly Edition), June 5, 1933. The diagrammatic statistics of V. A. Kotov (in Russian *Social Insurance in the USSR, 1928-1932*, pp. 18-23) enable us to continue these figures. In 1928 the number of days paid for in respect of temporary incapacity were 8.41; in 1930, 8.38; in 1931, 8.12. In the different quarters of these years the range was only between 10 and 13 days. Tuberculosis, influenza, ulcerations and lesions were the worst causes, together with rheumatism.

The principal industries alone show a larger number of days lost than the

American observers go on to note that "this is in sharp contrast with the German experience, where, with a waiting period, and with benefits amounting to only a part of the wage, the average number of days lost annually has ranged within recent years between 12 and 15. . . . The country with by far the more liberal system of benefits shows less lost time, although medicine and public sanitation are more advanced in Germany than in Russia. The full reasons for this are not yet conclusively established, but from our enquiries we are convinced that it is largely due to (1) the full medical attendance and treatment which are given to the workers and their families; and (2) the tendency of ill or injured workers, when the benefits are only a fraction of their wages, to return to work before they are well, thus rendering them more susceptible to future illnesses, and consequently causing them to lose additional time. A low scale of benefits seems therefore to be false economy, even when judged by the purely monetary standards." The latest statistics for the USSR show a continuance of the fall in the percentage of days lost through sickness, in years in which the British as well as the German figures register disquieting increases. The reduction is particularly marked in most of the heavy industries, due, it is suggested, to improvements in the sanitation and safety of the factories.

We can only add that, so far as we have been able to ascertain, expert opinion in the USSR sees no reason for alarm as to the possible adverse effect on productivity of the extremely generous provisions of its scheme of social insurance, any more than from the very wide endowment of the wage-earning community with economic security.

Training for Life

Four days after its seizure of power, the Bolshevik Government formulated, in a decree by A. V. Lunacharsky, a remarkable long-term programme of educational reconstruction, evidently inspired largely by Lenin himself, which attracted no attention whatever in the western world. If to-day we refer to this revolu-

entire total of insured persons. Thus the average worker in the rubber industry in 1928 lost 16 days, reduced in 1932 to less than 11 days; in the leather industry 15 days, reduced in 1932 to 11; in basic chemicals, and also in the boot and shoe industry, under 14 days, reduced in 1932 to less than 11 and less than 9 respectively. All the industries reduced their average of days lost in 1932 as compared with 1928, by between 15 and 33 per cent (*The USSR in Figures*, Moscow, 1934, p. 203).

tionary programme, it is not because it gives an accurate picture of any of the social services that now exist in the USSR. It is needless to say that the sweeping proposals of 1917, have in 1935 not yet been put in operation all the way from the Baltic to the Pacific. It is probable, indeed, that (in eighteen years) no one of them has been carried out in its entirety. In these pages we seek only to distinguish the main trends of Soviet Communism in the vast field of the training of the new generation for life; the direction in which this service has moved since 1917, and in which it is still moving. What seems to us significant is that we can find no better way of emphasising these trends than by summarising what was laid down in the hectic first week of the assumption of government, and expanded into 32 articles by the decree of October 16, 1918.¹

¹ Lunacharsky's decree, signed by him as People's Commissar of Education on October 29, 1917, and published on November 1, 1917, together with the fuller decree of October 16, 1918, will be found in the (Russian) *Collection of Decrees and Resolutions on Education* (Moscow, 1918), vol. i., pp. 156 and 107. There are available, apart from the mass of Russian sources, many useful descriptions in English of educational work in the USSR. Perhaps the most convenient summary is given in the *Educational Year Book* for 1933, in an authoritative article by Dr. N. Hans, who has also published a volume on *The History of Russian Educational Policy (1701-1917)* (1931, 206 pp.); and another (with S. Hessen), extremely critical, entitled *Educational Policy in Soviet Russia* (1929, 250 pp.); continued down to 1932 in a German edition entitled *Funfzehn Jahre Sowjetschulwesen* (1933, 260 pp.). These should be supplemented for past history by *Education and Autocracy in Russia from the Origin of the Bolsheviks*, by D. B. Leary (University of Buffalo Press, 1919); and for soviet projects by *Les Problèmes de l'instruction publique en régime soviétique*, by A. W. Lunacharsky (Paris, 1925) as well as by the valuable publication by VOKS at Moscow, entitled *The School in the USSR*, and *The Higher School in the USSR* (both 1933). Other sympathetic surveys from different angles will be found in *Civic Training in Soviet Russia*, by Professor S. N. Harper (1929); *New Minds, New Men*, by T. Woody (1931), with bibliography of over 400 items; *The New Schools of New Russia*, by Lucy L. W. Wilson (1928); and the articles by John Dewey in *The New Republic* for November and December 1928, largely republished as *Impressions of Soviet Russia and the Revolutionary World* (1929). A useful succinct account of recent date is *The Broad Highway of Soviet Education*, by C. A. Harrison, with preface and notes by Beatrice L. King (1934). *Soviet Education*, by R. D. Charques (1932, 48 pp.), is an exposition of the ideas inspiring all the work. These ideas, as expressed in Stalin's speeches, are given in a compilation entitled *On Technology*, by J. Stalin, issued by the Cooperative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers (Moscow, 1932, 80 pp.). Much of actual practice may be picked up from *Youth in Soviet Union*, by Vladimir Zaitsev (1934). See also *Education in Soviet Russia*, by Scott Nearing (1926); *Schools, Scholars and Teachers in Soviet Russia*, by N. T. Goode (1929); the chapters by G. S. Counts and C. Washburne in *Soviet Russia in the Second Decade* (1928); see also "Education in the USSR" by G. S. Counts, in *The New Republic*, February 13, 1935. The lengthy exposition of theory and policy by a distinguished soviet professor, *The New Education in the Soviet Republic*, by A. Pinkevich (1929), should also

Tsarist Russia was, of course, not without an educational service of magnitude, and within its chosen narrow scope, even of a certain efficiency. By the efforts of the more enlightened Zemstvos and a few philanthropists, this service had been considerably extended during the generation preceding the war. But educational work was scarcely encouraged by the Tsar, the Holy Synod and the bureaucracy, and was tolerated only as a class system on old-fashioned lines, designed mainly for the production of enough doctors, lawyers, teachers, clerical officials and other specialists for the use of the Court and the government, the nobility and the wealthy. The idea of educating the mass of the population, even as far as reading and writing, found no favour with the autocracy. What Lenin and his colleagues committed themselves to in 1917 was the complete sweeping away of this autocratically limited, pedantically inspired, class system of pedagogic dogmatism, in order to substitute for it a universal and classless provision of both "enlightenment"¹ and training for life in all its fullness and variety, for all ages from infancy to manhood; disregarding practically all ancient scholastic tradition; avowedly based exclusively on the latest science in every branch, and free from every kind of mysticism; devoted to the end of fitting everyone for life in the service of the community; the whole system to be, in principle, gratuitous, secular and universally obligatory. But Lenin's programme expressed in Lunacharsky's decree, and expanded by that of October 16, 1918, also outlined precisely how these revolutionary ideas were to be carried out. It included such specific proposals as the universal adoption of co-education² in all subjects and at all ages; and a ten-years'

be consulted. His smaller manual, *Science and Education in the USSR* (1935, 176 pp.) gives a later survey. Over 60 recent German publications on education in the USSR are listed in the bibliography entitled *Die Soviet-Union 1917-1932*, edited by Klaus Mehnert (1933). Among French works may be noted *La Pédagogie scolaire en Russie soviétique*, by Eugene Devaud (Paris, 1932); and *Les Problèmes fondamentaux de l'École de Travail*, by Pistrak (Paris, 1927); *Organisation et principes de l'enseignement en URSS*, par Jean J. Trillat (Paris, 1933, 70 pp.).

¹ "It cannot be made too clear at the start that soviet education embraces much more than the school system. A point worth noting to begin with is that the strict meaning of the word *prosveshchchenia*, which is always used nowadays to signify 'education' is 'enlightenment'. 'The People's Commissariat of Enlightenment' is indeed a much juster and more accurate title than 'Board of Education' for the soviet government department which administers education in each of the constituent republics of the Union" (*Soviet Education*, by R. D. Charques, 1932, p. 11).

regular course of schooling from 8 to 17 inclusive for every boy and girl from the Baltic to the Pacific without any examinations or any punishments. To this was soon added the organisation of an equally universal provision of appropriately graded "pre-schooling" from the infant in its third year up to the age of 8; and of a no less widely spread five-years' course of specialised vocational and scientific training from 18 to 22, for all careers, and this not for a selected minority, but, with stipends or maintenance allowances, for all who show themselves capable of it. Most revolutionary of all was, perhaps, the determination to unite, at all stages, in what we shall have to call the "polytechnical school", theory and practice, learning and doing, science and experiment, the teacher's lectures with the pupil's own constructive creation—always with the fundamental object of training for life, and under the influence of a deliberate intention of bridging, and even ultimately of superseding, the distinction between the brain worker and the manual labourer, not to say also the intellectual cleavage between the city and the village. It is in this broad outline that we find the main trends of the soviet educational system of to-day.

Universalism

We need waste no words in appraising either the mere magnitude of the increase effected since 1917, or in reciting the particular achievements in 1935 of the soviet service of education. We may note, however, that so great was the social devastation of 1914–1921 that, for years, nearly all the schools and colleges in the USSR sank down to the lowest depths, with the teachers on starvation wages; destitute alike of proper accommodation and often even of heating, together with books and writing paper, ink and pencils.¹ So little attention could be given to education by the sorely taxed soviet authorities that it took a whole decade even to get back to the pre-war totals of schools and scholars.²

¹ This is described, not without malignancy, in "The Russian Schools under the Yoke of the Bolsheviks", by E. Kovalevsky, in *Ten Years of Bolshevik Domination*, edited by Joseph Bickerman and published in English at Berlin, 1928.

² Stalin described in 1934 the increase since 1929 under the following heads: (a) The introduction throughout the USSR of universal compulsory elementary education and an increase of literacy among the population from 67 per cent at the end of 1930 to 90 per cent at the end of 1933.

The most important feature to-day is the extraordinary "universalism" of the system. In the whole of the USSR, education, in the full sense of training for life, has now to be provided, as a matter of course, gratuitously and with attendance made compulsory, in every town and village, for every child, irrespective of sex or race or colour or creed or nationality even among the numerous backward races of the USSR. There is no other fragment of the earth's surface, at all comparable in extent, in which anything like this conception of an educational service prevails.¹

It is, indeed, firmly held that communism can be effectively established only on the basis of universal participation in the life of the community. Thus, it involves, merely to begin with, universal literacy. "Without literacy", said Lenin, "no politics, but only rumours, small talk and prejudices."² When the Bolsheviks took office something like 70 or 80 per cent of the

(b) An increase in the number attending schools of all grades from 14,358,000 in 1929, to 26,419,000 in 1933. Of these the number receiving elementary education increased from 11,687,000 to 19,163,000; middle school education increased from 2,453,000 to 6,674,000; and higher education increased from 207,000 to 491,000.

(c) An increase in the number of children receiving pre-school education from 838,000 in 1929, to 5,917,000 in 1933.

(d) An increase in the number of higher educational establishments, general and special, from 91 units in 1914 to 600 units in 1933.

(e) An increase in the number of scientific research institutes from 400 units in 1929 to 840 units in 1933.

(f) An increase in the number of club institutes from 32,000 in 1929 to 54,000 in 1933.

(g) An increase in the number of cinema theatres, cinema installations in clubs, and travelling cinemas, from 9,800 units in 1929, to 29,200 units in 1933.

(h) An increase in the circulation of newspapers from 12,500,000 in 1929 to 36,500,000 in 1933.

"It would not be amiss to point out that the number of workers among the students in our higher educational establishments represents 51·4 per cent of the total, and that of toiling peasants 16·5 per cent, whereas in Germany, for example, the number of workers among the students in higher educational establishments in 1932-1933 was only 3·2 per cent and that of small peasants only 2·4 per cent" (*Stalin Reports on the Soviet Union*, Seventeenth Congress of the Communist Party, 1934, p. 42).

We may add that the number of children who finished their elementary school course in 1929 was estimated at 1,200,000, whilst the corresponding number in 1932 was 3,451,000.

¹ Compare the position of the service of education in India, which has had the advantages of British rule for more than a century; or in the manifold colonial empire of six European powers over nearly the whole continent of Africa; or even in the United States, which still has 5 per cent of adult illiteracy, and (in 1935) literally tens of thousands of schools closed because of lack of funds.

² Quoted in the article by M. Epstein, Assistant People's Commissar for Education, RSFSR, in *The School in the USSR* (VOKS, 1933), p. 34.

whole people were illiterate. To-day, throughout European Russia at any rate, and also in all the settled parts of Siberia, all but a tiny remnant of the elderly and the aged have left this stage. "Recently we noticed in the newspapers a new item, modestly put in small type. . . . *Everyone in Moscow who was this year called up for military service was able to read and write.*"¹ It has taken little more than a decade to get schools in practically all the villages of the USSR, however imperfect may still be the teaching and the accommodation, and to bring, at least in all the settled areas, nearly all the children into school. In 1914, there were only seven millions at school ; in 1929 there were over eleven millions. Not until 1931 could school attendance be made universally compulsory by law, and the numbers then rose to nineteen millions. Although it is not to be supposed that schools have yet reached every nook and corner of Soviet Asia, the Caucasian mountains, or the Arctic Circle, by 1935 the aggregate total on the school and college registers for full-time education of all grades had grown to over 26 millions, or one person in six. Meanwhile the number of children under 8 in kindergartens and other institutions of "pre-schooling" had grown to over six millions, making in all thirty-three millions, or actually one in five of the census population under full-time instruction of one or other kind or grade.

The universalism in education in the USSR is, in one respect, in outstanding contrast with the school system of Great Britain and other capitalist countries. In the Soviet Union there are no schools designed specially for the reception of the children of the middle class and the wealthy bourgeoisie or the aristocracy. All infants and children of school age and all adolescents obtaining higher education, classified merely by age or by grade of study, attend the same schools and colleges, whatever the position or the income of their parents.² There is, alike in practice and in formal regulation, none of the segregation or grading of pupils

¹ *The School in the USSR* (VOKS, 1933), p. 76.

² The present writers inspected one of the ordinary ten-year schools of the Moscow City Soviet, and were interested to learn that, whilst the children of Stalin were in attendance at the school, it was privately forbidden to point them out to visitors, or in any way to distinguish between them and other pupils, as this might have an injurious effect on their character and development. In another ordinary school the child of a former People's Commissar of the USSR was in attendance ; and in another the child of a soviet ambassador to a foreign court.

according to parental rank or profession, wealth or income, which in other countries has so much influence alike on the schools themselves and on the pupils.

But it is another aspect of this universalism in the service of education that seems to us the most striking. From the first the Bolshevik programme included the concession of "cultural autonomy" to every one of the numerous races or nationalities out of which the Soviet Union is constituted. It is held that, in order to make education genuinely universal, the children of every race must have access to teaching *in their own vernaculars*. Nothing had been more characteristic of the tsarist government than its persistent policy of "russification".¹ Going to the opposite extreme, Soviet Communism aimed at providing schools in the vernacular for all its constituent races, great or small, even where, as in some three dozen cases, the vernacular had never been reduced to writing. It was, indeed, necessary to invent alphabets for them—the Latin, not the Russian, being taken as the basis—and to print for them the first books that they had ever seen. There are, we are told, in 1935, schools in the USSR teaching in more than 80 different languages, in all of which the various state publishing enterprises now issue books, besides publishing also works in a score or more of foreign tongues.² There are now (1935) newspapers in 88 languages.

In practice, by a decision of the RSFSR Commissariat of Education of April 27, 1927, these nationalities are divided into four groups. In five cases, namely Russian, Ukrainian, White Russian, Georgian and Armenian, the vernacular language is the medium of instruction throughout the local educational system, including all the colleges of university rank and the research institutes. The second group is that of nationalities of substantial populations, having their own alphabets and books, and their own intelligentsia. Here education up to 18 takes place in the native tongue; but institutions for persons above that age use Russian,

¹ To this day, it should be remembered, the governments of Poland, Hungary, Italy—we must add also Germany, Roumania and Yugoslavia—are accused, by substantial national minorities, of denying to their children, in one or other district, this elementary right of schooling in their mother tongue.

² Already in 1929 there were primary (or first-grade) schools in 66 languages; seven-year schools in 37, and nine-year schools in 23. There were kindergartens in 30 languages. At the other end of the scale there were higher technical institutes in 32 languages, and universities in 5 (*Educational Policy in Soviet Russia*, by N. Hans and S. Hessen, 1930, p. 183).

although there must always be special chairs in the native language and literatures in all the higher institutions within the several territories. The third group comprises such of the lesser nationalities, for which alphabets have had to be provided, as live together in compact communities. In these cases the primary schools or grades use the vernacular, but secondary education and all higher institutions adopt Russian as the medium. Finally, there is a group of very small peoples, including also dispersed and often nomadic tribes, who have still no alphabet, or have only just had one made for them, and who have no books, and indeed, no national culture. For these, whatever may be done in "pre-schooling" up to 8 years old, only Russian elementary schools are provided, at any rate for the present.¹

Under the influence of this universalism, it is precisely the backward races and the backward districts that have made the greatest proportionate progress. "Let us take for example the Tartar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Literacy among the Tartar population amounted to 15 per cent before the revolution; in the autumn of 1932 . . . 94 per cent . . . Primary schools before the revolution 35; now compulsory education has been introduced, not only for first grade schools but even for the seven-year school. Moreover the Tartar Republic is about to introduce universal pre-school education. . . . Now there are 20 universities [meaning colleges for the further education of persons over 18] with 2371 students, and there are special Tartar branches of the universities which conduct their courses mostly in the native languages."² But the Tartar Republic is not the most remarkable case. "In the Bashkir Republic before the revolution, 1.8 per cent of the children attended primary school. In 1929 the percentage rose to 58.4; in 1930 to 71.8; in 1931 universal compulsory education was introduced. The number of secondary schools in 1929-31 was 121, with 16,300 children; in the following year there were 149 . . . with 20,300 children. Arrangements are now being made to introduce universal seven-

¹ *Educational Policy in Soviet Russia*, by N. Hans and S. Hessen, 1930, pp. 178-179. See also article by N. Hans on "Education in the USSR", in *Educational Year Book* for 1933.

² "Schools for Soviet Nationalities", by L. Davydov, in *The School in the USSR* (VOKS, Moscow, 1933, p. 66). In 1934 it could be claimed, we know not how accurately, that the Tartar Republic had a much larger proportion of students in technical institutes (29 per 10,000 population) than either Germany or Great Britain, which each had less than 20 per 10,000.

year schooling. . . . The republic has 4 universities (a teachers' college, an agricultural institute, a medical school, a higher agricultural school), 30 technical schools, 2 workers' institutes, 2 workers' faculties and 2 special schools." Much the same report comes from the other districts.¹

This spectacular encouragement of practically all the vernaculars has had four distinct motives. It was seen to be a necessary condition of the unity which has become the basis of the strength and permanence of the soviet power. It is manifestly the feature of cultural autonomy on which each minority most obstinately insists. Without the provision of schools in the vernaculars there could have been no such rapid conquest of illiteracy as the Soviet Union has achieved. Moreover, without using the vernaculars there could have been no such widespread propaganda of communist doctrine, and no such gigantic circulation of the reported speeches of the leading personalities as is now common. It is interesting to notice that enabling each minority to have its own schools does not wholly promote the growth of national separatism. Thus, neither in the Ukraine nor in Georgia is there local uniformity in the educational service. If Russian is not to be the language of all the schools in those republics, so equally is not Ukrainian or Georgian. Wherever the necessary minimum of families exist in a town or village, any such minority may have its own school, using its own mother-tongue. Accordingly there are, in the Ukraine, not only Ukrainian schools, but also Polish, Yiddish, Russian, White Russian, German, Greek, Estonian, Lettish, Lithuanian, Moldavian, Bulgarian and what not; in fact schools using no fewer than twenty different vernaculars. In

¹ *Ibid.* pp. 66-67. This "universalism" has extorted the admiration of hostile critics. "The achievements of the Soviet Government in the field of national education are very considerable. . . . These results were possible through a special system of financial subventions from central funds to the minorities. Thus whereas the Russians in the RSFSR receive from the treasury about 1.2 chernovetz roubles per head for educational needs, the autonomous republics and regions receive from the same source about 3.8 chernovetz roubles per head. Without this central help the autonomous territories, usually the most backward . . . would not have been able to undertake the enormous task. This policy of the Soviet Government may be just and generous, being the only way to repay Russia's debt to these aboriginal inhabitants of territories conquered during the centuries by Russians, and left neglected by the Imperial Government. . . . In spite of the partisan character of education imparted, the national renaissance of all Russian minorities is an actual fact which brings within itself immense possibilities in the future" (*Educational Policy in Soviet Russia*, by N. Hans and S. Hessen, 1930, p. 185).

Georgia there are, not only Georgian schools, but also schools teaching in Armenian, Greek, German, Hebrew, Yiddish, Russian, Turkish, Assyrian, Polish, Kurdish and other tongues.

There is, indeed, necessarily an overriding unity amid all the prudent diversities of the service of education of the USSR. The majority of the teachers are, at present, necessarily of Russian extraction, and usually of Russian training. All of them have been educated in Russian literature. In all schools, Russian is, if not the first, always the second language. Nine-tenths of all the existing books are in the Russian language. Among the lesser nationalities, only the Ukraine, which has been in some respects in advance of the RSFSR, can find a complete educational staff of its own. All the rest have still to depend, for all but common schooling, to a considerable extent on the products of Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev. Moreover, the local autonomy of the educational service in the couple of dozen constituent and autonomous republics does not extend to fundamental principles, in which the whole of the USSR has, according to constitutional practice, to keep in line with the RSFRS. Finally, an increasing proportion, though still only fewer than a quarter, of all the teachers are members of, or candidates for the Communist Party, or the Young Communist League (Comsomols). The whole tone of every school is avowedly and markedly communist and no rival doctrine is inculcated.

This continuous dissemination of communist doctrine through the entire service of education—which is parallel with, and doubtless equally pervasive with, the common practice, in every national system of schooling (and not least in Great Britain and the United States), of basing the school life upon the dominant creed and constitution of the particular country—has a great influence on the backward races of the USSR. “For many nationalities”, it has been said, “some of which are still in [the] nomadic stage of evolution, the Marxist doctrine of the struggle of capital and labour is as incomprehensible and unreal as some mystic philosophy. They acquire the new dogma as a new religion, and simply exchange Buddha and Mahomet for Marx and Lenin. What they really imbibe very easily is the propaganda against the western capitalist world. The internationalism of the Communist Party is reflected in their minds as a militant patriotism for the first workers’ and peasants’ state, which is the fatherland

of all enslaved eastern nationalities. In Moscow they are induced to see the centre of the new Eurasian world opposed to the rotten civilisation of bourgeois Europe.”¹ Take it all in all, we must agree that the trend of universalism in the soviet service of education has “immense possibilities in the future”!

Polytechnikisation

Turning now to the curriculum and pedagogic methods of the schools, we have to note, during the past five years, a far-reaching change, definitely making for greater efficiency. The whole decade, 1921–1930, was a period of luxuriant experiment, when the lessons of other countries were ignored; discipline was neglected; the pupils were supposed to govern the school; the teachers did as they liked, whilst the inspectors favoured one system after another.² The result has been described by foreign observers as a “joyous Bedlam”, in which the pupils learned all sorts of things, and the cleverest among them not a little, but seldom the formal lessons common to other countries. “The soviet school child”, noted one observer, “was apt to get a very uneven kind of training, and to develop precocious brightness in some things, with woeful lack of precise knowledge in others.” In 1931 the authorities seem to have realised that this was not an ideal training for life. If gossip is to be trusted, one member after another, in a meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR (TSIK), rose to complain that his own children, though eager and bright, could not spell, were weak in their arithmetic, and knew more about the bad conditions of labour in capitalist countries than about the geography of the USSR. In 1931 Andrei Bubnov succeeded A. V. Lunacharsky as People’s Commissar of Education for the RSFSR, and the whole system was reformed from top to bottom. School discipline was restored. Subjects were once more taught separately, the common apparatus of examinations and exact marking was introduced and the curriculum for each grade was drastically remodelled.

Communist enthusiasts are prone to see throughout these far-reaching changes in the soviet educational system the gradual

¹ *Educational Policy in Soviet Russia*, by N. Hans and S. Hessen, 1930, p. 185.

² This is pictured in the so-called *Diary of a Russian Schoolboy*, by N. Ognyov (1928); actually written by a teacher in a soviet school.

adoption of a principle which is summed up in a strange new word—polytechnikisation. "This reform", says one of its leading advocates, "has no precedent, in point of force, significance and scientific basis, in the whole history of popular education."¹ In its simplest form this trend is manifested in the scheme of reorganisation of the elementary and secondary schools, in supersession of the "Dalton Plan" and the "Complex" or "Project Scheme", which at first charmed the educational administrators. In the "polytechnical school" the teacher is not to be spared the grind of individual teaching, and not even the task of delivering set lectures to his class. The pupils are no longer to be relieved from the mental effort of actually learning and remembering what the teacher tells them. The new feature is that the giving of information by the teacher is always to be accompanied by specific action on the part of the scholars; as, for instance, by their performance of the operations that the teacher is describing. "Both industrially and educationally", notes an English authority, "Soviet Russia's policy is a gigantic exercise according to Samuel Butler's principle 'learn by doing'".² With this object, the school, whether "four year" (or, as we should say, elementary); or "seven year" or "ten year" (which we should call secondary), is now placed in constant and intimate association with one or more of the neighbouring factories, or in the country, with adjacent state or collective farms. The school becomes a centre of instruction, not only in reading and writing in one or more languages, but also in the principles of all the sciences, *taught always as the basis of the various arts of production*. This invariable bias towards "technology" is, in the elementary and secondary school, not at all with the idea of "pre-apprenticeship" to any one craft, but definitely in order to create in all the pupils a common intellectual basis of scientific method for all the

¹ "Polytechnical" because it imparts to the children the scientific fundamentals of the most essential branches of production in the national economy, combining, in the process of tuition and education, general subjects with productive labour as applied in progressive production and technique" ("The Polytechnical School", by S. Gaissinovich, Assistant Director of the Scientific Research Institute of Polytechnical Education; in *The School in the USSR* (VOKS, Moscow, 1933), p. 54).

The decree of October 16, 1918, had declared that "the principle of productive labour should underlie the whole educational system: the teaching in the schools must bear a polytechnical character" (*Collection of Decrees and Resolutions on Education* (in Russian), Moscow, 1918, vol. i. p. 107).

² *Industry and Education in Soviet Russia*, by J. C. Crowther (1932).

various courses of vocational training, in one or other of which, on the completion of their school years, they will severally elect to engage. It is with this end in view that the teachers' lessons in science are to comprise descriptions of the various products, including some account of their history and their specific utility, together with the different processes of material production, in close relation to the teacher's expositions and explanations of the scientific principles, mechanical or physical, chemical or biological, on which these processes of production are based. In the schemes of the most enthusiastic advocates of polytechnikisation the pupils were not merely to experiment with models or test-tubes in the school laboratory or workshop, but also to spend part of each week in the factory or on the farm, actually using the machinery and the tools of each productive process; witnessing the output of their own manual effort; being shown how to overcome their manual inefficiency and compelled to realise how the processes illustrate and confirm what the teacher had told them of the scientific principles underlying the work. This, however, was seldom found either practicable or convenient. Moreover, it proved to be not even very educational. In the schools actually visited in 1934, it had been wholly or mainly replaced by visits of a whole class to the factory under the guidance of the teacher.¹ But if an English teacher imagines that such a "polytechnical school" is merely a variant of the "manual training" or the "vocational bias", sometimes advocated for English schools; or if the employer thinks it an admirable device for making skilled craftsmen, he shows that he has not understood what the soviet pedagogues are aiming at. They are not seeking to direct the pupils' attention to particular occupations, or to persuade them to choose such occupations when they leave school,

¹ It may be thought that this practice of taking the pupils inside the factory, with the teachers themselves explaining the manufacturing processes, is in line with the practice of "educational visits" adopted in the best of the English elementary schools. An important difference is that the London boys and girls are mostly taken to such places as Westminster Abbey and the National Gallery, with the object of making them realise the past. The Moscow boys and girls are taken to the engineering and clothing factories, printing establishments and gigantic bakeries, in one or other of which most of them will find employment. The object is to make them understand the principles and applications of contemporary science as applied in production.

The four chief industries now chosen for this practical demonstration of scientific principles are engineering, manufacturing chemistry, the production of electricity, and agriculture. (*Science and Education in the USSR*, by Professor Pinkevich, 1935, pp. 30-33.)

or even to create in them any special fitness for these occupations. Whether the boys and girls eventually become carpenters or cultivators, tractor drivers or school teachers, administrators or dramatic authors, does not, at the school stage, concern the educators. What is quite sincerely intended by the polytechnical school is the very opposite of training in any particular vocation or craftsmanship; in fact, an improvement in the intellectual equipment of *all* the pupils throughout the land, irrespective of the particular occupations that they will severally choose. It is held that, merely to compel children to listen to lectures, or to witness experiments or even to "play about" by themselves, in the school workshop or laboratory, is not the way to render *the whole body of citizens, which is what these pupils are to become*, either scientifically minded or intellectually active. Nor will even a passive understanding of the lessons learned at school stir, in the adolescent, the intellectual curiosity, the initiative and the inventiveness that the Soviet Union seeks to create in all its citizens.¹ And thus we have at present in the USSR, not yet all the teachers in all the schools, but literally thousands of them,²

¹ " 'And how in the world', asked one of our party, when we were introduced to the mathematics professor, 'do you succeed in converting mathematics to concreteness?' For answer the professor opened a cupboard and displayed a row of tins of different shapes and sizes. 'Which require the least material? Which pack best into a given space? Which . . . ?' There is no lack of practical problems for the mathematicians" (*The Broad Highway of Soviet Education*, by C. A. Harrison. 1934, pp. 23-24).

The soviet pedagogic experts make the largest claims for this new technique of education between 8 to 17. One of them writes as follows: "The above-described process of the reciprocal fructification of physics, chemistry, mathematics and natural history, by technology, productive labour and modern technique, is one of the most outstanding features of soviet instruction and education. It secures the training of a perfectly new intelligentsia . . . which possesses not only the culture of reasoning, pondering and expressing opinions [but also] the culture of the intellect that is closely connected with labour and action. Material production, on which the new man is being educated in the soviet school, secures to him a knowledge of the value and significance of the sciences. . . . These are people who think and reason for the sake of acting, and who act and build consciously and intellectually" ("The Polytechnical School", by S. Gaissinovitch, in *The School in the USSR*, VOKS, Moscow, 1933, p. 61).

² The "seven-year polytechnical school" was stated to be the rule in most cities in 1933, and was expected to be extended to "the whole of the countryside" by 1937. (*Moscow Daily News*, March 3, 1934.) This apparently impossible programme is already being carried out, by the simple expedient of annually prolonging the stay in each school by one year. Thus, in 1934 or 1935, the four-year schools automatically become five-year schools; in 1935 or 1936, six-year schools; and in 1936 or 1937, seven-year schools. In the course of this gradual enlargement of the numbers in attendance at each school an additional teacher will be provided. It should be noted that the upper standards of a seven-year

as yet mostly in the seven- or ten-year schools, educating their pupils in science by describing the things that we consume or use; whence they are derived and how they are grown or manufactured; the machines and the processes that are employed, and, at the same time, the scientific principles or generalisations that the machines and the processes exemplify. And literally hundreds of thousands of pupils are, in the light of the teachers' lectures, learning by making things; though, as we think, at this stage not usually in the factory but more commonly by watching the product emerge from the process which their own manual effort has—at any rate in a small way, in the school workshop or laboratory or garden plot—set going and guided.¹

school all learn one foreign language. Either English or German is chosen. One of the present writers saw such a school, with its German-taught pupils of 12-15, in a village in the province of Moscow. It is amazing to contemplate that, if the programme can be carried out, the school in every village from the Baltic to the Pacific will be teaching a foreign language. In not one village in England is there (1935) such a school!

¹ The *Communist Manifesto* of 1848, by Marx and Engels, explicitly proposed the "combination of education with industrial production" as well as the "combination of agriculture with manufacturing industries; the gradual abolition of the distinction between town and country by a more equable distribution of the population". The conception of "polytechnikisation" of education is to be found repeatedly in the writing of Marx (notably in the proceedings of the Geneva Congress of the First International in 1866) and Engels; it was more than once expounded by Lenin; and it appears in the earliest educational pronouncements of the Bolshevik Government in 1917-1918. It was specially advocated in *The Labour School*, a notable book (in Russian and German) by Professor V. Blonsky, in 1920. But for the first decade and a half the schools had to get along as they could, in a welter of pedagogic experimentation coupled with mass campaigning against illiteracy. Not until practically all the children had been got to school could the transformation of the outlook of the schools and their teachers be seriously undertaken. In the years 1930-1932 the plan for "polytechnikising" the schools was worked out, and promulgated in "directives" to be put in operation by the several Commissariats of Education. The English student will find useful the chapters by Professors B. Gruzdev, S. Kamenev and S. Gaissinovich in *The School in the USSR* (VOKS, Moscow, 1933); *The Five-Year Plan and the Cultural Revolution*, by Alfred Kurella (Workers Bookshop, 16 King Street, London, E.C., 1931); *The Broad Highway of Soviet Education*, by C. A. Harrison, with preface by Beatrice King (Society for Cultural Relations, London, 1932); *Cultural Construction in the Third Decisive Year*, by D. Skomorovsky (Moscow, 1931); and two articles by Beatrice King in *The British Russian Gazette* for January and March 1933. Among French works we may notice *Les Problèmes fondamentaux de l'École du Travail* by Pistrak (Paris, 1927); and *Les Problèmes de l'instruction publique en régime soviétique*, by A. W. Lunacharsky (Paris, 1935), especially chap. iv., "Le culte de la production", pp. 103-131; *Organisation et principes de l'enseignement en U.R.S.S.*, par Jean V. Trillat (Paris, 1933, 70 pp.).

"It was in September 1931 that a resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party insisted, as part of a general reform of the school system, on universal "polytechnikisation". At the beginning of 1934 the Sovnarkom

Now, the present writers are not competent to assess the pedagogic efficiency of this "polytechnikising" of the elementary and secondary schools. It must be understood as a deliberate attempt to bring the school closely into contact with adult life and practice. All schooling is to become training for the active work, the recreation and the leisure of the producer. It is taken for granted that there can be no room in the soviet school system for any training for the life of a non-producer. Every boy or girl, without exception,—even those whose parents have in the past been non-producers—will be brought up, from the first, with a view to the eventual adoption of an occupation, useful to the community. This occupation may be either that of manual labour or that of an intellectual profession. The young people will all be given equal opportunities of choice at 16 or 17, as between different occupations, so far as accommodation and the requirements of the community permit, according to their faculties and desires.¹ But no provision at all is made for the education of a "leisure class", which assumes that its function is merely that of existing, more or less beautifully, at the expense of others; or even that of spending a lifetime in "philosophising" without doing. Moreover, there is another reason for making no distinction, so far as elementary and secondary schooling is concerned, between those who may eventually adopt one occupation or another. It is not only for the exercise of their occupation that schooling has to prepare them; they have to be trained for life itself. On the assumption of universal participation, upon which Soviet Communism is based, all boys and girls have not only to

of the RSFSR took in hand the systematic improvement of the teachers' training colleges, and the necessary raising of the teachers' qualifications" (*Moscow Daily News*, March 3, 1934).

¹ The position of the children of the "deprived" categories, on the one hand, and those of the intelligentsia on the other, must be mentioned as, in some respects, exceptional. They are nowhere excluded from the regular day school, whether (as we should say) elementary or secondary. They are not formally or generally excluded from institutions of higher education, or from vocational training. But during the first decade, when there was a great rush of children of manual working parents towards further education and the brain-working vocations, these received preference for admission, just as, in practice, before the Revolution, the children of the wealthy or of the intelligentsia received preference over those of working class parentage. With an increase in the accommodation and, as we think, with growing humanitarianism, the exclusion of children of the deprived categories, has, we believe, come to an end. It is, however, often thought desirable for these youths between school and college to pass a year or two in a factory, which (as many English parents have discovered) is, in itself, not a bad course to adopt.

be trained for a productive occupation, but also educated for active and intelligent citizenship, and further, for all the rest of the activities of life. And, if only to obtain the maximum benefit for the community this training for the whole of life must be universal. It is not supposed that all citizens will have the same faculties, or indeed, equal capacity ; but there must be no attempt to create a special class for whom, whether by law or custom, or by the device of prescribing particular scholastic attainments to which access is restricted, any or all of the brain-working occupations are reserved. It is held that neither the parents' wealth, nor their official or professional status, nor even their intellectual attainments or distinction, ought to obtain for their children any preference in opportunities of further education, or in the adoption of an occupation, over others less fortunate in their parentage. Vocational training, including further or higher, and more specialised education—beginning only on the completion of the common school course which, it is assumed, will in the near future be at 18—must be open, without distinction of sex or race or colour, any more than of parental rank or affluence, to all having the necessary capacity and liking for the particular occupation chosen. As the community has to pay for the maintenance as well as the training of most of the aspirants, the number to be admitted to the several courses of vocational training has necessarily to be decided, year by year, by the governmental authorities, in accordance with the requirements of the several services or professions. It follows that a selection must often be made among the aspirants ; and this is, in practice, effected by a competitive examination. Only the most promising can be admitted for the occupations in which there are temporarily more applicants than places to be filled.¹

¹ "The Commissariat of Education retained complete control only over the Pedagogic Institutes and those of Fine Arts. But the Department of Vocational Education has retained certain rights of supervision over the whole field of vocational education. At present there are no less than 12 different commissariats which have their separate network of vocational schools" ("Education in the USSR", by H. Hans, in *Educational Year Book*, 1933, p. 573).

Concurrently with this reform the total number of higher institutes, corresponding roughly to British university colleges, in medicine, commerce and industry, engineering, law, economics, pedagogy and the fine arts, has been increased to over 800, having over 400,000 students over 18, pursuing courses from three to six years. Perhaps the largest and most magnificent of these is that modestly termed the Polytechnical Institute at Leningrad, which has ten faculties, with about 1000 professors and teachers, and 10,000 students of either sex (about to be increased to 13,000) ; all over 18, and pursuing a five-years course

Almost contemporaneously with the "polytechnikisation" of the schools, and to some extent in pursuance of a similar conception of education as training for life, a drastic reorganisation of all the universities and technical colleges was carried out. The universities,¹ some of which had survived from tsarist times, have been somewhat overshadowed by the separate specialised colleges or institutes, the number of which has been increased up to (1935) over 800. To each of these institutions has been assigned the definite function of training its students between 18 and 23 either for the practice of a particular occupation or profession, or for research in a particular branch of science. And for the better promotion of this deliberate training for life, the supreme administration of most of the various colleges and institutes was taken away from the Commissariat of Education, and entrusted to the commissariats responsible for the several branches of industry or administration that the students intended to serve. Thus the colleges and institutes training engineers, industrial chemists and similar technicians, were placed under the USSR Commissariat of Heavy Industry, which has a special department for their supervision. Those training chemists in dye-stuffs are under the USSR Commissariat of Light Industries, which includes textiles. The medical colleges come under the superintendence of the several commissariats of health of the various republics. Similarly those training teachers remain with the several commissariats of education; on the other hand those training agronomists, of whom so many more are now required for the state and collective farms, are directed by the new USSR Commissariat of Agriculture. It would be an error to assume that this adminis-

in one or other branch of applied science or technology, leading to immediate appointments as specialist technicians in one or other branch of industry. This technical university covers with its buildings more than one square mile; its chief physics laboratory commands, for its experiments, an electrical current of a million volts; its library subscribes for 135 foreign scientific periodicals. It has a special faculty for "cultural" studies, including foreign languages, history and literature. English and German are compulsory in all the faculties, whilst French is optional.

¹ Although emphasis is constantly laid on the activities of the scientific colleges and institutes (which usually deal with more than physical or biological science, and always involve one or more foreign languages), the universities, old and new, continue to exist and even to grow, although not usually proliferating into additional faculties. The universities are now (1935) 21 in number, with various faculties, most of which count also as scientific research institutes in particular subjects, and are closely associated alike with the USSR Academy of Sciences and the USSR commissariats concerned with production.

trative reorganisation, according to subjects or faculties, of the 800 colleges and institutes of what, in Great Britain or Germany would be considered of university rank, implies or requires any limitation of the curriculum. Those competent to judge have testified to the fact, almost to their own surprise, that the purest of mathematics, and the least applied of the other sciences, still hold an honoured place in Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev. It does mean, indeed, that each institution is to make itself as efficient as possible in its definite function of turning out the best-equipped professionals in its particular line. But it is recognised that the best-equipped engineer or chemist, teacher or researcher, is not produced by excluding from his training either pure mathematics or the most abstract physics, or that which is sometimes particularly designated as culture. It is quite understood that history and literature, foreign languages, and a knowledge of the institutions and accomplishments of other countries, not to mention some acquaintance with all the sciences, are as much required to produce the perfect technician as specialised proficiency in his own technique.¹ He is, however, not required to spend years in the study of the language, literature and philosophy of ancient Greece and Rome.

It is contemplated and hoped that the great gulf which has heretofore existed between the brain-working occupations, and those left to the manual workers will be, by these educational reforms, narrowed and bridged, if not, in the course of time, entirely removed. It is held that there is no brain-working occupation—not even that of poet or painter, administrator or army officer—in which the professional would not be better, not only for “polytechnical” education in childhood or youth, but also for some actual training in manual arts, and even, when he is in full vigour, for some intermixture of manual work with his intellectual activities. Equally it is contended that there is no manual-working occupation which would not be better performed if the worker had a scientifically trained mind, and realised the place in the life of the community that his occupation held. In the one duty that (apart from the steadily dwindling “deprived” categories) all men and women have in common in the soviet

¹ In 1934 it was specially directed that world history, as a subject in itself, desirable in every faculty, should be taken up again. From October 1934 scores of courses in history are being given in all the principal educational centres.

state, namely that of active participation in citizenship and public work ; as also in the part of life—actually the greater part—that all are equally entitled to enjoy, namely the hours of rest, recreation and leisure ; it is held that effective training of body and of mind are alike indispensable for maximum achievement.

There are analogous tendencies in other parts of the soviet system. At all stages, and in all branches, the pupil is made to do more for himself than is usual in other countries. It is held that within reason, the more manual work that can be found for him to do, in the course of his mental education, the better will be that education. Even in the kindergarten the visitor may see the toddler taught to “ serve by doing ”. After accomplishing the arts of dressing and undressing without assistance, the child sets out the table and clears away ; moves the little chairs and tables, fetches whatever is required, and puts things back properly in their places. In the elementary school needlework is practised by boys and girls alike, but only in the first two years (8 to 10) ; and only as a common preparation for life, to the extent of enabling both boys and girls to do their own sewing on of buttons, mending tears in garments, darning socks and stockings, and elementary knitting.¹ The school boys (or girls) are diverted from merely “ playing at Indians ” to jointly helping the peasant to weed and harvest. A school has been known to spend its vacation in the country in actually reconstructing with the children’s own hands, and without any but the minimum of technical assistance, a broken-down dam so as to produce electricity by water power, together with the apparatus by which the village is now lighted and the water raised from the wells. Or the whole school undertakes a “ regional survey ” of its neighbourhood ; discovers for itself alike its geography and its geology, its flora and fauna ; unearths its prehistoric remains and classifies its modern buildings ; applies geometry and trigonometry to measuring the area of the fields, the width of the rivers and the heights of the trees, and analyses, in structure and function, the various social institutions of the locality. The students in the medical faculty between 18 and 23 have regularly to undertake the keeping in order of their laboratories and preparing their own

¹ Girls intending to engage in a “ needle trade ”, whether merely dressmaking or work in a garment factory, get the appropriate technical training after 15. Moreover, there are often voluntary circles in which girls join in various arts of needlework outside school hours.

drugs, even to washing the bottles ; it is they who habitually provide the whole attendance on the operating surgeons ; and they often do all the work of dressing and bandaging which elsewhere falls to the nurses. The young men and women in the engineering colleges usually make themselves proficient in one or other mechanical craft in the course of their theoretical studies. It is not infrequent that one of the managerial staff of a great engineering factory is removed from the office, and relegated to the bench or the forge of the same or some similar enterprise, not altogether by way of punishment for inefficiency or neglect, but partly because it is thought that, after a sort of " refresher course" in manual operations, he will be actually better qualified for re-appointment to a managerial position in another enterprise. There is, in fact, no distinction drawn between the brain worker and the manual worker, other than in their respective functional proficiency. The fact that one man studies longer than another may make him able to do more things, and may lead him to specialise on work for which the other is not equipped, but it does not put him in any different social position, and may often not lead to any higher remuneration.

The Organization of Leisure

It may have seemed, from the emphasis placed on the " poly-technikising " of all schools, and the stress laid, even in the highest colleges and institutes, on technology, as if the trend in soviet education was entirely materialistic, in the sense of seeking only an ever-increasing output of material commodities. This is far from being the case. Indeed, the trend towards " cultural " developments is, in the soviet service of education, at least as marked as that towards vocationalism.¹ What is significant is that these two trends are not regarded as antagonists or rivals in the training for life, still less as appertaining to separate strata or classes of the population. All men and women, without exception, are expected to become workers and producers, whether by hand or by brain, and therefore all, without exception, require appropriate technological training. But all men and women are like-

¹ Even in the most highly developed polytechnical school, the curriculum includes what are usually thought of as " cultural " subjects. Thus, the People's Commissar of Education in the RSFSR, speaking to the Fifteenth All-Union

wise expected to become active citizens, participating in all the life of the community, no less in their hours of leisure than in their work time. A significant feature in the daily routine of the government departments of education in the Soviet Union is the large part occupied with specifically "cultural" developments, both within and beyond the schools and colleges; a much greater part, it is clear, than in the corresponding government departments of England or New York State. The result is seen in the Congress of Soviets, gave the following analysis of the time-table for the fifth, sixth and seventh years (ages 13, 14 and 15):

Range	Per cent of School Time	Number of hours per month
1. Labour in Production	18	22½
2. Physical Science (mathematics, physics, chemistry, natural history, drawing)	38	48
3. Social Science—including literature and geography	23	30
4. Languages	7	9
5. Music and physical culture	9	11½
6. Club work	5	6½
	100	127

Quoted in *Universal Education and the polytechnikisation of the schools* (Russian) (Moscow, 1931), p. 102.

Here is the "model time-table", issued by the Commissariat of Education of the RSFSR for the guidance of local authorities and teachers for children from 8 to 16:

GRADE	Hours per Week (6 Days)							
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII
Russian . .	6	6	5	5	5	5	4	3 (or 4)
Mathematics .	5	5	5	5	5 (or 6)	4 (or 5)	5 (or 4)	4
Natural science	2	2	2	3 (or 2)	4	7	7	7
Social science .	2	2	2	2 (or 3)	1	1
Geography	3	3	2	2	1	1
Shop work .	2	2	2	2	5 (or 4)	4 (or 3)	5	5
Foreign language	2	2	2	2	2
Physical culture .	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1
Drawing .	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2
Music .	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
History	2	2	3 (or 2)	3 (or 2)
Technology (materials)	1
	20	20	22	25	30	31	31	30

great expansion of "cultural" activities among the population during the past decade, which to say the least, does not fall short of the contemporary growth in industrial production.

Physical Culture

Characteristically enough, in this story of the Remaking of Man, we have to begin with physical culture, in which the people of tsarist Russia were exceptionally deficient. For the children of all ages, from the crèche to the highest class in the ten-year school, there is nowadays nothing so universally taught, and so incessantly repeated, as training in the bodily habits that make for perfect health. In 1923 an All-Union Council for Physical Culture was established, consisting of representatives of the trade unions, the Communist Party and the Comsomols, on the one hand, and of the Commissariats of Education, Health and Defence. Under the influence of this council, and largely at the expense of the commissariats of education of the several constituent and autonomous republics, physical exercises of all kinds have been made the subject of repeated scientific investigation, and of literally hundreds of textbooks and treatises, which the State publishing enterprises have issued to the teachers in hundreds of thousands of copies: thus in numbers vastly exceeding those for Great Britain, Germany or the United States.¹ For the adolescents an important channel of influence for both sexes is the rapidly growing Young Communist League (Comsomols) now (1935) counting some five million members, mostly between 17 and 25. In every Comsomol cell the maintenance of perfect health is demanded from every member. Daily physical exercises become a social obligation, the fulfilment of which is urged every morning throughout the land by the innumerable loud speakers of the state radio service. But the most striking manifestation of this "universalism" in physical culture is the increase during the past few years in organised participation in every form of sport or games, from running, skating, ski-jumping, rowing, bicycling, fencing and gymnastic entertainments, to football,

¹ The titles of a number of these publications, scarcely any of which have been translated, are given in *New Minds, New Men?* by Thomas Woody (1932), pp. 434, 437, and 483-510. See also an article on "Physical Culture in the USSR", by T. Hutchins, in *British Russian Gazette*, October 1931.

basket-ball, bowls, lawn tennis, baseball and folk-dancing.¹ Voluntary military drill and rifle-shooting competitions attract their thousands. Gliding and parachute jumping are growing specialities and there are already a considerable number of amateur aviators. Millions of young people now "take to the road" for their rest-days and annual vacations; and there is a substantial beginning of mountaineering stimulated and promoted by "proletarian" tourist agencies.² Of *fizculturniki*, or regular members of physical culture clubs or circles—meaning associations for practising any outdoor game or sport—there were said to be, in the USSR, some two millions in 1927, over five millions in 1931, and by the end of the Second Five-Year Plan in 1937 there are expected to be many more, some say no fewer than thirty millions! Over 50,000 of these members paraded in the Red Square in 1931 on the tenth anniversary of the "Red Sports International", when Stalin and other leading statesmen greeted them from Lenin's mausoleum. Vast stadiums have been erected for their accommodation in nearly every great city from Leningrad to Tashkent. Twenty years ago hardly anything of this habit of outdoor games and sport existed among the Russian people. Nowadays there is some ground for the estimate that a vastly greater aggregate number, and even a larger proportion, of the adolescents of the USSR are to be found, say on a day in June, actively engaged in outdoor games or sports, than (if we exclude those who merely look on) in Great Britain or the United States. Three salient differences strike the observer. One is the extent to which, in the Soviet Union, all this cultivation of games and sport is consciously based on the conviction, in the young people themselves, that it promotes and

¹ Neither cricket nor golf seems yet to have become naturalised in the USSR. Incidentally, we may observe, the "professional" is unknown in soviet sport; and there is the very minimum of betting or wagering for money in connection with games.

² "If the young Soviet worker wants to spend his vacation hiking in some part of the Soviet Union, he has only to join the Society for Proletarian Tours and Excursions. In almost every corner of the vast Soviet Union this society has established tourist centres, providing an ideal jumping-off place for hikes and excursions, and enabling the young worker, at an extremely moderate cost, to get acquainted with such beautiful places as the Crimea, the Caucasus, the Urals, Kazakstan, Central Asia; to explore the rivers, lakes and forests of the central part of the USSR, or to see things of an antiquarian interest, relics of older civilisations. This society also organises excursions to the new soviet factories, where the achievements of modern technique may be seen" (*Youth in the Soviet Union*, by Vladimir Zaitsev, 1934, p. 52).

maintains physical health and therefore constitutes a part of civic duty. Another is the close association, not only of physical exercises, but also of all organised games, with medical supervision and research. "Without medical control no physical culture" is the slogan "We are not only rebuilding human society on an economic basis; we are mending the human race on scientific principles." Hence not only half a dozen separate institutes for research in different branches of physical culture,¹ but also systematic medical examination, spring and autumn, of every member of a games association; and a resident doctor at every trade union "rest house" or holiday home. The third difference is the cordial encouragement, the cooperation and the financial subventions that are universally accorded to what has quickly become a national habit, not only by the People's Commissars of Education and Health in the various constituent and autonomous republics, but also by every government department that can be helpful.

Political Culture

In the USSR, second only in magnitude to the deliberate promotion of physical culture, is the planned dissemination of what is termed political culture. Apart from the dwindling categories of the "deprived", every person over 18 is expected to be, not only a voter, but also a voter with understanding of what he is voting about, and, as we have elsewhere explained, even an active participant in public administration of one kind or another. For efficiency, this obviously requires universal training. Accordingly elaborate provision is made by every organ of the government for the spread of what is not unreasonably deemed political culture. We need not describe its foundation in the school, where the atmosphere, and even the curriculum, is as much interpenetrated by Marxian communism, the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the coming of the world revolution, as that of the English school by a conventional Christianity, loyalty to a constitutional monarchy and the glories of the British Empire. More specific instruction runs through all the activities of the

¹ Such as the Institute for the Health of Children, the Institute for Therapeutic Physical Culture, the Institute for Physical Therapy and Orthopedy, the Institute for Occupational Diseases, the Institute for Social Hygiene, the Institute for Health Resorts and Spas, not to mention the Psycho-physiological laboratories of the Commissariat of Defence.

Young Communist League (Comsomols), whose members form a large proportion of the "activists", not only in trade union administration, but also in the prolonged educational campaigns by which more than 90 per cent of the electors are rallied to vote at the periodical soviet elections in the large cities. There are orthodox textbooks of "Political Grammar", backed by quite an extensive literature, in the hands of all the aspirants for appointment as teachers in the elementary and secondary schools. On this literature they are lectured during their courses at the equivalent of the English training colleges. But probably the most powerful and the most continuous influence is the periodical press. Few people in the western world realise that the daily, weekly or monthly newspaper is actually more widely read, and more universally penetrative, in the USSR than even in the United States.¹ Yet the content of this immense periodical press is the very opposite of what the newspaper proprietors of the western world believe to be indispensable to nation-wide circulations. Imagine a widely circulating newspaper, all copies of which are paid for (there being, in the USSR, no system of "returns"), yet carrying hardly any paid advertisements, and offering no bribes of insurance, no competitions for prizes, and no distribution of books or other gifts among its readers—a newspaper, moreover, which contains absolutely no "police court news" and no reports of divorce cases; nothing about the fashions in dress; no stories of sex or murder or suicide or accidents; and no gossiping personalities about the private life of royalties, or millionaires, or national celebrities! The ten thousand periodicals of the USSR, daily, weekly, monthly and quarterly, issued in 88 languages, catering for readers of all sorts and all occupations, are endless in their diversity. But in one respect they are uniform. They are wholly occupied with "public affairs", that is to say, with politics in its widest sense, including, of course, wealth production. Some of them print telegrams of foreign news (but only news of this kind), of which a copious supply is provided by the Soviet Telegraph Agency (TASS,

¹ For a fuller description of the newspaper and magazine Press in the USSR see *Die Presse Sowjet Russlands*, by Just (Berlin, 1931), also the statistics in *Press and Publishing in the Soviet Union* (School of Slavonic Studies, 1935). The chapter by R. W. Postgate on "Radio Press and Publishing" in *Twelve Studies in Soviet Russia*, edited by M. I. Cole, 1933, pp. 205-248, gives an admirable account of how the several types of newspapers are organised, and the place they fill in the social organism.

established in 1925) from all the principal countries of the world. They all deal, more or less instructively, in editorial articles, with issues of public policy great or small. But they also relate innumerable incidents of public administration; exciting stories, full of statistics, of the achievements and successes of this or that factory or farm or school; and, still more frequently, gruesome accounts of the local breakdowns and failures of this or that branch of public administration. As we have mentioned in the previous chapter, nowhere in the world is there such unsparing revelation of the blunders and losses of state factories or government departments, or of the acts of oppression or malversation by public officials, as in the soviet newspapers, which are served by something like three millions of village correspondents.¹ This is encouraged and approved by the Soviet Government, as the surest means of obtaining the redress of popular grievances, and of preventing a repetition of the misdeeds of local agents. What is not permitted is any advocacy of the private employment of wage labour in order to make a profit out of it, which is known as exploitation; or of buying things with a view to selling them at a profit, which is termed speculation; or any praise of the political systems of foreign countries; or, indeed, any suggestion that any other form of social organisation would be preferable to that of Soviet Communism. To the foreigner the remarkable thing is that such newspapers, filled with nothing but reports and discussions about public affairs, including short stories illustrating these subjects, but without even the attraction of political party contests, and devoid of any of the contents that secure great circulations in France, Great Britain or the United States, should be eagerly bought and devoured by nearly every family in the USSR.² As a means of instructing every citizen about the collective organisation of agriculture, industry and government, on which his well-being depends, and of making him acquainted with the details of its local administration—that is to say, in giving him the rudiments of political culture—there can be no question of the efficacy of such a press. There will, of course, be less agreement about the educative result of always presenting the existing

¹ See *ante*, pp. 775-776.

² The aggregate circulation of each issue in 1935 is apparently not far short of 40 millions, which is about the number of separate households in the USSR. The principal peasant newspaper, *Krestyanskaya Gazeta*, has a circulation of three millions, reputed to be the largest in the world.

system of government as if it were the only one to be considered. This involves forgoing such sharpening of the intellect as may result from the clash of arguments for and against democracy or monarchy, liberalism or conservatism, the Republican Party or the Democratic Party. The soviet educationists esteem more highly, in the training for life, the wide dissemination of the knowledge that they regard as essential for universal participation in public affairs.

A similar universal grounding in political culture is being created, in all their personal intercourse with their fellow-citizens, by the two or three million members of the Communist Party. Every candidate for admission as a Party member has actually to prove his own "political culture", as well as his belief in the Party tenets. It was a feature of the "chistka" or purge of the Party in 1933 that one of the requirements insisted on, as a qualification for remaining a member—in addition to faith, loyalty and works, together with a high standard of decency in personal life—was ability to expound and explain to the average citizen the policy and programme of the government in which they were taking part. Quite a number of honest and loyal members of the Party, of long standing and good life, were excluded from membership, and relegated to a newly invented lower grade of "sympathisers", not for any "heresy" but merely because of their shortcomings in intellectual capacity and political knowledge.¹

It is, in fact, one of the principal objects of soviet education that no adult should remain "politically illiterate". To understand the A B C of public policy, and to be acquainted with the machinery of government administration, may not be exactly the idea of political culture entertained by the British or American academic world. But to make the whole hundred millions of adult men and women between the Baltic and the Pacific even so far "politically literate", almost as soon as most of them have become alphabetically literate, would be no mean educational achievement—certainly in mere magnitude, a greater extension of "culture" in this one part of life than any government of the western world has yet approached.² And nothing less than this

¹ See Chapter V. in Part I., pp. 375-376.

² It is worth notice how much this universal spread of a common "political literacy" among races of different experiences and temperaments is facilitated by the soviet policy of entrusting the local administration of each of the backward races of the USSR, not to members of the dominant Russian race, but to

is within the programme of the People's Commissars of Education of the various constituent and autonomous republics of the USSR.

Artistic Culture

The wide diffusion of artistic culture among a whole people has seldom, if ever, been recognised as part of the duty of government. Yet in the USSR the artistic culture of the masses has its own place in the service of education; and Lunacharsky, who was for fifteen years People's Commissar of Education of the RSFSR, was particularly concerned with its promotion. We may consider that there is little trace of it in the school curriculum, although music and drawing appear in that of every village school. Even the Russian pedagogues have found no way of teaching art along with the alphabet, though we must not ignore the subtle personal influence, in the USSR as elsewhere, of the artistically gifted teacher. There is, however, a very good beginning of artistic culture in some, at least, of the schools. Here is an attractive description, as long ago as 1920, of what goes on in the "forest schools" in the summer villas built by the well-to-do in the forest around Moscow, now converted into convalescent homes for ailing children, or simply holiday homes for others. "The unique thing here," said Mr. Brailsford on his visit in 1920, "and indeed in all the Russian schools, was the prominence given to aesthetic culture. Every villa had its piano. The children evidently revelled in drawing and painting, and were encouraged to exercise their creative fancy. Some of their portraits, and even more of their interpretations of Russian fairy tales, showed unusual talent. They vied with each other, moreover, in writing verses. Each little colony had its 'soviet', in which the children, with the aid of a teacher, learned to discuss their own affairs. I saw one of these in session, the girls very solemn and businesslike, and obviously leading the community, the boys much slower and much more reserved. Minutes were kept punctiliously, and the game was evidently educative."¹

sedulously trained and indoctrinated members of the particular race, speaking the vernacular, familiar with local habits and sympathetic with specifically racial customs. The influence of such local administrators in promulgating what they have learned in Moscow must be considerable.

¹ *The Russian Workers' Republic*, by H. N. Brailsford (1921), p. 81.

"Nor is the idyllic aspect wholly absent. Even William Morris, if he had

How successfully the most promising children are picked out for special training in music or dancing, painting or sculpture, we are unable to report. One hears of cases of such selection at the age of 12 or 14 ; and of promotion to music and dancing academies and to special courses of art training. It is plain that what may be termed the artistic professions are being successfully recruited, and that the numbers engaged in them have greatly increased. In the Moscow schools the elder children are encouraged to form "literary circles", "musical circles" and "dramatic circles", which are occasionally visited by successful writers and artists, interested in discussing with them their artistic progress.

So far as the Soviet Government is concerned, the influence of the People's Commissars of Education may be traced rather in getting the utmost for the creation of a popular feeling for art out of the picture galleries and museums, the theatre and the ballet ; out of music and literature ; and, in all the arts, also out of the practitioners themselves.

Museums and Picture Galleries

It may be suggested that no government has ever done so much, within little over a dozen years, as that of the USSR in the way, not merely of maintaining, developing and increasing the public museums and picture galleries throughout the land, but also of widening and deepening their influence on the mass of the people. Museums of all sorts now exist in all the large cities of the USSR, and indeed, often by individual effort, also in some of the villages. Collections of pictures, and of old things of artistic workmanship, are necessarily more limited in number, but those of Moscow and Leningrad are, as they have always been, among the best in the world. What is distinctive of Soviet Communism in this respect is the amount of thought and effort that has been put into the task of getting them visited and appreciated by the people, and of making them the means of universally diffusing some modicum of artistic culture. Not content with a daily opening free of charge, the People's Commissars of Education have managed to get the museums and heard the choir in Vladimir, watched the children in their camps and playing-fields, seen their drawings of fairy tales, and stood behind the village carpenters at work on their new models of handicraft, would have recognised some of the elements of his dream" (*ibid.* p. 198).

galleries of their republics constantly resorted to by organised crowds of children and older students, of soldiers and sailors, of factory workers and of peasants, whom the visitor meets at all hours of the day. These throngs are taken from room to room by specially qualified attendants, mostly educated women, who do their best not merely to explain the exhibits but to point out their artistic qualities—it may be added, not always without political bias! How much dissemination of artistic culture can be achieved in this way, we do not pretend to estimate. But we hazard the suggestion that the Soviet Government puts more effort into getting the utmost artistic mass-education out of the magnificent collections that it has inherited, and those additional ones that it has formed, than any other government in the world.¹

Theatre and Ballet

It is significant that the theatre, the opera, the ballet and the cinema are, in every republic within the USSR, as much within the sphere of the commissariat of education as the school itself. Here also, as with the museums and the picture galleries, what is distinctive of Soviet Communism is, not so much what is provided for the public, as what is done to get educational value out of it. The theatre, the opera and the ballet were of outstanding excellence in tsarist Russia, but any educative influence that they had was confined to a small class. To-day in the USSR they appeal literally to millions; they are not limited to the great cities, but exist in every town. Many villages, state farms and collective farms have their own cinemas, to the aggregate numbers of tens of thousands. The larger factories, and many other workers' clubs, provide their own stages and their own amateur actors, besides frequently inviting travelling companies. More than sixty theatres are now (1935) open in the collective farms, which are regularly visited by travelling companies of salaried actors. In the large cities the theatres are filled every night with proletarian audiences; most of the tickets being distributed in advance, at

¹ "Lenin said that what we think of art is not important; but what the millions say about art is important, for art commences only when its roots are spread broadly through the masses" (*Memoirs of Clara Zetkin*, 1929, quoted in "The Fight for Cultural Advance", by M. Epstein, Assistant People's Commissar for Education in the RSFSR, in *The School in the USSR*, VOKS, Moscow, 1933, p. 35).

some 25 or 30 per cent discount off the public prices, through the trade unions and other popular organisations. Red Army men of all ranks obtain tickets free of any charge. Probably in no other country have so large a proportion of the urban wage-earners, and even some of the villagers, acquired the "theatre going habit".¹

What seems a unique institution is the "children's theatre", open all the year round, designed expressly for children of 9 to 12 years, or 13 to 15 years, and served by its special staffs of playwrights and producers and over a thousand actors and actresses, nearly all of whom confine their activities to this specialised drama. It should be said that no person under 16 is admitted to the ordinary theatre, so that the adults may be unfettered in their choice of plays by any consideration of what may be thought unfit or unseemly for childish ears. But the theatre is too important a factor to be excluded from the children's education; accordingly special children's theatres are maintained for continuous performances at the expense of the several commissariats of education. In 1934 there were ten in Moscow (one for each municipal district), and more than a hundred in the other cities of the USSR. The performance is always in the afternoon, either for the younger or the older children, who are drawn from the seven- or ten-year schools of the district. Each child pays a few kopeks for its seat, a payment exacted in order to make the child feel that it is really "going to the theatre" like the grown-ups! The plays are interestingly written about subjects and situations within the children's comprehension. They are produced and acted with all the technical excellence of the Russian stage. They are free from didacticism, and of anything that can fairly be called propaganda, although they are, of course, subtly penetrated with a "healthy moral tone" and a strong "civic patriotism". The packed child-audiences are thrilled with excitement at every phase of the drama acted before them. If the theatre has all

¹ Kislovodsk, in the Caucasus, formerly the Aix-les-Bains of tsarist Russia, has become exclusively a town of trade union "rest houses" and convalescent homes, thronged throughout the year by twelve to fifteen thousand proletarian guests of all ages. When visited in 1932 by one of the authors, the entertainments provided consisted of an excellent theatre, opera and ballet and an orchestral concert of classical music; but none of the "merry-go-rounds", etc., found at Blackpool or Coney Island. The only other alternative to walking in the beautiful gardens, enjoying the Nazan baths, and engaging in modest mountaineering, was an endless series of lectures on technology and Marxism!

the educative influence on adults that it is supposed to have, it seems difficult to overestimate the importance, in child training, of such a carefully designed children's theatre.¹

Music

In music, too, within little more than a decade, the enjoyment of music and no small amount of acquaintance with the greatest composers has passed, in the USSR, from a small class to literally tens of millions of factory workers and peasants. Not all the trade unionists, it is needless to say, strive to get the cheap tickets for the opera and the orchestral concerts, which in the larger cities are always at the disposal of their organisations; but the visitor is surprised at the numbers who have acquired this new taste. The whole of the Red Army; the entire personnel of the OGPU, including its special troops; and the crews of the rapidly growing maritime fleet, are all provided with opportunities for hearing good music.²

Most of the factories, and now many of the collective farms, have formed their own bands and orchestras, possibly of no great attainments, but testifying, at least, to a growth of musical culture. The latest development is the increasing habit of listening to the music broadcast by the radio from some sixty or so stations to more than a couple of million owners of wireless sets, as well as to hundreds of thousands of loud-speakers. Noteworthy, too, is the sudden new demand by the members of village cooperative societies in 1933-1935, when they found themselves in possession of unexpectedly large yields from their collective farms, for the gramophones that government factories are now turning out by the ten thousand, and even for pianos!

¹ The children's theatre is described in the article entitled "The Bubnov Central House of Children's Art Schools", by A. Lunacharskaya, in *Soviet Culture Review*, No. 2 of 1934, pp. 23-28 (VOKS, Moscow). For the development of the theatre in the USSR, see the number entitled "The Theatre in the USSR" of the VOKS magazine, *Social Construction in the USSR*, vol. vi, 1934; and *The Soviet Theatre*, by P. A. Markov (1934, 176 pp.).

The Autumn Number of *The Studio* (London and New York, 1935) is devoted to "Art in the USSR", surveying achievements in all forms.

² The authors can testify that a ship's company, expecting to stay only two or three nights at Leningrad, spontaneously pressed the captain to wireless a message to ensure their getting seats for the performance of an opera that they particularly wished to hear.

Literature

For literary culture a government can do most by publishing books at prices that ensure wide circulation ; by promoting libraries that place books within reach even of those who cannot buy, and by honouring the authors who produce good literature. Soviet Communism does a good deal in all these ways. During the past decade the output of the various governmental publishing departments has increased by leaps and bounds ; and so great is the popular demand for books that practically every issue goes immediately " out of print ". During 1932 the number of separate " titles " published reached the figure of 55,000, with a total issue exceeding five hundred million copies—an aggregate product which, even allowing for differences in the way of dealing with pamphlets, etc., probably exceeds the output for the year of all the publishers in the rest of the world. The mass of book and pamphlet literature thus hurled at the population of the USSR is naturally of varied character. The largest section to-day is that of school and college textbooks for the twenty-six millions of students of all ages, with which we may include the new demand by hundreds of thousands of factory operatives for instructional booklets explaining how to operate particular kinds of machinery. Another large section consists of reports, in cheap pamphlet form, of the informative speeches of the political leaders, which, having genuinely educational objects, irrespective of electoral contests, are, in content, unlike those of the statesmen in other countries. Not so many copies are printed, although the editions are vastly greater than is usual elsewhere, of the works of the heroes of Russian literature during the last hundred years, from Pushkin to Tolstoy ; together with those of contemporary novelists and poets, dramatists and humorists, in all the principal languages of the USSR. Finally, there must be mentioned the large editions that are issued of translations of the principal English, German, French and Italian authors, from Dante and Chaucer and Shakespeare and Voltaire and Balzac and Flaubert and Goethe and Dickens down to some of the most widely read contemporary novelists of Great Britain and the United States. This annual torrent of literature is issued at low prices, from a cent or a penny up to a pound or more for magnificent collections of reproductions in colours of the best pictures ; a common figure

for a single volume being one rouble. A large proportion is bought by the innumerable libraries that have sprung up in the branches of every kind of organisation, whether trade union, cooperative, Comsomol, army, sporting, school, institute, or club. From one end of the USSR to the other there may well be, in 1935, more than fifty thousand of these libraries, large or small, nearly all of them having funds to spend on a perpetual enlargement of their collections.¹

Whether or not the whole of the population in the USSR are going to be " cultivated " in the western sense of the term, it is clear that they are steadily becoming a reading people. Every boy and girl, every factory operative, every office employee—we may almost say every peasant under thirty years of age—seems to be an omnivorous reader. Not altogether without reason has it been claimed that, in the USSR, it is the state publishing house, rather than the university professoriate or even the great army of school teachers, that is, in the service of general culture, the most potent agency.

Holidays and Amusements

Equally significant is the fact that the provision for recreation, the organisation of the oddly named " parks of culture and rest ", and the provision of " rest houses " in which the workers can spend their vacations, all fall within the sphere of the People's Commissars of Education of the various republics. They have, in fact, all to be included in the Remaking of Man, on which Soviet Communism is basing its new civilisation. The innumerable clubs for workers in factories or state farms ; the steadily growing provision for social intercourse of one or other sort in the more successful of the collective farms ; the " red corners " in factory or institute, and on board ship ; the often elaborate arrangements made for the organised amusement of the various sections of visitors in the parks of the larger cities ²—manifesta-

¹ We have statistics only of the large libraries with more than 80,000 volumes. These have increased, since 1917, from 29 to 111 in number. Some of the factories come into this list. The Molotov Automobile Works at Gorki has 113,000 volumes, with 18,000 registered readers. The Stalingrad Tractor Works has two libraries, one of general literature, with 86,000 volumes, and the other of scientific and technical works, with 116,000 volumes. The Institute for the Mechanisation of Agriculture in the North Caucasus has 82,000 volumes (*Moscow Daily News*, April 15, 1935).

² These arrangements are often minutely sensible. In the urban parks and

tions of the advantages of popular organisation, more genuinely spontaneous and uncontrolled than is believed by the foreigner—all receive the beneficent patronage of the commissariats of education. Most of the palaces of bygone royalty, and the mansions and summer villas of the former wealthy, have been adjusted to their new uses as holiday homes for the wage-earners, the management and the allocation of railway tickets being left in the hands of the committees of the several trade unions. It is worth notice that, whilst vodka can be purchased in bottles at the special government shops devoted entirely to this commerce (which are usually covered with government posters urging you not to drink), it is an accepted universal rule that no alcoholic drink of any sort is obtainable at any workers' club or holiday "rest house", any more than at any theatre or concert hall, or at any railway station or communal dining place.

The Meaning of Culture

Is there any inaccuracy in describing all this varied organisation of the people's leisure hours, equally with the time spent in school and college, as the promotion of popular culture? This, it may be said, is to give a new meaning to the word "culture" as it has commonly been used in England. There is, it must be candidly admitted, in the USSR of to-day, little of the sort of culture that used to be recognised as such in the Oxford or Cambridge common rooms, or in the artistic coteries of Bloomsbury or Chelsea; and even less governmental recognition of it, or encouragement to it.¹ It is worth while analysing the divergent meanings of the word.

gardens there are often free shelters for temporary refuge from rainstorms; broad covered places with one or more open sides, furnished with small tables and abundant chairs. In many of these a woman attendant will be found in charge of a counter, loaded with the current issues of various newspapers and magazines, and a small selection of popular books. These are all available gratuitously for the temporary use of any applicant, who deposits against the loan his trade union or party membership card, which he reclaims on returning his reading matter when the rainstorm ceases.

¹ There is, we believe, no teaching of Greek or Latin in the elementary or secondary schools of the USSR, though German or English is commonly taught even in the villages, in all seven- or ten-year schools. In one or other of the 800 colleges, academies and research institutes of university grade a large proportion of the living languages of the world are studied with practical objects. Greek and Latin, like Sanscrit and Hebrew, are studied by those pursuing anthropology, archaeology or philology. There is, similarly, no formal teaching of philosophy,

Both under Soviet Communism and in Great Britain the *élite* emphasise in culture the idea of self-improvement and self-development. Both agree in the importance of physical culture as an element in the good life. Both agree, too, whether intuitively or as a scientifically valid inference from psychology, in estimating more highly, as a means of physical culture, the instrument of outdoor games or mountaineering than that of even the best gymnastic exhibitions, or formally ordered exercises. But Soviet Communism avoids, whilst Great Britain usually commits, the error of regarding culture, not as knowledge of what is best in the world and a competent evaluation of the whole universe in which we live, but as essentially, or at least predominatingly, "bookish" in its nature. Or, if not exclusively "bookish", culture may indicate mainly a preoccupation with selected parts of the activities of the world, such as music or painting, poetry or literary style; or even the collecting of things thought beautiful. Moreover, it seems as if the British conception of culture were closely bound up with the absence of any use-value in the pursuit or practice of the cultured life, apart from what may be admitted to be the utility of promoting culture itself. In Britain the devotee of culture is apt to regard, with what the soviet communists think a silly complacency, the fact that his efforts to increase or develop his own culture are divorced from any practical use in the transformation of the world. These differences between divergent views of culture lead to graver contrasts. Is it unfair to say that the British devotees of culture not only accept as inevitable the exclusion of the masses from the "realms of gold" in which they themselves find so much virtuous enjoyment, but

and (except in the Communist Academy (for which see pp. 966-969) for the higher education of Party members and then only for the purpose of refuting criticisms of Marxism) next to no exposition or criticism of the works on philosophy, theology or metaphysics, by either mediaeval or modern authors. There is, in fact, a positive discouragement of any purely "bookish" culture. We do not presume to estimate how much may not be lost by this all-pervading "positivism", as Auguste Comte might have termed it. A few of the largest public libraries strive to keep their collections up to date by importing from other countries their more important new works on philosophy. The Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute at Moscow makes a point of obtaining everything dealing with Marxism, in whatever language published.

We have already mentioned (p. 905) that, in 1934, it was decided that the subject of history should be added to the college courses. From October 1934, whole series of lectures on the history of various nations in the world are being given by scores of professors, often illuminated by descriptions of their social institutions, and sketches of their literatures.

also secretly rejoice at their own exclusive possession of something in which the common lump of men cannot share ? And is not this the explanation of a certain polished arrogance of mind among these superior people, producing, even in the most amiable of them, a certain veiled condescension towards the people at large ?¹ In the usage of Soviet Communism there is, in the conception of culture, no such connotation of inevitable exclusiveness, of a pleasant aloofness, or of a consciousness of superiority. It is, at any rate, definitely the policy of the Soviet Government—as it is very far from being that of any other government in the world—that the possession of culture shall be made, not necessarily identical or equal, but genuinely universal ; that none of the known means of awakening the powers of the child, or stimulating the development of the adolescent, or refining the life of the adult, shall be withheld from, or denied to, any resident in the USSR ; and that, as fast as the increasing wealth production permits, these means shall actually be put, for individual use or enjoyment according to their several faculties, at the disposal of literally everybody. Soviet communists actually believe that, by a sustained effort of self-sacrifice on the part of the older people, the entire generation that is growing up in the USSR can be raised to a high level of culture. There will be some who will see in that very belief, and in the strenuous efforts that it inspires, a real evidence of culture in the best sense of the word.

The Civilisation of a Whole Nation

It is, in fact, in its universalism that we see the most significant of all the trends of the service of education in the Soviet Union, whether we think of the young or the old, the great cities or the backward races ; whether the stress is on physical health or on technical training, on wealth production or on universal participation in the affairs of state ; on music or on the drama. More than anywhere else the government in the USSR is concerned with the young. “ The guiding idea of the Soviet Republic ”, it has been said, “ is to give the children a preference in everything, from food and clothing to less tangible goods. The explanation

¹ It was in vain that Matthew Arnold quoted Menander to the cultivated coteries of his time. Have they not, in the matter of culture, steadfastly refused to “ choose equality ” ?

of this deliberate policy is not sentimental. Communism is a Messianic doctrine, which lives for the future, and acts with long-sighted vision. Its ambition is to base the greatness of the world's first socialist republic upon a generation of children who will be mentally and physically the superiors of the men and women of to-day."¹ In education, even more than in any other sphere, Soviet Communism has made a new departure in the world's history. Never before has there been a genuine attempt to make an adequate or complete education universal. As was pointed out as early in the course of the soviet experiment as 1921, in a book that attracted too little notice in Great Britain,² the policy of the USSR in this field is without precedent. All down the ages, in every country, "the privileged ruling and employing class never seriously intended that the children of the manual workers should enjoy the same opportunities as their own. Even advanced Liberals in contemporary England speak of their ideas as 'the educational ladder' by which they mean a system which will help the more capable children of the manual workers to climb above their class. Whatever a few idealists may have planned or preached, there is no real attempt to rear the whole mass of working-class children in the best culture of their age. . . . To my mind," wrote Mr. Brailsford in 1921, "the most inspiring thing in Russia is that the socialist revolution, instantly and instinctively, began to realise the ideal of universal education, which the interests and prejudices of class have thwarted in the rest of Europe. Every fair-minded observer has given the Bolsheviks credit for their prompt efforts to send an illiterate people to school. Their ambition is much bolder. They intend, from infancy to adolescence, to make, for every Russian child, the conditions, both physical and intellectual, which will enable its mind to evolve its utmost capacities. They intend that none of the comforts, none of the pleasures, none of the stimuli which awaken the powers of a child born in Europe in a cultured middle-class home shall be lacking to the children of the humblest Russian workers. Their belief is that, by a great and self-sacrificing effort, the entire generation which is coming to maturity in Russia can be raised to a high level of culture." Mr. Brailsford did not fail to point out that the soviet communists had many difficulties to

¹ *The Russian Workers' Republic*, by H. N. Brailsford (1921), p. 76.

² *Ibid.* pp. 74-75.

overcome. "They will", he said, "not at once attain their full ambition. They are hampered by poverty. They suffer from a dearth of teachers who share their outlook. Many a long year will pass before the primitive isolated Russian village can absorb more than the bare rudiments of civilisation. But this they have achieved. They have broken the barriers which class and poverty had raised against education."¹ We emphasise Mr. Brailsford's point that it is in the conception of the civilisation of the whole nation that is found the true significance of Soviet Communism. "For as yet Europe has had no cultivated nation, but only a number of relatively cultivated classes."²

Educational Shortcomings

The goal and the ideal may be beyond all praise, but the achievement lags woefully behind. Great as has been the advance in all branches and grades of education in the USSR, the shortcomings are (1935) still formidable. Of the immense programme placed before the people, probably not one item has been carried out in its entirety. Twenty-two millions of children are in attendance at school, but hardly anywhere, in city or country, are there school buildings sufficient to contain them. The newest erections are of the highest excellence, but in practically all the cities, and in some of the larger villages, the children have to come in two shifts—occasionally even three shifts spread over a long day.³ There are not yet enough teachers to bring all the classes down, not to the maximum of twenty-five, as required by the decree of 1918, but to a maximum even of fifty. Of the half a million teachers, probably those having only the scantiest of pedagogic qualifications account for one-half. It may be possible within the next two or three years to turn all the four-year schools into seven-year schools throughout the USSR, as the Ukraine has already

The Russian Workers' Republic, by H. N. Brailsford (1921), pp. 74-75.

² *Ibid.* p. 198.

³ In Moscow, in 1934, in spite of having opened 100 new schools within the last five years, all the schools (some 500 in number) work in two shifts, except 35, in which there are three shifts; where there are ten-year schools (8 to 17 inclusive) attendance is not legally compulsory after the fifteenth birthday.

In the villages the school may have any sort of accommodation—an enlarged peasant's hut, very occasionally a disused church, and increasingly a new building, often erected free of charge by the workmen of a neighbouring factory, who take the village school under their patronage (see p. 744).

done, and even to increase proportionately the teaching staff. But it will be impossible for many a day to find trained and qualified teachers for every hamlet and village between the Baltic and the Pacific. In the higher colleges and institutes the professors complain that the bulk of the students come with an imperfect grounding in what should be secondary school subjects ; and have to spend much of their years of vocational training to repairing some of these deficiencies. The training of teachers suffers specially from this inadequate preparation. At best, the five-year course is all too short to equip fully either the medical practitioner or the engineer, still less the scientific researcher. The demand for technicians of every kind is so great that students are snatched away from college, and given responsible appointments, long before they are equal to such tasks. It is a tribute to the versatility and adaptability of the race, and to the all-pervading zeal and devotion to the public service, that these immature and imperfectly trained young men and women achieve a degree of success that is remarkable. But how great is the need for improvement, and how far the Soviet Union has still to go, no one knows better than the People's Commissars and the academicians themselves. In view of the immensity of the task, and the height of the ideal, this scarcely amounts to a criticism.

Looking at the whole range of the social services of the USSR, and taking into view also the organisation of the productive forces as described in our two preceding chapters, there is, however, one fundamental criticism to which we are tempted. Whatever else has been achieved by Soviet Communism, it has not yet gone far in the direction of making life beautiful. But how can it be expected to have done so within less than a couple of decades ? " We are ", declared Lenin ¹ in 1921, " a beggarly, uncultured people. We should speak of that semi-Asiatic cultural backwardness, which we have not yet thrown off. . . . We are a people, to put it mildly, on the level, as it were, of semi-barbarism." This ugliness of Russian life is the outcome not of communism but of the previous centuries of tsardom. Nevertheless, it has to be admitted that—except for the magnificent Neva front and the

¹ At the second All-Russian Congress for Political Education in 1921, quoted by M. Epstein, Assistant People's Commissar for Education of the RSFSR, in " The Fight for Cultural Advance ", in *The School in the USSR* (VOKS, Moscow, 1933), p. 30.

Red Square at Moscow—the wide expanse of the Eurasian plain is still almost as devoid of beauty as of comfort, and not yet much better provided with either than was tsarist Russia. Yet even here there is definite progress in the newest buildings of Moscow and Kharkov, together with the new underground railway, and in much else.¹ And so impressive is the advance already made, and so contagious the atmosphere of hopefulness, that the observer comes away half prepared to believe that even beauty will, in due time, be achieved as well as the comforts of life.

Changing the Environment

In the various social services hitherto described, we have seen how largely Soviet Communism relies, for the Remaking of Man, on the development in body and mind, in capacity and character, of the individual child, of the individual adolescent and of the individual man or woman, whether as citizen, as producer or as consumer—not to say also as a member of the organised Vocation of Leadership. It is to this end of the maximum development of every person that, in the Soviet Union, all the various social institutions seek to create positive health in every member of the community, to equip everyone with education and culture, and to guarantee, at all ages and in all the vicissitudes of life, that state of economic security in which alone an uninterrupted course of individual development is practicable.² But to deal in any or all of these ways exclusively with the individual is not enough. Man in society is, not entirely, but to no small extent, dependent on the environment, exterior to himself, in which he lives and moves. It is accordingly of importance, if the peoples of the USSR are to be successively raised to higher stages of civilisation, that the environment in which they have to dwell, and from the influence of which, in the past, at least much of their degradation has come, should be itself transformed.

Governments in the past have seldom thought of deliberately changing the environment of their peoples. This is not explicitly set out, even in the twentieth-century textbooks of political

¹ From an architectural standpoint the best three recent buildings may be Lenin's mausoleum by Shchushev, the Palace of Industry at Kharkov by Serafino and the magnificent sanatorium for rheumatism at Odessa.

² *Speech of Welcome to Foreign Delegates*, by N. M. Shvernik, Secretary of the AUCCTU (1933), pp. 17-18.

science of the western world, as one of the purposes of government. Yet how can mankind be improved, or even in any way changed, without changing its environment? The Soviet Government naturally gives a large place, in its policy of the Remaking of Man, to measures for the transformation of the environment, alike of the dwellers in cities and of those in the rural areas. Under this head come a whole series of colossal projects, many of them already being partially put in operation year by year, as opportunity permits. These range from gigantic schemes of artificial irrigation in order to keep back the inroads of the desert on the cultivated land, on the one hand; and of subsoil drainage of the huge part now made up of swamps and marshes, on the other, up to plans for an all-pervading electrification of the whole area of the USSR, and for the completion of a continuous network of roads and navigable waterways throughout the vast plain. We have perforce to confine ourselves here to the one important part of the environment constituted by the buildings, in and about which the 170 millions of people in the USSR spend so many hours out of the twenty-four; together with the various common services made necessary by the aggregation of these buildings, and of those who frequent them, in the multitude of villages, and notably in the rapid expansion of populous cities.

The Service of Housing

It is a paradox of social statistics in every country that some of the greatest advances in social organisation are made the subjects of the bitterest reproaches. This is the case with regard to the service of housing in the Soviet Union. The living conditions of the mass of the people in the industrial centres of tsarist Russia, as well as in the villages, were so appallingly bad, and the rapid growth of the city population during the past decade has been so overwhelming, that the utmost efforts at rehousing have so far scarcely kept pace with the ever-enlarging needs. Hence, in spite of really great achievements, Soviet Communism is blamed to-day for the fact that the housing of the people is still a blot upon the picture!

No reasonable judgment can be arrived at about the trend in the service of housing until we realise what things were like before the Revolution. Nowadays we usually attempt to measure

overcrowding by counting how many individuals have to live in a single room. But in the industrial districts of tsarist Russia more than half of the factory workers had no rooms at all! "According to the findings of a special investigation made in St. Petersburg in 1908, only 40 per cent of the textile workers had separate rooms; the remainder found shelter in overcrowded barracks, where they occupied separate bunks. On an average a working family had only three square metres of floor space" (literally only 10 square feet), "and this in St. Petersburg, where the workers enjoyed comparatively better living conditions than elsewhere." Nor was this terrible overcrowding caused merely by urban conditions. In 1920 an English visitor found his way, the first foreigner for six years, to "the factory in the forest", twenty miles from the small town of Vladimir, where capitalism had built a cotton mill to take advantage of the incredibly low level of wages among the peasants. "No trade union was tolerated here before the Revolution. Every form of association among the workers, even for purposes of education or recreation, was forbidden. I saw", continues this observer, "the vast barracks in which they had been housed. Each family had for its dwelling a narrow though lofty cell (one cannot call it a room) lit by a tiny window high up in the wall. Often as many as seven or eight pairs of lungs inhabited these cells, and the allowance of space was supposed to be seven cubic feet [equal to seven feet by one and by one] for each person. The factory was well lit by electricity. There was no artificial light in the barracks, and the sanitary arrangements were unspeakable."¹ Matters were at any rate no better in the mining districts. "At Asbest", in the Urals, relates a Canadian expert of his first impressions, "I saw the workers living, for the greater part, under the conditions that existed when the mines were under private ownership. Most of them were quartered in large log-houses consisting usually of one huge room, either unpartitioned or divided by flimsy curtains. An entire family—man, wife and children—would have a space possibly six feet by twelve, in which to live, sleep and cook. The beds were composed of boards covered by a heap of rags. The workers seldom if ever undressed. There was no attempt at providing latrines or other like facilities. Some families which we observed were living in a sort of earth

¹ *The Russian Workers' Republic*, by H. N. Brailsford (1921), pp. 12 and 13.

hovel; others in huts half of which were hardly more than excavations in the ground, rudely roofed over.”¹

For the first decade after the Bolshevik seizure of power, though many plans were made, and some new dwellings erected, the Soviet Government found no time or power to make any substantial advance in housing, either in the old cities or the new, at the mines or in the villages. With the formulation of the First Five-Year Plan, however, a bound forward was made in all directions. The aggregate amount of new building has, during the past seven years (1928–1934), steadily increased year after year, a large proportion of the materials and labour force available being allocated to the provision of additional dwellings for the rapidly increasing population of the cities, the oil-fields and the mining areas; whilst, among the agriculturists, every state farm (sovkhos) and many of the more thriving kolkhosi, whether communes or artels, have made new provision both for farm buildings and for the accommodation of part of their workers. Comparable statistics are not easily discoverable, but it seems probable that, in the mere amount of state, municipal, selosoviet and cooperative building, during the past seven years (1927–1934), the USSR has actually done more than any other nation within that period. In the cities of the USSR, from April to October, the noise of building operations never (1932–1935) ceases day and night.

Systematic Town Planning

What are the salient trends in this considerable rehousing of the people between the Baltic and the Pacific? We first note the amount of thought and foresight that has been put into the task, with the widespread adoption of town planning. Equally conspicuous in most cases has been the haste and consequent defectiveness of the actual operation of building and equipping the new dwellings. There has certainly been no monopoly in housing. The need has been so overwhelming that many different agencies have been not only allowed, but actually persuaded, to lend a hand in providing accommodation to whatever extent and in whatever style they could. Finally, it will be seen that, whatever ideas may have been entertained in some quarters of a utopian communal life, the public demand has mostly compelled

¹ *Working for the Soviets*, by W. A. Rukeyser (1932), p. 152.

the provision of substantially self-contained family dwellings, comprising several rooms, and often a separate kitchen ; usually with no more arrangements in common among the adjacent families than have been customary in western Europe for a whole generation.

We take these four main trends in detail.

With regard to housing, as in so many other activities of Soviet Communism, we see the characteristic devotion of endless time and thought to getting the best scheme or plan. The planning of new cities, or the rebuilding of old ones, is in the USSR, not a fad of philanthropists or utopian architects, but a recognised part of the art of public administration, forced on the attention of statesmen and officials, architects and builders, and also the general public, by elaborate specialist museums and research institutes, and by organising periodical public exhibitions, with exceptionally vivid maps and diagrams, explaining how each city can best be transformed and developed. The extension of such cities as Moscow and Leningrad, for the next twenty or thirty years, has been exhaustively studied and graphically delineated, having regard to the more convenient location of additional factories, the amount of new housing required, the means of communication and locomotion, the supply of water and electricity, the disposal of surface water, sewage and garbage, the maintenance of open spaces and the construction of stadiums, the provision of the necessary number of schools and places of higher education, hospitals and clinics, public baths, fire stations and every kind of public office. At Kharkov the corresponding organisation, called Guipergrad, an institution for the study of the development and extension of existing cities, is reported to have a membership of 1100, of whom no fewer than 900 are professional architects or building engineers, has worked out, with equal elaborate detail, the future development of the city, which is steadily approaching one million inhabitants. At Dnieperstroy, where the greatest hydro-electric generating plant in the world is supplying a rapidly growing congeries of factories, more than three years were spent by the expert officials representing the central government, the local governments and the various industrial corporations, in planning every detail of the growth, during the ensuing thirty years, of an estimated urban aggregation of a million people. This design includes a civic centre

surrounded by six autonomous self-contained satellite cities, free from the drawbacks of "suburbs". The most striking example of this deliberate town planning has been manifested in such new cities as Magnitogorsk and such transformations as Chelyabinsk. Doubtless there are mistakes and unforeseen contingencies in all this elaborate forecasting of future action. But it is hard to believe that deliberate planning is not better than leaving everything to haphazard individual decision when the moment arrives. Architects from western countries find this part of the housing problem ably dealt with in the USSR. We quote one enthusiastic summary by a British expert. "The town planning," he said, "the city planning, the regional planning, is all good. They have considered everything, power for the factories, convenience of getting raw material to the works and finished products away from them. The new cities are zoned and belted in the most approved and up-to-date way. They have provided amply for all aesthetic, health and recreational wants, planting trees everywhere, building fine cinemas and theatres, ample hospitals and schools. Everything has been well and wisely planned." ¹

Unfortunately, as is equally characteristic of the present phase of Soviet Communism, the elaborate planning of the future is not accompanied, so far as building is concerned, by an equally high standard of execution. The considerable work in providing additional housing in the cities and other industrial areas, during the past seven years, has been done in great haste, largely by peasant youths very imperfectly trained as building craftsmen. The haste was part of the "Bolshevik tempo", deliberately adopted for the heavy industries, to be explained as arising from the intense desire to make the USSR self-sufficient before the constantly apprehended attack (or blockade or embargo) by the capitalist powers could be begun. Whether or not this fear was justified, the acceleration which it demanded has had an adverse result on the incessant building operations of 1928-1934, in the frequent failure to finish off the hundreds of thousands of new dwellings up to anything like western standards of quality. The observant visitor comes across endless complaints of leaky roofs,

¹ "A Holiday in Russia", by Clough Williams-Ellis, in *Manchester Guardian Commercial*, October 15, 1932, p. 11; see in confirmation the informative chapter on "Architecture and Town-Planning", by Geoffrey Ridley, in *Twelve Studies in Soviet Russia*, edited by M. I. Cole, 1933, pp. 109-124.

windows that refuse either to open or to shut, warped doors, floors attacked by dry rot, and imperfect plumbing ; of buildings left long unprovided with any water supply or sanitary conveniences, and of the lack of arrangements for adequate lighting or heating. But defective as the new dwellings may be, from the standpoint of Vienna or Amsterdam, or from that of the best that Great Britain or America can show, they are plainly superior to the overcrowded hovels that they superseded. The frank comments of the English architect whom we have already quoted are at least instructive. Writing in 1932, Mr. Clough Williams-Ellis said of the USSR : " Just as their new industrial cities are immeasurably better in layout and general lines, so are our individual buildings immeasurably better in finish and workmanship. And here you come to the reason why Russia is exciting. Here, in my own sphere, is the challenge—is it better to do the wrong thing well or the right thing badly ? Your answer to this will depend, as your answer to the Russian challenge in general, on whether you care more for the present or for the future. Russia's mistakes in city buildings are remediable. She will have to put new doors and windows, sometimes new floors, into her houses. Sometime, in some not far distant five-year plan, she will have to reconsider some light-hearted notions she has as to plumbing. It will be exceedingly annoying to have to do all this, but unless Russia and the present Russian mentality change in the next twenty years, all this will be done. What about our mistakes ? Our mistakes need dynamite. The water will run out of our baths, our windows will open and shut, but our streets are wrong, our factories or our houses are in the wrong place, we have spoilt our rivers, and even our fine new roads, and unless the present English mentality changes strangely in the next twenty years, we shall not set these things right." ¹

The number and variety of the agencies called upon to help in this work of rehousing are bewildering. The USSR Government has led the way by repeatedly demanding instant attention to the need, and by itself building, not only new offices nearly everywhere, but also huge blocks of flats in Moscow for the civil servants. The hundreds of municipal soviets, in great cities and small, have been constantly stirred up to build both blocks of

¹ " A Holiday in Russia ", by Clough Williams-Ellis, in *Manchester Guardian Commercial*, October 15, 1932, p. 11.

flats and small houses for their growing populations. Many of the manufacturing corporations—the government enterprises called trusts—have erected more or less extensive blocks of flats for their office employees and their manual workers. Most of the larger factories have done the same, as part of the annual running expenses, often at the instance of the trade union, and as a concession made in the annual collective bargaining, which is, as we have described, everywhere so actively conducted in the opening months of each year.¹ Special efforts have been made to improve the housing accommodation in such areas as the Donets coal mines and the Baku oil-fields, in order to counteract the troublesome tendency of the workers to wander away elsewhere. In all the new manufacturing suburbs of old cities (as at Gorki, Stalin-grad and Kharkov) and in the creation of new cities (as at Dnieper-stroy and Magnitogorsk) the provision of dwellings for the workers almost necessarily had to be undertaken simultaneously with the erection of the factories, in order to attract the new recruits. But not all this extensive and varied activity, at hundreds of different centres, by central and local governments in their various departments, and by industrial trusts and separate factories, trade unions, and consumers' cooperative societies, could keep down the continuous deficit of housing accommodation. In Moscow and Leningrad, and to a lesser extent in a few other cities, cooperative housing associations were encouraged, by allocation of sites and concessions in the way of credit, to build houses for their own members. Individual owners were in some cases permitted, and even assisted, to enlarge buildings for their own occupation. As is so often found to be the case in the USSR, with its fundamental conception of multiformity, there has been, in the vast enterprise of housing, no idea of there being only a single employer, a single controller or a single agency. The only thing forbidden is the profit-making building contractor hiring wage labour, or the individual speculator in housing accommodation.

Nor did the government of the USSR claim for itself any monopoly, either of policy or of execution. The work undertaken by or under any authority in any part of the USSR has, of course, to be reported to Gosplan for inclusion in the General Plan. The total of projected expenditure has, accordingly, to be approved each year by the USSR Central Executive Committee (TSIK).

¹ See pp. 285-291.

The principal legislative decrees about housing are enacted by TSIK, and ratified by the All-Union Congress of Soviets. The responsibility for providing adequate dwelling accommodation for all the people rests primarily on the several constituent and autonomous republics, and on the local soviets, to be carried out generally by special administrative commissions, and to be supervised, in the main, by the several People's Commissars of Health, or Commissars of Communal Affairs.

At various times since the Revolution, there have been experiments in common arrangements, in which groups of students or other unmarried persons, and sometimes families, joined together in dispensing with separate housekeeping, separate kitchens and often separate meals. Some persons looked forward to a time when the family would cease to be the unit for housing accommodation. Some of the new dwellings that were being provided in connection with great industrial enterprises, as for instance at the Molotov Automobile Works at Gorki, were actually laid out as communes. But it was soon found that such arrangements were unattractive to the mass of the workers and their wives, and the family unit of accommodation was reverted to. In recent years the whole provision of new dwellings has taken the form of flats of two, three or four rooms, each flat usually having its own kitchen, and usually also its own water supply, bath-room and water closet, though there is some sharing among two or three contiguous small flats. The arrangements in common for the inhabitants of a whole block sometimes comprise a crèche and a children's playground; less frequently a branch store of the local cooperative society; whilst occasionally part of the ground floor is utilised for the local offices of public departments, such as the district pharmacy, and perhaps the consultation point of the local health administration. There are, however, we think, nowhere any more arrangements in common than in the later blocks of dwellings of the Vienna Municipality, or the London County Council; usually, in fact, there seem to be fewer.

With all this multifarious activity by so many different authorities, all intent on building additional workers' dwellings, it is impossible to get any definite statistics of the aggregate amount actually completed.¹ We append statements covering

¹ Comparison with other countries is made difficult by the difference in method of measurement. In Great Britain we count by rooms, whereas in the

the two periods 1926-1930 and 1931-1934. "During the last five years [1926-1930]", reported L. M. Kaganovich, in 1931, "over 3½ billion roubles have been spent on new house construction throughout the USSR, and over 30 million square metres of new dwelling space have been added . . . up to 1931 about one million workers' families have been settled in these new houses, whereas in 1931 alone 600,000 workers' families will be provided for. . . . In spite of the inadequacy of what has been done in this sphere from the point of view of the ever-growing needs of the workers and toilers, let the bourgeois slanderers point to one country in Europe where such extensive housing construction has been undertaken during the past five years [1926-1930]. During this period a number of cities have been reconstructed, such as Baku, Grozny, Leningrad, Novosibirsk, Nizhni-Novgorod [now Gorki], etc. Moreover a number of entirely new cities have been built, such as Magnitogorsk, Dnieperstroy, Kuznetsk, Dzerzhinsk, etc."¹

"Since 1931 [to 1934]" reported the People's Commissar of Communal Affairs of the RSFSR, "about 6300 million roubles have been invested in housing and communal construction. Over 19 million square metres of living space have been constructed. . . . In Moscow, for example, about 2,200,000 square metres of new living space were built between 1931 and 1934; whilst in the [other] cities of Moscow Province over one million square metres were built, and in the city and province of Leningrad 2,200,000. Housing construction has also been developed on a large scale in the Urals and in Western Siberia. In the cities and new constructions of these regions . . . 4,700,000 square metres have been built. Particularly outstanding is the fact that before the Revolution in the textile regions of Tver there were up to 2·5 square metres of living space per person, while now in Kalinin there are five to six square metres. No bourgeois country has ever known housing construction on such a scale. . . . It is necessary, however, to say, with Bolshevik directness," he proceeds, "that our achievements in housing construction do not as yet satisfy us. In this branch of municipal economy there are great shortcomings.

USSR measurement is by square metres of floor, or living space. A British apartment or flat of three rooms, suited to not more than six persons of all ages, in a block of workmen's dwellings has usually about 72 or 85 square yards of floor space; or, as the Russians would say, 56 or 67 square metres of living space.

¹ *The Socialist Reconstruction of Moscow and other Cities in the USSR*, by L. M. Kaganovich (1931), pp. 9, 62.

In 1933, 9,700,000 square metres of living space were constructed in the cities of the RSFSR, whereas on January 1, 1934, only 5 million square metres had been brought into use. Matters were not better in 1934. During the first eleven months the executive committees fulfilled the housing construction plan by 78.5 per cent, the cooperatives by 85 per cent, and so on. Matters are proceeding more successfully in the Western Province, Bashkiria and Karakstan; and worse in Sverdlovsk, Chelyabinsk and in the Far Eastern Territory. The situation is absolutely impermissible in Ivanovo, where 9640 square metres were brought into use in the first eight months (annual plan 52,200 square metres). In Yaroslavl only 36,400 were ready for October 1st. In housing construction cooperatives have considerably grown. They now include up to 400,000 persons. During these years 1,700,000 square metres of living space have been built and brought into use. In addition to this, the housing cooperatives have put up 578,000 of standard houses." Dwelling on the problem of quality of housing construction, Komarov emphasised that "in many cases it does not correspond to the growing cultural needs of the toilers. Insufficient attention is paid to the architectural form and interior planning and finish. An example of this is the workers' settlement of the Molotov automobile plant in Gorki. In Voronezh a new house for specialists had to be largely reconstructed in order to be brought into use. . . . The housing facilities of the cities of the RSFSR have greatly increased during the past few years, and at the beginning of 1934 reached 132 million square metres. . . . Great tasks face us in the field of housing. The Seventeenth Party Congress issued a directive to construct 64 million square metres of living space in the Second Five-Year Plan. From 40 to 45 million square metres of this fall to the cities of the RSFSR." ¹

Strive as they may, the soviet authorities will not be able, for many a year, to house decently their rapidly growing population.

¹ Report of N. P. Komarov, People's Commissar of Communal Affairs of the RSFSR, at the Sixteenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, January 18, 1935; in *Moscow Daily News*, January 20, 1935.

The aggregate of 132 million square metres given as the existing accommodation in the cities of the RSFSR alone, would, in Great Britain, be regarded as housing without illegal overcrowding about 3 million families averaging five persons each, which appears to be less than has been built for letting, including private enterprise, since the Great War in the cities of Great Britain.

Municipal Services

Scarcely less important than adequate dwelling accommodation in influence upon health and character, are the various common services that the close aggregation of buildings and persons in cities renders necessary. In such matters as water supply and main drainage, paving and lighting, means of transport, public baths and other accessories of the civilised life of a densely crowded population, the Soviet Government has already transformed many of the cities of the USSR almost beyond recognition. Prior to the Revolution such municipal services as existed usually extended only to the parts of the cities inhabited by the wealthy and official classes. For the most part the streets, if paved at all, were only roughly paved with cobble-stones, and hardly any were regularly cleaned or properly lighted. The transformation has been greater than the statistics can record. Writing in 1931, Kaganovich gives the following particulars: "According to figures for 1911, out of 1063 inhabited points with a population of over 10,000 only 219 (20.6 per cent) possessed water supply systems . . . and even those almost exclusively served only the centres of the cities. By 1926 the number of cities with water supply systems had increased to 283 . . . [by 1931] the number . . . has increased to 333 . . . not to speak of the restoration of old systems. 32 cities [in 1931] now possess drainage systems, as compared with 19 before the revolution. Tramway systems have been newly installed in 10 cities, not to speak of the extensive development of the previously existing systems. Before the war 61 cities . . . were supplied with electricity. The number is now 393."¹

In 1935, the People's Commissar of Communal Affairs of the RSFSR (covering about four-sevenths of the population of the USSR) reported as follows on the progress from 1931 to 1934: "During the past few years 660 million roubles have been expended for sanitary and technical measures. New water systems have been built in Dzerzhinsk, Shakhty, Engels, Lysva, Alma Ata, Frunze, Kineshma and other cities. The water systems in Gorki, Samara, Chelyabinsk, Perm, Stalingrad, Novosibirsk and Sverdlovsk have been radically reconstructed. Before

¹ *The Socialist Reconstruction of Moscow and other Cities in the USSR*, by L. M. Kaganovich (1931), pp. 62-63.

the Revolution the Moscow water system supplied 23 million gallons of water a day. Now it supplies 124 million gallons. . . . Sewage systems, bath-houses and communal electric service have also greatly increased. A total of 166.7 million roubles has been invested in communal electric stations from 1931 to 1934. The capacity of electric stations has increased during this time [by] 82,000 kilowatts. . . . Central-heating stations and gas systems were also developing, particularly in Moscow, where the number of gas meters increased from 33,500 in 1931 to 50,500 in 1934. . . . In 1933 and 1934 new street car lines were built in 11 cities. . . . In the Second Five-Year Plan street car lines will be built in 16 cities. . . . Autobus communications have also expanded. Before the October Revolution there were no autobuses in the country at all. In 1930 there were bus lines in 36 cities, and in 1934 in 97 cities. . . . the construction of our subway [in Moscow]—the best in the world—has been carried on, under the observation of Comrade Stalin, under the immediate leadership of the Moscow committee of the Party and of Comrade Kaganovich. No country in the world has known such a rapid tempo of subway construction. . . . In 1928 the first asphalt pavement was laid in Moscow, while at the end of last year [1934] 1,900,000 square metres of streets and squares were covered with asphalt.”¹

Looking back on this lengthy exposition of the proceedings of the Soviet Government in the Remaking of Man, we note the range and variety of the expedients that have been brought to the task. But these varieties of organised social services, extending from birth to burial, constitute only a relatively small part of the process of the Remaking of Man that is going on in the USSR. For all their social utility and all their width of range, the processes of woman’s emancipation and juvenile education, social insurance and replanning the cities, are nevertheless only supplementary, in their effect on the population, to the organisation of life itself. This is not always understood by critics of the social services. Yet every man or woman physically and mentally able to engage in productive work is necessarily subject to a lifelong education and training by the effect upon him of the

¹ Report of N. P. Komarov, People’s Commissar of Communal Affairs of the RSFSR, to the Sixteenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, January 18, 1935; in *Moscow Daily News*, January 20, 1935.

conditions of his employment. To the statesman of the Soviet Union, what is produced in the factory or the mine, on the farm or the oil-field, is not merely wealth, but also the workers themselves, as they are moulded by their work. The forty thousand male and female operatives at the Stalingrad Tractor Works, whom the factory itself has created out of the raw peasants who began to build it, are as much part of its product as the tractors that it constructs out of steel.¹ This Remaking of Man by the factory in which he works is not taken into account by the balance-sheet and profit and loss account insisted on by the western economist; but it is forcibly within the consciousness alike of the Bolshevik statesmen and even of the Bolshevik factory managers themselves.

Svistun, the director of the Kharkov tractor factory, one of the most successful soviet enterprises, is distinguished for the constant attention that he pays to the effect of industrial employment on the life and the character of workers. "We make tractors," Svistun said to Louis Fischer in 1931, "but I also want to make new men."²

"In the words of Marx," says a skilled mechanic, "the working-class, in remoulding society, must remould itself as well. This remoulding process takes place every day; it produces those examples of heroic labour which are well known to the proletariat of all nations; it creates our shock brigades and whole shock-brigading workshops."³ "A soviet factory", sums up Maxim Gorky, "is a school of socialistic culture, and not a capitalist slaughter-house."⁴

Nor is it only the technical operations of building the plant and working the machinery that mould the men and women engaged in wealth production. In our chapter entitled "In Place of Profit" we have sought to describe the incentives, new and old, that are deliberately brought to bear on the workers in the Soviet Union.⁵ No less influential in the formation of char-

¹ This is vividly revealed in the collection of autobiographical sketches of these workers, published in English under the title of *Those who built Stalingrad*, with foreword by Maxim Gorky (1935, 268 pp.). "Having read this book," writes Gorky, "the non-Party youth of the Union of Soviets will see how these people have built the plant, and how the plant has re-educated these people."

² *Machines and Men in Russia*, by Louis Fischer, 1932, p. 130.

³ *Where the Workers are in Power*, by D. Zaslavsky (Moscow, Cooperative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the USSR, 1933), p. 35.

⁴ *Those who built Stalingrad* (1935), foreword.

⁵ Chapter IX. in Part II, "In Place of Profit."

acter is the great amount of participation in industrial administration that is involved, both in the prolonged and extensive collective bargaining¹ in which the trade union engages every year, and also in the management of all the social enterprises run by the trade union itself, and all its arrays of committees and members' meetings, including also the Comradely Courts.²

But this is not all. The political organisation of the citizens, from the bottom to the top of the pyramid of soviets, including the service of literally hundreds of thousands of men and women in unpaid public offices in city and village,³ and the frequent bursts of voluntary work by crowds of "Saturdayers",⁴ afford a perpetual "training in public service" to the factory operatives and office employees, and now to the members of the collective farms. Cooperating in a similar way in the Remaking of Man in the USSR are also the innumerable voluntary associations of one or other kind,⁵ in which so many millions of people of all ages are enrolled. Nor can the urge for individual self-improvement be omitted from this summary of the factors in the Remaking of Man. To the western observer it looks as if all the younger men and women working in the factories and offices, and an ever-increasing proportion of the villagers, were almost more bent on improving their qualifications or widening their experience than on amusing themselves. The astonishing numbers attending free evening classes in all the cities; the widespread endeavour to get into the technicums or the workers' faculties preparing for entrance to a scientific institute or university; the rush of ambitious inventors who think they have discovered a technical improvement; the eager nomination, by trade union branches, of promising members earning good money for promotion to three or five years' scientific training upon a government stipend giving only bare maintenance; the constant popular pressure for instructive lectures as well as for dramatic performances in the workers' clubs, and for the enlargement of their libraries, where scientific and technical books are often engaged by waiting lists, ten deep, of expectant borrowers; all

¹ Pp. 185-191.

² Chapter III. in Part I., "Man as a Producer", Section on Trade Unionism, pp. 160-219.

³ Chapter II. in Part I., "Man as a Citizen".

⁴ Chapter IX. in Part II., "In Place of Profit".

⁵ Chapter VI. in Part I., "Dictatorship or Democracy?"

these, and many other manifestations of the individual urge, are cooperating in this large-scale Remaking of Man. Throughout this seething mass of social movement, what is impressive is, not only the independence of individual initiative, with the unity of spirit in which the common aims are pursued, but also the immensity of the number of those who are brought within the influence of a deliberate social training. In the following chapter we shall attempt to analyse the purpose that inspires this tireless effort, and the instrument on which reliance is placed for its realisation, together with the errors and shortcomings that obstruct its optimum result.

CHAPTER XI

SCIENCE THE SALVATION OF MANKIND

At this last stage of our enquiry, can we discern, in the constitution and activities described in the foregoing pages, the essential basis of Soviet Communism? What has been the emotional faith that has led the Bolsheviks to their amazing conquests of the manifold difficulties with which they have had to cope? What are the instruments upon which they rely to fulfil their purpose? What is their conception of the relation of man to man, and of man to the universe? In short, what is the philosophy on which they are, as they think, building a new civilisation?

It may be thought that we could have avoided this task by giving, as an answer to the enquiries, a summary of the philosophic conclusions of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Many such expositions of the communist philosophy are nowadays available for British or American readers; and accessible in scores of other languages.¹ If we prefer not to paraphrase even the most authoritative summary of "Marxism", but to attempt an

¹ The student will need no list of the voluminous works of Marx, Engels and Lenin, all of which have been republished in various languages. To the English or American reader we may cite, in addition, the following among the many explanatory works: *What Marx really meant*, by G. D. H. Cole (1933, 317 pp.); *Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx*, by Sidney Hook (1933, 288 pp.); *The Communist Answer to the World's Needs*, by Julius F. Hecker (1935, 323 pp.); *On Marxism To-day*, by Maurice Dobb (1932, 48 pp.); *Aspects of Dialectical Materialism*, by H. Levy, John MacMurray, Ralph Fox, R. Page Arnot, J. D. Bernal and E. P. Carr (1934, 154 pp.); *Plan or No Plan*, by Barbara Wootton (1933, 360 pp.), especially pp. 220-224.

English readers will find useful the volume entitled *Marxism and Modern Thought*, by N. I. Bukharin and others (1935); and *Dialectical Materialism*, by V. Adoratsky, 1933, 96 pp. Also *A Handbook of Marxism*, edited by Emile Burns, 1935, 1088 pp., being an extensive collection of the more important texts and speeches.

analysis of a different kind, this is not because we undervalue the terseness of these summaries, or the refreshing originality with which they break away from the conventional phraseology of the age-long controversies from Plato to Kant, and from Hegel to Bradley. There is a more practical reason for writing this chapter afresh. It may be humiliating to an American or a Briton to confess it, but the fact cannot be ignored that the common summaries of "Marxism" fail to penetrate to the mind of the ordinary reader of English.¹ He does not understand what is meant by such un-English phrases as "dialectical materialism" and "the materialist conception of history", in which what are called "contradictions" are endlessly developing; or by the "passing of quantity into quality", and the "interpenetration of opposites"; "thesis" being followed by "antithesis", and "negation" by the "negation of negations", until a "synthesis" is reached; and the "classless society" is ushered in by the "dictatorship of the proletariat", after which the unending series of changes starts a similar procession towards another synthesis, the nature of which cannot at present be foreseen. We prefer to content ourselves with examining the methods of thinking, and the aim and purpose, of Soviet Communism as these are exhibited, not so much in the words of the philosophic writers as in the policy and actions of the Soviet Government (especially during the past decade); and in those of the Central Committee of the Communist Party as directed successively by Lenin and Stalin.

Marxism, it has been said, is both a method and a doctrine, each of them supporting the other. The survey and analysis of the history of the past—the method summed up in the phrase "the materialist conception of history"—led Marx and Engels, and, after their death, Lenin, to the confident assertion that the

¹ "Communist ideology employs a language which is foreign to our ears. It rests on an historical foundation of controversies which have never interested us. It has never been interpreted within a framework of verbal conventions which are familiar to us. The consistency of the communist outlook is difficult for an Englishman to comprehend. Englishmen who are most disposed to take a materialistic view are most distrustful of mere logic. An apparent flaw in the consistency of communists makes it still more difficult to understand them. They insist on the historical approach to other categories of human activity. They do not appear to apply this to their own methods of propaganda. They do not expound their teachings with any evident regard for the traditional background of those with whom they disagree" ("Contemporary Philosophy in Soviet Russia", by Lancelot Hogben, in *Psyche*, October 1931, p. 3).

successive transformations of the way in which the production of food and other commodities was carried on must necessarily be accompanied, in each country, by changes in the organisation of society and of government. They saw these changes happening in the form of struggles between different classes to achieve dominance. Just as the social order that has been termed feudalism gave way, through successive struggles, to the social order termed capitalism, so (it was asserted) capitalism would, in successive struggles, be superseded by communism. In vain, at each stage of this evolution do the defenders of the *status quo* put their faith in the permanence of the particular equilibrium that seems to them to have been reached. Dialectical materialism taught that nothing stood still, and that there was never an equilibrium. The mere difference in the pace and direction of the motion set up by the stresses and strains inherent in every form of society as in every form of material substances (in Marxian terminology the "contradictions") involved conflicts and struggles between classes, and consequent changes in the mutual relations between them. It was inevitable that the growing numbers and importance of the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie should eventually find intolerable the social relations and governmental forms which feudalism had created. The system of capitalism, which was substituted for that of feudalism, underwent its own successive developments, in which the new class of the proletariat (labourers owning none of the means of production, and having no other way of getting food than the sale of their labour-force for wages), steadily increased in numbers and in consciousness of their own propertyless condition. The capitalist employers, competing disastrously for profit with each other, and suffering from successive crises in which prosperous booms precipitated ruinous slumps, try to escape competition by combining in cartels and trusts and amalgamations, taxing the consumer by monopoly prices, and necessarily requiring such huge capitals that their management inevitably falls into the hands of the financiers. Incidentally this leads to "imperialism", or the exploitation of tribal races or undeveloped foreign regions, and wars for their conquest. Meanwhile the proletariat grows continually, and spasmodically rebels, whilst the governments of the financiers, hunting profits by the scent of gold, without any attempt to understand what they are doing, become more and

more muddled and less and less able to maintain their control of the economic forces. Inevitably there comes a revolutionary upheaval in which the expropriators are themselves expropriated by the only growing class, the proletarians.¹

Now, we are not here concerned with the question of the truth or validity of this doctrine or method of historical analysis, nor with its assertion of the inevitability of an eventual world revolution in which the "dictatorship of the proletariat" takes the place of the "dictatorship of the bourgeoisie". What we have to note is the dynamic effect of the method and the doctrine itself in the particular case of the Russian revolution of October 1917. In our judgment this dynamic effect was considerable, alike on the mind and will of Lenin himself; upon the Bolsheviks whom he attracted and educated; upon the members of the Petrograd and other soviets; and eventually upon the mass of the population. We suggest that the future historian will attribute to the belief in the inevitability of the proletarian revolution no small part of the remarkable success of the upheaval which Lenin so persistently advocated, and, at the correct moment, so energetically led. In the eighteen years that have elapsed since the seizure of power, it has been, more than anything else, the popular acceptance of this conception of the inevitability of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" that has enabled the successors of Lenin in the government not only to maintain their power but also to overcome so many of their difficulties.

¹ This evolution of social organisation the Marxian describes as dialectical materialism. The phrase requires explanation to an Englishman. Professor H. Levy has ventured on the following translation, in a paper included in *Aspects of Dialectical Materialism*, by H. Levy, John MacMurray, Ralph Fox, R. Page Arnot, J. D. Bernal and E. P. Carr (1934, pp. 2-3): "We say that any two successive stages in the development are dialectically connected. Thus the word contains something of the sense of "developmental". Any attempt to discuss one of these stages statically without taking into full consideration the fact that that stage was itself changing, and was part of a changing or growing process, and in particular part of an evolutionary chain, would be undialectical. But there is more than this implied in it. The development is regarded not necessarily as proceeding at what might be called a pedestrian pace. Like an individual walking in the country downhill, his internal momentum increases, he breaks into a run, and finishes up with a leap across the stream in the valley to climb slowly up the next slope. To say the process is dialectical implies also, therefore, that it is not simply a pedestrian development, but that during the process internal forces are aroused which drive it with accelerating speed to the completion of the process and with a bound to the next stage." The student will note that the Marxian use of "dialectical" is neither that of Kant nor that of Hegel.

The Struggle with Nature

There is no conception more fundamental to Soviet Communism than that of man's perpetual struggle towards a greater command of the universe in which he finds himself. This struggle has various phases. Primitive man had literally to fight for bare life. He had day by day to get food and to defend himself against other animals, not excluding his fellow-men. Man in society has still to obtain sufficient food, clothing and shelter, together with security for the continuous maintenance of himself and his family against aggression both from within his particular social organisation and from without. Civilised man struggles not only for these necessities on steadily ascending levels of the common standard but also for the further development of himself, of his own community, and of mankind, in intellect and character, including the acquisition of every kind of culture. Accordingly the Bolshevik aim, as we have described it in the preceding chapter, has been the Remaking of Man. The Bolsheviks held that man's power over nature could come only from his advancing knowledge of the universe. Accordingly, the Communist Party and the Soviet Government have persistently and whole-heartedly put their faith in the instrument of science, used under the direction of their dominant purpose. "Soviet rule", observed a distinguished French statesman on a recent visit to Moscow, "has bestowed on science all the authority of which it deprived religion; science is the new dogma. . . . Pure science", he sums up, "is unquestionably a cult in the Soviet Union."¹

The outstanding feature in the mentality of the soviet administrators is, indeed, this implicit and unswerving belief, as the main instrument of achievement, in knowledge itself; that is to say, in man's continually increasing apprehension of the facts of the universe. This devotion to science does not mean what the Englishman understands by materialism. To the Bolshevik the mind of man, with all its emotions and ideas and sensations and memories, is as much within man's knowledge as his body; and both body and mind are as much parts of the universe to be studied as the stones or the trees or the weather. What the Bolshevik takes as his instrument for social advance is the

¹ *Eastward from Paris*, by Edouard Herriot (1934), p. 215.

aggregate of definite knowledge of all these things. That knowledge—discovered in man's experience of life upon this earth; analysed by the classifications that man makes; impressed on man's mind by a continuous process of "trial and error"; repeatedly verified by qualitative comparison and quantitative measurement of the phenomena to ensure that the "order of thought" always corresponds with the ascertained "order of things"; and finally generalised into what we misleadingly term "laws" of nature—is simply what is known in the western world as science.

But we must clearly understand that, to the Bolsheviks, the science in which, as an instrument, they put so much faith, is sharply distinguished from either metaphysics or theology. It is man's ascertained knowledge of nature (including human nature), that they find so effective in achieving their purpose. They may claim to be masters of practical psychology but they definitely repudiate any "absolute" within or behind nature, of which man knows nothing. It is the external world itself, *as man apprehends it*, that the Bolsheviks study. Just as the physicist or the chemist, the biologist or the anthropologist, regards, as the object of his investigations, the external world itself as known to man, and does not, in his scientific studies, trouble himself with speculations about the "thing in itself" or about a suppositious "reality" behind phenomena of which he can know nothing, so the Bolsheviks dismiss as futile, or at any rate as without significance to science, all the various metaphysical speculations which two thousand years of philosophers have preferred to discuss. This, as we must repeat, is not to exclude the study of mind equally with that of body. Man is found to have ideas about things, and memories, just as he has sensations and emotions; and these states of mind themselves form part of the universe that man apprehends and investigates. But the ideas, like the memories, the sensations and the emotions, are merely man's way of thinking about things. The Bolsheviks are emphatic in the declaration that the ideas about things are not prior to the things to which they relate. Thus, they definitely reject as baseless the suggestion that there exists a primordial idea or plan or pattern, of which the universe itself is the expression, or which it is working out.

The application of science in order to improve on the way in

which, without man's intervention, changes would occur is a late acquisition of man. From the Neolithic Age down to the end of the great navigations of the sixteenth century, man, broadly speaking, took the resources of nature as they were, and, as Professor Hogben has suggested, the economic problem of this period in social evolution was one of communications—of how to get at these resources. To create both a calendar and a geodesy as the necessary cultural basis of an international economy permitting the exchange of local natural products and those of a primitive agriculture was no mean achievement of the Egyptians and the Ancient Greeks.¹ But this ancient science, upon which the calendrical and seafaring technology of the time was based, was mainly important in enabling a relatively small section of each community to move around in order to get as much as possible out of the limited resources of different localities.

From the seventeenth century onward the centre of progressive science gradually shifted to Northern Europe, where slave labour was not available. Attention then became particularly directed to non-human sources of power, by means of which extensive operations in deep-shaft mining and large-scale metallurgy could be carried on in ways impracticable for the ancients. During the last three hundred years science has been more and more concerned with the discovery and application of new forms of force, new sources of power, new combinations of elements and new elements themselves, by means of which the commodities and services desired by man could be produced, in enormous quantities, with a minimum of expenditure of human labour-force. The greater part of the science of to-day is concerned with enabling man in society, if he will only take the trouble to learn, so to improve on the non-human ways of change as not only to produce in almost unlimited quantity what nature, with less aid from man, produced in small amounts, but also to bring forth new substances and new forms of force which the pre-scientific age had never seen. In this respect the century of Faraday and Clerk Maxwell, Marx and Darwin, Mendeleyev and Pasteur, Rutherford and Einstein, stands out above all past human existence. And the chapter is not closed. Every year man's knowledge is increased. By the

¹ "Mathematics in Antiquity", by Lancelot Hogben, in the issue of *Antiquity*, June 1935, citing Dr. Neugebauer's *Vorlesungen ueber Geschichte der antiken mathematischen Wissenschaften*.

unceasing investigation of every part of the universe, including those important parts that we call social institutions and human behaviour, science is continually being extended, revised and rewritten.

The Bolshevik conception of science as the instrument of man's command over nature, differs, as it seems to us, in some respects from that commonly enunciated by the scientists of the western world.

There is, first, the invariable conjunction of matter with motion, as one of its qualities. To the Bolshevik the whole universe, and every part of it, appears always on the move. Nothing, whether alive or dead, thing or thought, group or relation, is ever static. Absolute immobility is a figment of the imagination, within human experience completely non-existent. Nature, even the smallest part of it, is nowhere or for the briefest moment of time in equilibrium. To imagine a state of equilibrium otherwise than as strictly relative to particular changing conditions is merely misleading. Such a supposition vitiates every inference that includes it.

This universal mobility, or actual conjunction of matter with motion as one of its inseparable attributes, necessarily involves a perpetual shifting of relations between the different parts of the universe. The various substances that we see or feel, the atoms or molecules of which they are composed, the electrons of which the atoms are made up, the thoughts which they evoke in the human mind, are always changing their relation to each other and to the human observer. They are parting at different rates with the energy with which they are all charged. And every change reacts not only on the minds of men but also on every other part of the universe.

This unevenness of change in different fragments of the universe, including both the human observers themselves and the relations between them and the various fragments observed, has the important feature that the changes are always mutual or reciprocal. It is not merely that everything alters even whilst we are looking at it. The change perpetually taking place in each fragment of the universe effects a corresponding change in every other fragment of the universe, including the human observer himself, and the human society of which he forms a part. Thus, to cite a commonly used example, the organisation, and

also the technical methods, of production of commodities useful to man are, and have always been, not only different in different countries at the same time, but also periodically changing from century to century, and even from decade to decade. And every such change effects a corresponding change in the persons engaged in production and in the relations to each other of the classes constituting each human society.¹ The habits and customs out of which social life is made change with the relations in production. The forms of social and political organisation and the human beings themselves change.

Further, the Bolshevist conception of change, whether of things or of thoughts, of individuals or of social groups, always includes the antecedents of the change and its consequences. For every change must necessarily be not only from some former state but also towards some later state. Any conception of a change of things or of thoughts must, to have any meaning, include both these aspects. In an analogous way our comprehension of an idea, which is a thought in our minds, is not completely realistic unless we enquire how and whence it came, and to what action or other effect it necessarily leads.²

¹ Understanding may be helped by the following graphic illustration. "Reduced to its baldest essentials, that philosophy may be stated in the following series of propositions. Every part of the universe is in a state of continual development. This development proceeds by way of an 'inner contradiction of opposites', which may be visualised as a sort of internal tension created by the pull of opposing forces at work in every entity or concept. This tension is finally resolved in a new balance of forces, or synthesis, whereupon a fresh pull is set up and the whole business, which is known as a dialectical process, begins all over again. Further, this dialectical process is now a continuous, now a discontinuous affair, each new synthesis being brought about much in the same way as victory in a tug-of-war. First there is a long pull by both teams, then suddenly one flops. And it is essentially the same process alike in the physical world, in the world of social organisation and the world of thought. (The quantum theory comes in handy here, the jumpy behaviour of electrons affording an elegant parallel to the epochs of revolution in social history; while the picture is made perfect if we include also the mutations that occur in the animal and vegetable kingdoms.) And finally, it is a *material* process. It exists in itself, and is in no way dependent on the mind of God (which does not exist at all) or the mind of man, which is, indeed, itself subject to the very same dialectical movement. The most that man can do is to act in accordance with 'conscious necessity': to understand the nature of things and fall in with it, instead of trying to kick against the pricks. But this is not to say that the universe is a mechanistic affair, a mere structure of atoms blindly controlled by a balance of forces. It is to be interpreted in terms of growth rather than of equilibrium, to be visualised as an organism rather than as a machine" (*Plan or No Plan*, by Barbara Wootton, 1934, pp. 222-223).

² This was fancifully expressed by the American philosopher Charles Saunders Pierce: "The elements of every concept enter into logical thought

The purposive action in which human thought issues—which is one among the varied changes in the universe effected by each change in the human mind—is not usually, and never advantageously, a case of putting into practice only one branch of our knowledge of the universe. For the thought to become dynamically complete, as a plan, in the sense of accomplishing any social purpose, all the branches of knowledge that have any relevance to the purpose must be simultaneously present in the mind, and be put conjointly into operation. The engineer building a bridge, or the agriculturist cultivating a farm, will fail to accomplish his purpose completely, without error or shortcoming, if he uses only his knowledge of mathematics or mechanics, without calling in aid his knowledge of chemistry or biology as the case may be. In planning the enterprise account must also be taken, and made the subject of equally scientific study, of the purpose for which the bridge or farm is being created, and the effect which it will have on social customs and other social institutions, alike in the neighbourhood and elsewhere. Nor must the maker of the plan omit, if he wishes his work to have unbroken success, any of the effects of the conditions of employment upon the workers who take part in the construction, and also its subsequent results on those who will enjoy its amenities or consume its products. That is to say, we have to realise, as is not yet adequately understood, that the branches of knowledge that we call sociology and ethics—as yet very imperfectly worked out—are as indispensable to completely successful social construction and human progress as the physical and biological sciences. In short, all experience of social development, whether economic or political, demonstrates that it takes all branches of knowledge, and requires their most intimate conjunction, to achieve completely any desired end in social change.

We see here, also, why “science”, to be useful in our command over nature, must become “technology”. The Bolsheviks do not even understand why the westerners make any distinction between the two, or between pure and applied science, a distinction which seems both dangerous and unscientific. They ask how any genuine science (that is to say, any real knowledge of at the gate of perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and *whatever cannot show its passport at both these gates is to be arrested as unauthorised by reason*) (*Collected Papers of Charles Saunders Pierce*, edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, Harvard, 1935, vol. v., “Lectures”).

the universe) can be "pure" in the sense of having no relation to the external world, or to those changes in the external world which any change in our scientific thought effects. The Bolsheviks naturally understand that some of the knowledge of the universe that we gain may not be immediately capable of use in the accomplishment of any conscious purpose; whilst other knowledge can be at once applied to satisfy our desires. They even estimate as highly as the westerners those scientific advances that are so abstract as to transcend, at present, all imaginable possibilities of usefulness. But the Bolsheviks do not regard the most abstract or the least purposeful scientific truths as essentially different from those that can be immediately applied to surmount a contemporary difficulty. Just as all scientific truths are derived, in their view, exclusively from a study of the facts of the universe, including among those facts successive states of the human minds in the universe, so all scientific truths must inevitably relate to changes in those facts, whether or not the truths are immediately seen to be applicable to the purposeful making of other changes. Scientific thinking is valid only when it is carried on in terms of conceivable action. There is no genuine knowledge of the universe that is not potentially useful to mankind, not merely in the sense that action may one day be taken on it, but also in the fact that every new knowledge necessarily affects the way in which we hold all the rest of our stock.

It would be foolish to suggest that the Bolsheviks have created a new science, or that they have, in little more than a decade, mounted on the shoulders of the scientific world of the west. The Bolsheviks in the USSR, like the present generation in every other country, rightly claim to be the heirs of all the knowledge and all the culture of the past, irrespective of the particular communities in which the various advances were first made. Marx and Lenin, and after them Stalin, have repeatedly made it clear to their followers that it is only by claiming this heritage, and making themselves completely masters of it, that they can hope either to achieve any further advances or to build successfully the socialist society which is their goal. What the western world may chiefly learn from them to-day is not so much such additions as they may already have made to the sum of human knowledge, as the manner and the spirit in which they

are seeking to educate, in a true appreciation of science, alike their scientists, their administrators and their citizens.¹ In contrast with the soviet conception of the "polytechnicalisation" of the schooling of all sections of the population, British education and British social organisation have led to a regrettable dichotomy. Scientists and technologists, whose work is changing the material basis of civilisation, are too often trained in complete ignorance of the social results of their activities and of the social responsibilities these entail; whilst statesmen, historians and sociologists are generally educated in ignorance of the technological changes which do so much to mould the character of our civilisation. Thus the dialectical implications of science are often not present to the mind of the western mathematician or physicist, chemist or biologist; still less to the mind of the western student of social institutions (sociology) or of human conduct or behaviour (ethics). We may even suggest that these aspects of science are not always borne in mind in the scientist's own studies, when he shuts himself up in his own narrow specialism, which he may even delight in keeping what he calls "pure" and unconnected with the world of action.

The Organisation of Scientific Research

In the preceding chapter we have described how science, as an indispensable guide to action, has dominated the whole soviet educational system, from the kindergarten through the polytechnical schools and technical institutes to the highest ranges of the universities and other places of research. In addition to the score of universities, which are increasingly freeing themselves from the metaphysics and philosophies of bygone thinkers and from the dominance of the ancient literatures in which their thoughts had been expressed, there were, in 1934, no fewer than 840 separate scientific colleges and institutes, with 188 branches variously grouped and directed, all of them of what elsewhere would be deemed university grade or rank; and each devoted to its own function of turning out trained men and women (to whom, from eighteen onward, they give a five-years course), either as qualified technicians in particular branches of produc-

¹ Chapter X. in Part II., "The Remaking of Man", section on "Training for Life".

tion or other public services, or as researchers and professors in one or other branch of science. Thus, above and beyond the couple of hundred thousand schools and "techicums" (technical institutes), and "rabfacs" (workers' preparatory faculties) of lower than university grade, in the curriculum of all of which science is predominant, we find to-day in the USSR, what exists in no other country, an elaborately planned network of more than a thousand research laboratories, with their own extensive libraries and collections, scattered over the vast territory between the Arctic Ocean on the north, and the Black Sea or the Central Asian Mountains on the south, at each of which selected staffs of trained researchers, with salaries and expenses provided, are working in coordination on particular problems, allocated largely with special reference to local needs, opportunities or resources.¹

It is instructive to learn for what reasons, and by what stages, so elaborate an organisation of research was instituted.

¹ "Prior to the October revolution there were only some scores of scientific institutions in Russia. At the present time their number exceeds a thousand. The vast majority of them originated during the First, and during the early years of the Second Five-Year Plans.

Subjects	Institutes	Branches	Location	Institutes	Branches
Academic centres .	54	—	RSFSR . .	581	112
Industry . . .	194	84	Ukraine . .	139	54
Agriculture . .	140	42	White Russia .	34	4
Transport and Communication . .	21	23	Transcaucasia .	41	13
Social-economy			Uzbekistan .	28	4
Sciences . . .	49	10	Turkmenistan .	10	1
Medicine . . .	271	15	Tadjikistan .	7	—
Education . . .	111	12			
	840	186 [sic]		840	188

(*USSR in Construction*, issue for June 1934.)

"The total number of people engaged in scientific institutes in 1929 was 4612; in 1930, 11,639; in 1931, 16,853; and in 1932, 29,375. The number of (assistant) investigators with university education in 1929, 6320; and in 1932, 10,659. In 1930 the capital investment was 32 million roubles; in 1931, 73 millions. The operating expenses in 1930 totalled 57 million roubles; in 1931, 138 million; and in 1932, 176 million roubles" (*Moscow Daily News*, November 5, 1932).

The Diary of a Science Worker, a student's manual annually published in Russian, gives an illuminating vision of the wealth of opportunity afforded to the young man or woman of 18, and effectively opened to the poorest by the apparently unlimited number of stipends (scholarships covering a bare maintenance).

Here is a description by a distinguished member of the ancient Academy of Sciences, Professor T. Rainov, of the gradual evolution of a general plan for the advancement of knowledge. "At the beginning", he says, "planning in the field of scientific work was carried out in an inadequately organised way. It proceeded mainly along the lines of activities of large departments, which in their turn corresponded to important fields of the national economy of the Soviet Union. This practice particularly developed after large groups of scientific institutions, which formerly had been under the People's Commissariat of Education, passed over to the industrial commissariats in order to draw scientific work nearer to practice. The planning of science was not yet completely decentralised at this stage.

"This was manifested first of all in financing scientific institutions. In planning their budgets, questions naturally arose of a network of scientific research institutes, and of eliminating parallelism and overlapping activities. The necessity of working in close contact with practical construction often led to collisions of scientific institutions of different departments in the same industrial enterprises; and then, of course, the question arose of interdepartmental coordination of scientific work. Finally, participation of scientific institutions of different departments in conferences and congresses, particularly on broad complex problems, contributed also to such a decentralisation.

"Thus ground was prepared for further concentrated and consolidated planning of science in the USSR. The necessity of solving problems concerning organisation and methods of planning scientific research work and coordinating the work of scientific organisations of different departments were discussed at the first All-Union Conference on Planning Scientific Research Work, convened in the spring of 1931. The Second All-Union Conference at the end of December 1932, worked out a plan of scientific research work in the field of physical, chemical and engineering schemes for the Second Five-Year Plan period, and particularly for 1933. The conference devoted special attention to one important problem, that of taking measures to utilise the results of scientific work in production. The resolutions of the conference, later approved by the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry, are of enormous importance. Henceforth the planning of science extends from the outlining of scientific topics

to the utilisation of the results of scientific work in practice, and thus becomes an essential part of socialist planning as a whole."

A Research Centre organised inside Gosplan

"One of the resolutions of the first conference provided for the organisation of a centre of planning scientific research work within the State Planning Commission. A number of measures had been taken by the Government to organise such a centre. To extend unified planning on the very content of scientific work the State Planning Commission could lean first of all upon the Communist Academy. According to the decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union the Communist Academy was made responsible for the elaboration and adoption of Marxist-Leninist methods of scientific work. The first conference on planning science emphasised this rôle of the Communist Academy, and suggested that the Academy should carry out its rôle of methodological centre in the field of planning scientific work also. A further step was taken in 1934 when, according to decrees of the Government, the Academy of Sciences of the USSR was placed under the supervision of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, and the institutions of the Academy were removed to Moscow. The Academy of Sciences has now become the most important scientific basis of the State Planning Commission in planning science."¹

¹ "The recent decree of the Central Executive Committee", says Academician Karpinsky, "which places the USSR Academy of Sciences under the direct supervision of the Council of People's Commissars, is enthusiastically greeted by the Academicians and the 3000 scientific and technical workers of the Academy.

"The decree is a new and important step toward linking the everyday work of the Academy with the needs of socialist construction. Much has already been achieved along this line. The Academy, which formerly studied only purely theoretical questions, has become an important factor in the life of our country, and as such must keep in constant touch with the People's Commissariats which direct the development of various branches of the national economy.

"The committee for supervising the scientific institutions under the Central Executive Committee, however, under whose supervision the Academy has been, could not insure our institution such contacts, and sometimes even delayed our work.

"The removal of this unnecessary intermediate link opens bright prospects of cooperation between the Academy and socialist industry and agriculture, as well as with scientific institutes not connected with the Academy, which sometimes duplicate our work" (*Moscow Daily News*, December 20, 1933).

Future Lines of Planning

"It is now quite clear that the planning of science will go on in the future along the following lines: individual scientific institutions outline their plans in accordance with the general problems of the economic and industrial plan of the country for a given period. These plans, proposed from below and corrected by the higher organisations, will serve as material for the elaboration of one compound plan by the State Planning Commission and the authoritative central scientific organisations, such as the Academy of Sciences and the Communist Academy, and others collaborating with the commission."¹

How Research is Planned and Executed

It is interesting to examine how this huge volume of research work, by so many different institutes, is organised and conducted.² The supreme control is now practically vested in the Sovnarkom of the USSR, which has annually to approve the estimates of expenditure, submitted in the budget, for ratification by the Central Executive Committee (TSIK) of the All-

¹ "Planned Science and Socialist Construction in the USSR", by Professor T. Rainov, in *Moscow Daily News*, September 5, 1934. Dr. Rainov makes it clear that "the problems outlined by the first conference on planning science are to remain the essential elements of this unified planning of science. These problems comprise: (1) Determination of the rôle played by the whole system of scientific research work in the budget of the country. (2) Planning the topics of scientific work. (3) Planned building of scientific research institutes. (4) Planned distribution of these institutes. (5) Planning of developing scientific cadres and educating new scientific workers. (6) Planned financing of scientific work" (*ibid.*).

² We do not attempt to cite the very considerable number of books on science published in Russian. The following are some of the more accessible descriptions by competent British observers, of what they have seen in the USSR: *Science in Soviet Russia* (1930, 128 pp.) and *Industry and Education in Soviet Russia* (1932, 94 pp.), both by J. C. Crowther; "Technical Education in Russia", by B. Mouat Jones, in *The New Russia* (1931), pp. 66-79; *A Scientist Among the Soviets*, by Julian Huxley (1932, 120 pp.).

Works by Russians in English include *Science at the Cross Roads* (236 pp.), being the papers contributed by the USSR delegates to the International Congress on the History of Science and Technology in London, July 1931; *The Basis of the Technological Economic Plan of Reconstruction of the USSR*, by G. M. Krzhizhanovsky (Moscow, 1931, 32 pp.); many valuable articles in the VOKS monthly issue, vols. i.-v. of 1933, especially that under the title of *Scientific Construction in the USSR*; also the issue for June 1934 of *USSR in Construction*; the convenient volume, *Science and Education in the USSR*, by Professor A. Pinkevich (1935, 176 pp.); and the volume entitled *Marxism and Modern Thought*, by N. I. Bukharin and others (1935).

Union Congress of Soviets.¹ This control is exercised in practice by the several USSR People's Commissars concerned with the various branches of production, each of whom has some of the scientific institutes attached to his commissariat. The largest number of them, more than one-fourth of the whole, come under the purview of the People's Commissar of Heavy Industry, who has had to develop a Scientific Research Sector (NIS) specially charged with this branch of his administration. This sector works through specialist committees, of which there are at present about a dozen, composed almost entirely of the principal researchers in the sciences concerned. These committees, we read, "contain about ten or fifteen members. They have two main meetings in the year; some of them more. They draw up a plan of research for their subject to cover a year's working. This includes a statement of the general line of research which is to be undertaken in each institute. There is sometimes much difficulty in apportioning research to the various institutes. For instance, much discussion was necessary in apportioning the research of high-tension direct-current transmission between the Moscow Institute of Experimental Electro-Technics, the Leningrad Institute of Electro-Physics, the Physico-Technical Institute of Kharkov, the laboratory of the Electrosila Factory, and the laboratory of the Electrical Machine Factory at Kharkov."²

The Academy of Sciences

The intellectual supervision of all the research in the USSR, and therefore the responsibility for the allocation and coordination of the work of all the thousand institutes, is now undertaken by the ancient Academy of Sciences of the USSR, the functions of which were drastically transformed by a decree of 1930.

¹ "During 1932-1937 4020 million roubles are to be invested in research institutes in the USSR" (*USSR in Construction*, issue for June 1934).

Some of the research institutes are under different offices ranking for this purpose as commissariats, such as Gosplan, the Central Road Administration, the Hydrometallurgical Committee, the Civil Air Fleet Administration, and other organs of the Central Executive Committee (TSIK) of the USSR. Others are under Centrosoyus and the All-Union Producers' Cooperative Unions. Others, again, are under the People's Commissars of the various constituent or autonomous republics, or the State Publishing House (Ogiz) of the RSFSR. We deal separately with the institutes directly responsible to the USSR Academy of Sciences itself, and with those under the Communist Academy.

² *Manchester Guardian*, June 2, 1934.

"Established", as one of its members reports,¹ "over two centuries ago, in 1724-1725, and placed under the control of officials appointed by the Government, the Academy of Sciences, during the tsarist period of its existence, constituted a sort of official department of science; and although it had in its ranks many distinguished Russian scientists of that time, it also contained many members whose sole distinction consisted in being docile and tractable servants of tsarism. The old Academy had none of the prestige, nor did it occupy the special place in the economic life of the country, which the new rejuvenated Academy of the USSR has acquired in recent years. . . . At the present time the Academy numbers 93 active members (Academicians). The oldest of them by age (born in 1846) and by time of election (in 1886) is the present President of the Academy, A. P. Karpinsky.

"Until 1932 the Academy had no representatives of the technical sciences in its ranks. In 1932 the academic body was enlarged by the election of 14 distinguished specialists in technical disciplines, among whom were the creators of the great technical constructions started and accomplished by the Soviet Union in recent years (Dnieprostroy, etc.). Among them we find Academicians Alexandrov, Winter, Graftio and others."²

The subjects adopted for special study by the Academy's Five-Year Plan may be classed, we read, "into the following complexes: (1) The complex of problems relating to the study of the structure of matter, and based on the latest achievements

¹ Professor I. Korel, in the issue for June 1934 of *USSR In Construction*.

² Although the Academy now fully accepts the soviet régime, only a small proportion of its members belong to the Party. At the present time the 93 Academicians are of the following specialities: mathematical sciences, 4; physics, 8; technics, 18; chemistry, 10; geology, 8; biology, 13; history, 6; social economy, 6; European languages and literatures, 10; orientology, 8; and philosophy, 2. Besides the Active Members the Academy has 68 Honorary Members and 300 Correspondent Members. The Active Members constitute the General Assembly of the Academy, which is its supreme organ. The General Assembly meets in sessions that are held 5-7 times annually in conformity with a plan drawn up for a whole year in advance, in which provision is made both for the periods of the sessions and the basic questions to be discussed.

The Academy is divided into two departments: the Department of Mathematical and Natural Sciences and the Department of Social Sciences. The growth of its work in recent years may be measured by its annual budget, which amounted in 1928 to 3,903,000 roubles; in 1932 to 16,746,000 roubles; whilst the estimate for 1934 was 44,500,000 roubles. It publishes a number of journals, such as *Izvestia* (News) of the Academy, and also *Izvestia* of its separate scientific institutes, besides such popular scientific journals as *Herald of the Academy of Sciences* and *Priroda* (Nature).

in astronomy, physics, chemical physics, and chemistry ; (2) the group of problems relating to the study of utilisation of the natural resources of the Soviet Union ; (3) the problems connected with the systematic investigation of the power resources of the Soviet Union, with the opening up of new sources of power, with questions of distant power transmissions and electrification of industry, transport and agriculture ; (4) the group of problems relating to the new construction developing throughout the Soviet Union, with questions of distribution of the productive forces, seismic investigations, investigation of building materials, questions of health protection, etc. ; (5) the group of problems connected with the chemification of the country ; (6) the complex of problems relating to the study of the evolution of the organic world, the solution of which should stimulate greater harvests, assist in combating drought, in cultivating new crops, in the intensification of cattle-raising, in the creation of raw material basis for light industry ; (7) the complex of socio-historical problems connected with the task of overcoming capitalism and the survivals of earlier social formations in the mentality of the people.”¹

The activities of the Academy are, in fact, not hampered by any limitations, either of geography or of subject. Thus it is stated² that “ the widely dispersed network of scientific research institutes (under the supervision) of the Academy, consisting of two main sections, that of applied science and that of the natural sciences and mathematics, have, for their main object, the direction of the whole system of scientific knowledge towards meeting the requirements of the country and furthering the growth of its economic reconstruction. The sphere of activity of the Academy embraces, as it were, the whole of the territory

¹ “ This spring a conference of the four Academies and of the Scientific Research sector of the Commissariat of Heavy Industry will be convened for that purpose. This conference will be followed by numerous meetings of representatives of various institutes working in the same field but supervised by different organisations. . . . The Academy, Volgin pointed out, has no technical research institutes of its own, but such committees can easily replace them by coordinating the work of the non-academic and scientific-technical institutions, the best leaders of which are members of the Academy. . . . The transport committee has already rendered valuable assistance to the railroads ” (Report on the activities of the USSR Academy of Sciences for 1932, made by the secretary (V. P. Volgin) to the annual meeting: *Moscow Daily News*, February 21, 1933).

² *Progress* (London) for October–November 1933, pp. 235-239.

of the Soviet Union. Although its main activities are concentrated in the institutions, laboratories and museums of the capital, the Academy has nevertheless succeeded in extending its influence to the farthest corners of the Soviet Union by establishing scientific research stations and organising expeditions in all parts of the country; for example, a number of branches and subsidiary institutes of the Academy have been set up in the Urals, the Caucasus and the Far East, forming, as it were, a vital link between the capital and the wide periphery of the Union. . . . The activities of the Academy of Sciences in the domain of the social sciences are also of great scientific value, and play a definite part in the cultural reconstruction of the life of the peoples of the USSR. We shall take as an example the Historico-Archaeographical Institute and the Eastern Institute. The former, which is carrying on the work of the Archaeological Commission, which had been in existence for about a hundred years (for a long time not included in the Academy), is engaged in seeking, collecting, preserving, treating and editing historical publications, and deals also with other pertinent historical subjects, on the basis of Marxian methodology.

“In studying the development of the Russian Empire, pre-revolutionary historians confined themselves almost exclusively to Great Russia, which to them represented the whole of the empire. The other peoples inhabiting Russia were considered of little importance. It follows therefore that the history of Great Russia has been written in some detail, while that of the majority of the other peoples of the USSR has to be started from the very beginning, that is to say, from the gathering of historical records and systematising them. That is why the Archaeographical Institute devotes a great deal of time to the study of those peoples who were most suppressed under the old régime. To make it possible to write the history of these peoples the Institute has been publishing various documents from the State archives.

“The archives of the seventeenth century relating to Astrakhan give a fair outline not only of the local economic life of the people, but also of the economic and political relations between the various groups of the population belonging to the Turko-Tartar nationalities. The Uzbek, Turkoman and Tadjik nationalities will find a reflex of their past in the records which

have been preserved and which depict the trade relations between Moscow and Middle Asia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. These documents refer frequently to the international position of Middle Asia at that time ; to the economic and social structure of the Middle Asiatic khanates—Bukhara, Balha and Khiva ; to the independent rôle played by Middle Asiatic trade, and to the trade dealings of Eastern Europe ; they supply information of the political inter-relations between the Uzbek khanates and the Turkoman, Kalmyk and Kazak-Kirghiz tribes, and so on.

“The Eastern Institute has for its main object the study of the social problems of the Far East. Its activities are conducted along two directions, literary and historico-economic. Its literary work is closely bound up with questions concerning the national culture of the Eastern peoples and the furtherance thereof. Of the many languages and dialects spoken by the peoples of the Soviet Union only a few have been studied at all.”

A feature in which the Academy of Sciences is unique is its close contact with the manual workers in the principal industrial centres. This “contact between the Academy of Sciences and the organised working-class public is”, we read, “steadily growing. Among all the academies of the world the Academy of Sciences of the USSR is the only one to report on its work to the proletarian audience. The Academy has received hundreds of ‘instructions’ from the workers at its provincial sessions. The Academy has established a committee of scientific consultation and propaganda. Members of the Academy visit factories, deliver addresses and consult on the most important problems of production.”¹ Here is a description of one of these popular assemblies :

“This is an ‘open meeting’. No academy of science in the world but this could even envisage such a meeting.

“It is in Vyborg, proletarian quarter of Leningrad, famous for its revolutionary history. Here, the workers have at their disposal a splendid Palace of Culture, in the great hall of which they are now gathered. The Academicians are the guests of the Vyborg workers to-day ; to-morrow they will be the guests of the men and women of the Red Putilov Works.

“Zaslavsky [the correspondent] vividly described the scene.

¹ *USSR in Construction*, issue for June 1934.

In the body of the hall—the proletariat, fresh from factory, plant, technical school, docks. On to the spacious stage file the Academicians amid thunderous applause from the gathering. Here are names famous throughout the world, in astronomy, physiology, biology, geology and other sciences. Here leonine frosted heads, broad stooped shoulders—many of the traditional figures of the scientists of the bygone era. Some still wear the ancient frock coat of ceremony, with the traditional contempt of their kind for clothes.

“They have come to make one of their periodical reports to the workers. But this is no adulterated ‘popular’ science—no mild evening of ‘adult education’ in which benevolent professors unbend and condescendingly, in ultra-simplified language, hand working-men some easy titbits of geology or astronomy. Of such is the ‘adult educational movement’ of capitalist lands.”¹

“There are five or six such meetings of the Academicians each year. These public sessions have become a feature. The Academicians visit factories, travel throughout the land meeting workmen, reporting to them, hearing of the worker’s experiences and difficulties. And on each side there is a genuine and frank friendliness. It was not always so, of course. For long after the revolution there were scientists who stood aloof from the revolution, from the working class, for they feared for their science. But time proved them wrong, with emphasis.”²

A report of the activities of the Academy during 1932–1933 delivered by V. P. Volgin, Permanent Secretary of the Academy, pointed out that “during the last seven years the Academy institutions underwent a radical reorganisation, destroying the wall separating the Academy from the revolutionary life of our country. While remaining the All-Union centre of theoretical

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, December 22, 1932.

² *Ibid.* The constant note in the USSR is the intimate connection of the scientists with the producers concerned with their researches. We noted that Academician Vavilov, the President of the Leningrad Academy of Agricultural Sciences, in May 1933 “left Leningrad for Central Asia, where he will inspect the progress of the sowing campaign. He will also superintend the work of the experimental station organised near Tashkent by the Institute of Plant Culture, for the purpose of introducing new crops in Kazakstan” (*ibid.*, May 11, 1933).

In the United Kingdom and the United States the meetings of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, and the corresponding American associations, usefully promote a general publicity for scientific work, but they appear to fall behind the USSR institutions in direct connection with the industries themselves.

research, the Academy has succeeded in linking up its activities with the practical needs of socialist construction. . . . The Physico-Mathematical Institute of the Association, which is supposed to carry out theoretical research only (problems of technical physics are studied by the physical, technical and other institutes of the Commissariat of Heavy Industry), continued its investigations of quantum electrodynamics, and prepared the way for the experimental study of the structure of matter (the disintegration of the atomic nucleus)." Work of like nature is being done in their own spheres by the Chemical Association, the Platinum Institute, the Soil Institute, the Biological Association, the laboratory of the Biochemistry and Physiology of Plants, the Zoological Institute, the Historico-Archaeological Institute and the Institutes of Slavic Culture and Orientology, and the Institute of Russian Literature.¹

The Communist Academy

The Academy of Sciences is not in sole charge of the intellectual direction, and the allocation and coordination of the work, of the thousand or more scientific institutes of the USSR. This important function is shared with another organ, completely independent of the Academy of Sciences, and entitled the Communist Academy.² This body, established during the first

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, February 21, 1934.

² The Communist Academy, which was originally called the Socialist Academy, had its origin at a session of the Council of People's Commissars on March 15, 1918, when Lenin accepted a proposal of two revolutionary intellectuals, the professors M. N. Pokrovsky and M. A. Reussner, and ordered a decree to be drawn up. This decree, enacted June 25, 1918, established "The Socialist Academy of Social Science" as "a free association of persons having for its purpose the study and teaching of social sciences from the standpoint of scientific socialism and communism, as well as of sciences cognate to the aforesaid branches of knowledge". It was to have "two basic sections: (a) scientific research and (b) scientific education". It was given considerable powers and a free hand, but it was "attached to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee", from which it drew the necessary funds. In 1919 a new decree (April 15, 1919) defined it as "an autonomous association of workers in scientific socialism pursuing the aims of scientific organisation, scientific research and instruction". It was to unite and bring together "the workers of scientific socialism in the RSFSR". Not until 1923 did it take the name of the Communist Academy; and not until 1926 was its purpose and its task expressly defined in terms of "Marxism and Leninism".

See article "The Communist Academy", by V. Ostrovityanov and R. Premysler, in *Scientific Construction in the USSR*, being vol. v. of VOKS (1933), pp. 28-36.

few months of Lenin's administration, is described in the following paragraphs of the amending decree of the Central Executive Committee (TSIK) of November 26, 1926 :

"(1) The Communist Academy, constituting the highest All-Union learned institution, has for its purpose the study and elaboration of questions of social science and natural science, as well as of questions of socialist construction, upon the grounds of Marxism and Leninism.

"(2) The tasks of the Communist Academy include : (a) elaboration of problems of Marxism and Leninism ; (b) combating of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois distortions of Marxism-Leninism ; and (c) rigid advocacy of the standpoint of dialectical materialism both in the social and the natural sciences, and repudiation of the survivals of idealism." ¹

The organisation and the specific functions of the Communist Academy, which has always been confined to Party members, have undergone various changes. In 1934 it was governed by a presidium of 15 members, one of whom acts as president ; whilst the president and three other members elected by the presidium constitute the bureau of the presidium, by whom the day-by-day administration is conducted.

The nature of the work of this Academy in the organisation of Scientific Research may be gathered from the following authoritative account of its development :

"During the first Pyatiletka the Communist Academy widely elaborated the problems of socialist construction, waging a fight against bourgeois, trozkist, right and 'left' opportunistic theories. A turning-point both in the work of the soviet theoretical front in general, and in the work of the Communist Academy in particular, was signalised by Stalin's address before the Conference of Agrarian Marxists. His speech, dedicated to problems of agrarian policy, gave guiding suggestions for the entire ideological front. This speech also gave a full list of demands upon science dictated by the transition from the period of restoration to the period of reconstruction—the period of the unfolded socialist advance.

"This turning-point was accompanied by scientific discussion, which developed on the economic, agrarian and literary fronts,

¹ Decree of Central Executive Committee (TSIK) of All-Union Congress of Soviets, November 26, 1926.

on the front of the theory of state and law, and elsewhere. The result of these discussions was the realisation, under the leadership of the Party and of the Government, of the complete exposure and repudiation of the idealistic distortions of Marxism in the fields of political economy, philosophy, Party history, literary critique, pedagogics, etc.

"A most important stage in the work of the Communist Academy was marked by the ruling of the Central Committee of the Communist Party on March 15, 1933, upon the report of the presidium of the Academy. While noting the correct political line carried out by the Academy in the struggle against anti-Marxian and revisionist tendencies, the Central Committee pointed out the necessity of continued untiring efforts 'to eradicate both existing and emerging theories in various branches which reflect the bourgeois and social-democratic influence' . . . (together with) 'the necessity of concentrating communist thought upon theoretical elaboration of problems of socialist construction and the class-struggle of the proletariat'.

"In conformity with this ruling the Institutes of the Communist Academy began to reconstruct their work, coordinating it to a larger degree with the problems of socialist construction.

"Thus the Institute of Soviet Construction took part in the elaboration of a whole series of questions connected with the reconstruction of the work of the soviets and the administration of revolutionary justice; the Institute of World Economy developed activity in the study of the economic situation, and elaborated a number of questions pertaining to the world economic crisis; the Agrarian Institute began to coordinate its work more closely with the People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the USSR; the Institute of Economics began to elaborate concrete problems of socialist construction, etc.

"In the course of the first Pyatiletka the Communist Academy was transformed into a complex organism incorporating in itself a whole number of scientific research establishments. By 1931 it embraced nine separate Institutes, and also the Natural Science Association, which included in itself eleven separate scientific establishments. To this should be added the nine editorial offices for special scientific journals, and also 16 Marxist Societies.

"The Institutes of Red Professors, then incorporated in the Communist Academy, were attended by about 2500 students.

"This quantitative growth placed difficulties in the way of concrete guidance of the scientific work. In this connection the Communist Academy was confronted squarely with the question of decentralisation of the scientific research work, which was carried out in 1932.

"At the present time the Communist Academy has 7 Institutes: (a) Institute of Economics, (b) Institute of World Economy and World Politics, (c) Institute of Soviet Construction and Law, (d) Agrarian Institute, (e) Institutes of Philosophy, (f) History and Literature and (g) Art. The Communist Academy has also its branch in Leningrad."¹

One of the most important of these institutes—that termed the All-Union Academy of Agriculture, also called the Agrarian Institute—was established in 1933, at the command of the Seventeenth Party Congress, "to work out forms and methods of reconstructing collective farms, and to build up theory on the basis of local experience". Revzina, the head of the institute, states that "Our institute was founded to help the Party and the Government to realise these tasks by summing up, elucidating and generalising the experience of the existing collective farms. We broadcast the experience of the best collectives so that all may use it, and reveal the shortcomings and mistakes in the work of others. . . . The Party, in its political instructions, has battled against two forces which hinder the organisation of work. The first is lack of individual responsibility and the second is the idea of equal shares in the produce irrespective of how much work had been done. When collectivisation takes place in an agricultural region formerly operated privately, people who lose their parcel of private land tend to lose also a sense of individual responsibility in the local social life. Some feel no individual obligation to the social order. To abolish irresponsible attitudes towards collective property the Central Committee of the Communist Party passed a decree on February 4, 1933, which resulted in stabilisation of the collective labour force in the permanent collective brigade, which has a definite piece of land allotted to it. It is given collective funds for productive purposes and it bears full responsibility for the work on its parcel of land." The Agrarian Institute has advised the use of piecework and of bonus

¹ Article by V. Ostrovityanov and R. Premysler in the volume of VOKS entitled *Scientific Construction in the USSR*, vol. v.

grants, as well as the formation of links between a definite field brigade and allocation of tractors. "The experience of the MTS Policy Sections, established this year, is summed up and studied by the Institute . . . also the important problems of accounting which is absolutely necessary for sections".¹

We do not understand in what relation the Communist Academy, with its seven institutes, stands to the Department of Social Science of the Academy of Sciences, which, as we have mentioned, has its own institutes in the same field, notably the Historico-Archaeographical Institute, the Institutes of Slavic Culture and Orientology, the Institute of Languages, the Institute of Russian Literature and the Council for the Study of the Productive Forces. It is, indeed, currently reported in Moscow (1935) that, now that a Marxist handling of scientific enquiries is universally adopted, the Communist Academy will presently be formally dissolved. Its institutes will be handed over, possibly with some reallocation of subjects, to the Academy of Sciences.

Popular Participation in Research

One of the significant developments of the past decade is the wide interest taken in scientific research, and the extent to which the active participation of the mechanic and the machine-minder, the practical administrator and even the schoolboy has been secured. Not only is every factory and state farm expected to maintain its own scientific laboratory and conduct its own experiments, but each individual worker is encouraged to offer his own suggestions, and even to make his own inventions.

There are to-day in the USSR literally hundreds of thousands of manual working wage-earners, including many Comsomols and other college students, who believe that they have made original inventions of some sort; who think of themselves as inventors,

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, August 6, 1933. In July 1934 the All-Union Academy of Agriculture was reorganised by decree of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Its branches were abolished, to be superseded by subordinate research institutes to which particular lines of research will be allocated. The Academy was placed under a commission of 50 members, 30 being nominated by the People's Commissars of Agriculture and the State Farms, and 20 "correspondent members" chosen from the highest scientists. The direction is entrusted to a president and two assistants, with a "science secretary" (*ibid.*, July 21, 1934).

and who spend much of their leisure in experimenting with new devices. There are societies of inventors, with large memberships, who are perpetually meeting in conferences and discussing how invention can best be promoted. There is a Central Council of Inventors, which has assigned two and three-quarter million roubles as a fund for awarding premiums to the best-organised inventors' nucleus in a factory; the money to be used to "improve the material conditions of inventors" in factories which put their plans in operation. "A commission in charge of the drive (VOIZ) has been set up by the All-Union Committee of Trade Unions, consisting of representatives of the Committee, the Inventions Committee (BRIZ) of the Council of Labour and Defence (STO), the Central Council of the Inventors' Society, the Central Committee of the Young Communists' League, the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry, and two of the daily Moscow papers, *Pravda* and *Trud*, organs of the Communist Party and the trade unions respectively.¹

"Meetings and conferences of inventors and rationalisers of Moscow have been and are still being held at their respective enterprises, where workers and engineers have pledged to turn in at least one new rationalisation proposal each for the Seventeenth Party Congress Invention Fund.

"The Central Council of VOIZ is sending its employees to Gorki, Ukraine, Leningrad, Ural and North Caucasus to help organise the activities of worker-inventors of these cities and republics in connection with the approaching Congress. A special conference of young worker-inventors of Gorki province has been scheduled to be held in Gorki prior to the opening of the Party Congress."²

We can best complete this description of the widespread popular participation in scientific research by the following account of how a boy of 12 was encouraged to pursue his passion for invention at an institution peculiar to the USSR, which illustrates the official attitude towards the amateur inventor, who is elsewhere so often regarded as a troublesome nuisance.

"Not so long ago Paul—he is just 12 years old—developed a passion for electricity. He installed a door bell which stubbornly refused to ring. All of his free time he fussed about in his room

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, May 10, 1932.

² *Ibid.*, December 27, 1933.

or in the corridor near the wires and fuses. I suspect—and not without good cause—that the failure of the lighting in our apartment last week was the result of his work.

“Leaving at last the bell, Paul designed an electric motor. To be sure his machine had little resemblance to an ordinary motor. It was the size of Paul’s fist and represented a sort of flat reel on which was wound thin wire covered with white insulation. The motor lacked the main property common to all motors: it did not move, nor did it bring anything into motion.

“Paul got excited, went somewhere and enquired about something. Apparently his enquiries were successful: his snub-nosed face began to beam with joy. After school, when he had finished his dinner, Paul began to dress; he put on a warm overcoat and an earcap.

“‘Where are you going?’ asked his father, not lifting his eyes from the newspaper.

“‘To the Children’s Technical Station’, Paul replied with an air of importance. . . . It did not take him long to find the house. House No. 8 was the third from the corner. Paul entered a big yard. At the end of it was a small wooden house, and still further, on the other side, was a three-storey brick building. . . .

“‘What have you come for, youngster?’

“Picking up courage Paul asked in turn:

“‘And who are you? Are you one of the workers of the Technical Station?’

“‘Yes, I’m its manager.’

“Paul’s cheek-boned face brightened up.

“‘You’re the man I want. I . . . I have made an electric motor, only it does not work. And in general . . .’

“The manager of the station smiled.

“‘Well, you have done right to come here. Come with me.’

“They went to the door bearing the sign: ‘Personal Consultation’. . . . They entered a big, well-lit room. It was full of people, and despite the fact that everybody talked, it was not noisy. It was the business-like air of a beehive in which everything was in perfect order. . . . Paul joined the group which was crowded about the consultant. Very soon he learned what the defects of his motor were. He was sent to the electro-technical shop located in the same wooden house. With shining

eyes and thumping heart Paul saw his motor beginning to rotate. But his enthusiasm was immediately dampened for he was told that his model was uneconomical, took too much current, gave little effect ; the other defects of his motor were also pointed out to him, and it was explained how to rectify them.

" In the shop there was everything necessary for a young electrical inventor and designer to make experiments and tests ; there were real motors and dynamos, transformers, rheostats, currents up to 40,000 volts in tension. Here he spent his first evening as well as a number of future evenings with the other boys in serious and thoughtful work. . . . Children's Technical Stations are to be found in every district of Moscow and new ones are constantly springing up. Only this year a well-equipped station has been established in the Trekhgornaya factory. Their number in the provinces also grows very rapidly. The Central Station is connected with 25 of them, but their total number is incomparably larger, and grows almost daily—the polytechnisation of the school has provided a powerful impetus to their development. Recently a station was organised in the Gorki Automobile works. The workers of the station frequently come to Moscow to the Central Station to study its work and experience. The three young communists whom Paul found talking to the head of the Central Station, Olkhovsky, were workers of the Voronezh station who came to see and learn. . . .

" These boys sometimes develop into extremely skilled technicians and inventors. Thus some of the boys who worked in the avio-model shop have become valuable specialists for the airplane factories and aviator schools.

" The Children's Technical Stations, which organise and promote the growing Children's Technical Movement, constitute one of the most characteristic features of socialist education based upon labour principles, self-development ; upon the principle of giving the abilities and gifts of many every opportunity of utmost development from the earliest age. And how many inventive talents will be carefully fostered from their very embryo ; it is even difficult to foresee what abundant fruits the generation which is to-day 12-13-15 years old will yield to the future. . . . And since ' technique during the period of reconstruction decides everything ', one cannot but agree with the words of Olkhovsky : ' The Children's Technical Movement is no trifle. . . . Give it

time to develop and you will see what tremendous results it will yield. The prospects are breath-taking ! ' ' ' ¹

The Work of the several Research Institutes

We have neither competence nor information to enable us to form any judgment of the actual achievement of the vast array of research institutes all over the USSR ; nor of the success that has attended their centralised intellectual direction and planning. Nor can we pretend even to an accurate description of the organisation and work of these thousand-odd separate institutes. We can give only illustrations of the exuberant initiative, the boundless variety and the insatiable intellectual curiosity manifested in these researches. From the darkness in the depths of the Arctic Ocean and the Black Sea to the cosmic rays in the stratosphere ; from the various factors of the weather (including " the making of rain ") to the causes or conditions of earthquake ; from the utilisation of as yet unworked mineral deposits to the growing of new fruits, the modifying of existing cereals, and the breeding of new hybrids of animals, no part of the material universe is left unprobed and untested. Perhaps the most original feature of the typical scientific institute in the Soviet Union is its deliberate planning of its own research. " Each department ", we are told by a well-informed English scientific observer, ² " draws up a plan for work from January 1 to December 31 of each year. The plan

¹ Article by A. Paley in VOKS, vol. i-ii., 1933, pp. 151-156. See also the issue of VOKS entitled *The School in the USSR*, describing these Children's Technical Stations. It is explained that " in these centres, children of a mechanical turn of mind who wish to try out some gadget they have constructed are made welcome. Expert advice is at hand on all problems of a mechanical nature, with workshops in which practical work in various branches of science may be carried out. Help is given by correspondence also, the manager of the Moscow station receiving thirty to forty letters daily from enquiring and aspiring inventors in the provinces. There are ' radio ', ' electro ', ' photo ', ' auto ', and other rooms, each with its special apparatus, its own consultant, and its own group of students.

" In these schools the expensive apparatus and models which would be beyond the means of ordinary schools are concentrated. Sometimes the children who make use of them develop into skilled technicians and inventors. Boys who once worked in the ' avio-model ' shop are now valuable specialists in airplane factories and aviation schools. The inventiveness of youth is a quantity too valuable to waste. At times problems in rationalisation are sent by the factories to these ' stations ', and often adequate solutions are found for them."

² " The Organisation of Research " in *Manchester Guardian Commercial*, June 2, 1934.

is given in detail for each quarter, and there must even be a suggestion of what will be done on each day. At the end of each month the research worker assesses what percentage he has accomplished of his plan. This is usually about 80 per cent to 90 per cent [we may charitably assume that this refers to the particular experiments that are to be tried], and the assessments are notably honest. The workers in each department are organised as a team or brigade, and each holds frequent meetings to discuss its own work and the policy of the institute. Every brigade has to give an account of its economic as well as its scientific activity. Each research problem has its own cheque book, which accompanies all orders for apparatus. Hence the cost of the work on each problem is automatically recorded, and can be compared with the estimates of the costs in the plan." Such mechanical records of laboratory work are not to be despised. Even so did Faraday day by day enumerate and mechanically record all his thousands of experiments, most of which, of course, were apparently fruitless. It would be a mistake to suppose that, in the USSR, the mere execution of such innumerable experiments is confused with that unlimited curiosity and boundless adventure with ideas, out of which new discoveries sometimes unexpectedly emerge.

The equipment of some, although not all, of these institutes has excited the admiration and envy of all the foreign scientists who have visited them. In many departments the newest and most complicated apparatus for every branch of the experimental work has been obtained, apparently regardless of cost, from Europe and America, whilst much more, including many new contrivances, has been manufactured within the USSR.¹ It was, of course, impossible to equip all the institutes simultaneously; and it is reported that those dealing with the more urgent problems arising out of the First Five-Year Plan were given priority. Other subjects, such as biochemistry for instance, had, perforce, to wait for the new equipment they required until the

¹ "The Soviet Government shows its appreciation . . . by granting facilities to scientists in the pursuit of their work, and by appointing a special commission for the improvement of the material conditions of scientists. Clubs, rest houses, and sanatoria for scientists have been opened throughout the Soviet Union. In their living conditions, travel, and food, scientists are classified in the highest category, and every effort is made to enable them to give their undivided attention to constructive and inventive work" (*Moscow Daily News*, November 2, 1932).

more liberal appropriations of the Second Five-Year Plan could be drawn upon. When the soviet determination is remembered, to concentrate all energies on making the USSR as quickly as possible independent of other nations so far as the making of every kind of machinery was concerned, we shall not be surprised to find that as many as one-fourth of all the scientific institutes fall within the domain of the Commissariat of Heavy Industry. In the Second Five-Year Plan it seemed almost a matter of life and death to secure a prompt increase in the production of food-stuffs; and a large accession of strength was then thrown into agricultural research and the development of the food industries, in addition to the multiplication of other "consumers' goods", which had been at first subordinated to machine construction. Probably in a Third or Fourth Five-Year Plan other priorities will have to be attended to; and we should expect the relative distribution of institutes, so far as their subjects of research are concerned, to be very different from that of to-day. Thus the current researches in the USSR are not all at the same advanced point. There may well be some institutes at work on problems which British or French or American scientists feel to have been already adequately dealt with in their own laboratories. There is, we fear, still too much isolation of thought between western science and that of the USSR. The records of investigations in various fields—we may instance anthropology and geology—seem to be inadequately known to British and American scientists.

Mathematics and Physics

One of the fields in which these research institutes have earned an international reputation, at any rate for good work, if not for new discoveries, is that of physics in its newest branches. Those under the control of the Commissariat of Heavy Industry, through its scientific department (NIS), seem to have made great advances in combined work. Among them may be named the "Karpov Institute of Physical Chemistry in Moscow, the Institute of Chemical Physics in Leningrad, the Physico-Technical Institutes of Leningrad and Kharkov, the Optical Institute of Leningrad and the Electro-Technical Institute. . . . The research in these institutes by investigators such as Frumkin, Semenov and Joffe"¹ is mentioned as deserving of notice.

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, November 2, 1932.

The Materials and Processes of Wealth Production

Original work of at least equal importance, and of more immediate practical value, has been done in the concentrated joint attack upon the scientific problems actually encountered in bringing mining and manufacturing industries to the complicated technological balance necessitated by the First and Second Five-Year Plans. "The establishment of a scientific technical department", we read of NIS in the Commissariat of Heavy Industry, "has assured close cooperation between theoretical research and practical work. During the past four years, heavy industry alone has created 235 scientific research institutions to take care of its diverse branches. Fuel (coal, oil, peat, briquettes); metals (ferrous, non-ferrous, light and rare); chemistry, with all its numerous specialities; construction as well as construction materials; aviation; auto and tractor industry and machine-building, each has its own special institute treating its specific problems. These are to be found not only in the old industrial centres but throughout the Union, even in far away districts such as the Urals, Eastern Siberia, and Central Asia."¹

Agriculture

During recent years, under pressure of the constantly apprehended deficiency of foodstuffs—it is never forgotten that tsarist Russia suffered in every decade from actual famines—special attention has been paid to problems of agriculture. Literally hundreds of institutes for biology and for genetics, for animal husbandry and for plant culture, for the application to farming of electricity and even of aviation, and for many other branches of knowledge, are cooperating in discovering how to increase the quantity and improve the quality of the innumerable varieties of foodstuffs. "There are to-day in the USSR", we read in 1933, "no fewer than 1233 scientific stations for observations and experiments in farming, of which more than 1000 have been founded since 1930." This is a larger number than were opened in the whole world during the first 75 years of scientific study of farming, since the first such station were opened in France in 1835. "Working in the domain of plant-culture alone there are

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, November 5, 1932.

646 institutions, 100 on fruits, 79 on oil-bearing plants, 76 on vegetables, 61 on cotton, 60 on maize and sorghum, 60 on potatoes, 52 on grain, 45 on new crops, 25 on flax. In the field of animal husbandry 254 scientific institutions are working.¹ . . . Some 26,000 scientific and technical workers are engaged in the work of these institutions. The demand for new scientific workers in agriculture has been so pressing that the Communist Universities, whose function was to train leaders for government and Party posts, have recently been converted into agricultural schools, training leaders for farming.

"This network of scientific stations is flung far across the country, from the 40 stations in Transcaucasia, the 31 in Uzbek Republic, the 5 in far-way Tajikistan, to the famous Khibinsk Station, north of the Arctic Circle, which is leading the fight to carry cultivated crops into the north.

"They comprise institutions such as the Plant Institute of Leningrad, the Institute of Mechanisation and Electrification of Farming, the Fertiliser Institute, the Irrigation Institute, the Saratov Institute, studying farming in dry districts. They are allied with hundreds of thousands of 'collective-farmer-inventors', who are creating new methods, trying them out and passing them on to scientific stations, and applying the results of the stations on their own farms."²

¹ Preliminary results of Professor Herman J. Muller's work at the Academy of Sciences on Genetics, Vavilov said, "indicate that mutations are obtained more easily in products of cross-breeding than in pure stock. Moreover, scientists at the Leningrad Laboratory have discovered that it is easier to cause mutations by X-rays if the fly which is the object of the experiment is fed on salts derived from heavy chemical elements. Thanks to the work of Dr. Medvedev it is now possible to compare the effects of such treatment on two different species of flies. . . . Workers in America have discovered that if a group of seeds are divided, one part planted immediately and the other kept for five years, the second batch yields mutations different from those of the first. There is undoubtedly some connection between this phenomenon and the mutations which Professor Muller has produced by the use of X-rays, so that cooperation between this Institute and the American scientist is likely to be mutually beneficial. . . . 'There is a group of very capable young men at these laboratories', an American observer said. 'In general, I find that the average scientific worker here is much younger than in America. In many ways I prefer young scientists, they are filled with enthusiasm which old men lack'" (*Moscow Daily News*, October 27, 1933).

² *Moscow Daily News*, February 15, 1933. Anna Louise Strong, reporting interview with Vavilov, adds a significant anecdote: "Vavilov, the chief scientific adviser of the Commissariat of Agriculture, and known throughout the world of agricultural scientists for his brilliant studies in plants, once told me of a visit he paid to the foremost experimental station in England. The

"Professor N. I. Vavilov continues to direct the Lenin Academy of Agricultural Science in Leningrad while supervising the new Biological Institute of the Academy of Sciences in Moscow. The former organisation has a general staff of about 18,000 persons at various stations throughout the USSR. Professor N. I. Vavilov's latest researches have been concerned with the origin of domesticated animals. He has followed his demonstration of the origin of domesticated plants in certain world centres by similar researches on domesticated animals." We owe to him the discovery that nearly all the cultivated fruit trees originated in Iran. The Persian jungle is virtually a mass of wild cherry, plum, apple and other fruit trees. The fruits are very small but of the same sort. "The story of the Garden of Eden is derived from the character of the Persian Jungle", and the Bolsheviks find it strange that one of their scientists should be the first to show that it rests on a basis of historical fact. Professor Vavilov's latest results indicate that Asia has played an important part, not only in the origin of domesticated animals, but also in that of the human race.

"Soviet science is intensely active. Changes and extensions are in progress everywhere. In spite of high educational pressure there is a severe shortage of scientific directors for all the extensions, but the new type of young communist scientist is appearing. Will he succeed in simultaneously making scientific discoveries and adhering to the Communist Party's political line?"¹

Genetics

"Interesting results have been achieved by another foreign scientist permanently employed in the [Genetics] Institute. The Bulgarian geneticist Postov succeeded in overcoming the sterility of the so-called 'distant hybrids' (the product of cross-breeding regular tobacco with its distant wild ancestor is usually sterile).

director admitted that, in spite of excellent equipment and highly trained scientific workers, he was at a lack for scientific problems on which he might hopefully apply his zeal.

"So also was our science in the old days', added Vavilov. 'We scientists had learned more than we could ever hope to see applied in the backward peasant fields of Russia. But now, since the socialisation of farming makes possible swift application of science, life itself sets us daily more fascinating problems than we have time to solve.'"

¹ *Manchester Guardian*, March 23, 1935.

When Postov included, in the cross-breeding process, a third participant (another variety of wild tobacco), the hybrid obtained appeared to be fecund.

"Vavilov expressed the opinion that the method of obtaining treble and quadruple hybrids adopted by Postov has long ago been used in nature, so that a number of species should be considered as synthetic products. . . .

"According to Vavilov, the practical results of this discovery are immense. Were it possible to obtain a fecund hybrid of the huge American variety of tobacco, which is usually destroyed as a weed but which contains much lemon acid in its leaves, shortage of this acid would cease to exist in our country. Without waiting for this, Soviet scientists have found a way of obtaining the precious acid from the leaves of makhorka, which, however, contains much less than the American tobacco.

"Speaking of the results of his last year's expedition to Central and South America, the Academician stated that, contrary to existing beliefs, he has established that the huge tracts of South America played a rather insignificant part in the genesis of cultivated plants. Some of the most important of them, like cotton, corn and many kinds of vegetable, first appeared in the comparatively small mountainous part of South America, Guatemala and Honduras. Potatoes, on the other hand, were 'born' in the highlands of Peru, Bolivia and Equador at an altitude of 3500-4000 metres. An exploration of the latter territory enabled Vavilov to obtain 16 hitherto unknown varieties of potato, some of which are unaffected by frost or pests. These varieties of Equador potato are already being successfully cultivated on the experimental farm of the Institute of Plant Industry near Leningrad." ¹

"To-day's experimentation does not wait for the slow processes of nature to test its work. The Saratov Institute, for instance, has great sheds in which it creates its own drought, hot winds, winter conditions. Rapid propagation methods have been found for cotton whereby the qualities of a new variety can be spread over the whole of Central Asia within four years. In animal husbandry the methods of artificial impregnation allow a similarly swift introduction of new strains. Science itself takes on the speed of the Pyatiletka (Five-Year Plan). This is the

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, February 22, 1933.

chief characterisation of agricultural science for the past three years." ¹

The progress of science in agriculture in the USSR is thus commented on by one of the leading British scientists. "Elsewhere", writes Sir Daniel Hall, "the man of science must take up an apologetic attitude at the present time with regard to agriculture. For two generations he has been entreated to make the land more productive and to reduce costs; but as an American professor of agriculture writes to me: 'Ten million acres of cotton and some thousands of tobacco have been ploughed under. The latest move is the killing of some 5 million pigs weighing under 1000 lb. and the slaughter of some 200,000 prospective mother sows. If this will bring national prosperity I have wasted my life.' The man of science may be forgiven if he concludes that he is no longer wanted and may retire to his ivory tower, but whatever food for irony the world spectacle presents he will not be allowed to enjoy it in detachment, for if the deluge comes he will be swept down with the rest. . . . We have one example before us in the Russian plan. This represents what we might call an engineer's lay-out to obtain maximum efficiency of production from the land, given a perfectly clean sheet as to land, labour and capital, without any hampering conditions other than those imposed by soil and climate. It is the method of industrial exploitation such as we see at work in some of the great farms of the United States and of tropical countries, raised to a higher power, from thousands to millions of acres, by the all-controlling state organisation. Its aim is to secure from the soil the food and other raw materials required by the nation by the minimum employment of man-power, made effective by the application of science and machinery, thus liberating the greater proportion of the labour hitherto so employed for other forms of production which will add to the real wealth of the community. It demands for its realisation a wealth of directive skill and a technique of national organisation which only began to be attempted during the war. It necessitates a social revolution which no other country is prepared to carry through." ²

¹ *Ibid.*

² Lecture on "Science and Agriculture" reported in *Nature*, London, November 11, 1933; included in volume entitled *The Frustration of Science*, with preface by Professor Soddy (1935), pp. 13-29.

The Fight for Health

But the research institutes are far from being limited to the sciences bearing specially on processes of the production of foodstuffs and other commodities. Nearly half a hundred of them come under the direction of the People's Commissars of Health of the seven constituent republics, amongst which the RSFSR and the Ukraine take the lead. We have space only for brief accounts of a few of these medical institutes.

The Central Institute of Röntgenology

The Central Institute of Röntgenology, Radiology and Cancer was actually the first scientific research institute to be established under Lenin's administration. Founded in 1918 it celebrated its fifteenth anniversary in 1933. "During the first years of the institute's existence, which coincided with the civil war and general devastation of the country, the scientists working there were the only ones engaged in research work in the city whose population fed on 100 grams of rye bread daily. . . . This institute is not only a research organisation but an educational one too. In the course of the fifteen years of its existence it has trained 170 people as specialists on röntgenology. Of these, 26 are now professors and 76 have been transferred to other organisations. In addition to this about 700 physicians specialised in X-ray treatment."¹

The Leningrad Institute of the Brain

Another institute dating from 1918 is the Leningrad Institute of the Brain, which was founded by "the late Academician Bekhterev, whose name the institute bears. Organised in the first year of the Revolution, the institute at first held a modest place, but gradually it grew and developed into a great scientific organisation occupying two many-storeyed buildings. . . . The Institute has under its control a school of 3000 pupils, a school for defective children, and a psychiatric hospital. By the extensive researches conducted by this institute, confirmed as they have been by other work in Western Europe and the United

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, May 6, 1933.

States, its members consider that the theory of the existence of inherently higher and lower races of mankind has been completely demolished.”¹

The Leningrad Institute of Experimental Medicine

New vistas of human development and longevity have been opened up by the discoveries of the great Leningrad Institute of Experimental Medicine, in connection with which the celebrated Professor Pavlov continues his laboratory experiments in conditioned and unconditioned reflexes. Six new “complex clinics” were to be opened in 1934–1935, particularly for the study of metabolism, cancer, the higher nervous activities, contagious diseases and the influence of external factors on living conditions. The rays discovered to emanate from all living beings, now proved to be generated by chemical processes in the organism, are believed to play an important rôle in the formation of malignant tumours. “The institute takes as its province all biological phenomena in their relations to each other and to the conditions of specific social mediums. . . . The central section of the institute is the sanatorium clinic, which provides for the study of both healthy and sick people. Taking together all its various departments, laboratories and clinics, this institute claims to have no equal throughout the world.” One of the topics receiving special attention in this institute is the biological mechanism of senescence.

The Moscow Institute of Endocrinology

This institute, in conjunction with another at Leningrad, maintains a continuous series of investigations into the mysterious ductless glands and hormones from which so much new light is expected. At the moment attention seems to be concentrated upon the possible bearing of recent discoveries on the relation of heredity to environment—the opposite ends of a pole round which has raged the battle of generations of scientists. “Some said environment was more important in its effect on the individual—others maintained that heredity accounted for everything a man did. But never the twain did meet. Now we have the soviet scientists coming forth with the announcement that they will

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, June 15, 1933.

make environment influence heredity—that they will remake a race, not one generation only but succeeding generations, by changing the living conditions of this one.” Referring to the discoveries of Professor Muller, in which new insects have been created by the application of the Röntgen ray to the common form, Professor Stepan B. Pavlenka, scientific director of the Moscow Institute of Endocrinology, declared that “there is no reason why the theory of such a mutation should not be applied to man. It’s the other side of eugenics. Heretofore advocates of improving the race always took into account the environment under which people lived and said, ‘Bearing these conditions in mind, you must do the following’ . . . We don’t bear conditions in mind. We study and change them. And, changing conditions, we hope to change the race. . . . Undoubtedly, in the not far-distant future, medical science will determine under what conditions of life the organs of the body remain young and healthy, will discover certain other glandular extracts which rejuvenate, as we have done already, and man will live half again as long as he does now. . . . Most important of these activities”, he says, “is the mass work which they are conducting to determine the cause and cure of endemic diseases—goitre in some sections of the USSR, and the ‘urovsk’ (disfiguring) illness long peculiar to certain Far-Eastern regions. . . . Since 1930, when the Moscow Institute sent expeditions to study and treat this disease, it has considerably decreased. . . . In Moscow, the seat of this nationwide activity of endocrinologists, the Institute conducts scientific research work in laboratories well equipped with instruments, and manned by competent physicians and technicians. There are 87 of them; and in addition a corps of young medicos who aspire to become professors of endocrinology, and of older men who got their training before endocrinology became part of medicine, and have now come for six months or a year for graduate work in the field.”

The Campaign against Rheumatism

One of the specific problems with which the Commissariats of Health had to grapple in the USSR was the enormous prevalence of rheumatism, to which is attributable no less than 18 per cent of all the disablement from ill-health. For this subject no special institute seems to have been established. But

a large proportion of all the institutes, chiefly biological and medical, have been called upon to contribute to the investigations organised by the All-Union Committee for the Fight against Rheumatism, under a medical professor, Maxim Petrovich Konchalovsky of the First Clinical Hospital of Moscow. The campaign took two main forms, one of which has been wide popular propaganda among the workers in all industries as to how to avoid conditions favourable to rheumatism. "Before this campaign could be started it was necessary to determine the exact nature of rheumatism, and to find out what made it so prevalent in certain trades. It was Professor Speranski who simplified the first of these tasks by showing that the primary result of the toxin of rheumatism is to alter and harm the nerves, while the secondary result is that the injured nerves often but not always impair the sufferer's ability for motion.

"It was found that 18 per cent of all disease is due to rheumatism, a fact which had not been previously known, since in 40 per cent of all cases rheumatism attacks some internal organism such as the heart.

"Having gained an understanding of the nature of the malady with which they had to deal, the committee set about studying the conditions under which it arises, a research in which Professor Danishevski played an important part. It was discovered that three times as many persons had rheumatism in the country as in the city, and that the illness was most common among farm workers, transport men and miners.

"Further study disclosed that a job at which the worker became heated and then cooled off quickly was particularly dangerous, as was any employment which steadily overloaded particular parts of the body with work. Absence of certain foods in the diet was a contributing factor, while repeated blows on the same place often causes the disease when it would not otherwise arise.

"Although the main emphasis in this country is being directed towards the prevention of rheumatism, the Committee is not neglecting those already suffering from the disease. For the successful treatment of patients, Professor Konchalovsky favours a combination of various methods of cure, rather than implicit reliance on a single remedy. For instance, although he has found mud baths of little value in the handling of acute rheumatism, he believes them to be the best treatment of the chronic ailment.

Fortunately, the USSR is richly supplied with mud baths, the finest being at Odessa, Saki, Kharkov and Astrakhan." It is not claimed that the problem of rheumatism is yet completely solved. It calls for further combinations of effort. "The attack against rheumatism can only be won by raising the standard of living of the masses."

Hence equal emphasis is now placed on popular education. "A campaign for mass education on this line is being carried on by the medical authorities, and the government, trade union and industrial officials are giving it invaluable support. Meetings are being held, literature distributed, and speakers sent throughout the USSR. Professor Konchalovsky has himself addressed many groups of transport workers on this subject.

"A campaign of this thoroughness is possible only in a socialist country where the health of every worker is a matter of importance to the government. Because of it, more emphasis is being put on proper clothing in occupations which are particularly subject to rheumatism. For instance, workers loading freight cars are being made aware of the danger of becoming chilled on their way from the shed to the cars. Miners are learning that warm dry clothing is essential if they are to continue to work efficiently in cold damp mines. Draughts which formerly claimed a high toll of rheumatics in factories are now being eliminated. More varied diets are being served in the restaurants catering to the railroad and mine workers. Jobs which involve frequent knocks on the same part of the worker's body are being abolished, or the length of the shift is reduced."

The Central Aero Hydro-Dynamic Institute

In another branch of work, the requirements of aviation, civil and military, led, as early as 1918, to the establishment of what is reported to be the most comprehensively designed and the most completely equipped scientific research institute of its kind in the world. Indeed, so elaborate was the lay-out, and so rapid has been its development, that no fewer than four independent institutes have been, during the past sixteen years, separated off and set up by themselves to pursue specialist lines of investigation that the emerging problems have called for.¹

These are the institutes dealing respectively with wind-driven engines

The Central Aero Hydro-Dynamic Institute (ZAGI), located at Moscow, and ten times as extensive as when it started, now confines itself to the designing, constructing and testing of every kind of flying machine, from the smallest "moth" single-seater aeroplane up to the most gigantic semi-rigid dirigible. The basic equipment of the experimental department, which is reported to have no equal in the world, are the aero-dynamic and hydro-dynamic tubes of great length and magnitude. In these elaborate experimental wind-tunnels and canals have been constructed, in which can be tested, under the diverse conditions of wind and weather, every design, every component and every kind of material. Equally elaborate are the devices and equipment for testing and experimenting with the machines in flight. The accurately recorded reports of the experiments in all the departments of the Institute render its series of scientific monographs entitled *The Works of ZAGI* one of the most valuable contributions to the science, studied, we are told, in the scientific institutions concerned with aviation all over the world.

The Exploring Expeditions

Another feature of the research work is the great number of exploring expeditions that are sent out every summer, either by single institutes or by temporary combinations of institutes, to investigate the geology and mineralogy, the flora and fauna, the characteristic or novel diseases and generally the resources and opportunities of the little-known parts of the USSR. Similar expeditions excavate the mounds or graves or other structural remains of past civilisations throughout the great plain, or study the languages, customs and tribal organisation of the hundred or more racial groups in the USSR, among which are found the remnants of tribes in almost every stage of primitive savagery and barbarism. More than two hundred separate parties carrying out these archaeological and anthropological investigations are organised by the Academy of Sciences every year. Meanwhile, a larger sum is spent annually in the USSR on an ever

and with hydraulics; together with the Central Institute of Aviation Motors and the All-Union Institute of Aviation Materials. See for ZAGI and its offspring the article entitled "The Central Aero Hydro-Dynamic Institute", by Professor A. I. Nekrasov, its Assistant Director, in *Soviet Culture Review*, No. 2 of 1934.

more intensive and more nearly complete geological survey of the whole area, than by all the other governments of Europe and Asia put together. "During the last five years the number of geological field parties has steadily grown. In 1927-1928 there were 628 parties; in 1928-1929, 988; and in 1932 the number of parties grew to 2500. In other words, during the elapsed period the number of field parties increased five times; and in the last two years most of the parties were engaged in surveying operations, lithological, geological and topographical." ¹

The Unevenness in the Devotion to Science

It is, we think, clear that the Soviet Government, inspired and guided by the Central Committee of the Communist Party, has, during the past decade, manifested a greater devotion to science than any other government in the world. Not only does it spend more on the teaching of science and on the promotion of scientific research, but it habitually defers more, in its policy and practice, to the lessons of science. In this sense it is the most "positivist" administration that the world has seen!

If, however, we examine with greater particularity the attention paid to science by the Soviet Government, we note an unevenness, even after more than a decade of work, as between the different branches of man's study of the universe. There is, in the USSR to-day, much more teaching and study devoted to the parts of the universe dealt with by mathematics and mechanics, physics and chemistry, biology and radiology—and vastly more research after new knowledge—than to social institutions, on the one hand, and the behaviour of individuals on the other. Yet social institutions and human behaviour constitute important parts of the universe in which we live. They exhibit phenomena distinct from those presented to us by the other parts of the universe that the several scientists take as their special fields. It is true that what can be learned from observation of social institutions (sociology) or from that of human behaviour (ethics) is not so much in popular demand as what can be learned from physical or biological science; and cannot so readily be converted into technologies comparable with

¹ "Studying the Soil of the USSR", by Academician I. Gubkin, in *Scientific Construction in the USSR*, VOKS, vol. v., 1933.

those of mechanical and electrical constructions, mining and metallurgy, or agriculture and stock-breeding. Yet, just because sociology and ethics are still only on the threshold of becoming positive sciences of the same order of validity as chemistry and biology, there is, we suggest, even more new knowledge to be expected from unprejudiced objective study of the phenomena here concerned, than from further investigation of those parts of the universe to which so much attention has been already paid.

We are struck by the fact that among all the thousand and more institutes of scientific research now at work under the intellectual supervision of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, there seems to be none¹ taking as its sphere the structure and function of the contemporary administrative organs themselves, from the smallest selosoviet up to the All-Union Congress of Soviets; from the humblest industrial artel up to the Commissariat of Heavy Industries; from the village cooperative store up to *Centrosoyus*; from the least important *kolkhos* up to the most important *sovkhos* or the Grain Trust; from the little social circle in the factory club up to such giants of voluntary association as *Osoviatikhim* and *Mopr*. If these innumerable and infinitely varied social organisations, each of them having attributes of its own, were biological organisms, belonging to different species and genera, the scientific botanists and zoologists would be swarming to scrutinise, and to register with the utmost particularity, the minutest differences in the form and the method of working that each of them displays; the actual course of development of each kind, and the particular relations that it has to all the other kinds. There is probably as much new knowledge to be acquired—to cite only one example—by such a precise and detailed description of the organisation and working of all the thousand city *soviets* of the USSR, in comparison with similar precise descriptions of the congresses of *soviets* of

¹ We do not overlook the various institutes in the Department of Social Sciences of the Academy of Sciences, which we have already mentioned. But these seem to confine themselves to language and literature on the one hand, and on the other to social institutions of past civilisations or remote primitive tribes. Nor can we ignore the seven institutes of the Communist Academy, which we have enumerated, and to which we shall recur. But none of these appears to be undertaking a systematic objective descriptive analysis of all the attributes of contemporary social institutions, such as the biologist makes of all the different species of plants and animals, or as the chemist makes of every substance submitted to him.

the rayons and oblasts, as there has been in the botanists' precise descriptions of a thousand varieties of wheat, or the aviation engineers' comparative tests of scores of different types of flying machine.

The duty of scientific study is as great in respect of one part of the universe as in respect of others. The scientific method of observation and experiment, hypothesis and verification, is the same for all parts of the universe. It is true that the tools that the scientist employs in the fields of sociology and ethics differ from those that he employs in the field of chemistry or in that of biology. It may be that the investigations present greater difficulties. But the scientific investigator in the fields of sociology or ethics is not without instruments of discovery appropriate to his own enquiries, which are as effective as the microscope and the galvanometer.

We do not suggest that the Soviet Union has made no discoveries in the sphere of sociology. On the contrary, it has to its credit two new inventions in social institutions of fundamental importance, which we have described in previous chapters,¹ and which are destined, we believe, to be accepted by other countries and remodelled according to their peculiar circumstances. We count, as one of these, the entirely novel social structure of the USSR, with its universal popular participation as citizens, producers and consumers, that we have described as "multiform democracy" guided by a Vocation of Leadership, operating a governmental apparatus that transcends the old categories of legislature and executive, or politics and economics, by the more comprehensive one of social administration. The other discovery is the equally original conception of entirely dispensing with the capitalist entrepreneur and his profit-making motive, in the engagement of wage-labour; and of planning all production deliberately for community consumption. To these new departures in politics and economics we shall recur in the following chapters.² But it must be remembered that both these outstanding sociological inventions which the Soviet Government has to its credit were not the product of merely practical administrators or untutored revolutionaries. They emerged in action only as the

¹ Chapters I. to VI. in Part I., and Chapter VIII. in Part II.

² Chapter XII. in Part II., "The Good Life," and Epilogue, "A New Civilisation?"

indirect outcome of the lifelong studies of three of the most laborious as well as the most imaginative sociologists of the past hundred years. Can we name any economist or political scientist who scrutinised and investigated, longer and more continuously, past and present social institutions themselves, than Karl Marx on the one hand, and Lenin on the other? Is there any industrial administrator in any country who is known to have examined more minutely, and pondered over more deeply, the prospective effects of contemporary capitalism than Friedrich Engels? Think of the decades spent by Marx in the library of the British Museum, studying every scrap of documentary evidence whilst producing his voluminous descriptions and generalisations on western industrialism. As for Lenin, he may be said to have spent his whole life, from youth to the age of forty-six, whether exiled in Siberia, or sitting, day after day, from the time of opening to the hour of closing, in the public libraries of Geneva and Zürich, Paris and London, in a sustained study from documents and observation, of the structure and working of all contemporary social institutions, whether the autocracies of eastern and central Europe or the parliamentary democracies of Britain, France and Switzerland; whether the *mir* and the *artel* of the Eurasian continent, or the trade unions, the cooperatives and the political labour parties of the western world; or of factory and commercial administration, whether under nineteenth-century capitalism or twentieth-century imperialism. It was exactly because Lenin was a scientist and not a mere politician or administrator, and had spent laborious years in observing or studying, not people's opinions, but the facts themselves, as to the nature and development of the *mir* and the *artel*, the trade union and the cooperative society, the working of parliamentary machinery and the strength and weakness of political parties, that, when the moment for action came he was able to suggest and elaborate the entirely novel social institutions which are achieving such a considerable measure of success in the USSR. Continuance of like inventiveness in meeting new emergencies cannot, without prolonged scientific study analogous to that of Marx, Engels and Lenin, be counted on. Thus, the scientific research institute, as the practical method of organising and multiplying such study, has its uses in sociology no less than in physics or biology.

Hence it is to be regretted that more has not yet been done in

the USSR, in the way of precise objective comparative descriptions, as devoid of prepossessions as those of the biologist within his own sphere, of the structure and working of particular social institutions, within the USSR, and without.¹ The vast increase of definite knowledge about what certainly constitutes, in the consciousness of each individual, an important part of his universe, would anyhow enlarge his "culture". But it would do more than this. There is, as yet, in any country in the world, only the beginnings of a science of sociology, but it has already taught something of value to the practical man. It would, we are convinced, teach the world much more, if the USSR, in conjunction with other civilised countries, would give to this nascent science as much attention as has been given to mechanics and physics, chemistry and biology.

The Science of Human Behaviour

It is less easy to make a persuasive case in favour of a scientific study of human behaviour. Ethics, as such a science would be called, has hitherto been largely dominated by an imperfect psychology (which may be improved when the biologists know more about the processes of human consciousness); as well as by unscientific importations from metaphysics and theology. But an exact descriptive study of actual behaviour by men and women under particular circumstances, including the effect upon

¹ We hold the systematic collection of data to be as indispensable to sociology as it has proved to be in biology. But, of course, the collection of data is not enough. "Data of one kind or another", it has been said, "are not so difficult to obtain; but generalisation is another matter. The social scientist may resent the premature generalisations of his predecessors. He will himself not get very far unless he himself tentatively generalises; unless, in a word, he has ideas as well as data. Essays and investigations may be piled mountain-high; they will never by themselves constitute a science or a philosophy of economics, psychology or society. The two processes—the making of hypotheses and the gathering of data—must go on together, reacting upon each other. For in the social sciences, as elsewhere, the generalisation is at once a test of, and a stimulus to, minute and realistic research. The generalisations will not endure; why should they? They have not endured in mathematics, physics and chemistry. But, then, neither have the data. Science, social or other, is a structure; a series of judgments, revised without ceasing, goes to make up the incontestable progress of science. We must believe in this progress, but we must never accord more than a limited amount of confidence to the forms in which it is successively vested" (*Pasteur: the History of a Mind*, by E. Duclaux (English translation, 1900), p. 111, quoted by Abraham Flexner in his *Universities, American, English, German* (1930), pp. 12-13; and also in *A Study of History*, by Arnold J. Toynbee (1934), vol. i. p. 50).

them of different stimuli, whether in encouragement or in repression, would probably throw light on certain problems that confront teachers and statesmen in the USSR and elsewhere. What, for instance, is the effect upon productive efficiency of the emotion of fear? What is found to be the reaction, to the fear of criminal prosecution, in (a) the manual-working factory operative or miner; (b) the foreman or assistant manager; and (c) the director of the whole plant? How is initiative affected, and willingness to try experiments, by apprehension that lack of success in departures from routine may lead to reprimand or dismissal? What is the effect of "terrorist" measures, taken in order to deter counter-revolutionaries, upon members of the intelligentsia who, though not communist in opinion, are yet loyally serving the community in which they live?

Why is it that the intermediate grades in the USSR, between the manual workers on the one hand and the commissars and directors on the other, are, as we have already mentioned,¹ deemed to be, on the whole, less zealous in performance of duty, less intellectually alert and less loyally devoted to the service of the public, than their associates in the other two grades? What sort of stimulus could be devised to induce in them something like the effect of introducing piece-work rates in mechanical production?

What is the effect, upon the mentality of particular categories of men and women, of any sudden change in policy which upsets their "established expectations"? It was doubtless convenient to reverse drastically the "New Economic Policy", or the conditions of membership of the kolkhosi, when the previous arrangements had proved undesirable. But what was the social loss incurred when people found that conduct in which they had been encouraged was suddenly made a penal offence? How could the discouragement of initiative and industry, consequent on this infringement of established expectation, have been avoided?

We add another instance of the need for a more systematic and complete application of communist science in the field of human behaviour. Is the communist use of the emotion of hatred scientifically justified by its effects; or even correct "Marxism"? The Great War of 1914-1918, which has upset

¹ See Chapter IX. "In Place of Profit," in Part II., pp. 797-801.

so much of European civilisation, was accompanied in nearly all countries by serious explosions of hatred against the peoples, as well as the governments, of the enemy nations; not by any means least in Great Britain and the United States. It is for science to investigate the causes and consequences of such seemingly irrational emotions, just as much as the causes and consequences of outbreaks of plague and cholera. What are the causes and consequences of anti-semitism, now in one country, and now in another? Why is it that, in the USSR, as in other countries, the Communist Party is distinguished from all other controversialists by the peculiar virulence of the hatred that it concentrates on the bourgeoisie, leading to hatred of the various religious denominations, hatred of the other parties created by different factions among the wage-earners, hatred even of those in its own ranks who are thought to be "deviating" either to the left or to the right of the general line formulated in the Party decisions of the moment. Is there any truth in the old adage that "Anger is a bad counsellor", and may not the adage apply also to hatred, because of the specifically blinding effect of the one and the other? Under the influence of the emotion of hate, as of anger, mankind often fails to see the right road, and even falls into the ditch. Moreover, hatred of our opponents or enemies seems inconsistent with the very basis of Marxism. The opponents of communist proposals are, equally with those proposals, the outcome of the evolutionary process, as explained by dialectical materialism. It is not owing to "original sin" that the enemies of communism persist in counter-revolutionary activities, but because they have been "made that way" by the circumstances of their lives. Communists may be entirely justified in suppressing those who take another view than theirs, but does this afford any justification for hating them? Is there any validity in the observation that hatred misleads the haters themselves into inconsistencies of action? We might discover that hatred produces just as surely "contradictions" in communist policy as competitive acquisitiveness does in capitalism. The scientific investigator might learn much from the policy of Soviet Communism with regard to the treatment of criminals. In dealing with "ordinary crime", such as theft or embezzlement, assault or public disorder, soviet justice regards the offender as succumbing to a momentary lapse, which may become a

criminal habit unless his circumstances are changed. The aim is to "re-educate" the sufferer from his liability to such lapses, by giving him the experience of an ordered life of production; so that he may become persuaded that such a life of social virtue actually "pays better" than one of crime! In this wise and humane treatment of "ordinary" criminals, soviet communism may claim to lead the world. It might be discovered that, under the emotion of hatred, the soviet treatment of the political offender has often been fundamentally different from that dealt out to the thief or the drunkard. Is there any truth in the assertions that in some of the OGPU's concentration camps, and even in some of its closed places of detention for "political" offenders—after discounting the exaggerations which disfigure and discredit nearly all the "revelations" on this point which have been published abroad—there has prevailed not only very unscientific insanitation and overcrowding, with an unnecessary amount of disease and mortality, but also bad cases of deliberate cruelty and torture, possibly only by subordinate officials, equal to the worst that is alleged against the fascist dictatorships. Yet these "political offenders" are just as much the result of their past circumstances as the thieves and drunkards, and the brutal assailants of women, who, except in regular epidemics of crime, are so much more humanely and so much more wisely treated in the USSR. The so-called "political offenders" also need to be convinced that what they rebel against is, if they would only try it, wiser and better and more successful than their own mistaken policy. They may need segregation during the process of conversion; and if persuasion ultimately fails, and they continue liable to incessant outbreaks of criminal violence (such as political assassination) they may (like incurable lunatics) require permanent but kindly seclusion from the world. If it should be found that our ill-treatment of criminals springs from hatred, it might be discovered that we do not mend matters by hating these offenders; we only harm our own natures by causing or allowing our opponents to suffer cruelty or ill-treatment.

Yet another problem in human behaviour. What is the effect, alike on "the leader" and on the mass of the people, of the extreme adulation now given in one country or another to the chosen head of the community for the time being? Is this adulation of one citizen among many thousands of devoted

workers consistent with their relative merits, or in harmony with the spirit of equalitarian comradeship? It is easy to understand the practical utility, for a politically illiterate community, of what the hunter knows as the leader of the herd. But with the advance in political culture the drawbacks to such a form of national leadership demand attention. How far is the exaggeration and repetition, which seem to be inherent in this national habit, detrimental to veracity in the adulator, and to his own resistance of the temptation to hypocrisy? What other evils are suggested by the contemporary experience of leadership in Italy and the German Reich? What lesson can be learnt from the less intelligent but more conventional adulation of royal personages in Great Britain? Will it always be necessary to create such a "head of the community", rather than give impersonal prominence to the highest council of administrators?

All these problems of human behaviour are of pressing importance in the USSR, as in other countries. They supply valid reasons for the establishment of one or more scientific research institutes—free from theological or metaphysical prepossessions; and using, as scientists must, not exclusively the current "first approximation" to a theory, or indeed any one hypothesis, but tentatively all imaginable hypotheses for successive classifications of facts into generalisations capable of verification by further comparative study of the facts. It is in this way, as is indicated by the history of the physical and biological sciences, that the world is most likely to acquire new knowledge of those relatively obscure parts of the universe that to-day await illumination by the progress of those inchoate sciences termed sociology and ethics.

The Disease of Orthodoxy

We have given our analysis of the principles and practice of the Soviet Government in the customary phraseology of English speech. We have preferred to avoid the special terms invented by Hegel on the one hand, and by Marx and Engels on the other, in which "dialectical materialism" is usually explained. We have adopted this course as the one most likely to convey to the British and the Americans the meaning that we wish to express. But we expect to find our action in this respect objected to by some of those who claim to be Marxians. Many of these persons

seem actually to resent any attempt to explain the Marxian dogmas otherwise than by repeating a Marxian phraseology, which does not, to English readers, bear its meaning upon its face. It is a commonplace of human experience that the easiest way to provoke violent contradiction is to paraphrase a creed in words to which its votaries are unaccustomed.

We think that this insistence upon peculiar phraseology is a minor symptom of what we venture to call the disease of orthodoxy, from which public discussion in the USSR will doubtless in due time recover. There is, at present, too frequently an attempt to deal with problems, not by scientific investigation of the facts, but by the application of phrases culled from the writings of Marx and Engels, and now also from those of Lenin and Stalin. Any conclusion in other terms is often, not demonstrated to be scientifically incorrect, but summarily denounced as being either a "left deviation" or a "right deviation"; that is to say, as unorthodox.¹

Such a worship of orthodoxy is, of course, contrary to the methods of science, on which the actual practice of the Soviet Union is generally based. The particular expressions that Marx

¹ Is this disease of orthodoxy in the ranks of the Communist Party a "hang-over" from the Orthodox Church? We are told by the British historian of the Eastern Church that Athanasius was the "founder of orthodoxy". "It is a term", so Dr. Stanley writes, "which implies, to a certain extent, narrowness, fixedness, perhaps even hardness of intellect, and deadness of feeling; at times, rancorous animosity. In these respects its great founder cannot be said to be altogether free from the reproach cast on his followers in the same line. His elaborate expositions of doctrine sufficiently exemplify the minuteness of argument which perhaps may have been the cause of his being regarded as a special pleader or jurisconsult. His invectives against the Arians prove how far even a heroic soul can be betrayed by party spirit and the violence of the times. Amongst his favourite epithets for them are: 'devils, antichrists, maniacs, Jews, polytheists, atheists, dogs, wolves, lions, hares, chameleons, hydras, eels, cuttlefish, gnats, beetles, leeches'. There may be cases where such language is justifiable, but, as a general rule, and with all respect for him who uses it, this style of controversy can be mentioned as a warning only, not as an example" (*Lectures on the History of the Eastern Church*, by Arthur Penrhyn Stanley, D.D. (1862), pp. 246-247).

We seem to hear an echo of the epithets that Athanasius hurled at the Arians, when the communists describe opponents in their own country as bloodsuckers, vampires, leeches, wreckers, traitors, double-dealers, petty bourgeois, rogues, adventurers, fakirs; and the socialist or labour leaders of other countries as social fascists, dissemblers, capitalist hirelings, flunkies of big business, boot-lickers, place-hunters and sneaking snobs. "There may be cases", as Dr. Stanley urbanely observes, "where such language is justified", but (especially when negotiating a united front with these same leaders) the comment that he adds may be apt, "this style of controversy can be mentioned as a warning only, not as an example".

used nearly a hundred years ago are important to his biographer, and also to the historian of thought and doctrine. They are also indispensable to the student of to-day as constituting not only a valuable "first approximation to a theory of the dynamics of social institutions" but also a remarkable collection of hypotheses in economics and political science, by the light of which, among others, the facts of the present day may usefully be approached and systematised. But the scientists of each generation are bound by their training to investigate the contemporary facts for themselves, using the generalisations of all previous writers, even the greatest of them, *not as dogmas to be accepted in the words of the master, but only as hypotheses*, which were suggested by the facts of the time, but which have to be tested by repeated comparison with current facts, seeing that it is only from such a process of verification that scientifically valid conclusions can be drawn. This view we imagine to be good dialectical materialism; or, as the Briton or American would say, good science. It is, as we have seen, of the very essence of dialectical materialism to recognise that all things are perpetually in motion, changing even as we investigate them. This condition of ceaseless change is specially marked in those parts of the universe which are dealt with by that scientific study of social institutions which is termed sociology, and by that scientific study of human behaviour to which we still apply the ancient term ethics. These parts of the universe are quite exceptionally changeable. The subject-matters of the studies called mechanics and physics, chemistry and biology, although we believe them to be always in motion, are not affected by what we think about them, nor by how we experiment with fragments of them. But in the domains of sociology and ethics, the very universe itself that we have under investigation is changed by our thinking about it, and by what we do to it. Not only their relations one to another, but the social institutions themselves, and the actual conduct of individual men and women, are apt to be altered by any publication of the knowledge that we acquire about them; and they may be completely transformed by the judgments that we form upon them. The world of social institutions and human conduct to-day is plainly very different—economically, socially and politically—from what it was when Marx and Engels wrote. Our knowledge in every branch of science has, since then, enormously increased in amount, and

markedly changed in substance. It cannot therefore be taken for granted that the generalisations and conclusions arrived at in 1845 are exactly true in 1935 ; or that any phraseology used at the former date even appropriately expresses the knowledge of a century later. As hypothesis in the process of investigation, a phrase or a slogan may be invaluable, even after it has been discarded as no longer expressing the contemporary facts. Used as dogma from which it is impermissible to depart, it arrests intellectual progress.

We may cite, as an example, the case of "Darwinism" in biology. Charles Darwin is honoured by British and American biologists as a revolutionary discoverer in their science. But none of them quotes to-day, as authoritative, any particular sentence from his voluminous writings ; still less do the biologists of to-day argue about what he may have meant by his phrases. No one insists upon maintaining "Darwinian biology". Indeed, any student who uses the phrase "Darwinian biology" to-day is understood to imply theories which have since been emended or superseded by new knowledge. It is taken for granted that biology, like every other science, has grown since Darwin's day. It has changed even as the result of Darwin's own work, which, after three-quarters of a century, continues to cause Darwin's own conclusions to be still further modified.¹ It is, in fact, the destiny of the genuine science of each generation, by the subsequent increase in human knowledge that it causes, to render its own conclusions partly obsolete. Is it suggested that "Marxian economics" can be, in this respect, an exception to all other science ? Those who erect the writings of Marx, Engels and Lenin into a sort of "Holy Writ", not to be questioned, corrected or extended by any advance in the science of sociology, would do well to remember that they are thereby denying the validity of the very process of dialectical materialism ; and reverting, indeed, to the doctrinal rigidity of the Orthodox Church. It was, we imagine, in this sense that Marx was moved to declare, in his later years, that he was "not a Marxist !"

Needless to say, the Communist Party is as fully aware of the evil effects of the disease of orthodoxy as of its prevalence in the

¹ Similarly, the "Newtonian laws" of motion or of gravity, which remained unquestioned for centuries, are now seen to be only "first approximations", to which Einstein has added refinements of supreme importance.

ranks of the Party. In 1932, for instance, A. I. Stetsky, one of the secretaries of the Party, and a member of the Central Committee, made a firm stand against the glaring manifestation of the disease in the phraseology employed by communist writers in the USSR. He objected to the "mere process of attaching dialectic or Marxist-Leninist labels to one or other sphere of knowledge".¹ He pointed out that "not so very long ago, at a gathering of Moscow surgeons, brave comrade Popovian read a paper on 'Marxism and Surgery'. It was a paper which contained neither Marxism nor Surgery." A journalist, a theoretician on technology, had written an article "The Dialectics of an Internal Combustion Motor". Stetsky added that a society of Marxist technicians had heard addresses on "The Dialectics of a Synchronising Machine", and "The Dialectics of Graded Steel". He said that the journal *The Soviet Herald of Venereology and Dermatology* "aims at considering all problems that it discusses from the point of view of dialectical materialism"—a staggeringly wide sweep indeed! A number of other special journals, such as *The Journal of Epidermology and Micro-Biology*, declare that they have similar aims. *The Journal for Marxist-Leninist Natural Science* has the following slogans: "We stand for Party in mathematics"; "We stand for the purity of the Marxist-Leninist theory in surgery". In *The Journal of the Scientific Research Institute of Machine-building and Metal Working* Comrade S. I. Gurkiz writes, quite unabashed, an article "On the Marxist-Leninist Theory in Farriery", where he says: "It must be borne in mind that not a single process in our conditions must be carried out without sufficient Marxist-Leninist foundation, just as no machine must be put down, and, still more, imported from abroad". The author complains that "things are specially bad in this respect in the field of smith-stamping work. Here people work, not only without a Marxist-Leninist basis, but without even any logical, let alone scientific, consideration of the process." "What a pity", remarks Stetsky, "that the author had not thought fit to inform Comrade Ordjonikidze [People's Commissar of Heavy Industry] a little earlier of his staggering discovery." During the Five-Year Plan (which has been firmly fixed on a

¹ In the article entitled "Simplification and the Simplifiers" in *Pravda*, June 5, 1932. This is referred to, not quite correctly, in *Russia's Iron Age*, by W. H. Chamberlin (1935), p. 296.

Marxian basis) people have managed to work at the blast furnaces, the Marten furnaces and in blacksmiths' shops in ignorance of "the Marxist-Leninist basis of the technological process". "It only remains for us", adds Stetsky, "to desire that the author should give a basis at least for farriery!" But Stetsky adduced an even more remarkable example of what he deplored. "Here, for instance, are the writings of a certain theoretician under the promising heading: Materialist Dialectics and the Fishing Industry. Here is a dialectic characteristic of the fishing industry in the district: "It is now in the primary stage of its 'becoming', its birth. It has only just appeared." Or, for instance, the following dialectic gem: "Yet the swarm of fish in any ocean is ultimately not so much a dynamic object as a dynamic process in motion (to use philosophical language) in all its categories. It is in this that the dialectical clarity of the fishing industry is to be found."¹

"Is it not", Stetsky asks, "the greatest crime . . . to make attempts to 're-equip' any field of knowledge by using a few quotations, and one or two statements as to 'the unity of contradictions' [or] 'the transformation of quantity into quality'? Is it not mockery of dialectics to attempt to make it into a kind of master-key, the presence of which (in the form of one or two generalisations) enables one to open all secret places, all doors of any department of knowledge? No, materialist dialectics is never a magic formula, which, if one had learnt it off by heart, gives one, without any further labour and trouble, the key to all the secrets of Nature, to the mastery of all special knowledge—from surgery to bootmaking! . . . Nothing is as opposed to real, and not merely verbal Marxian dialectics as attempts of this kind. For it is one of the fundamental laws of this dialectic that there is no abstract truth; truth is always concrete. . . . Marx, Engels, Lenin, have . . . constantly emphasised the fact that dialectics is '*the correct reflection of the external development of the universe*'; that building any science on the basis of dialectics means *studying persistently and in detail, the relevant cycle of phenomena* of its development." "It is useful", Stetsky adds, "to quote the following characteristics of our teaching from Lenin: 'We do not by any means regard Marx's theory as something complete and not to be touched; we are, on the contrary,

¹ "The Socialist Reconstruction of the Fisheries", by D. V. Nov, July 5, 1931.

convinced that he has only put down the corner-stones of that science which socialists must further in all directions if they do not wish to lag behind life. We think that, for Russian socialists in particular, independent work on Marx's theory is necessary ; for that theory gives merely a general directing statement, which is applied, in particular, differently in England and in France, differently in France and in Germany ; differently in Germany and in Russia " (Lenin's *Works*, Russian edition, vol. ii. p. 492).

In support of his complaint, Stetsky also quotes a declaration of Friedrich Engels : " We shall all agree that in any field of science *it doesn't matter whether it is the natural sciences or history—one must start with the given facts* ; that is to say, in natural science, we must start with various objective forms of the movement of matter. . . . In theoretical natural science it is impossible to build up correlations and bring them into facts. *They must be extracted from the latter, and when once they have been found they must be proved in so far as possible by experiment.*" ¹

The historian of the Soviet Union between 1917 and 1935 will become aware of many instances in which the disease of orthodoxy has gravely affected the course of administration. Naturally, it has been among the lesser lights of the Party that the disease has been most prevalent ; Lenin himself, arch-controversialist though he had been in exile, was intensely realist as an administrator, always going straight to the facts, whatever the dogmatic theorist might say ; and never fearing even the accusation of opportunism. Innumerable instances may be cited. In insisting on accepting the German terms of peace in 1918 ; in seeking, through Chicherin, during 1918–1919, every possible basis of accommodation with the capitalist governments ; in trying, in the period of War Communism, every promising experiment in the industrial reconstruction that was so urgently required ; in offering concessions to foreign capitalists for the development of the soviet natural resources ; in sanctioning, during the crisis of the Civil War, all the desperate expedients, unknown to Marxian theory, that Trotsky and the other military commanders could invent ; and finally, in springing upon the Party in 1921, the entirely unorthodox " New Economic Policy ", Lenin sought unceasingly to teach his followers how fatal it is,

¹ F. Engels, *The Dialectics of Nature*, p. 91 of 1931 Russian edition, Ogiz, Moscow.

when grappling with unforeseen difficulties, to be blinded in the consideration of the current facts, or hampered in initiative, by even the most authoritative theory out of the past.¹

Stalin has expounded the same lesson in many an act of state. We need refer here only to two examples. One is the prolonged stand that he made against the Great Russian chauvinists, who in vain quoted Marx against him, with regard to the national minorities; first, in promoting and developing the policy of cultural autonomy within the Russian Socialist Republic; and then, in 1923, as we have elsewhere described,² in insisting, even at the last minute, on such a revision of the draft statute constituting the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as transformed that creation from what would have been little better than a unitary state into an effective federation of constituent republics. The second great example of Stalin's teaching of scientific realism in the teeth of dogma is afforded by the ending of the long controversy with Trotsky and his followers, among whom were numbered many of the chief theoreticians of the Party. It is, we believe, to Stalin himself that must be ascribed the ingenious decision on the agricultural front, as the only way of escaping from the danger of ever-recurrent famine, to group, within a decade, practically the whole twenty-five millions of peasant holdings into collective farms of the *artel* type, which alone would ensure the prompt mechanisation of

¹ "On this account it is", we were told by the chief historian of civilisation in England, "that although the acquisition of fresh knowledge is the necessary precursor of every step in social progress, such acquisition must itself be preceded by a love of enquiry, and therefore by a spirit of doubt; because without doubt there will be no enquiry, and without enquiry there will be no knowledge. For knowledge is not an inert and passive principle, which comes to us whether we will or no; but it must be sought before it can be won; it is the product of great labour and therefore of great sacrifice. And it is absurd to suppose that men will incur the labour, and make the sacrifice, for subjects respecting which they are already perfectly content. They who do not feel the darkness, will never look for the light. If on any point we have attained to certainty, we make no further enquiry on that point; because enquiry would be useless, or perhaps dangerous. The doubt must intervene, before the investigation can begin. Here, then, we have the act of doubting as the originator, or, at all events, the necessary antecedent, of all progress. Here we have that scepticism, the very name of which is an abomination to the ignorant; because it troubles their cherished superstitions; because it imposes on them the fatigue of enquiry; and because it rouses even sluggish understandings to ask if things are as they are commonly supposed, and if all is really true which they from their childhood have been taught to believe" (*History of Civilisation in England*, by H. T. Buckle, 1857, pp. 334).

² See Chapter II. in Part I., "Man as a Citizen", pp. 79-81.

arable culture. This sweeping measure of collectivisation was accompanied, contrary to Marxian theory, by the continuance of these same peasants as independent producers in individual ownership of the means of production, so far as these consisted of house and garden and paddock, even of considerable extent; a cow and a pig, and often more than one; a swarm of poultry and a row of beehives, in the use of which, for private wealth production, the fortunate owners were to be encouraged, and even subsidised. Who would have thought, from a study of Marx, that it would have been part of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat to make all the millions of individual owner-producers well-to-do?

“ *Anti-Godism* ”

So far we have described the positive and creative aspects of the cult of science in the USSR. There is also a negative and destructive side: the violent denunciation and energetic uprooting, from one end of the Soviet Union to the other, of religion, and especially of the Christian religion.

Here it must be recalled that in tsarist Russia Christianity was at its worst. The Tsar was the supreme autocrat of the Orthodox Church; and he had, during the last few years of his reign, Rasputin as his spiritual adviser. This adventurer had, by his unsavoury combination of drinking bouts and sexual orgies with religious fanaticism, together with habitual venality, completely disgusted, not only the ordinary capitalist but also the corrupt inner circles of Russian society—a disgust so great as eventually to lead to his violent removal from the scene by a relative of the Tsar himself.¹ The village priesthood, taken as

¹ It may be recalled that Rasputin was not only the spiritual adviser to the royal family, but was also recognised and even honoured by the Primate of the Russian Church. Thus the well-known Ukrainian nobleman and landlord, Vladimir Korostovetz, who was an official in the tsarist Foreign Office, after describing his interview with the metropolitan Pitirim, the “highest representative of the Church”, tells us: “When I had taken leave and was going down the stairs, I saw a carriage drive up and two figures get out. One of the men I recognised immediately, for it was Sturmer, the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was helping his companion out of the carriage. Dressed in a Russian rubashka, with a great wedge-shaped beard, stooping a little, the second figure appeared—Rasputin. Both were going to call on their friend, Pitirim, and only then I understood why the reception had been closed. What vile intrigues are these three men now going to hatch for Russia? was my thought as I left the monastery” (*Seed and Harvest*, by Vladimir Korostovetz, 1931, pp. 193-194).

a whole, was illiterate and grasping. The monasteries, enjoying large revenues, were nests of miracle-mongering. Throughout the vast Eurasian continent indigenous pagan magic and incantations held their own amid the Christian rites and such Christian doctrine as the peasant was taught. It is scarcely to be wondered that, after reading a "plain, objective and not unsympathetic account of Russian religion", the professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of London declared in 1934 that he could "only come to one conclusion, and it is a conclusion that all true friends of religion will share—*nearly all that religion has been, and has meant, in Russia ought to perish for ever from the face of the earth and from the memory of men*".¹

Whatever may have been the shortcomings and defects of the Greek Orthodox Church, it must be recognised that the attitude taken up by the Communist Party has excited a pained surprise and intense disapproval among earnest Christians in Western Europe and the United States, which has militated against any friendship with the USSR. On the other hand, it is exactly the explicit denial of the intervention of any God, or indeed of any will other than human will, in the universe, that has attracted, to Soviet Communism, the sympathies of many intellectuals, and especially of scientists in all civilised countries.²

Marx and Engels, in all their voluminous writings, took up a position of positive and uncompromising atheism. Like them,

¹ Professor John Macmurray, in a review of Dr. Julius F. Hecker's *Religion and Communism*, in the English magazine *Soviet Culture*, February 1934, p. 15.

² This attitude has been well put by a contemporary English thinker: "The most 'civilised' men have refused to accept superstition and magic as an explanation of the universe and man's place in it. They have denied that the strength and unprovability of a belief are adequate grounds for believing that the belief is true. They have maintained that beliefs which are the offsprings of emotion, sedatives of our fears, or the fulfilment of our desires, are suspect. . . . The civilised man soon finds that the knowledge which reason and experience can give him is strictly limited, and that all his knowledge is founded upon beliefs which are mere intuitions and which he has no reason to believe true. If he sticks to 'science' and describes the world or even the universe as it appears to him, he remains on fairly firm ground; he may even succeed in splitting an invisible atom or weighing an invisible star. . . . The metaphysical beliefs of the civilised man are cold compared with those of the savage; for the savage's beliefs are dictated to him by his emotions, whereas the civilised man suspects any of his beliefs which he believes because they satisfy his emotions. It is also true that the metaphysics of civilisation are negative and uncreative in the sense that they refuse to claim knowledge of things about which they have no knowledge; but the criticism is only important if it is more creative to believe what is not true than to believe that you do not know" (*Quack, Quack!* by Leonard Woolf, 1935, pp. 164-165).

Lenin insisted, as the basis of all his teaching, on a resolute denial of there being any known manifestation of the supernatural. He steadfastly insisted that the universe known to mankind (including mind equally with matter) was the sphere of science; and that this steadily advancing knowledge, the result of human experience of the universe, was the only useful instrument and the only valid guide of human action. There is, it was declared, nowhere any miracle, nowhere any "immortality"; no "soul" other than the plainly temporary "mind" of man; and no survival or revival of personality after death. Lenin refused to admit any hesitation or dubiety in the matter. He would not consent to any veiling of these dogmatic conclusions by the use of such words as agnosticism or spiritualism. He wrote a whole volume¹ to mark off, most resolutely, from his own following, anyone who presumed to treat religion as anything but superstition, leading to mere magic without scientific basis, and serving, as Marx had once said, as opium for the people.

When the Bolsheviks came into power in 1917, they made this defiant and dogmatic atheism the basis of their action.² There is evidence that it did not lack extensive popular support. Up and

¹ *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, 1909.

² The reader may be referred to the excellent work *Religion and Communism*, by Dr. Julius F. Hecker (1933, 303 pp.), for a full and systematic examination of the position in the USSR, with an appendix of the principal decrees and other documents. His earlier work, *Religion under the Soviets*, New York, 1927, may still usefully be read. See also the chapter "Religious Freedom and Control" (pp. 90-104) in *Liberty under the Soviets*, by Roger N. Baldwin, New York, 1928 and 1930, 272 pp. The decrees may also be found in the British Parliamentary Paper (Cmd. 3641 of 1930) entitled *Certain Legislation respecting Religion in force in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*.

The "persecution" of religion in the USSR, at different periods and in particular localities, has been described, usually under the influence of deeply moved feelings of abhorrence, in such works as *The Bolshevik Persecution of Christianity*, by Francis McCullagh (1924); *The Russian Crucifixion*, by F. A. Mackenzie (1931). The case is stated with more restraint, and doubtless with greater accuracy, in *Russia's Iron Age*, by W. H. Chamberlin (1935), chapter xvi. "The Crusade against Religion", pp. 311-326. See also *Communism and Religion*, by Ivor Thomas (1934), 28 pp.; *Fifteen Years of Religion and Anti-Religion in Russia*, by Paul B. Anderson (1933, 78 pp.); and *Militant Atheism: the World-Wide Propaganda of Communism*, by the Right Reverend Monsignor M. D'Herbigny (1933, 80 pp.). The following may also be consulted: *The Russian Revolution*, by Nicholas Berdyaev, 1931, 95 pp.; *New Minds, New Men?* by Thomas Woody, 1932; and *Russia To-day, what we can learn from it?* by Sherwood Eddy, 1935, 316 pp. A pamphlet taking the other side, published by the Cooperative Society of Foreign Workers, gives more useful information of the present position: *Religion and the Church in the USSR*, by M. Steinman (Moscow, 1933, 64 pp.).

down the country there ensued, in the villages as well as in the factories, a great deal of what we can only describe as spontaneous mass conversions to atheism ; very much as there had been, a thousand years before, mass conversions to Christianity.

In the first years of the confusion of " War Communism " and in the agonies of the Civil War and the famine of 1921, there were, in many villages and cities, all sorts of popular excesses against the Church and its priests, as there were against the landlords and capitalists. The lands belonging to the monasteries and other Church institutions were seized and shared among the local peasants ; the kulaks being described as the leaders of the looters.¹ An unknown number of priests who had made themselves objectionable to the villagers, or who had resisted expropriation, were killed. In many villages churches, often by popular acclamation, were converted into clubs or schools or storehouses for grain.

The Soviet Government failed, for some years, to get control of the popular feeling ; and doubtless sympathised with it in all but its worst excesses. All the schools were immediately secularised ; all religious teaching having been forbidden in Lunacharsky's proclamation of October 26, 1917. The closing of churches, and their diversion to secular uses, by mere majority vote at the village meeting, continued for some time unchecked. Anti-god museums were established in the cities, often in secularised churches and monasteries, in which were exhibited exposures of the sham miracles² by which the clergy had deceived the people ; " sacred " relics which had been made objects of worship ; pictures displaying the close association of church dignitaries with the Tsar and with the army officers ; diagrams of graphic statistics showing how great were the revenues extracted by the Church from the peasantry ; and everything else calculated to inflame public opinion against the organised religion that had hitherto deluded the people.

The direct propaganda of atheism was undertaken, at first by individuals, and presently by groups and local societies who, from 1922 onward were supported by a weekly newspaper called *Bezboznik* (The Godless). A conference at Moscow in 1925

¹ " Of all the human monsters I have ever met in my travels I cannot recall any so malignant and odious as the Russian kulak. In the revolutionary horrors of 1905 and 1919 he was the ruling spirit—a fiend incarnate " (*The Eclipse of Russia*, by E. J. Dillon, 1918, p. 67).

² Such as the pretended non-decomposition of bodies of " saints ".

adopted, after discussion, a series of theses laying down the lines upon which religion should be combated ; and the methods to be adopted for the propaganda of atheism among the various sections of the population, including children and adolescents, college students, the Red Army, village clubs, the various national minorities and so on. The individual propagandists and the local groups and societies were drawn together in one great " Union of the Godless ", which gradually established a vast network of branches, with cells among the membership of every kind of society, from one end of the USSR to the other. In 1929 an " All-Union Conference of Anti-Religious Societies " at Moscow changed the name of its central organisation to " The Union of Militant Atheists ". At that date it counted about 9000 local cells or branches, with an aggregate membership that did not exceed half a million, among whom over one hundred different racial and language groups were represented. Very energetic campaigns were then launched for the expansion of its work, in which anti-religious propaganda was combined with efforts to assist the development of collective farms, to popularise the increase in the defensive forces of the USSR, and to promote the industrialisation arranged for in the Five-Year Plan. The past six years have witnessed an extraordinary growth of the movement.¹ From 9000 cells and branches, it sprang year by year to 30,000, 50,000 and 70,000, with an aggregate membership, paying tiny fees, counted by millions.²

Naturally, the majority of this great membership take little

¹ The membership over 14 for 1932 was given as five and a half millions, about 70 per cent men and 30 per cent women ; about 45 per cent between 14 and 22 ; 45 per cent between 23 and 45 ; and only 10 per cent above 46. Of this membership it was estimated that some 40 per cent were members or candidates of the Party, or Comsomols, whilst about 60 per cent were non-Party. In addition, there is a junior organisation for children under 14 which counts about two million members, nearly equally divided between boys and girls (*Religion and Communism*, by Julius F. Hecker, 1933, p. 219).

² " Confidence in themselves as a new conquering class, youthful naïveté and joy in pioneering, and the relish of the machine and the untold wealth that it yields, inspire the youth of the Soviet Union to deeds of which the meaning and purpose are fixed in advance by the philosophic system which has become their faith, and lead them to break with a religion built up on man's humility in the face of the incomprehensible and his recognition of the limitedness of his powers. The new youth are full of contempt and incomprehension of an outlook which does not regard the immanence of human reason as the super-eminent source of the energies of human life and of man's history. In their view science has killed God " (*Nationalism in the Soviet Union*, by Hans Kohn, 1933, pp. 15-16).

active part in the activities of the Union, and content themselves with paying the small annual dues, and perhaps subscribing to one or other of the atheist periodicals. On the other hand, the number of those who have passed through the organisation is much greater than its current membership; and that of the people who have become completely indifferent to religion is greater still. "At least half the population", states Dr. Hecker in 1935,¹ "is already unchurched, and more or less indifferent to the old religious taboos and traditions. . . . The Moslems, which formerly were the most fanatical in adhering to their religion, are now turning away from it in large numbers; the reasons are chiefly social and economic. To the Moslem women it means emancipation from their age-long degradation; to the men it means freeing themselves from the oppression of their former feudal lords. In joining the collective the former semi-slave farm labourer becomes independent; a new life begins for him, and he readily abandons his old religion which has taught him submission to a master. . . . Anti-religious propaganda among the minor nationalities is at the same time an agitation for a social revolution, and its far-reaching consequences are widening."²

The social atmosphere in the USSR is unfriendly to any form of supernaturalism; just as the social atmosphere of the United States or Great Britain is unfriendly to any dogmatic atheism. But so far as the present writers could ascertain in 1932 and 1934, there is, in the USSR to-day, nothing that can properly be called persecution of those who are Christians, any more than there is of Jews, Moslems or Buddhists.³ There is no law against the avowal of belief in any religious creed, or the private practice

¹ *Religion and Communism*, by Julius F. Hecker (1933), pp. 220, 226.

² There is an "International of Proletarian Freethinkers" which was started by German and Czecho-Slovakian atheists in 1925, and was joined by the Soviet "Union of Militant Atheists" in 1926. The latter set themselves to turn the international work in the direction of supporting a revolutionary uprising in the several countries, whereupon the merely "reformist" freethinkers withdrew to form the so-called Brussels International of Freethinkers. The International of Proletarian Freethinkers, passing completely into soviet control, is now centred in Moscow, where it claims to maintain correspondence with groups in more than thirty countries.

³ We do not understand how Mr. W. H. Chamberlin can assert, as he does in his article in *Foreign Affairs* (New York), that "representatives of all religious faiths are being persecuted [in the USSR in 1935] at least as vigorously as Dissenters and Catholics were persecuted under Charles II. [in England]". Fortunately, Mr. Chamberlin enumerates carefully all the forms that the "persecution" takes. The Soviet Government refuses to print or to import

of its rites. There is no exclusion from office (apart from the voluntarily recruited Vocation of Leadership) of men or women who are believers. There is nowadays no rejection from the public schools and colleges of the children of believers. Churches, mosques and synagogues are still open for public worship, which any person is free to attend. The services are conducted in each case by the religious teachers (priests, mullahs, etc.) whom the respective congregations choose to maintain.¹ All the buildings are national property, and they are leased free of rent, but subject to the payment of the ordinary taxes, and to the keeping of the building in proper repair, to self-formed registered societies of particular religious denominations, which make themselves responsible for the maintenance of the clergy and other expenses. Births, marriages and burials may be blessed by religious rites, either in the home, at the cemetery or in church, by desire and religious books. Practically all seminaries for priests are suppressed. The churches are forbidden to carry on charitable or recreational work. The children of priests are denied access to higher education. There is frequent arbitrary closing of particular churches. Priests and others active in religious work are sometimes summarily arrested and deported on grounds that they do not understand. Mr. Chamberlin is evidently unacquainted with past history if he thinks that the six kinds of "oppression" which he recites amount to anything like the penal treatment meted out to "Dissenters and Catholics" in the England or the Ireland of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, or even in the New England of those times.

¹ In 1934 the present writers were informed that there were more than forty churches in Moscow open for religious worship; about half that number in Kiev, and corresponding numbers in other large cities; but there are none in the newly established manufacturing cities. There are Roman Catholic services in Leningrad and Moscow, which are unmolested and well attended. The Jews have their synagogues; the Moslems their mosques (in the city of Kazan, for instance, several); there are even Buddhist temples; and various evangelical sectaries have their own places of worship—in the cities in greatly reduced numbers, but (as far as can be seen) not inadequate for the present congregations, which are, however, greatly swollen at Easter. In the villages it was reported that three-fourths of the churches were still open for religious worship though with greatly dwindled congregations; and that the number secularised, though running into thousands, formed only a small percentage of the whole. Mr. Chamberlin gives the number of churches still open as about 38,000 for the whole of the USSR, which would be about 70 per cent of those existing before the Revolution (*Russia's Iron Age*, 1935, p. 325). The Soviet Government has, for some years, refused to allow any village church to be secularised by a bare majority. Nothing less than an overwhelming vote of the village electors will now suffice. In the villages with Jewish populations the synagogues continue their services, and the Jewish families their ancient rites.

In some areas (as the present writers were told in the Tartar Autonomous Republic in 1932) a large proportion, if not a majority, of the mullahs followed the bulk of their congregations in abandoning Islam, and taking to secular work in the service of the Soviet Union; whilst most of the other mullahs went away.

at the expense of the persons concerned. The priests of the Greek Orthodox Church are to be seen, in the cities, walking the streets in their religious garb,¹ and in the country working in their gardens, without molestation or abuse. Icons may still be seen without concealment in many a peasant's *izba*, even in the collective farms. Christians, Jews and Moslems are not, as such, refused employment, nor are their children excluded from the schools and colleges, although no provision is made there for religious instruction of any kind. Parents are not forbidden to give, within the home, religious teaching to their own children ; but no school (and no assemblage of children outside each family) for the purpose of religious instruction is permitted. The religious societies and the clergy are forbidden to undertake or promote any educational or charitable or recreational work as a corporate function of their congregation, or in connection with the churches. The priests, in short, are allowed to do nothing beyond holding services for worship, and performing religious rites connected with births, marriages and funerals at the request and expense of the family concerned.² By an alteration of the law made in 1929, any public propaganda of religion (apart from conducting services and preaching sermons in church) is made a penal offence ; although anti-religious propaganda continues to be permitted,

¹ There is even said to be an exceptional case of a priest of the Greek Orthodox Church, who conducts weekly services, and also serves as a part-time official in a government department. He is an exceptionally qualified scientific specialist whose consultative assistance is so highly valued that he is allowed to attend in his priestly garments.

² By judicial decision in 1935, it was laid down that it was a punishable offence to baptize any child without the consent of its parents.

During the first nine months of the years 1927 and 1928 the percentages of births, marriages and burials in Moscow at which religious rites were performed was as under :

	1927	1928
Births without	33.0	38.1
„ with	59.7	57.8
Unknown	7.3	4.1
Burials without	30.1	33.3
„ with	66.8	65.7
Unknown	3.2	1.0
Marriages without	81.6	86.3
„ with	15.6	11.8
Unknown	2.8	1.9

(*Religion and Communism*, by J. F. Hecker, 1935, p. 229.)

and even encouraged. No religious books (at any rate in the Russian language) are issued by the government publishing establishments; and none are allowed to come in from abroad. In short, although there is no persecution of individuals because of their holding any religious belief, there is a great deal of restriction of any corporate or public religious activities. The Soviet Government and the Communist Party show no favour to any religious belief, and persistently direct the whole force of public opinion against it. To imagine or believe that there is anything in or affecting the universe or mankind, in any unnatural or supernatural way, contrary to the ascertained truths of science, and at the same time not amenable to scientific investigation, is—so the communists declare—merely the superstition, and the faith in magic, of the ignorant. But the ordinary citizen is not punished for his ignorance in being a believer, even in what is thought to be magic. There is no persecution of the silent yearning for a spiritual vision of the universe. What the Communist Party maintains is a rigid rule for itself. Its own membership, including probationary candidature for its membership, is open to no one who does not whole-heartedly and outspokenly declare himself an atheist, and a complete denier of the existence of every form or kind of the supernatural.

The persistence of this intolerance of any faith in supernaturalism may be attributed to a mixture of motives. The clergy of the various religious denominations are believed, not unnaturally, to continue in a state of determined hostility to the very existence of the Soviet Government, and to all its activities. Those of the Greek Orthodox Church continue to look to Paris, where an Orthodox Theological College is maintained by some White *émigrés*, from which it is hoped to keep up a supply of priests to fill the places left vacant by death and desertion. The religious congregations in Moscow and other cities are suspected of sympathy with the “counter-revolutionary” intrigues and conspiracies that are supposed to be perennial. All these motives for intolerance may fade away as the Soviet Government feels its own existence definitely ensured. But even then the continuance, among the people at large, of religious belief as inculcated by the priests, may still be regarded as an obstacle to their whole-hearted acceptance of the science by which alone the people’s work in agriculture and other forms

of production, can be made ever more efficient. In the rural districts the priests have allowed the peasants to go on fixing when to sow and when to begin to reap, not from any knowledge of agriculture or of the weather, but upon the traditional saints' days. In times of drought their remedy was to lead the peasants in procession round the fields in order to pray for rain. They still teach the peasants that the yield of the harvest depends, not so much on the efficiency of the cultivation, as on the ceremonial blessing of the fields. Even to-day the priests are apt to inculcate, for the maintenance of health and the prevention of disease, not the preventive or remedial measures advocated by the medical practitioners provided by the commissariats of health, but the anointings and prayers in which alone the priests themselves usually believe. And there has been, both in the Orthodox Church and among some of the sectaries, a darker side. Part of the degradation of this theology down to the Revolution was its association with a dangerous eroticism, for which absolution was obtained by confession. In some cases there was even self-immolation by masses with some mysterious faith of thereby ensuring salvation in immortality. In short, it seems to the Communist Party, and to the Soviet Government, as if religion, even where it is not an opiate to the people, discouraging all effort for social improvement in this world, must be regarded as no better than the superstitious magic characteristic of barbarism and savagery. As such, it needs to be resisted and if possible extirpated.

It is, however, now recognised by the responsible leaders that it is unnecessary, and even imprudent, to affront the feelings of pious believers by insults to their religion and by ridicule of its observances. The Soviet Government has more than once intervened to moderate the provocative activity of the Union of the Godless. No church can now be closed in the cities (otherwise than by removal for a street improvement) unless no religious society can be formed to undertake its maintenance, and provide for its use by regular services; or in the villages, unless an overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of the locality insist upon the transfer of the building to secular uses. The wisdom of this amount of tolerance has been cogently argued by a popular communist propagandist.¹ "A believer", writes Kerzhentsev,

¹ *Bolshevism for Beginners*, by P. Kerzhentsev (1931), p. 78.

“ whose religious feelings are affronted will only become still more religious. Thus the forcible closing of a church against the will of the population will merely evoke a desperate, passionate struggle and confirm the dupes of the priests in their faith. The cultural standards of the population must be raised, books of popular science circulated, and cinemas and theatres substituted for church ceremonies, for people go to church for entertainment too, for the sake of the singing or ritual. In this way we shall achieve the emancipation of the workers from the yoke of religion.”

But this is not enough. It is being argued by some that the sweeping denial of all possibility of any supernaturalism, which is now insisted on by the Communist Party in the USSR, is detrimental alike to personal veracity and clear thinking, and to scientific progress. It is one thing to take a stand upon science, which comprises all that is known, and to refuse to believe or assent to any statement about the universe or about mankind, which is either contradicted or unsupported by evidence that will stand scientific examination. What seems unwarranted, even according to dialectical materialism, is the dogmatic denial of the very possibility of the existence of anything that is unknown to science—unknown, that is to say, to the scientists of to-day. After all, the science of each generation is not only perpetually contradicting many of the dicta of the scientists of the preceding generation, but is also demonstrating the existence of whole ranges of phenomena—we need only instance radiology—of which our grandfathers had no inkling. Moreover, we have to recognise that the human species is not “ the only pebble on the beach ”. The universe known to man is greater than, and different from, that known to the dog ; and both of these are hopelessly beyond the ken of the ant. Can we be quite sure that there do not exist, within what we call the universe, in a way as unimaginable by us as the wonders of radiology were by Marx and Darwin, entities as completely beyond our ken as we are beyond that of the ant ? This possibility affords no warrant for a belief in the existence of gods or angels, any more than in buddhas or devils ; and no ground whatever for a belief in personal immortality, or in heaven or walhalla. But the very limitation of our present knowledge should suggest that it might have a healthier educational effect on the unlearned if we explained that we simply did not know, and

why we could not necessarily expect to know—that is to say, if we took up the position, not of a dogmatic atheism but of a strictly scientific agnosticism. To put the case on the lowest ground, the dogmatic atheist is not unlikely, as Kerzhentsev has explained, unexpectedly and by repulsion, to create the obstinate theist!

Whether further study of the nature of man's mind, and of the not uncommon craving for the assumption of some purpose inherent in the universe as a whole, may not one day lead to the recognition, even by the scientists themselves, of something beyond the knowledge yielded by man's actual experience—some means of communion with something anterior or superior to the universe itself—remains a speculation, perhaps a yearning, about which nothing can be asserted.¹

In the foregoing pages we have sought to survey, in its highest ranges, the vigorous and continuous cult of science in the USSR, just as we have described, in our chapter on *The Remaking of Man*, the strenuous attempt to develop the intelligence and increase the knowledge, not of a selected few among a selected race, but of the masses of factory operatives and peasants, of hunters and fishers, of wandering tribesmen, of the innumerable religious and primitive superstitions of the vast Eurasian continent. But all this activity in stimulating the intellect of the inhabitants of the USSR, it may be said, leaves untouched the realm of conscience in the mind of man. By sweeping away all

¹ "Primitive and early civilisations peopled the universe with whole galaxies of gods and demons. As man lived and learned, he found exact explanations for phenomena previously attributed to the gods. The more progressive (or, at least aggressive) peoples, in the material sense, gradually reduced supernatural omnipotents to one, whom they regarded as ruler. The Bolshevik society, seeking to write another chapter in the Book of Changes, denies the supernatural *in toto* and abolishes the last of the gods, devils and angels. Regardless of personal beliefs, regardless of what may be the outcome of it, it is clear that the communist experiment with religion is another human effort to emancipate the mind from supernatural fears. Such steps as have heretofore been taken in this progressive liberation, have been made by the learned and the well-to-do, and the results have been restricted to a narrow circle. Will the proletarian culture, now forming, contribute permanent extensions to man's freedom, and what will it be? The liberating principle of democratic societies has been individualism; that of Bolshevik society is to be collectivism. In the quest for freedom, which will contribute most? Both can be wedded to science, or to religion. It seems that judgement of the present experiment will ultimately depend simply upon the proved greater effectiveness, of one principle or the other in satisfying needs, material, emotional and intellectual" (*New Minds, New Men?* by Thomas Woody, 1932, p. 256).

supernaturalism, there is destroyed, at a blow, the code of conduct founded on divine revelation by the different religions—Judaic, Buddhist, Christian or Moslem—together with the not less formidable codes of the primitive tribes. Has not this produced, among all the peoples of the USSR, a state of ethical anarchy as to the relation of man to man, equally with the relation of man to the universe? What, it will be asked, has been the result of this anarchy on human conduct, as manifested in man's relation to the community either as a citizen, or as a producer, or as a consumer; or on his personal behaviour as a friend or mate, as a child or parent; or on his own life in pursuit of his own well-being? In the following chapter we shall endeavour to uncover the dominant purpose which steels the will and directs the aim of the Bolshevist statesmen, and holds the Communist Party to its devoted activities. We have to describe the scale of values that defines for them the "good life", and trace the dawn and the progress of a new conscience, out of which may ultimately come even that "withering of the state" of which Marx wrote nearly a century ago.

CHAPTER XII

THE GOOD LIFE

THOSE who have had the patience to read through the preceding chapters of this volume will have been impressed by the energy and persistence with which the soviet statesmen have pursued their aims. Whether in deliberately planning a vastly increased production of commodities and services ;¹ or in organising with unparalleled ingenuity the labour of the producers ;² or in providing for the health, education and economic security in all the vicissitudes of life of the entire community ;³ or in adopting, as the main instrument of their achievement the fullest application of science,⁴ Lenin and Stalin, and the organised Vocation of Leadership which they have moulded and inspired, have been governed by a single purpose.⁵ This purpose, as we have explained, has

¹ Chapter VIII. in Part II., "Planned Production for Community Consumption".

² Chapter IX. in Part II., "In Place of Profit".

³ Chapter X. in Part II., "The Remaking of Man".

⁴ Chapter XI. in Part II., "Science the Salvation of Mankind".

⁵ Western scientists, as it seems to us, supply no confident answer as to the origin and causation of human purpose. They cannot maintain, to-day, the conception of inspiration from outside the universe, or from behind the phenomena, of which alone man is aware. They feel obliged to believe that the mind of civilised man, with all its contents or phases, has been slowly built up throughout the long ages of man's ascent in the biological scale. Our purpose, like our will and our emotions, can, the scientists tell us, represent nothing but an amalgamation or a residuum of all our inheritance ; moulded in successive generations by home and other social environment ; worked on by all sorts of education and training ; affected by our personal habits and our particular experiences ; and rising in our minds, we know not why or how, as an urge that compels our actions. We do not understand that the Marxian communist would differ from this conclusion. What he adds is his own interpretation and summary of the evolution of social organisation, after the long period of the "primitive" societies, down to the establishment of the "classless" community. As suggestive in this connection may be named the substantial book

been the universal advance in civilisation of the people of the USSR. What was to be obtained for them all were the conditions of the good life.

The Pursuit of Plenty

The road for an advance in civilisation—the conditions of the good life—lay clear before them. The vast population with which the Soviet Government had to deal was, in 1917, with statistically few exceptions, not only ignorant, with a specially low standard of health, and coarsened and brutalised by centuries of oppression; but also miserably poor, and suffering periodically from actual famine. The first requisite for the good life in the USSR was to increase very greatly the annual production of the commodities and services by the enjoyment of which it is possible for man to rise, stage after stage, from barbarism to civilisation. It was crystal clear to Lenin, and his companions, that, as the necessary basis for any universal improvement in health, education, technical capacity, culture, manners and refinement, poverty had to be converted into plenty.

For the Whole Population

What was equally clear to them—and in this they differed from the statesmen of other countries—was that the “plenty” had to be secured, not for any superior class or classes, and not for any particular race or races, even if these classes or races proved themselves to be more capable or more industrious or more enlightened than the rest of the population, but universally and without exclusions, for all the inhabitants of the USSR.

Now, the very idea of universality of participation in the plenty of a prosperous community was never present to the minds of nineteenth-century statesmen. This was not because they lacked humanity or charity. They were merely convinced that such a universalism was impracticable. They had been taught that “the poor ye have always with you”. Under a system of private ownership of the means of production, in which the direct motive for enterprise and employment is, not an increased supply

entitled *Ethics*, by Nicholas Hartmann, 1926, admirably translated by Dr. Stanton Coit, 3 vols., 1932; and also *The Dawn of Conscience*, by James H. Breasted, New York, 1934.

of commodities for the enjoyment of the whole people, but the making of profit for the benefit of individuals among them, experience proved that, with the ever-increasing aggregation of capital into larger units, whilst a minority became wealthy, the majority remained poor. Lenin and his companions believed that these aggregations must inevitably pass into public ownership, and that the substitution of collective for individual property in the means of large-scale production, and the deliberately planned administration of these in a condition of social equality, overcame the supposed impracticability of making plenty universal. They had, accordingly, no motive for accepting as inevitable the poverty of the poor, whether the poor were in poverty through their individual weakness of character or capacity, or through that of the race or class to which they belonged.

It will be noted that the Bolshevist conception of the universality of plenty was unconnected with any belief in the social value, or even in the possibility, of identity or equality among individuals, whether in work, capacity or morality, or in the amount or kind of service rendered, or in the rate of earnings or wages or other form of income. What was aspired to in the future was the very opposite of equality among individuals, namely, a state of society in which each person would voluntarily serve according to his ability, and receive from the community whatever was appropriate to his needs. Only, as the ability varies enormously, whilst the material needs are much the same for the ablest as for the stupidest, and the cultural needs do not greatly differ in cost, there is no reason to fear that this formula would again divide society into rich and poor as the institution of private property inevitably does.

With Advanced Industrialism

The desired condition of universalism in plenty could be secured, it was confidently held, only by a considerable degree of industrialisation. A community predominatingly agricultural, with farming carried on by a multitude of peasants, was, it was believed, necessarily a community without plenty. Without full use of scientific technology, it was impossible to secure the immeasurable increase yielded by mass production. Individual production is, as regards all material commodities, always small

production, yielding, if at all equally divided, little above bare subsistence. The great wealth formerly obtained, even from agriculture, by a relatively small number of proprietors by their employment of innumerable slaves or serfs, or rack-rented peasants, and still enjoyed in capitalist countries by means of the private employment of wage labourers, could be, in mass production, both surpassed and universally enjoyed, without exploitation of slave or serf or proletarian, only by making power-driven machinery in common ownership serve, not individual landlords or capitalists, but the industrialised collectivist state. Under Soviet Communism, in fact, the machine becomes the ubiquitous slave of mankind.

In Social Equality

This universalism in plenty, to be secured by the abolition of individual ownership and private management of the instruments of large-scale production, together with the definite penalisation of trading in commodities for profit, and of the employment of persons at wages with a view to the making of profit from their labour, was assumed to result in a condition of social equality. Whilst production by personal effort could be allowed, and the personal ownership of whatever the individual himself could earn, and even the investment of his savings at interest in the government savings bank or loans, the amount of inheritance could be strictly limited by taxation, whilst no social privileges need be permitted, even to those (such as authors or artists of genius) whose peculiar talents enable them to produce works which can be enjoyed without being consumed in the process, and thus to obtain exceptionally large incomes without speculation or exploitation. Above all, there need be no monopoly of education or training. These boons could be ensured, along with the necessary allowances for maintenance, to the offspring of all parents as quickly as sufficient teaching could be provided, without distinction of sex or race, or parental position or wealth. The aim was an equalitarian society where health and economic security, education and culture, manners and refinement, would be, in the absence of any privileged class, or any privileged race, substantially common to all, because effectively open to all. Nothing less than this creation of a new and unprecedented social order is the Bolshevik aim.

The "Classless Society"

This condition of social equality will not be completely attained, so the Bolsheviks have held, until they have established what is termed the "classless society". Such a vision of the social organisation of the future usually baffles the British and American student. In England, the classless society is understood as one in which the individual men and women, being all of one social class, would be all alike ; or, more precisely, would manifest a much higher degree of uniformity than the members of the numerous different sections nowadays found in any highly developed capitalist community. A classless society, in this sense, it is felt, would involve a loss of individuality, and a monotonous sameness, which would be distressing, if not actually inimical to progress. At the same time, it is made a matter of reproach to Soviet Communism that, after nearly twenty years, the USSR shows no sign even of approaching such a monotonous uniformity among individuals ! It is, indeed, alleged, without evidence, that a distinct new differentiation among social classes is, in the USSR, becoming increasingly visible.

These criticisms are, in our opinion, alike based on a simple mistranslation or misunderstanding of what Soviet Communism means by the classless society. Karl Marx, and, after him, successive generations of followers, have chosen to take, as a summary of social evolution in the period of capitalism, a continuous and relentless economic struggle between competing social groups or sections. These, it is assumed, will increasingly coalesce into two opposing hosts, the one host (called the bourgeoisie) eventually uniting all the various groups or sections who live on rent or interest or the profit which is gained, whether directly or indirectly, by the employment of persons at wages, or by buying and selling commodities, or by the various financial manipulations to which this leads ; whilst the other host (called the proletariat) comes to comprise, not only the great mass of wage-earners inheriting that status from slave or serf or wage-earning ancestry, but also the numerous groups or sections, losers in the economic struggle (called the petty bourgeoisie, or the "white collar workers" or the poor peasants), whom the economic struggle will have remorselessly pressed down into the proletariat. Marx foresaw that the wage-earning proletariat would come to

form an ever larger proportion of each capitalist community, whilst the bourgeoisie, though uniting many groups or sections, would be steadily reduced in aggregate numbers by the constant absorption of all small business enterprises into larger ones ; and the consequent relegation of impoverished profit-makers and their children to the ranks of the proletariat. At last, in the view of Marx, there would inevitably be a social explosion, in which the vast multitude of the swollen proletariat would expropriate the relatively small number of bourgeois, thus establishing a society in which there would be no longer individual profit-makers, purchasing labour-force for hire, nor any proletarian workers selling their labour-force for ever-dwindling wages as their only means of subsistence. All able-bodied persons would be serving the community according to their faculties, whilst they, and also all sections of the non-able-bodied, would be supported by the community according to their needs. This would be the " classless society ".

Now we are not here concerned with the truth or accuracy of this extremely summarised version of the economic and social history of the world, between the stage of primitive savagery or barbarism, which science now declares to have existed for many hundreds of thousands of years, and the final catastrophe of world capitalism which seemed indefinitely remote until the Russian catastrophe, and its sequel in the successful establishment of the USSR, foreshortened the prospect startlingly. The consummation expected by Marx has to a very large extent become a political fact in the Soviet Union, though in the other countries it is still in the air. It is even possible that, on the completion in 1937 of the Second Five-Year Plan, or at any rate at no distant date, the leaders of the Soviet Union may be able to declare that the phase called the " Dictatorship of the Proletariat " has passed, as the state is now almost coterminous with the whole population, and the " classless society " has been substantially established. For by that time there may well be, in all the wide expanse of the USSR, practically no individual capitalists purchasing labour-force from proletarian labourers driven to sell their labour-force to those seeking to make a profit out of it ; nor even any private traders buying commodities which they have not themselves made, in order to sell them at a higher price. There will accordingly no longer be any division of society into the two

classes of exploiter and exploited ; or, as that great Jewish statesman Disraeli expressed it, in the same decade as Marx,¹ into " the two nations " of the rich and the poor. But the soviet leaders will certainly not mean by such an assertion that there is anything like uniformity among the inhabitants of the USSR, either in capacity or attainments, in intellectual development or training, in personal habits or pursuits, in the social associations that they constitute or the groups to which they belong. On the contrary, communists claim that, by the greatly increased opportunity for self-development afforded to those who have hitherto been the poorest, and the greatly enlarged variety of occupations effectively opened to the entire population, Soviet Communism is creating positively more differentiation of individuality than exists in any capitalist country.

There are certainly some grounds for such a claim. We habitually forget how limited is the choice of occupation (say, of the boy in an English mining village), and how small are the opportunities of self-development (say, of the Balkan landless labourer's child)—how scanty and primitive is the schooling, and how rare the technical training, that is, even to-day, allowed to more than half the population of Great Britain—how huge are the numbers to whom, in all capitalist countries, any development of inborn genius and any rise in civilisation is, save in exceptional cases, practically denied. It is significant that something like one-half of all the adult male population of advanced capitalist communities consists of lifelong labourers or nondescripts who never become able to earn the wage of a skilled craftsman. The position in the Soviet Union is very different. The principle of universalism, on which, as we have shown, the provision for health, schooling, training for life and choice of occupation is based in the USSR, with its drastic ousting of all disqualifications of sex or race, inferiority of social position or lack of means, necessarily implies a vast unloosing of human energy, a great increase in available capacity, and, at least, a not inconsiderable development of genius that would otherwise not have been able to fructify. That other principle of multiformity, to which Lenin attached so much importance, incidentally opens up a diversity of ways among which the increased energy, capacity and genius

¹ Benjamin Disraeli's novel, *Sybil, or the Two Nations*, was first published in 1845.

have plainly a more effective choice of opportunity than in more rigidly canalised communities. It is not merely that there is, in the USSR, as we have shown, not a single employer, but, instead, hundreds of thousands of managements constantly seeking to enrol recruits. There is not even a single type of industrial organisation, but instead, a whole variety of different kinds of service. These range from the innumerable enterprises of the array of executive governments constituting the Union, the score of constituent or autonomous republics and the tens of thousands of oblasts, rayons and selosoviets ; up to the multifarious executive agencies of the trade unions and the consumers' cooperative societies ; the whole of these employing, in the aggregate, some 25 millions of wage-earners. Then there is the quite different status of membership or partnership in the tens of thousands of industrial artels of owner-producers, or in the quarter of a million collective farms, with an aggregate adult membership approaching 50 millions ; to say nothing of the numerous fishery kolkhosi and the " integral " cooperatives of the hunters and trappers. Finally there are, even to this day, millions of individual self-employers whose ranks anyone can join in the wide open spaces, either among the still surviving independent peasantry, or among the independent hunters and trappers, or among the independent fishermen on the coasts, or among the independent prospectors for minerals. We have elsewhere described how tens of thousands of scientific workers are thronging the thousand or more scientific research institutes in every branch of knowledge. It looks as if nowhere in the world—not even in the United States—is there so much variety and diversity in the choice of employments effectively open to every member of the population as in the USSR. And this diversity and multiplicity of occupation and employment is continuously increasing with the growth and extension, throughout the vast area, of an ever more nearly complete social equality in the good life.

A Compulsory Environment

Now the principal objection made in the western world to Soviet Communism, and especially to its claim to be establishing the good life, is the destruction of personal freedom that is felt to be involved. Freedom, it is said, is not only a fundamental

condition of the good life ; it is also its very essence. Any attempt deliberately to organise the good life for other people against their will ; any project of providing the means of the good life for the whole of any population ; any corporate action by the government of the community, even in economic or cultural matters, or anything in the nature of a General Plan to which all must conform ; and still more, any legislative prohibitions in the realm of individual conduct, even with the best of motives, necessarily amounts, it is urged, to an intolerable infringement of the individual liberty on which the good life absolutely depends. This is a fundamental objection to the whole manner of life in the USSR which has to be candidly examined. How far can it be truly said that the individual citizen enjoys less freedom in the Soviet Union than in Great Britain or the United States ? ¹

Legal Prohibitions

First let us note that there seem to be not a few prohibitions with regard to personal life imposed by positive law in Great Britain or France, not to mention pre-war Germany, in which the inhabitant of the USSR has a superior freedom. We need only refer to the British law as to divorce which is complained of among all social classes ; even if we do not adduce the English statute, not yet wholly repealed, punishing sleeping out in the open air without having "visible means of subsistence" ! There is the English law of trespass, involving the deliberate exclusion of the masses, not only from the extensive parklands of the wealthy in the countryside, and from the expensively cultivated gardens in the squares of the London West End, but also from wandering at will along sea cliffs, through mountain passes and forests, in fields and over moors, and by the side of streams, in many of the most beautiful regions of Great Britain. To the present writers the sport of killing the birds that fly in the air, and the fish that swim the streams, seems a remnant of barbarism ; but if such recreation be desirable it is, in Great Britain, confined, in one or other way, to a fraction of the population, and is severely punished as poaching when indulged in by the common man,

¹ The best examination of this question known to us is the candid and scrupulously accurate volume by Roger N. Baldwin, *Liberty under the Soviets*, New York, 1930, 272 pp.

unable to afford expensive gun and game licences, though the catch would mean something in the pot for the Sunday dinner. What seems to the soviet authorities far more important to the community than these class restrictions on the personal freedom of the masses, in the interests of a tiny minority, is that not a particular class but the whole people should enjoy throughout their lives the widest possible enlargement of their mental or cultural environment, and the maximum opportunity of using this freedom, without discrimination of age or sex, race or colour, simultaneously with an equally universal increase of leisure.

Such a universal extension of freedom requires, however, that the public authorities should see to it that nothing is provided for public use or enjoyment that is definitely harmful to the community. Thus, nothing may be printed in the USSR, whether book or pamphlet or circular, which has not been passed by the agent of the public censorship (Glavlit) who sits in every printing establishment. As no individual can lawfully employ labour for his own profit, all the thousands of newspapers and other periodicals that are so eagerly read by the public, catering, as they do, for every group or interest, and for every locality, are run, not by capitalist proprietors, but by one or other of the manifold agencies of the collectivity. The same is true of all the theatres, concerts, cinemas and other popular entertainments. The couple of hundred thousand places of education in city or village, between the Baltic and the Pacific, from nursery school or kindergarten, up to university college or research institute, are equally provided and maintained by one or other public authority. In short, it may be said that in the USSR no social institution of any kind, however voluntary its membership or clientele, escapes the universal plan. The mental and cultural environment is thus everywhere under the direction, not, it is true, of any single government organ, but of one or other of the literally hundreds of thousands of authorities of public character. This universal supervision is directed by a deliberate purpose.

The practice of the USSR reveals the nature of this purpose, and the extent to which the mental environment is regulated. In the first place, nothing is permitted that is deemed "counter-revolutionary". This does not mean that no criticism of the government is allowed. On the contrary, there is, as the student will have concluded, no country in the world in which there is

actually so much widespread public criticism of the government, and such incessant revelation of its shortcomings, as in the USSR. Nearly every issue of the newspaper contains details of breakdowns and failures ; of the scandalous behaviour of officials whose names are given ; of cases of neglect and oppression ; and of the need for this or that alteration or improvement of government policy or administration.¹ The " wall newspaper ", in which, in every factory and office, the staff publicly criticise, and even lampoon, their superiors, is a universal institution all over the USSR. No such public criticism by the wage-earner of his employer, or of his foreman, is allowed in capitalist countries. The Soviet Government approves of all this publicity as " self-criticism ", even when it is criticism of itself as employer ; and is itself not backward in contributing to it. Hardly a speech is made by a People's Commissar or other leader which does not

¹ We have already pointed out that, so incessant is this stream of exposure and criticism, that whole volumes of attack on the soviet system have been published in most countries by its enemies, who find it easy to collect and arrange this " self-criticism " as if the exceptional cases were typical of the whole administration. See p. 773.

The much-maligned censorship of the work of the foreign correspondents at Moscow is, we are convinced, carried out on similar lines. It is well described by an American journalist :

" Russian censorship, where the Russian censorship is effective, lets much news come through. Dispatch in pocket, the American correspondent takes the soviet Foreign Office elevator up several floors to a somewhat messy room in which a Russian, who speaks and reads English, goes over with him what he has written. The censor will pass *every time* any factual description of things that the American has seen ; he will pass *every time* any of those articles or speeches abounding in savage self-criticism which soviet papers amazingly print, and which soviet leaders amazingly make. (Indeed, most of the hot stuff and inside dope peddled by the rumour-mongers of Riga, is taken directly from soviet papers, dressed up in attractively fantastic form, and sold with particular success in England.)

" The censor will not pass, but will ask the correspondent to modify, any condensed summary or interpretation of a series of events or a speech with which he disagrees. Also the censor will delete what is maliciously hostile, grossly provocative, deliberately untrue, or insulting to the state or its leaders. But even such stuff comes out of Russia by the ton—in books and articles written after the writer emerges. Or even without the formality of emergence.

" But in spite of this complete change in the amount of Russian information available, in spite of a censorship certainly more intelligent and certainly less ruthless than that of most South American and some East European states, and in spite of much excellent and accurate reporting, the old fable of the soviet mystery remains. Americans, because they were once educated to the scent of propaganda, refuse to believe their eyes. They persist in the conviction that there is a ' Russian answer '—that there is a Russian ' low-down '—that they have not ' been told '. They have developed what might be called an ignorance complex. The fundamental facts of the Russian State are clear and legible and well known " (*Fortune*, New York, March 1932, p. 57).

include some exposure of departmental failure, and a more or less sharp denunciation of erring officials. It is only the calling in question of the fundamental principles of communism, or some aggressive criticism of theoretic "Marxism"—and, of course, any incitement to political "faction"—that is barred as "counter-revolutionary".

On the other hand, there are various additional systematic exclusions from any form of publicity. Nothing pornographic is allowed in literature or other form of art. There is, indeed, less public "sex appeal", of any sort, in the cities of the USSR than in those of any other country. No incitement to racial hatred is permitted; so far, at least, as concerns the Jews, Tartars, Gypsies, Negroes or any other race within the USSR. No libel on any citizen in his private capacity will be passed. It is also soviet policy, in order to exclude the subtle influence of imitation, to forbid the publication of the details, and even the statistics, of divorces, crimes, suicides and accidents. It is, perhaps, as a matter of good taste, which may be dignified into "mental hygiene", that the soviet newspaper contains no "society news", and no gossip about the habits and doings of the personalities prominent in art, literature, sport, music or the drama, or even of the leading soviet statesmen and administrators. There is no mention of their families, or of their comings and goings. We do not know whether it is because of these manifold exclusions or in spite of them that the soviet newspapers are so widely read or so eagerly devoured.¹ The circulation of each issue of the periodical press in the USSR now approximates, in the aggregate, to the total number of family households between the Gulf of Finland and Kamchatka.

Plan or No Plan

How far does this systematic planning of the mental environment of the soviet citizen constitute a greater restriction of his personal liberty than is suffered by the citizen of every great country in which people live in closer conjunction with each other than, say, the Gauchos of Patagonia, or the pioneer farmers of the North American prairie or the South African veldt?

¹ People queue up in Moscow and elsewhere, at the newspaper distributing points, in their eagerness to get the latest editions of the evening paper.

Let us take, to begin with, the position of the schools and the teachers. So far as concerns nine-tenths of the children of school age, in Great Britain, their parents have no freedom of choice as to school or teacher or curriculum. They must, in fact, put up with whatever building and equipment, teaching staff and curriculum, is provided within reach of their homes.¹ The teachers are equally obliged to adopt, as the basis of their instruction of their pupils, and even of their intimate conversations with them, the fundamental conceptions of the national civilisation, such as constitutional monarchy, parliamentary democracy, British Imperialism, the capitalist organisation of industry, and a conventional Christianity. In no part of the country could a teacher in a public elementary school keep his (or her) job, however sincere and fervent his belief, if he was known to inculcate atheism, communism, the abolition of parliament, republicanism, or the dissolution of the British Empire. Indeed, dismissal would probably follow any open propaganda of such opinions even outside the school. The teaching staffs in the endowed and so-called "public" schools have little, if any, more freedom of opinion in this respect than those in the elementary school service. Even professors and lecturers in the British universities find it prudent, at least until they attain outstanding eminence in their several subjects, to abstain from public expression of any of their opinions on fundamental issues that run counter to the prevalent orthodoxy.

Practically the only point in the sphere of education in which there is more individual freedom in mental environment in Great Britain than in the USSR is in the heretical parent's choice of a school for the children who are not clever enough or fortunate enough to win a substantial scholarship tenable elsewhere. . . . If he can afford to pay fees and incur travelling and other expenses quite out of the reach of all the wage-earners and nearly all the lower middle class, an unorthodox parent can send his children to one or other of the few dozen mildly heterodox or quietly agnostic boarding-schools, in which alone a mental environment

¹ The fact that in England and Wales the Government supports many schools built and still dominated by the Roman Catholics, or by the Anglican Church, so that on the one point of religious creed parents can exercise this much choice of school, if there happens to be more than one within reach, does not appreciably effect the monopoly of a single (and, in effect, prescribed) curriculum and school atmosphere.

is available which is less rigid than that practically enforced on the children (and the teachers) of nine-tenths of the population. In these exceptional schools the curriculum depends mainly upon the view taken by the proprietor or director of what is essentially a private profit-making enterprise as to the wishes of the parents whom he seeks to attract; and the teachers need only be reasonably circumspect about their own particular heterodoxies.¹

Consider now the great part of the mental environment of an advanced industrial community that is constituted by the newspapers and magazines, on the one hand, and on the other, by the places of public entertainment, from the drama down to "the dogs" (greyhound racing after the "electric hare"). In Great Britain and the United States all these enterprises are provided by capitalists seeking to make profit out of them. Subject only to general legal restrictions,² not very rigidly enforced, and intended to prevent such patent evils as outrages on decency, libels on private individuals, injury to other people's property, and danger from fire, the enterprising capitalist is free to provide whatever entertainment he thinks will, by attracting most customers, yield him the largest profit. Or he may, if he prefers, use the newspaper or place of entertainment that he owns, partly to promulgate his own opinions, or to further the interests of himself or his creed or political party. Frequently he combines both motives, sometimes sacrificing some or all of his profit to his propaganda, and sometimes finding that all his motives work together to produce a maximum result. But whatever line of policy he chooses to adopt in his enterprise, the mental environment he is creating is beyond the control of the individual

¹ It is habitually forgotten how numerous and extensive are the classes to whom, in Great Britain among other countries, freedom of expression of opinions displeasing to the government, or to the majority of the citizens, is denied, either formally, by regulation, or informally, by the danger of losing their means of livelihood. The whole of the armed forces; the various local police forces; the entire staff of school teachers; the domestic servants of the well-to-do; the local postmasters and letter carriers; the employees in industrial undertakings; the retail shopkeepers in small communities; the farm labourers in rural areas; the medical practitioners; the solicitors, architects, portrait painters, sculptors and others who depend on the custom of the property owners—all these, and many more, find it prudent to keep silence about any heterodox views that they may hold.

² Only for the public performance of stage plays is there in Great Britain a preventive censorship (each play must be submitted, along with a fee, to a court official, not responsible to parliament, without whose express licence no public performance can take place).

citizen, whose sole remedy, and that only a partial one, is to forgo the newspaper or the entertainment.

How about the freedom of the million-fold "listeners-in" to the national service of broadcasting? One of the most interesting experiments in sociology is actually being made in this sphere. The new invention of radio broadcasting is being operated in different countries in different ways. In the USSR and the United Kingdom the service is provided for the people by public authority.¹ In the United States and some other countries this service is left to capitalist enterprise. The listening world has in neither case any further liberty than that of listening or cutting-off. But both expert opinion and popular feeling in the United Kingdom, including both English and Americans who have tried both systems, are emphatic that the system of monopolist public provision, constantly open to influence by public opinion, and not directly purchasable for use by rich men for their own purposes, is preferable to leaving the provision to be undertaken by the profit-making capitalist, even in respect of the personal liberty of the listeners, which is, in the United Kingdom and the USSR, protected from invasion by undesired advertisements.²

The position is much the same with regard to what is called propaganda. There is, of course, propaganda in the USSR, in every form, whether newspaper or book, school or university, entertainment or advertisement. It would be hard to decide whether there is, in the aggregate, more or less of it than in Great Britain and the United States. The difference is that in the USSR all the propaganda is deliberately planned, in what is believed to be the public interest, by the multiplicity of essentially public authorities, and expressly for the purpose of public

¹ It may be noted that the USSR shows here more freedom than the United Kingdom; in the former, reception is open to all without fee, whereas in the United Kingdom reception is limited to those able to pay a licence of ten shillings a year.

² A characteristically modern part of the mental environment of the population is the prevalence of staring or illuminated advertisements, designed to catch the eyes of as many millions as possible, either in the city streets, or along the rural thoroughfares, or in disfigurement of the landscape. In the USSR the little that is done in this way is deliberately planned with public objects, and is never allowed for the profit of any individual. In Great Britain and the United States such unplanned advertisements for private profit are only just coming to be regarded, if not as public nuisances, at any rate as an entirely wasteful expenditure from the standpoint of the community, and as mentally detrimental to the individual who cannot escape the insidious and persistent suggestiveness of the advertisers' characteristic mendacity.

education ; whereas in capitalist countries the planning is done by the multiplicity of capitalist or other private propagandists, either individually or in various combinations, but always in what they conceive to be their own interests, or, at best, according to their own caprices, without any decision by the community as a whole, or its authorised representatives. For the individual citizen the propaganda is as inescapable in the one case as in the other. In all countries his mind is bludgeoned to compel him to admit a whole series of ideas. Where systems differ is in who wields the bludgeon and with what purpose.

The conclusion to which the student is driven is that, as regards the great mass of the population in a densely crowded country, possibly as many as nine-tenths of the whole, by far the larger part of the mental environment is always and everywhere compulsory. From childhood to senility no one of this large majority can escape its potent and persistent influence. In modern life it is literally all-pervading. So long as eyes and ears are open, we cannot avoid its sights and its sounds. Infants and children, adolescents and adults, will inevitably be taught and trained—that is, subjected to artificial surroundings which may be either planned or unplanned. Not only nurseries and schools, but also books and newspapers, churches and cinemas, laws and advertisements, are all engaged in creating the people's mental environment.

The Western Freedom of the Rich

To the educated intellectual of the western world (especially if he enjoys a rentier income, or can earn adequate fees or royalties from a succession of clients, to none of whom he is beholden) the foregoing argument will appear mere sophistry. It is amazing how blind we can be to the living conditions to which the vast majority of our fellow-citizens are subjected, if we are ourselves in other circumstances ! If he is not trammelled by wearing a crown or by membership of the court circle, and not enmeshed in the obligations of a landed estate, or active participation in business, the intellectual well-to-do citizen of London or New York can surround himself exclusively with books of his own choice ; can subscribe only to the newspaper which he dislikes least ; can amuse himself expensively without going to the cinema

that he despises ; can attend the church that he finds congenial, or none at all if he so prefers ; can travel in the countries that are to his taste, or " follow the sun " so as to live always in the climate that suits his bodily comfort. Very naturally he becomes as little conscious of the circumambient mental environment that coerces his less fortunate fellow-citizens as he is of the weight of the atmosphere—to the influence of which even he is, at all times, irresistibly subjected. Of course he is not by any means as free as he thinks he is. Although he may largely exclude or dismiss it from his consciousness, no man can escape the influence of the mental environment involved in his nationality, his home circumstances, his education, his residence in a particular country at a particular stage of civilisation, and his participation in, or dependence on, the contemporary economic and political organisation. What he can do, and usually does do, is to regard as a condition of freedom a mental environment that is apparently unplanned, because it is constituted by an unknown congeries of irresponsible and mutually competing factors ; whilst he denounces as a condition of coercion a mental environment that is deliberately planned, exclusively in what is conceived to be the public interest, by the known and authorised representatives of the community as a whole. Yet between them there may be no difference in the actual degree of coercion or restraint of the average individual. There will, however, be a vast difference in the degree to which the whole population enjoys the conditions of the good life.

Where is Freedom ?

What, then, do we mean by freedom ? It is clearly something which practically all human beings desire, and the lack of which most people find irksome. It is certainly an important element in the good life. It coincides in meaning, we suggest, with " doing as one chooses ". Let it be admitted, for the sake of argument, that this freedom is the highest human good. Those whose intellectual training has been unconsciously based on the hypothesis of a static universe almost inevitably think of freedom as the *absence of restraint* ; those who assume that every part of the universe (including minds) is always in motion are apt to think of freedom as the *presence of opportunity* to act as they desire.

The division among the thinkers of the world is manifested in

the subtle change in the meaning commonly given to the term freedom. More than a century ago, the beginning of this change of meaning was expressed in the unexpected comment that under the English constitution every man was free, but only in the sense in which he was "free to resort to the London Tavern"—that is to say, if he could afford the expense! There is no freedom where there is no opportunity of taking advantage of it. As Professor Tawney points out, "Except in a sense which is purely formal, equality of opportunity is not merely a matter of legal equality. Its existence depends, not merely on the absence of disabilities, but on the presence of abilities. It obtains in so far as, and only in so far as, each member of a community, whatever his birth, or occupation, or social position, possesses in fact, and not merely in form, equal chances of using to the full his natural endowments of physique, of character, and of intelligence. In proportion as the capacities of some are sterilised or stunted by their social environment, while those of others are favoured or pampered by it, equality of opportunity becomes a graceful, but attenuated figment. It recedes from the world of reality to that of perorations."¹

In Moscow, where the whole population has lately been, at times, severely "rationed" for bread and meat and fats, there may well seem to have been more restraint on purchases than in London. Yet, as the rationing has been coincident, for the past five years, with opportunities for every able-bodied man or woman to obtain employment at trade union wages, there may easily have been greater actual freedom in the choice of food to the poorer citizens in Moscow than in London. For, in Great Britain, the housewives of the millions of unemployed labourers "on the dole", or even the millions of other families precariously existing on wages under two pounds a week (out of which rent and clothing and nearly a hundred meals a week² have to be provided)—say, altogether, something like one-third of the whole population—find their constitutional and legal freedom somewhat unsubstantial. In fact, they feel themselves quite otherwise than free! Life to them seems one continuous stringent and coercive "ration-

¹ *Equality*, by R. H. Tawney (1929), p. 139.

² For a family of five, at three meals per day, it would be 105 per week, which, at threepence each, would cost over twenty-six shillings per week for food alone. Yet threepence per meal, at British prices, does not allow for much choice among foodstuffs!

ing", not only of particular foodstuffs, but of nearly every exercise of will, and nearly every indulgence of desire.

But we may leave the philosophers of the western world to bring, in their own way, their definition of freedom up to date. What we are concerned with here is the view of freedom taken in the USSR. What is there prized as the highest good is *the maximising of opportunity, to act according to individual desire, of the entire aggregate of individuals in the community*. This effective enlargement, or wider opening, of the mental and cultural environment of all the people, without discrimination of race or colour, age or sex, income or position, is one main object of the deliberate planning of the good life in the USSR. The shifting of emphasis, from absence of restraint to presence of opportunity, as the condition of the good life, is, as we have already noted, characteristic of the changed view of the universe taken by modern science. It is coincident also with the transition from the "economics of scarcity" to the "economics of plenty". The shifting of emphasis from the freedom of one person to the aggregate of the freedoms of all the persons in the community is in harmony with the characteristic note of universalism that we have so often found in soviet statesmanship, based on the assumption of the high value of social equality and the positive evil of sex or class or race privileges.

If, as is universally taken for granted in soviet circles, everybody is to count as one, and nobody for more than one, the road towards the maximising of the aggregate of individual freedoms in the community lies along the path of an ever-increasing equality of opportunity. Equality, of course, is not identity. The nearer the kind of opportunity can be adjusted to the kind of faculty of each individual, the greater will be the community's aggregate of individual opportunity, and therefore of personal freedoms. It is thought that, ultimately, organisation on the basis of "from each according to his faculties, and to each according to his needs" will provide the closest adjustment.

It will now be clear why a certain amount of restraint, and a variety in kinds of restraint, are necessary conditions of this maximising of the aggregate of individual freedoms. There is, in any given place, at any given time, only a certain amount of opportunity open to the population in the aggregate. Anyone who takes to himself more than the appropriate amount and

kind of opportunity that falls properly to his share, not only robs another of some or all of the opportunity that he might otherwise have enjoyed, but also, by increasing inequality, inevitably lessens the aggregate amount of individual freedoms within the community. The social organisation which allows the British shipowner to treat himself and his family to a long and expensive holiday in Switzerland and Italy, whilst the hundreds of dock labourers who are unloading his ships, together with their families, get nothing more like a holiday than their wageless days of involuntary unemployment, not only injures them, but also diminishes the total aggregate of freedom within the community. Lenin is said once to have observed in his epigrammatic way: "It is true that liberty is precious—so precious that it must be rationed".¹ So long as the available quantum of liberty is not unlimited, the aggregate amount enjoyed within the community is, by appropriate rationing on an equalitarian basis, actually increased.

It remains to be added that freedom to do what one likes depends finally upon the existence of plenty of the means of doing it, however that plenty may be shared among the individuals within each country. Thus, we come up against the question of how to maximise plenty; that is to say, how to increase the aggregate of whatever genuinely constitutes the nation's wealth. Whether the Soviet Government will eventually succeed in its avowed aim of outstripping all capitalist countries in the production per head of useful commodities and services remains to be answered by the event. All that can be said at present is: (1) that by ordinary commercial measurements (which include a mass of social disutilities) the USSR cannot yet be shown to have reached the level of productivity per head of population enjoyed by the United Kingdom or some other European countries, or in the years prior to 1929, by the United States; (2) that the aggregate production, whether of capital equipment or of commodities and services, has increased in the USSR during the past decade by leaps and bounds, whilst that of all other countries has either fallen off or has at best

¹ When, during the Great War, Great Britain rationed sugar, the issue to every person of the ration card without which no sugar could be obtained was regarded by all persons of means as a restraint on their freedom. The same ration card was cherished by the poorest class as enlarging their freedom, ensuring to them the opportunity to purchase sugar which they would otherwise lack.

remained stationary ; (3) assuming that the increase in wealth production and in population continue at their present compound rates, it seems likely that, in the course of two or three decades, the USSR will have become the wealthiest country in the world, and at the same time the community enjoying the greatest aggregate of individual freedoms.

Unity in Action with Adventure in Thought

There is, we admit, a caveat to the foregoing argument. What the British or American intellectual is concerned about is not the aggregate of personal freedoms enjoyed by the total population, about which he thinks little and cares less, but the very serious loss suffered not only by himself, but also by the community, if the absolute freedom of speculative thinking by the tiny minority capable of original thought on any subject whatsoever is in any way interfered with. It is upon the complete "liberty of prophesying" among this minority—the membership of which cannot be determined in advance—that the intellectual progress of the world ultimately depends. Without this unlimited freedom to correct current errors, to think new thoughts, and to make intellectual discoveries, the world would succumb to the disease of orthodoxy, and fail to cope with the ever-changing conditions of social life. We might even not escape retrogression into primitive barbarism.¹

There is, assuredly, some validity in this assertion of the social importance of unlimited freedom of intellectual discussion, irrespective of the rightness or social value of the new thoughts to which, in any particular generation, it may prove to lead. On the other hand, an indulgence in unlimited freedom of discussion,

¹ This, we imagine, is what Mr. H. G. Wells meant when he declared (with what seems to us a strange misunderstanding of the position in the Soviet Union) that, unless the Communist Party promptly restored unlimited freedom of thought and public discussion, the USSR would, within less than a generation, find itself outstripped in intellectual development by Great Britain and the United States! This conclusion ignores the fact that whilst in capitalist countries there is to-day an admitted "frustration of science" through lack of funds and other encouragement, the advancement of science is a veritable cult in the USSR, upon which millions are expended and in which every individual who has, or thinks he has, ability to invent or discover is encouraged to participate. It is only one more instance of the incurable blindness of the wealthy intellectual to realise that freedom is as much the presence of opportunity as the absence of restraint.

especially if accompanied by unlimited duration of debate, has the drawback that it is apt to militate against the effectiveness of corporate action.

It is therefore necessary to consider the conditions under which both effective action and freedom of discussion are practicable. Take first the case of a great engineering work, or of a gigantic aeroplane, of novel design and uncertain success. The communist view is that in devising the plan, and in coming to the decision to make the experiment of construction, it is plainly desirable to provide for the utmost freedom of discussion. At this stage the widest participation is called for. Only by encouraging outspoken criticism of the project from all points of view, and with all degrees of competence, and the careful weighing of every objection and every alternative, can it be ensured that the decision eventually come to will be the wisest and most accurate then and there available. But once the decision is arrived at, the position is changed. It is held that the success of the enterprise will be jeopardised, and may easily be brought to naught, if all those concerned in the work, from the manual labourers, and the skilled mechanics, the foremen and the assistant managers, up to the highest technicians and the director himself, do not whole-heartedly cooperate, with complete assurance and entire devotion, in the execution of the particular plan that has been decided on. Whilst the work is in progress any public expression of doubt, or even of fear that the plan will not be successful, is an act of disloyalty, and even of treachery, because of its possible effect on the wills and on the efforts of the rest of the staff. A grumbling sceptic, or public "grouser", however able and conscientious he may be, may, by his creation of a "defeatist" atmosphere, actually bring about the fulfilment of his own prophecies of failure. The most that a conscientious man may do, if he is convinced that the plan is dangerously erroneous, is to communicate privately to the director the grounds on which he believes that disaster is imminent unless a change is made. If he has then no heart in the work, and no faith in its success, he should ask to be relieved, and posted to another job—still keeping silence about his doubts, so far as public discussion is concerned, lest he should, by incautious talk, himself bring about the failure or the disaster that he fears. In any corporate action, a loyal unity of thought is so important

that, if anything is to be achieved, public discussion must be suspended between the promulgation of the decision and the accomplishment of the task.

Now, from the communist standpoint, the position of the Soviet Government, which has on hand the hugest of tasks in the transformation, within a decade or two, of the millions of people of the USSR into a socialist state, is akin to that of the engineer undertaking a great and difficult work of construction. Such a task demands, for its accomplishment from everyone concerned, nothing short of complete loyalty and implicit confidence. It may be argued that the task is not one that should have been undertaken; and that the Soviet Government ought to have contented itself with the multitudinous discussion and the relatively trivial details of reform that characterise parliamentary democracies. It is the view of the Vocation of Leadership in the USSR that the drastic transformation of the manner of life of the Russian people, and that within the ensuing decade or so, is imperatively required. Only by creating the conditions of the good life can the good life be begun. It can well be argued that the decision to this effect has been substantially ratified not only by the acquiescence of public opinion, but also by the active cooperation of at least a majority of the citizens in the measures of administration. It seems to follow that, during the years of accomplishment of its task, the Soviet Government is bound to take the action which seems necessary to make its work successful. Such a course is admitted to be necessary when one country is actually at war with another; when neither faction, nor anything likely to lead to faction, is allowed, and even "defeatist" talk is made a criminal offence. When a government is engaged in a desperate struggle, not with another government but with the forces of nature, the danger of incitements to faction, and even of "defeatist" talk, may well be as great as in war. And the Soviet Government adds to the argument that it is, in a real sense, actually on the defensive against some or all of the capitalist governments whose hostility did not cease with the withdrawal of their troops from soviet territory little more than a dozen years ago. At various points beyond its frontiers centres of sedition are still actively maintained, actually with government connivance, eagerly grasping at every opportunity of intervention. Soviet territory is still

periodically invaded by secret emissaries, who come in illegally to foment disaffection and revolt, not even stopping short of assassination of soviet officials. The aspirations of national minorities in Georgia and in the Ukraine, which are now mainly cultural, are still being skilfully manipulated towards the purpose of overthrowing the Moscow Government. The threats of invasion by Japan, or by Hitler's Germany, seem to promise to these seditionists, almost from day to day, new opportunities for successful uprisings. When we remember how necessary the repression of all incitements to faction and of every manifestation of "defeatism" seemed to the British Government when it enforced the Defence of the Realm Act, as well as to all the other belligerent governments in the Great War, we can hardly wonder at the corresponding action of the Government of the Soviet Union to-day.

But even the unity in action may be purchased at a high price if it requires the stoppage of thought among the nation's thinkers. It is, unfortunately, part of the nature of things that the new and original thinking, on which all human progress ultimately depends, cannot be done to order. The most powerful government, whilst it may plentifully endow thinkers, fails when it tries to prescribe, or to limit, the new thinking that it wants done. No one can foresee what new thoughts will emerge, nor how nor when they will occur. Experience indicates that, when thinkers are forbidden to think along particular lines, or to discuss particular issues, they are extremely likely to be unable, as well as unwilling, to think at all! What is worst of all for new and original thinking is an atmosphere of fear; and it is just this atmosphere that is produced by any penalising of intellectual discussion among the thinkers themselves. It has, in fact, been found by experience that it does not pay to stop freedom of thought.

The Solution of the Problem

We have already discussed, in connection with our description of the Disease of Orthodoxy,¹ the imperative necessity of continual adventure in thought. Is there any escape from the dilemma prescribed by the practical necessity of unity in action, and the no less important requirement of freedom of thought?

¹ Chapter X. in Part II., "Science the Salvation of Mankind".

We suggest that the problem is one created only by the closet philosopher, and that the solution is found in practice. The answer has, in fact, been discovered, by experiment, by the Soviet Government, as by other administrations. Take, for instance, the practice with regard to the freedom of discussion of physiological or medical questions. The soviet censorship (Glavlit) refuses absolutely to allow the printing of pornography. But there is complete freedom of discussion, and of expression in print, in properly scientific language, by physiological or medical thinkers, about sexual functions, diseases or perversions. These descriptions and discussions would be peremptorily stopped by the censorship if they were so expressed as to come under the definition of pornography. Anything in this realm is allowed to be published, in any form, and at any price, which excludes the suspicion of pornographic intent.

It is in this example that we find the solution. What is necessary to the freedom of the thinker and the investigator is unfettered communication to his fellow-thinkers or contemporary investigators. It is not communication to the unthinking public that he needs for the fostering of original thought. There seems no reason why the freedom of discussion and expression allowed by common consent, within reasonable limits, to the physiologists and the medical practitioners, should not be allowed to the thinkers and investigators into the fundamental conceptions on which each society is based. What is complained of is that this is, to-day, not allowed in the USSR, as in many other countries, out of fear of faction. But it is not faction that such thinkers are after, and not popular discussion by the mass of unthinking men, any more than it is pornography that the physiologists and doctors have in view. What is desired is only the testing of their ideas that is given by discussion among their intellectual colleagues and equals. Hence the psychological speculators in thought, the philosophic critics of social theories, the metaphysical proposers of new utopias, should not ask or expect the State Publishing Houses to publish their lucubrations in popular pamphlets at the price of a few kopeks. The publication that such thinkers need and value is in the form of "proceedings" or "transactions" of a philosophical society, accessible to non-members but not brought indiscriminately to their notice; or in that of substantial treatises unlikely to find

purchasers outside the narrow circle of those capable of understanding the phraseology which such discussions require. To the present writers it seems that this might everywhere be permitted practically without limit. Published in this way, without newspaper reverberation, the most unrestrained adventures in thought are not likely to militate against unity of action in the particular constructive enterprises of the moment. Such highly intellectualised adventures in thought do not reach the uninstructed mass of the people, or even the actual practitioners of particular technologies, except by the slow process of filtering down, as and when the new ideas become generally accepted as scientifically valid by the instructed minority.¹ Yet such an amount of opportunity of discussion and publication is enough to set going, and to maintain, that unrestrained freedom of thought and unlimited speculation about what is at present unknown to science which is indispensable to the future progress of the USSR no less than to that of other communities.

We do not suggest that nothing more is called for, in the way of freedom of utterance, than the limited opportunity for the intellectuals that we have adumbrated. That amount of opportunity might well be conceded even in a state of war. When, however, the Soviet Government feels itself as secure as the British Government does, there seems no reason why popular lectures and speeches at open meetings, and discussions in cheap pamphlets and newspapers, should be any more restricted than they are in England. The feeling of the ordinary citizen—of the common man without intellectual pretensions—that he may without fear of prosecution or police oppression listen to what he chooses, say what he likes and propose whatever occurs to him, is an element of his good life which is ultimately of considerable value to the community. We may hopefully expect that, with the soviet characteristic of universalism in all its administration, those in authority in the USSR will, in due season, take this view.

¹ English readers will remember the anecdote told of Pitt. As Prime Minister he was consulted about criminally prosecuting William Godwin for the publication of an extremely subversive book (*Political Justice*). Pitt asked at what price the volume was published, and was told "Three guineas". His decision was that no book published at so high a price as three guineas was worth troubling about—meaning that, at such a price, it would circulate only among people unlikely to be improperly influenced by it.

The Evolution of Communist Ethics

So far we have explained the various social expedients devised by the Communist Party of the USSR to provide, as a matter of deliberate social construction, the conditions of the good life for all. But one of the most important factors in the social environment created in every community is the code of conduct that arises out of whatever social order is established; a code accepted and enforced, either by law or by public opinion of a majority of the inhabitants. Is there such a code of conduct in the USSR, and how does it differ from those of the western civilisation?

It so happened that the present writers had the opportunity in 1932 of asking a pertinent question of one of the most influential and most widely respected of Bolshevik leaders, one who was reported to be an embodiment of the Conscience of the Communist Party. The question was: "What is the criterion of good or bad in the conduct of a member of the Communist Party?" His answer—possibly the best he had time for, when thus questioned by importunate foreign enquirers—was, substantially, that whatever conduced to the building up of the classless society was good, and whatever impeded it was bad.

The answer so courteously given to us in 1932, as the outcome of intuition after a lifetime of experience, did less than justice to the Communist Party. It is plain from such study as we have been able to give to the proceedings of the People's Courts, and, still more, the Comradely Courts in the factory or the apartment house, on the one hand; and to the discussions common in the meetings of the millions of Comsomols on the other; that what may fairly be termed a system of ethics is being gradually evolved among the citizens of the USSR. This moral code is still in the experimental stage. There has not yet been time, amid all the transformations of the social order which have had to be put in operation over so vast an area, for even the principles of the new communist ethics to be either authoritatively proclaimed or universally accepted.¹

¹ Apart from the endless elaborations of Marxism, we are unable usefully to refer the student to many books. A well-known member of the Communist Party, Emelyan Yaroslavsky, has written books in Russian, apparently not yet translated, the titles of which are given as *Party Ethics* (1924) and *Morals and the Way of Life* (1926). A series of articles edited by A. Borisov, with

No Sense of Original Sin

The immediate effect of the revolution, with its destruction of "autocracy, orthodoxy and [so far as "Great Russia" was concerned] nationality", was, as we have seen, a general repudiation of historic Christianity. The unabashed and complete denial of any form of supernaturalism involved the abandonment of the code of morals founded on divine revelation. It is hard for anyone who has grown up in a Protestant country, and no less for a Roman Catholic, to realise how fundamental is the difference that this rejection of supernaturalism has made in the minds of the people. There is, in the USSR to-day, even among those who still cherish their icons, and whatever may be their conduct, an almost complete absence of any sense of original sin.

This loss of a sense of sin in the theological sense does not mean the disappearance of conscience, which, as we have been taught by Turgeniev and Tolstoy, the Russians possess in great measure. But it has been accompanied by a transformation of the conception of personal obligation. In contrast both with the Mosaic Commandments, and with such obligations as were emphasised by the Greek Orthodox Church, which were mostly in the form of specific prohibitions of what is wrong, the code of conduct of the Soviet Union has been, from its inception, almost entirely concerned with positive injunctions to do what is right. Morality is no longer mainly negative in form, but substantially affirmative.¹

preface by Emelyan Yaroslavsky, entitled *The Old Morals and the New*, published in Russian in 1925. Much information as to ethical ideas and the practical conduct of life in the USSR may be picked up from the very informative book *Red Virtue*, by Ella Winter (1933, with bibliography, 320 pp.); *Women in Soviet Russia*, by Jessica Smith (New York, 1927), unfortunately out of print; *Women in Soviet Russia*, by Fannina Halle (1933, with bibliography, 410 pp.); *The Soviet Worker*, by Joseph Freeman (1932); *New Minds, New Men?*, by Thomas Woody (1931, with bibliography); *Die Jugend in Sowjetrussland*, by Klaus Mehnert (Berlin, 1932), translated as *Youth in Soviet Russia* (1933, 270 pp.); *Humanity Uprooted*, by Maurice Hindus (1929, 369 pp.); *Marriage and Morals in Soviet Russia*, by Anna Louise Strong; and such novels as (Russian) *The Love of the Worker Bee*, by Alexandra Kollontai, translated as *Free Love*; *Cement*, by Feodor Gladkov (1929, 322 pp.); *Without Cherry Blossom*, by Panteleimon Romanov; *I Love*, by A. Avdeyenko (1934, 283 pp.); *The Soil Upturned*, by M. Sholokhov, London edition, 1935.

¹ This change has involved the loss of any appreciation of personal holiness in the sense in which this has been understood by believers in the supernatural. Bolshevik teachers and writers would not include either personal holiness in this sense, or the pursuit of it, among the factors or conditions of the good life. Their perpetual campaign of education includes no inculcation of the desirability of seeking such a state of mind. Not the perfecting of

No Absolute Morals

Another correlative of the loss of the sense of sin against God has been, in the Soviet Union, the abandonment of the idea that there is anything absolute, fundamental, universal or everlasting, about a scale of values.¹ Any judgment of conduct, it is held, is, everywhere and inevitably, the outcome of life. The contemporary code that public opinion supports is necessarily relative to the actual conditions of existence in each community during the generation that is passing away. The position is, and always must be, constantly changing. Morality depends on the state of the world for the time being. The Bolshevik standpoint has been stated in the following terms. "Everything which we describe as ways of life among mankind, as human relations and conditions, whether they are regulated by law or merely by custom, traditions and habits, is summed up to-day in the Russian language by the now stereotyped word *byt*, derived etymologically from the verb *byty*, to be. The expression is untranslatable in its richly laden brevity, containing an objective and a subjective aspect which interpenetrate and blend dialectically; it comprises the whole surrounding world in which man is placed as well as his attitude towards it. . . . In a country where the new economic order is in process of construction with such intensive vehemence the milieu is not fixed, not established once for all. And so man, together with his attitude of mind, cannot be the finished product of his surroundings, but *changes with them every day, at the same time as, and just because, he changes them every day.*"²

one's own soul or self, but the service of others, and the advancement of the community, constitutes virtue. No one is deemed to be good unless he does what he can for his fellow-men. He is not judged by his works, for his works may be unsuccessful from no fault of his own; but by the motives and incentives that govern his actions. Even if his works are socially useful and successful, if he is a "careerist" or a "self-seeker", he is not a good man.

¹ The revulsion against the assumption that morality is necessarily connected with supernaturalism or a belief in personal immortality, has led, in some quarters, to a repudiation of the term ethics. "The very conception of communist ethics", wrote N. Bucharin in 1924, "is not correct. We must not talk of ethics as of something which is inspired by fetichism, but of a certain conduct in order to obtain a certain end. This leads to the necessity to work out certain rules of our conduct; to have, so to say, our own commandments" (included in *The Old Morals and the New*, a series of articles edited by A. Borisov, with a preface by Emelyan Yaroslavsky (in Russian) 2nd edition, Moscow, 1925, pp. 18-22).

² *Women in Soviet Russia*, by Fannina Halle (1933), pp. 338-339.

Ethics emerging from Life

Accordingly, it is held that the essentially relativist code of conduct that is developing in the Soviet Union must, in disregard of any previous prescriptions, emerge from the new life.¹ It is necessarily based on a recognition of the facts of social life under Soviet Communism, resolutely abandoning the shamefacedness, the furtiveness and the secrecy by which the elders are still troubled, and which are deemed to be merely useless "hang-overs" from ecclesiastical superstition and devil-worship. Thus, to take one example, there is in the USSR practically no prudish suppression or ignoring of the bodily functions, not excluding those of sexual intercourse and reproduction. Children grow up accustomed to human equally with animal nudity; and whilst they gradually learn that certain parts of conduct are suited not for company but for privacy, they are never taught that any bodily function has a special quality of indecency.

We pause, at this point, to reassure the reader who regards all this revolution in morals as something very dreadful. However much the Victorian English may be shocked by some of the habits and some of the moral judgments of Soviet Communism, it must be realised that the inhabitants of the USSR find equally shocking some of the habits and moral judgments of the inhabitants of Great Britain and the United States. The conduct regarded as virtuous or decent in one part of the world is, as a matter of fact, regarded as quite the opposite in other parts. Morality, it has been said, is actually a question of latitude and longitude. The making of profit by buying in order to sell at a higher price—"regrating" our ancestors called what the soviet citizens brand as "speculation"—is in the USSR a criminal offence, but, in the United Kingdom, if on a large enough scale, often the pathway to a peerage. It is hard for the Englishman

¹ This view of ethics has been brilliantly set forth in the works of the eminent Egyptologist, James H. Breasted. Thus in the Foreword to *The Dawn of Conscience* (1935), p. xv, he observes:

"The fact that the moral ideas of early men were the product of their own social experience is one of profoundest meaning for thinking people of to-day. Out of prehistoric savagery, on the basis of his own experience, man arose to visions of character. That achievement which transformed advancing life, human or animal, on our globe was one from a characterless universe, as far as it is known to us, to a world of inner values transcending matter—a world for the first time aware of such values, for the first time conscious of character and striving to attain it."

to realise that the corporal punishment of children, like flogging for serious offences in the army and navy, is as abhorrent to the soviet citizen as the summary shooting of those who merely acquire wealth from the public by false pretences would be to the London banker. In the USSR even the parental slapping of disobedient children is not only a serious moral delinquency, but actually a criminal offence. The unabashed cuddling that takes place, sitting on the seats or lying on the grass, in the London parks would be inconceivable in the Park of Culture and Rest at Moscow.¹ On the other hand, it is in no way contrary to the moral code of the Soviet Union, any more than it was to that of tsarist Russia, for adults to bathe together in complete nudity; although bathing costumes are becoming usual in Moscow and Leningrad. It seems no more immoral for those who love each other to cohabit without either a religious ceremony or official registration than it is for English or American adults to marry without parental consent, or (among Protestants) to remarry after legal divorce.

The Soviet Union is specially interesting to the student of comparative ethics in that it is trying an experiment unprecedented in world history. "No society", it has been observed, "has heretofore attempted to create its morality consciously. The factors that go to make up the general feeling of what is and is not 'done' are, as has been said, subtle, and half or wholly unconscious. The soviets are still shaping and stating some moral rules. . . . Krupskaya, Lenin's widow, at a Party Conference in 1924, asked that it be definitely stated what was

¹ One of the authors spent ten days in 1932 at Kislovodsk, which had been the Aix-les-Bains of tsarist Russia, and where the royal palaces, luxurious villas and extravagant hotels have all been converted into trade-union rest-houses, either for holidaymakers or for convalescents. There were present in the June weather some ten or fifteen thousand visitors, nearly all manual-working wage-earners, enjoying the beautiful gardens and the various entertainments. The social observer noted that there was no drunkenness, no shouting or brawling, and no staying up after 11 P.M. There was very little spooning, and no litter, so that the social observer felt quite embarrassed about throwing away her cigarette-ends instead of placing them dutifully in the receptacles provided. Every rest-house had its medical staff, and provided the various diets called for by individual diathesis. The younger men and women indulged in games, athletics and a mild mountaineering. There was an excellent opera and ballet, a theatre playing every evening, and a good orchestra giving daily concerts. There were no merry-go-rounds, or cockshies, or shooting galleries, or exhibitions of monstrosities. But there were endless lectures in the rest-houses on Marxism and questions of technology which the observer found well attended.

permissible behaviour for a communist and what not. . . . The Party Conference, after long deliberation, agreed that no one code of behaviour for the new man could be settled on, but certain general principles could be stated.”¹

“Nor is it by accident or anarchically that these things are changing. The new man is planned as the new society is projected. The goal of communism is not merely to modernise factories, collectivise farms or turn out Five-Year Plan figures. The final purpose of communism is to create happiness for men, to lay the basis for the living of ‘the good life’. The Soviet citizen devotes his life to the building of a socialist society because he is convinced that such a society will improve everybody’s life. ‘We must do all in our power to create a new man with a new psychology’, said Lunacharsky in 1931 at a meeting of the Communist Academy.”²

What are the principal injunctions to the soviet child and the soviet citizen that, in 1935, seem to be shaping themselves into a code of conduct in the USSR?

The Constant Service of the Community

First among the moral obligations that communist morality imposes on the individual man or woman is that of service to the community in which he or she resides. This does not mean that the claim of the individual to “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness” is denied or ignored. What is asserted is that man in society is not wholly, or even principally, an individual product; and that, by the very nature of things, he has no thoughts or feelings, no claims or rights which are exclusively and entirely the outcome of his own individual intuition or experience. He, with all his demands and aspirations, is the creation of the society, from the family group right up to the republic, into which he is born, and amid which he lives. Without some form of social grouping, *homo sapiens* is non-existent. The individual is thus the group in one of its manifestations. Equally the group life is only one of the directions taken by the lives of its individual members. The service which morality requires the individual to give to the community is only a particular outcome

¹ *Red Virtue*, by Ella Winter (1933), pp. 18, 25.

² *Ibid.* p. 13.

of the instinct of self-preservation without which individual life could not continue : a form of the service which he renders to himself in order that his own individuality may be developed to the fullest practicable extent. The prosperity and success of the community as a whole is a condition precedent to the utmost prosperity and success of the individuals of whom the community is composed. Scientifically considered, there is not, and can never be, any conflict between the genuine interest of the individual in the highest and fullest development of his own nature and his own life, and the genuine interest of the community in being constituted of the highest and most fully developed individuals. Morality is thus, in a very real sense, part of the nature of the universe, to be not invented but discovered. It is, indeed, for man to settle what shall be the purpose of life, a question which science cannot answer. But, given man's purpose, it is knowledge of the universe, including knowledge about social institutions and human behaviour no less than knowledge about mechanics and physics, that will enable him to recognise and adopt the processes by which he can carry out his purpose ; and that will even lead him to invent instruments and devices, from the steam engine up to the " shock brigade ", from the hydraulic ram up to " socialist competition ", in order to increase his desired achievements. Thus, to the properly instructed soviet communist, scientific ethics is simultaneously both social morality and individual morality, because these are fundamentally and inevitably identical. Any breach of the moral code, whether by the community or by the individual, is a failure on the part of the one or the other accurately to realise the facts ; a failure due either to mere ignorance or to a weak and partial intellectual conception which is overborne by an emotional storm out of the depths of the subconscious mind.¹

¹ The natural instinct of the Russians for collectivism as against individualism is noted by Nicolas Berdyaev as a characteristic of the Orthodox Church, in contrast with the Protestant and the Roman Catholic. " It must, however, also be noted that individualism is inherent not only in Protestantism, but in the whole of western Christianity. The idea of the salvation of the individual soul, as well as the idea of the predestination of a small number to salvation, is a species of celestial, metaphysical individualism. The spirit of ' *sobernost* ', the idea of the *collective* character of the ways of salvation, is opposed to this sort of individualism. In the Church we are saved with our brethren, all together. We hope for a universal salvation, that is to say, for the transfiguration of the whole cosmos. The spirit of ' *sobernost* ' is better expressed in Orthodoxy than it is in Catholicism. Orthodoxy is resolutely *anti-individualistic*, though

The Payment of Debt

What has not yet been generally recognised or admitted in the western world, is that every person starts independent life seriously *in debt to the community* in which he has been born ; taken care of ; fed and clothed ; educated and trained. Others have worked in order that he might have these advantages. It is therefore the primary duty of every individual to use whatever faculties he possesses for the purpose of wealth production in one or other form, including any kind of social service, at least to the extent of repaying to the community what he or she has cost it, and also, wherever faculty permits, providing for the progressive improvement of the conditions of its life. The duty of work is thus universal and inescapable. Alone among modern thinkers Bernard Shaw has perceived the deplorable disease prevalent among the children of wealthy persons, who habitually live without rendering service to the community in which they have been born and bred. He puts the point forcibly to his readers among the English and American women in the following terms : " Anyone who does less than her share of work, and yet takes her full share of the wealth produced by work, is a thief, and should be dealt with as any other sort of thief is dealt with." ¹

Catholics do not understand this. But this cosmic 'sobernost' has not found its proper expression in the theology of the schools, nor in ascetic literature. It can be found only in the religious thought of the nineteenth century, in Khomiakov, Dostoevsky, Bukharev, Solovyov and Feodorov " (*Freedom of the Spirit*, by Nicolas Berdyaev, chap. x. p. 355).

¹ *The Intelligent Woman's Guide to Socialism and Capitalism*, by Bernard Shaw (1928), p. 72. The author adds impressively : " By far the most unjust and mischievous privilege claimed by the rich [in Great Britain] is the privilege of being idle with complete legal impunity ; yet unfortunately they have established this privilege so firmly that we take it as a matter of course, and even venerate it as the mark of a real lady or gentleman, without ever considering that a person who consumes goods or accepts services without producing equivalent goods or performing equivalent services in return, inflicts on the country precisely the same injury as a thief does ; in fact, that is what theft means. We do not dream of allowing people to murder, kidnap, break into houses, sink, burn and destroy at sea or on land, or claim exemption from military service, merely because they have inherited a landed estate or a thousand a year from some industrious ancestor ; yet we tolerate idling, which does more harm in one year than all the legally punishable crimes in the world in ten. . . . To live like a drone on the labour and service of others is to be a lady or a gentleman ; to enrich the country by labour and service is to be base, lowly, vulgar, contemptible, fed and clothed on the assumption that anything is good enough for hewers of wood and drawers of water. This is nothing else than an attempt to turn the order of nature upside down, and to take ' Evil : be thou my good ' as the national motto. If we persist in it, it must finally bring upon us another

In fact, it is only by every person contributing to the community's wealth production that the community can give each individual a share in the wealth produced. Only in this way can everybody be assured of continuity of economic security throughout life, that is to say, of maintenance alike in sickness and old age, as well as in the strength of manhood.

Inseparably bound up with this obligation to take part in the production of commodities or services is the conception that the work must be done by each person himself, by hand or by brain. Paramount is the injunction to abstain from and to resist "exploitation", meaning any employment of others at wages for the purpose of making a profit out of their labour. The foreign observer is sometimes tempted to think that abstention from exploitation is the ethical duty that is, in the USSR, most forcibly and frequently impressed on the youthful mind.

Along with this paramount individual responsibility is a universal and ubiquitous collective responsibility. Every social institution in the USSR, from the selosoviet, the rayon soviet and the oblast soviet, up to the congress and sovnarkom of each constituent or autonomous republic—equally every consumers' cooperative society and every industrial artel or kolkhos—is held collectively responsible for the fulfilment of all its functions, and even for the success of all its enterprises. In contrast with the British or American system of minutely defining the powers of every "collective", whether local governing body or business corporation, and then scarcely troubling to enforce the fulfilment of the functions entrusted to it, the soviet system is based, as we have shown,¹ on a wide omnicompetence of every social institution, so far as its activities apply only to its members, or to the inhabitants of the area to which its powers extend. It is practically unrestricted by such a doctrine as *Ultra Vires* by which in England every corporate body is disabled from going a hair's breadth outside the minutely specified list of powers conferred upon it. It is left free to do whatever it thinks best for the persons concerned. So long as its operations do not conflict with those of any superior authority, and are not actually in contravention of any decision of a higher council—so long also of those wrecks of civilisation in which all the great empires in the past have crashed" (*ibid.* pp. 58-59).

¹ See Chapter II. in Part I., "Man as a Citizen"; and the powers of the village soviet in the appendix to Part I., pp. 465-470.

as these operations appear to be successful in their working—the humblest or remotest social institution will not be interfered with. But if these operations are not, in fact, successful, or give rise to serious complaints, they will be peremptorily vetoed and cancelled, and the erring institution will be reprimanded, and, in the worst cases of recalcitrance or failure, summarily superseded.

The Maximising of Health

Perhaps the most extensive field of duty in communist ethics—a field in which the community has actively to cooperate with the individual, but in which the individual must incessantly look after himself—is that of the creation and the maximising of positive health of body and mind. We have already noticed the manner in which this conception of duty has influenced the development of the public health service.¹ We see it now, in communist ethics, in its aspect of individual obligation, along with the necessity of positive instruction as to how that obligation can be fulfilled. No one wishes to be ill or decrepit; but the human being is not born with the knowledge of how to avoid becoming ill and prematurely enfeebled. It is amazing that, notwithstanding the immense waste and loss caused by unnecessary sickness and premature senility, no community has yet whole-heartedly seen to it that every one of its citizens is taught how to acquire and maintain positive health. In the Soviet Union the public authorities for education and health seem to attempt, and even to accomplish, more in this way than any other government. Yet, in the vast population of the USSR, the majority of individuals are still far from knowing how to keep their health, and are consequently unable to fulfil their social obligations in this respect. Not every thinking citizen realises that only by everyone taking thought and choosing wisely can health be maintained. Apart from the avoidance of pathogenic microbes, which is largely a matter for the local authority to deal with, the range of individual duty is large. Personal cleanliness, daily shower-bath or immersion, intolerance of parasites and of filth of every kind, regularity of all the bodily functions, adequate physical exercise, free ventilation of the dwelling by night as well as by day, definite restriction of eating

¹ Chapter X. in Part II., "The Remaking of Man".

to something less than the demands of appetite, all become something more than "self-regarding" lines of conduct, and assume the dignity of social obligations. It is in a similar light that is seen the necessity of prudent self-restraint in every form of enjoyment. From this is evolved a common judgment as to drinking, smoking, gambling and sexual intercourse. We seem to see the code of conduct in these matters developing on the line of requiring from both sexes the perpetual maintenance of perfect health of mind and body. The code does not demand total abstinence. But it regards yielding to temptation as a weakness to be deplored, and, because one lapse leads to others, and eventually to injurious habits, to be definitely blamed. Excess is plainly misconduct, because science shows it to be inimical to health. Moreover, much that cannot be actually condemned is to be deprecated as being in bad taste, and unworthy of a Party member.

The student will notice that the communist policy is the very reverse of ascetic. What moved Karl Marx to a lifetime of political conspiracy and economic study in grinding poverty—what steeled the will to revolution of Lenin and his companions—was the misery and incompleteness of life that contemporary economic conditions everywhere inflicted on the mass of the people. The very object of the Bolsheviks in overturning the Provisional Government in October 1917 was to transform the social order of the USSR in such a way as to secure for the whole of the people the conditions of a good life. And these conditions of the good life meant nothing more recondite than such amenities as were enjoyed by the professional classes of London or Paris. The most influential of the friends and supporters whom Lenin had gathered around him during his years of exile, out of whom the Sovnarkom of People's Commissars and the other administrative organs were formed in 1917-1918, were, with few exceptions, not manual workers themselves, though often of proletarian origin; but men of considerable education, who had been trained as lawyers, doctors, professors, scientists and writers of books; men who were personally acquainted with the conditions of a cultivated existence among the professional classes in the cities of France and England, Switzerland and Austria. They had no desire to endow the whole Russian people with the senseless luxury of the tsarist aristocracy or the American millionaires.

But, on the other hand, they had no sympathy with the asceticism of St. Francis d'Assisi. The communists of the Soviet Union have not the faintest respect for the narrow lives of privation and confinement in which the more saintly of the monks of the Orthodox Church, like those of western Christianity, sought salvation. The stories of the saints now excite nothing but disgust, coupled with a disapproval that is not averted by the knowledge that these misguided persons were genuinely seeking personal holiness.

Sexual Intercourse

When in the western countries we talk about a moral or an immoral man, still more about a moral or an immoral woman, it is understood to refer to their sexual relations rather than to any other form of morality or immorality. This concentration on sex is unknown in the USSR. In the first decade of Bolshevik administration there was a general understanding that sexual intercourse was a personal matter, taking place by mutual consent between men and women of the same or of different races, colours or religions, for which no religious or other ceremony was required, whilst even official registration of the union was entirely optional. But sexual intercourse, and cohabitation, might entail social consequences involving special obligations (such as due provision for offspring, and for maintenance of a discarded spouse incapable of self-support) which the law should enforce. On the same principle of freedom in personal relations, divorce, at the option of either party, was as optional as a registered marriage; but both parties, according to their several means, were required to fulfil the above-mentioned financial obligations.

In the second decade we notice a gradual change of attitude. Lenin had never sympathised with the licentiousness that had marked the first years after the Revolution. Highly characteristic was his repugnance to the view put forward in the early days of the Revolution that sexual intercourse was as natural as eating, and no more to be criticised than the drinking of a glass of water when thirsty. Lenin said to Clara Zetkin in 1921 :¹ " ' I think this glass of water theory is completely unmarxist,

¹ *Reminiscences of Lenin*, by Clara Zetkin (1929), pp. 49-51; largely given in another translation in *Women in Soviet Russia*, by Fannina Halle (1933), pp. 113-114.

and, moreover, anti-social. In sexual life there is not only simple nature to be considered, but also cultural characteristics, whether they are of a high or low order. In his *Origin of the Family* Engels showed how significant is the development and refinement of the general sex urge into individual sex love. The relations of the sexes to each other are not simply an expression of the play of forces between the economics of society and a physical need, isolated in thought, by study, from the physiological aspect. It is rationalism, and not Marxism, to want to trace changes in these relations directly, and dissociated from their connections with ideology as a whole, to the economic foundations of society. Of course, thirst must be satisfied. But will the normal man in normal circumstances lie down in the gutter and drink out of a puddle, or out of a glass with a rim greasy from many lips? But the social aspect is most important of all. Drinking water is of course an individual affair. In love two lives are concerned, and a third, a new life, arises. It is that which gives it its social interest which gives rise to a duty towards the community.

“ ‘As a communist I have not the least sympathy for the glass of water theory, although it bears the fine title “satisfaction of love”. In any case, this liberation of love is neither new, nor communist. You will remember that, about the middle of the last century, it was preached as the “emancipation of the heart” in romantic literature. In bourgeois practice it became the emancipation of the flesh. At that time the preaching was more talented than it is to-day, and as for the practice, I cannot judge. I don’t mean to preach asceticism by my criticism. Not in the least. Communism will not bring asceticism, but joy of life, power of life, and a satisfied love of life will help to do that. In my opinion the present widespread hypertrophy in sexual matters does not give joy and force to life, but takes it away. In the age of revolution that is bad, very bad.

“ ‘Young people, particularly, need the joy and force of life; healthy sport, swimming, racing, walking, bodily exercises of every kind, and many-sided intellectual interests, learning, studying, inquiry, as far as possible in common. That will give young people more than eternal theories and discussions about sexual problems and the so-called “living to the full”. Healthy bodies, healthy minds! Neither monk nor Don Juan, nor the intermediate attitude of the German philistines. You know

young Comrade X? A splendid boy, and highly talented, and yet I fear that nothing good will come out of him. He reels and staggers from one love affair to the next. That won't do for the political struggle, for the revolution. And I wouldn't bet on the reliability, the endurance in struggle, of these women who confuse their personal romances with politics. Nor on the men who run after every petticoat and get entrapped by every young woman. No, no! that does not square with the revolution.'

"Lenin sprang up, banged his hand on the table, and paced the room for a while.

" 'The revolution demands concentration, increase of forces. From the masses, from individuals. It cannot tolerate orgiastic conditions, such as are normal for the decadent heroes and heroines of D'Annunzio. Dissoluteness in sexual life is bourgeois, is a phenomenon of decay. The proletariat is a rising class. It doesn't need intoxication as a narcotic or a stimulus. Intoxication as little by sexual exaggeration as by alcohol. It must not and shall not forget; forget the shame, the filth, the savagery of capitalism. It receives the strongest urge to fight from a class situation, from the communist ideal. It needs clarity, clarity and again clarity. And so I repeat, no weakening, no waste, no destruction of forces. Self-control, self-discipline, not slavery, not even in love. But forgive me, Clara, I have wandered far from the starting point of our conversation. Why didn't you call me to order? My tongue has run away with me. I am deeply concerned about the future of our youth. It is a part of the revolution. And if harmful tendencies are appearing, creeping over from bourgeois society into the world of revolution—as the roots of many weeds spread—it is better to combat them early. Such questions are part of the woman question.' "

Lenin's view as to the social obligations involved in sexual intercourse gradually became authoritative so far as the Communist Party was concerned. "Is marriage a private relation between two-legged animals that interests only themselves, and in which society has no right to meddle?" wrote Ryazanov. "We should teach young communists that marriage is not a personal act, but an act of deep social significance." "Marriage has two sides, the intimate side and the social," said Soltz, "and we must never forget the social side. We are against a profligate

or disorderly life because it affects the children. We wouldn't mix in a man's affairs if he changed his wife every third day, if his children and his work did not suffer from that. When we talk of love we have always to remember that sex relations imply not only a physiological relationship."¹

Public opinion among the Comsomols, as well as among Party members, increasingly emphasised the importance of stability of marital relationships. Down to the present day (1935), however, there has been no change in the law of 1920 making divorce at least as easy as legally registered marriage, and treating unregistered unions as in every way equivalent to marriages. But at least in the Communist Party and among the Comsomols, sexual promiscuity, like all forms of self-indulgence, has come to be definitely thought contrary to communist ethics, on the grounds enumerated by Lenin; it is a frequent cause of disease; it impairs the productivity of labour; it is disturbing to accurate judgment and inimical to intellectual acquisition and scientific discovery, besides frequently involving cruelty to individual sufferers. Stability and mutual loyalty have become steadily more generally enforced not only by public opinion but also, so far as Party members and Comsomols were concerned, by the ordinary Party sanctions. Disloyalty in marital relations, and even exceptional instability have become definite offences against communist ethics, leading not only to reprimands but also, in bad cases, to expulsion.

Similar pressure of public opinion has been appearing in the trade unions, of which some three-fourths of the members are outside the ranks of Party and Comsomol membership. A conference convened in 1935 by *Trud*, the organ of the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), was addressed, among others, by Soltz, as Assistant of the Procurator of the USSR. He urged that the trade unions should take more interest in the private lives of their members and their relations with their families. The editor of *Trud* pointed out that the trade unions should judge the value of their members not only by the work they do but also by their behaviour in their homes and their attitude towards their wives and children.

This growing puritanism in the marriage relation was reinforced, in the same year (1935), by the discovery that the

¹ *Red Virtue*, by Ella Winter (1933), p. 124.

provisions requiring one or other of the divorced parents to make payments for the maintenance of the children of the union, were being evaded or disregarded in many thousands of cases. According to a joint statement recently published by Soltz and the People's Commissar of Justice, N. V. Krylenko, in the last three years the courts of the RSFSR alone dealt with 500,000 cases arising out of such awards. The number during 1933 was 142,000, and during 1934 it had risen to about 200,000. Despite this absorption of the minor judiciary with such cases, it is admitted that many hundreds of thousands of children are not receiving the support from their fathers to which they are legally entitled, and even after the courts have dealt with the cases the parents find means of evading payment.

According to Krylenko, the causes of this situation are the inadequacy of the penalties for failure to pay awards, the ease with which parents can evade payment simply by changing their place of residence, and the complicated methods used to collect the payments. It is suggested that the penalty for failure to pay children's allowances should be increased from six months' forced labour or a fine of 300 roubles to not less than one year's imprisonment.

Concurrently, the legal division of the Mother and Child Institute of the Soviet Commissariat of Public Health has just published the report of a survey of the marital relations existing in 2000 families of Moscow industrial workers, numbering 7000 persons.¹ This report concludes with important proposals for new regulations for the granting of divorces. It recommends the abolition of simple notice of divorce through the Post Office. It suggests that the party who is not the applicant for divorce should be summoned to the divorce bureau, the "Zags" (Bureau for the Registration of Acts of Social Significance), which should enquire whether his or her rights would be violated by the

¹ Report of the Legal Division of the Mother and Child Institute of the Commissariat of Health for the RSFSR (in Russian), July 1935. See summary in *Manchester Guardian*, August 30, 1935; and for the whole change of opinion, Louis Fischer's article in *The Nation* (New York), August 21, 1935. Incidentally the investigation revealed that Russians are now marrying at a later age than they did before the Revolution. In 30.7 per cent of all marriages contracted before the Revolution the women were under seventeen years of age and 78 per cent under twenty, but only 56.9 per cent of those women interviewed who were married after the Revolution were under twenty at the time of their marriage. This change has an important bearing on the birth-rate.

granting of a divorce, and whether, in the case of a wife, she is pregnant or unable to work, and should also examine the position of the offspring of the marriage in case a divorce is granted. The proposed regulations also provide that persons contracting a marriage must report their former marriages and the number of living children they have. The report demands stricter administration of the laws providing penalties for concealing various circumstances, such as the existence of diseases which would make the marriage illegal, and for maliciously contracting premeditated short-term marriages. Finally, the report recommends that the youth in the advanced schools should be given a course outlining the laws dealing with family life and marital relations.

It is understood that new legislation and more stringent regulations are pending, both on divorce and on the enforcement of alimony. Drafts have already been submitted to the trade-union organisations in all the principal industrial centres; and discussions are (1935) already taking place in the soviet newspapers,¹ in the radio broadcasts, and at clubs and trade-union meetings about the proposals under consideration. We can form no opinion as to when the new legislation will be passed.

Prostitution

The attitude towards prostitution is characteristic. "The prostitute", it has been said, "is not acknowledged as punishable, unless she be guilty of spreading disease; but those who promote prostitution are. As a social phenomenon prostitution is regarded as springing primarily from economic causes and not from innate perversity or depravity of the female sex. To decrease or eliminate the necessity for it, it is urged that special care be taken about dismissing women from employment; [that] agricultural and industrial artels be formed to give women employment; [that] the qualifications of women for labour be increased by creating sufficient vacancies for them in professional technical schools; [that] dormitories be organised for the unemployed and houses opened for accommodation of women temporarily in the cities; and that agitation be carried on in schools, clubs and all organisations of youth, setting forth the

¹ Notably in *Pravda* during June and July 1935.

character of prostitution, its dangers and incompatibility with the life of a workers' republic. These preventive measures are supplemented by efforts to combat prostitution already existing which is considered as an inheritance from bourgeois society. These efforts fall under the head of (1) inspection of all places where prostitution may be carried on ; (2) struggle against those who promote dens of debauch ; and (3) free treatment for venereal diseases in dispensaries. Special detailed instructions are issued to the militia concerning the necessary steps and precautions in investigating prostitution." ¹

In another direction the jurists at work on the preparation of the criminal code were puzzled to know what to do about what is condemned as a crime by the laws of every civilised country. On what ground were they to make the mating of near kin (incest) a criminal offence ? It is said that a number of physiologists and medical practitioners were privately consulted ; and that they reported that, whilst incest might be repugnant, there was neither historical nor contemporary evidence to prove that it was injurious to the offspring or to the public health. Accordingly, although the marriage offices are directed to refuse to register marriages between persons connected directly by descent, including brothers and sisters, incest is not a criminal offence. Homosexuality was similarly long omitted from the criminal code of the USSR.²

What is "Not Done"

A significant feature of communist ethics is that its prohibitions are practically never independent, but relate essentially to failures to comply with its positive injunctions. Alcoholic drinking is blamed, and still more, habitual drunkenness or drug addiction, because it is a breach of the rule requiring the maintenance of perfect health. It is held to impair judgment and

¹ *New Minds, New Men?* by Thomas Woody (New York, 1932), p. 375.

² In March 1934, without any public discussion, the presidium of the Central Executive Committee (TSIK) suddenly issued a decree requiring all the republics of the USSR to add to their criminal codes an article making homosexuality between adult men punishable by three to five years' imprisonment ; and if done with minors or dependants or accompanied by force, by imprisonment from five to eight years. It is understood that this drastic action followed on the discovery of centres of demoralisation of boys, due to the influence of certain foreigners who were summarily expelled from soviet territory.

lessen efficiency, even where it does not seem immediately to lead to ill-health. Even in strict moderation the drinking of vodka is held to be wasteful and detrimental to the wealth of the community. Total abstinence from alcoholic drink, and even from smoking, is strongly recommended, and seems to be increasingly common among the Comsomols. As we have already pointed out, "spooning" in public is "not done" in the USSR. Many other things, such as the scattering of litter on the ground, whether paper or cigarette-ends, are tabooed.

Communist morality is avowedly distinct from the law of the land. An authoritative definition emphasises this point. Ethics, writes A. A. Soltz, "is a sum of traditions and customs accepted in a given society, the fulfilment of which is obligatory *without any prosecution at law, or any punitive sanction*".¹

Nevertheless, it seems that the injunctions and prohibitions of communist ethics are, when a case is brought before the People's Court, to a considerable but variable extent enforced by soviet law. There is, in fact, in the USSR, no hard and fast line between actions which are simply "not done", and are discouraged by public opinion, and those which, if brought into court, may be punished by judicial sentence. The Comradely Courts of the factories and offices and apartment houses, like the Comsomol groups, have no legal jurisdiction, although their reprimands are often accompanied by fines which are invariably paid. On the other hand, the People's Courts, which are statutory tribunals of first instance, deal with offenders without any nice regard to the words of the criminal code; and their decisions and sentences habitually take account, to a considerable extent, at any rate in the severity of the penalties inflicted, of the public opinion as to what is or is not "done".

On the other hand, many actions regarded as crimes in other countries are, in the USSR, left only to moral reprobation. The soviet authorities have, in fact, been slow to bring to bear upon moral issues the method of statutory prohibition of actions deemed to be wrong. The war-time prohibition of the supply of vodka was quickly repealed when the bad effects of such a law in positively increasing the consumption of dangerous home-made substitutes became manifest. "We do not try", said a leading moralist, "to legislate our people into good behaviour;

¹ *Red Virtue*, by Ella Winter, pp. 19-30.

we do not try to pass one moral law for all our people. . . . To a large extent our morals must grow out of the way of life.”¹ Much is deliberately left to public opinion. “The fundamental human urges of vanity, pride, ambition, the desire for approbation—the wish to stand well with one’s fellows—these are”, it has been said, “as strong in the Soviet Union as in our own world. Young Russians want as much as anyone else to do the ‘done’ thing; what is done and what is thought are stronger incentives to behaviour even than with us.”² Thus an attempt to commit suicide is not a criminal offence in the USSR, but is nevertheless contrary to morals. “Though not a crime, it is necessary to condemn suicide”, writes Yaroslavsky. “Only tired and weak people seek this way out. True, no general opinion will fit everyone’s case; each case must be analysed individually; but we cannot consider suicide a way out. We cannot acquit the man who takes his own life. . . . We must register a stern disapproval of suicide; then fewer people will take that way out; we should be attentive to the needs of people who find themselves in difficult situations, of course; but we must not acquit the weak, nor praise them for their wrong step, a step which is harmful to communism.”³

Personal Acquisitiveness

There is, in the USSR, a widespread and persistent discouragement of the personal acquisitiveness in which the Protestant bourgeoisie of the Western world saw a social virtue. The communists, on the contrary, are inclined to see in it the root of nearly all social evil. What is “not done” under Soviet Communism is the seeking of personal riches. The individual ownership of property is not forbidden by law, though many forms of wealth and what would otherwise be opportunities for acquisition are monopolised by the Government, just as in Great Britain all individual ownership is barred in such important enterprises as the internal telegraph, telephone and radio system; the whole business of postal communication; and the coinage of money. In the USSR both incomes and inheritance in excess

¹ Emelyan Yaroslavsky, a popular writer on ethics and member of the Central Control Commission, said this to Ella Winter. See her *Red Virtue* (1933), p. 25.

² *Ibid.* p. 19.

³ *Ibid.* p. 37.

of a small maximum are heavily taxed at progressive rates, as indeed they now are to a lesser extent in nearly all countries. The most marked difference in this connection between the USSR and the capitalist world is that the growth of wealth in private hands is regarded, both officially and by public opinion, not as a good thing in itself, but as always a source of danger to the community, and one which may, in particular cases, become a positive evil.

The only definite limit on personal income is that which the members (and candidates for membership) of the Communist Party voluntarily impose upon themselves. This was first adopted by the Paris Commune of 1871, which laid it down that none of the administrators or officials should receive a salary higher than that which could be earned by a zealous and highly skilled manual worker. Marx immediately applauded this regulation, which Lenin repeatedly insisted on, as obviating the danger of the Government of the state falling into the hands of a class pecuniarily distinguished from the proletariat to be governed. It has been consistently adhered to in the USSR for all the members of the Party, though the maximum has been successively raised with the rise in prices and wages. To this day the rulers of the USSR receive only the equivalent of the earnings of the most highly skilled and zealous craftsman. They live in flats of three or four rooms, usually with no more than a single "domestic worker" and with the wife, even of a high official, often going out to earn wages in one of the Government factories or offices, or as a journalist on the staff of one of the newspapers.

There is, indeed, little that an individual can, safely and comfortably, do in the way of personal consumption with any considerable income in the USSR.¹ Anything like ostentatious expenditure or luxurious living leads to comment and blame, and presently to suspicion of counter-revolutionary sentiments or activity. In a member of the Party it presently leads to reprimand or removal to some other locality, and, if persisted in, to expulsion from the Party. It is, indeed, not easy to find safe ways of spending any large income. The successful writer or actor cannot, in the crowded cities, buy for money more than

¹ This is the theme of an amusing novel, translated into English as *The Little Golden Calf*, by Ilya Ilf and Eugene Petlov (1932, 384 pp.).

the allotted floor space in the way of dwelling. He cannot go far in collecting a library, or the pictures he admires, because he cannot get enough rooms in which to place them. He has hitherto found it difficult to luxuriate in "deficit commodities" even when he has been willing to pay exorbitant prices; although this may have procured him a little of them. He may pick up discarded jewellery for his wife, but she will not find it comfortable to display more than one piece at a time, and she will have nowhere to keep it safely. What one can do with a large income is to travel extensively within the wide bounds of the USSR, with such comfort as can be got; to go to unlimited theatres and concerts; to improve the education of one's children by engaging private tutors; to devote oneself to scientific research or the writing of books; to indulge within the limits of discretion, in the joys of drinking and gambling; to get special medical attendance and nursing for any members of one's family who are ill; to have one's own automobile, and one's own chauffeur, and, if desired, even more than one. But nobody will find it comfortable to abandon his vocation in order to lead a life of leisure. Unless his health had failed, or old age had come, such a course of conduct would presently get him into trouble in one way or another; and the end might come, one night, in a peremptory summons to the headquarters of the Commissariat of Internal Affairs, where a severe examination in one of its departments, very much like the GPU, would bring to light the fact that he was infringing a fundamental principle of the soviet régime, that "if a man do not work neither shall he eat"—in short, that he was guilty of conduct so immoral as to be counter-revolutionary!

The attitude towards saving and investing by the individual is somewhat confused. For waste of any kind there is universal condemnation, which in the case of ostentatious living—what Veblen called "conspicuous waste"—excites general contempt. But pecuniary saving by the individual has ceased to be a recognised virtue. The child is not taught to save. Pioneers and Comsomols seldom think of saving as a personal duty. The wage-earner realises that he will be adequately provided for in sickness and infirmity, in unemployment and old age. His children will at all times have the essential of health. His widow will not be allowed to starve. His own burial or that of a member

of his family will be no burden on the survivors. Why should he save? The social object of individual saving in capitalist countries—the increase of the nation's capital—is, in the USSR, secured by Government action to a far greater extent than it is achieved in other countries by personal savings.¹

On the other hand, the Government Savings Bank offers a high rate of interest on deposits both small and great; and may also occasionally oblige the depositor by transferring without charge any sum on his order to the account of any other person in the USSR, thus establishing in principle a system of drawing by cheque on a current account, which the British Government Post Office Savings Bank refuses to allow. Moreover, the State Bank (Gosbank) sells for cash attractive "obligations" of the Soviet Government, yielding either rouble dividends or lottery prizes, or (if purchased in *valuta*), a solid 7 per cent interest remitted quarterly to any part of the world, and redeemable on demand in gold roubles or their current equivalent in *valuta* of any other country. This may seem to encourage saving, and even the creation of an income independent of work. But the amount so invested by any individual in the USSR is not large, and such an investor finds his total income lessened by an income-tax on his earnings with the steepest of progressions, whilst his capital accumulations are, in due course, equally cut down by the steepest of progressive death duties. The whole arrangement seems to be regarded as a temporary convenience to the Soviet Government in attracting a certain amount of capital in *valuta* from abroad, for which purpose newspaper advertisements are now (1935) used in Great Britain, the United States and France. It also enables the Government, by attracting paper roubles from

¹ In Great Britain, among the wage-earners, and to some extent also among the lower middle class, the motives for saving are mainly twofold. Such persons hardly ever save for the purpose of increasing the capital available for additional industrial enterprises. Partly they save for security of maintenance of themselves and their families in future vicissitudes, notably sickness and unemployment, burial and old age, and unforeseen contingencies. This incentive is superseded in the USSR by the universal provision under social insurance of all wage or salary earners; and by the cooperative provision for non-working members in the collective farms and fisheries. The other motive for saving in Great Britain is the desire to accumulate, out of exiguous weekly incomes, sums sufficient to purchase articles of clothing, boots, furniture, bicycles or wireless sets on which they have set their hearts, or for annual holidays. This motive for saving is apparently nearly as effective in the USSR as in Great Britain, especially now that payment by instalments has spread so widely in the latter country.

the investor in the USSR, to reduce to that extent the issue of additional paper money that would otherwise be required to increase the working-capital of each office or trust. To take a share in each successive internal loan is, in fact, regarded as the patriotic duty of all recipients of wages or salary, often collectively determined by vote of each local unit of the trade union, which calls upon its members to contribute a month's income, as a way of ensuring the fulfilment of the current Five-Year Plan. This is universally regarded as a sacrifice of additional personal consumption, in the nature of a tax on the wage or salary, refusal of which would be justified only by exceptional family circumstances. So much is this the case that those who invest a month's earnings in the internal loans, on which no interest is usually paid, but only lottery prizes on the drawn bonds, frequently omit to claim their prizes !

The Duty of the Party Member

It remains to be stated that the members of the Communist Party (including the so-called candidates who are treated as probationary members, with the one disability that they are not allowed to vote in Party meetings) are held to a higher standard of personal conduct than the ordinary citizen. They have voluntarily pledged themselves to two of the three characteristic obligations of the religious orders of Christianity, namely to poverty, to the extent of never accepting for themselves any larger salary or wages than the common maximum laid down by the Party rule ; and to obedience to the corporate decisions and commands of the Party authorities. Any breach of duty in these matters may be visited by reprimand and demotion ; and may ultimately lead to expulsion from the Party.¹ But there is no enforcement of these Party obligations by the soviet courts of law.

¹ It may be explained that, contrary to an impression common abroad, the Party member who is dismissed from office, or even expelled from the Party, is not left to starve. Since 1930, at any rate, he finds no serious difficulty in getting taken on again, though probably in a less responsible capacity, in one or other of the public enterprises always seeking additional employees. As for the prominent members of the Party removed from high office or even expelled from the Party, we see them habitually given other posts, often of dignity and importance, and even of equal salary, though of less political influence, and usually away from Moscow or Leningrad. Thus Tomsky, after being ousted from leadership of the trade unions, was appointed head of Ogiz (the State Publishing House of the RSFSR) ; Ryanazov, after dismissal from the Marx-Engels Institute, became director of the Museum at Saratov ; Rakovsky, who

Apart from these two obligations to the Party, members have no moral duties other than those of non-Party persons. Unlike the monastic orders of Christendom or Buddhism, the Communist Party prescribes to its members no exceptional mode of life, and no such special duties as continuous prayer, or praise, or meditation. But in their life as citizens, Party members are expected to reach and to maintain a higher standard of behaviour than the non-Party mass. If a man or woman is summoned before the People's Court or other legal tribunal, the first question asked is whether he or she is a Party member. Upon conviction for any offence against the law the Party member will be condemned to a more severe penalty than a non-Party man. If the conduct of a Party member becomes a matter of public scandal, whether about drinking habits, or profligacy in sexual relations, or merely lavish expenditure on personal amusement, he will be reprimanded and warned, and eventually expelled from the Party which he is considered to have disgraced.¹

To Each according to his Needs

At this point we recall the answer given to us by the distinguished communist leader of thought, already referred to at the opening of this section, when we asked what was the criterion of good and evil, to the effect that whatever contributed to the building up of the classless society was good, and whatever impeded it was bad. It is, indeed, a fundamental principle of

had supported Trotsky, was made head of a provincial university, and, after his dignified recantation and submission, was appointed Assistant People's Commissar of Health of the RSFSR and sent as chief Government representative to international conferences (Red Cross, etc.); whilst Zinoviev and Kamenev were repeatedly readmitted to the Party and found new salaried posts after their successive expulsions. In 1935 Enukidze, who had been secretary to the Central Executive Committee (TSIK) for over a decade, was removed from that important office for habitual negligence, and immediately transferred to the presidency of the Transcaucasian Federation. When further investigation brought to light unsuspected depths of the grossest negligence, he was expelled from the Party and dismissed from his new office with public disgrace. But he was promptly made assistant to the Government superintendent of Kislovodsk (see p. 1047), a not unpleasant position.

¹ N. Bukharin wrote in 1924: "These are the commandments: not to smoke; not to drink; to follow certain rules as to sexual relations; to develop in everybody a sense of class consciousness and class ambition; to promote communist education; to create communist specialists, sportsmen, social workers, etc." (included in *The Old Morals and the New*, edited by A. Borisov, with preface by Emelyan Yaroslavsky, 2nd edition, Moscow, 1925, pp. 18-27).

communist ethics that every individual should actively strive to bring about a condition of social equality. He must insist on the complete abolition of privilege, whether for the benefit of a particular sex, or class, or grade, or rank, or even of a particular race. It is a positive duty of every individual to seek the good life for all, without disqualification of any.

There is no hesitation or dubiety about the means by which this social equality in the good life can be attained. The first requirement is a great increase in the production of wealth, with a view to a maximal distribution of its benefits among the whole of the people. The communism taught by Marx and Engels convinced the Bolsheviks, and (as we think) has now convinced the bulk of the population of the USSR, that only by the complete liquidation of the landlord and capitalist, with their constant exploitation of the workers, and by the substitution, in wealth production, of public service for profit-making, could the necessary transformation of the illiterate, superstitious, brutalised, diseased and poverty-stricken population of the USSR be effected. It has accordingly been in the framework of the collectivisation of wealth production, becoming ever more nearly complete, that the Communist Party has adopted, enlarged and developed, almost out of recognition, the various social services that the western world has still only imperfectly and tentatively put in operation. Notable among them, as we have described,¹ are those relating to health, with maternity and infant care; the provision for sickness, unemployment and old age; education from the kindergarten to the university; and the town and country planning, and the rehousing, forming part of the transformation of the physical environment of every family, which is being effected.

In the transformation of the character and habits of the people that is being thus wrought, it has proved possible to proceed, almost at a bound, much further towards the formula of "from each according to his ability, and to each according to his needs", in the organisation of social services, than in that of wealth production as described in a previous chapter.² It has been found that the environmental conditions of health in body and mind, the provision of education, and opportunities for

¹ Chapter X. in Part II., "The Remaking of Man".

² Chapter IX. in Part II., "In Place of Profit".

every kind of culture, can be successfully distributed without money and without price to every person in the land. Over this important part of the field it has proved practicable to deal with the individual irrespective of the amount of wealth that he produces or possesses, genuinely according to the particular needs of himself and his dependants. So far as health, education and economic security are concerned, complete equality of opportunity is of the nature of the case. Whatever may be the race or colour, or the affluence or the political influence of the family head, the wife and mother, the infant, the school child, the college adolescent, and the adult seeking to extend his knowledge, in the USSR, find provided for them in these realms, usually without fee, and virtually without limit, whatever their peculiar needs require.

The western world has, with great hesitation and many qualms of doubt, latterly gone a little way in this direction, even if only in adopting the new term "social services". But for the most part, capitalist society has refused to abandon the "pew-rent" principle which the Protestant Churches in the nineteenth century applied to the ministrations of religion. Just as those who took part in Protestant religious worship were, in England and the United States, usually allotted seats nicely graduated in amenity according to the annual payment made for them, and therefore according to social class, so such advantages as any schooling beyond the rudiments, any treatment of the sick superior to the "bottle of physic", and any but the scantiest family dwelling, together with all provision of holidays, travel and culture, are, for the most part, even to this day, allotted to those only who can pay for them, and, very largely, in proportion to the payment made by each. Such an organisation of society is diametrically the opposite of that required by communist ethics, and one which every soviet citizen is called upon to withstand and prevent.

Ethical Progress in the USSR

It is hard, in such a flux as we have described, to formulate any judgment as to communist ethics as a whole. We see the emergence and the continuous evolution of a systematic code of behaviour. What is "done" and "not done" is a matter of

incessant discussion, especially among the young people of either sex, and particularly in the many tens of thousands of local units of the Comsomols. There has been, during the second decade of the revolution, a definite reaction against the outburst of licence that followed on the general overturn of 1917. Public opinion had asserted itself, with steadily increasing force, to lessen the bad behaviour that was found to render life uncomfortable to the mass. Universal schooling; voluntary attendance at evening classes; the growth of clubs and sports associations; and greatly increased facilities for rational amusement, have cooperated with a definite increase in discipline, inside the factory and outside, to bring about a general betterment of personal conduct. There is visible in the summer of 1935, and not only among the Comsomols, a distinct tendency towards what we can only style puritanism of a rational kind, founded, not on religion, but on hygiene and on economics; and manifesting itself, not in prayer and fasting, but in the modern essentials of the good life, notably in improvement of one's own qualifications and character, in the fulfilment of family duties, and in a personal behaviour useful to society and considerate of the comfort of others.

The Withering of the State

And what about the future? Had Marx and Lenin no vision of a more glorious flowering of the individual in the perfected socialist state than that which can be enjoyed in the USSR of to-day? The soviet authorities never fail to explain, to their own people as well as to foreign enquirers, that the element of direct and positive coercion involved in the planning of the environment, whether economic or cultural, is, by the very nature of the communist organisation of society, transient and temporary. The state, it is asserted, is destined and intended gradually to wither away, so that, eventually, the "government of persons" will be wholly replaced by the "administration of things". What is the meaning of this apparently incredible but undoubtedly sincere forecast of social evolution under Soviet Communism?

We must note first the definition given to the word "state". To the average Briton or American, unaffected by anything that Hegel may have asserted, the word "state" (as in "these United

States") means nothing else than the nation, or community of citizens, as organised in the correlative forms of government and governed. To the Marxian, as to the Hegelian, the state means something quite different, namely—apart from the mass of the people who are governed—the *essentially coercive machinery of government itself*, established in capitalist countries, as communists assert, by the dominant social class or classes, for the maintenance of private property in the means of production and the increase of the resultant unearned income.¹ Such a community is sometimes termed the "police state" (*Verwaltung*), in contrast with the subsequently developed "housekeeping state" constituted by the citizens, either as electors or representatives

¹ Professor Laski, in his stimulating book *The State in Theory and Practice* (1935), gives the following definition of the state: "We say that the Russian state went communist in the November Revolution of 1917: we mean, in fact, that a body of men became its government who were able to use the sovereignty of the Russian state for the purposes we broadly call communist. Whenever a state acts in some given way it is invariably because those who act as its government decide, rightly or wrongly, to use its sovereign power in that given way. The state itself, in sober realism, never acts; it is acted for by those who have become competent to determine its policies. . . . For every critical challenge to law involves a threat to order; and every government, where order is threatened, will necessarily use the armed forces of the state to preserve it. . . . From this angle the state may legitimately be regarded as a method of organising the public power of coercion so that, in all normal circumstances, the will of the government may prevail. It is a power outside and above that of the people as a whole. It is in suspense so long as the will of government is unchallenged; it becomes operative immediately the effectiveness of that will is in danger. And it is the possession of this legal right to resort to coercion which distinguishes the government of the state from the government of all other associations. The authority of a trade union or a church over its members is never a coercive authority in the first instance; it can only become such when the state decides to support the trade union or the church. The sanction of that support is always, in final analysis, the same: it is the knowledge that behind the decision of the state is the coercive power of those armed forces upon whose services its rulers are legally entitled to rely" (pp. 25-28). To this definition he adds: "For it can never be said too often, especially of that material basis which is decisive in determining social relations, that men think differently who live differently, and that the unity which gives endurance and stability to a society is therefore unattainable where they live so differently that they cannot hope to see life in the same terms. It is the poison of inequality which has wrought the ruin of all great empires in the past. For what it does is to break the loyalty of the masses to the common life, and, thereby, to persuade them, not seldom rightly, that its destruction alone can build the path to more just conceptions of statehood. In the long run, the exercise of power for ends unequally shared always breeds envy and hate and faction in a society; and no fabric can survive the circulation of these evils in its tissues. . . . Until Marx, it is true to say that most political speculation was inadequate because it failed to understand the dominating influence of the property-relation in determining the purposes of the state. It is in the proper grasp of that influence only that an adequate theory of political obligation can be found" (pp. 102-103).

on public bodies, or as individual members of voluntary associations, for the administration (*Wirtschaft* or *gestion*) of their common affairs.¹

This Hegelian conception of the state is not that which lies at the base of the practice of the USSR, which indeed avoids the use of the term "state" for the Soviet Union, just as it discards the word "Russia" in the designation of the government of the community. In the minds of the administrators of the Soviet Union, and those of the philosophers who explain its policy, what is being built up in the USSR is not a government apart from the mass of the people, exercising authority over them. What they believe themselves to be constructing is a new type of social organisation in which the people themselves, in their threefold capacity of citizens, producers and consumers, unite to realise the good life. This is in fact not a state in the old sense of the word, but an organised plan of living which the people as a whole adopt, comprising (a) defence against assailants; (b) procuring the means of the fullest life; (c) sharing these means among themselves without class or other privileges. What they visualise is a new form of society, unlike any other; made up of a highly elaborate and extremely varied texture of many kinds of collective organisation, by the universal membership of which the *interests and desires of all the different sections of the population will be fulfilled in a manner and to a degree never yet attained in any other community*. Hence the development, as we have described, of the multiform democracy of man as citizen, man as producer and man as consumer. With them, as every populous community needs leadership, there stands the new and unique professional association, which we have termed the Vocation of Leadership. This vocation, following the pattern of various professions in other societies, is recruited by cooption according to prescribed standards of knowledge and character. With them, too, it enjoys corporate auto-

¹ In England, the "housekeeping state" first appeared in the form of voluntary associations for such purposes as paving, cleansing and lighting the thoroughfares of the growing cities. These associations presently obtained from Parliament statutory powers (in what were called "Local Acts") to make all the householders compulsorily into members, so far as concerned the payment of contributions, and to warrant the execution of other improvements, including the manufacture of gas. It was out of these associations, called Commissioners, that English municipal enterprise was derived (*Statutory Authorities for Special Purposes*, by S. and B. Webb, 1922, especially the last chapter, on "The Old Principles and the New").

nomy and self-determination in its professional policy. It is without statutory powers, but it is, in effect, continuously seeking ratification of its corporate decisions, not only through the acquiescence of public opinion, but also in the active cooperation in the administration of a majority of the citizens themselves.

But this new type of social organisation, less than twenty years old, is not yet free from entanglement with the remnants of the old society out of which it sprung. In its pursuit of the good life, it is still assailed by enemies from within as well as from without. It therefore deems necessary for defence the maintenance of an extensive and elaborately equipped military force, able to repel a hostile world in arms. Equally necessary is the maintenance of courts of law and drastic penal sanctions, in order to deal effectively with enemies within the Union who still refuse to accept loyally an established order with which they some of them honestly disagree. In short, there is declared to be still a state of war, whether marked by individual sabotage or by wilful default in the fulfilment of social obligations, or by sporadic outrages and persistent threats of foreign invasion.

The present condition is accordingly regarded as a transition stage in which the new social order is not yet completely established. When this stage has been passed, it is believed that it will be possible gradually to dispense with the instruments of coercion in internal relations, even before the state of the world enables all armies to be abolished. It is assumed that the new type of community, with its elaborate and varied social texture—whether the pyramid of soviets from village to All-Union Congress, with their innumerable executive organs; or the nation-wide federations of trade unions and artels of industrial owner-producers, and presently also of collective farms; or the still vaster network of consumers' cooperative societies; or the penumbra of voluntary associations for innumerable purposes by which all the public bodies are surrounded and interpenetrated—will be able to obtain a sufficient degree of general loyalty and of assent to the good life that these "collectives" both make possible and embody, without any other coercion than that of education and public opinion. This, we gather, is the "withering of the state"—to use the Marxian phrase—that is to-day foreseen and prepared for in the USSR.

Even this seems too utopian for the Briton or the American,

who finds it hard to believe that there will not always exist individuals who, from whatever motive, will, at one time or other, refuse or neglect to cooperate with their neighbours, to such an extent as actually to thwart what is devised to promote the common good ; and who will therefore need to be suppressed by a police force.

But let us consider why the foreigner finds it difficult to share the optimism of the soviet philosophers in this respect. He may be prepared to believe that the active opponents of the USSR, who at present watch from Paris or Prague, Warsaw or Riga, Belgrade or Harbin, for any chance of destroying the Bolshevik Government, will presently die out, or become discouraged by cessation of the tacit connivance of foreign governments, and by the formal acquiescence of all the states of the world in the continuance of the Soviet Government. But every citizen of a capitalist country is conscious of the extensive underworld beneath its apparent order, from which there emerges a continual stream of common criminals, which he cannot believe to be lacking in the USSR. Such a citizen is, however, usually unaware of the very large percentage of all the crimes in his own country that are committed by men and women who are desperately poor. Nearly all minor thefts and malversations are directly occasioned, if not caused, by their perpetrators being, at the time, without regular employment at wages sufficient for their maintenance, or actually without the means of subsistence. Second only to destitution as a cause of crime is the habit of acquisitiveness which has become a social disease. It is hard for the Briton or the American to realise how large a part, not only of crime, but also of the temptation to default in one's social obligations, is due to the ingrained positive passion of acquisitiveness, reinforced by the negative dread of poverty, which has been for centuries fostered by the institution of private property in the means of production, and the use of these for individual profit-making, especially in the "epoch of scarcity" out of which, as regards the mass of the population, the capitalist world has not yet emerged. We do not know what proportion of the major crimes against property—such as forgery and embezzlement, the promotion of fraudulent companies and the shady practices of the Stock Exchange—are committed by brokers or dealers in commodities or securities ; or by financiers

of all sorts, together with their clerks and other subordinates ; or by trustees or solicitors who are false to the trusts that they have undertaken. But it seems at least likely that, in a society in which these classes have ceased to exist, the crimes specially characteristic of their occupations would eventually disappear. Probably no one born in the nineteenth century can realise adequately the extent to which crimes against property will be lessened among a generation reared, as that of the USSR will be, *without risk of destitution in any of the vicissitudes of life*, and thus without even the apprehension of it ; without ever witnessing the masses of private property which at present tempt to crime so many of those who have the handling of them ; and also without any more thought of the possibility of making a fortune by speculative dealings or by employing other people for profit, than the village postmaster has of owning the profitable postal service of his own or any other country—a generation which will also have grown up in full consciousness of so much of an epoch of plenty as to be at all times fully insured against actual want.

That there will always remain occasional lapses in conduct, due to temptations and emotions unconnected with wealth or the absence of wealth, would be admitted by communists themselves. Communism is not anarchism ; rather it is the polar opposite of anarchism. What is expected in the fully developed communist society is, not that everybody will be at all times perfect in his behaviour, but that these occasional lapses will be dealt with otherwise than by penal laws and cruel punishments.

The social influences and devices by which, in the USSR, the necessary acquiescence and cooperation of the whole of the population in the general plan of living may be secured without recourse to the sanctions of imprisonment, flogging or execution, will, it is expected, be manifold. Apart from the unique elaboration of the representative system, there will, it is clear, be a great extension of what we have termed Measurement and Publicity. And the experience of the USSR has already shown how successfully, by a highly evolved series of expedients, a voluntary and essentially spontaneous public opinion may be brought to bear, almost irresistibly, upon those who, in one or other way, fail in their civic duty or take from the community more than they give to it.

Measurement and Publicity

It will be seen that we couple measurement with publicity. Soviet Communism is fully alive to the importance of publicity in public affairs; and there is, as we have shown, probably a greater volume of public discussion of them in the USSR, by a larger proportion of the population, than in any other country. The interminable discussion on all public affairs in the factories and throughout cities, is rapidly extending to the country districts, where the village meeting, and now often the village club-room, provides a perpetual forum. The Government departments constantly feed the widely read newspaper press with facts and figures on every branch of administration. The newspapers revel in the "self-criticism" involved in the exposure of every case of defect or deficiency in the administration. The soviet leaders make their frequent speeches not only longer, but also much more educational than those of the statesmen in other countries, by their constant criticism of departmental shortcomings, and even by fierce exposures of administrative failures. This publicity is already aided by extensive methods of objective measurement of the result of every branch of administration. The soviet statistical service is, in all its ramifications, probably the largest in the world. It is rightly felt that without measurement there can be no accurate knowledge. This demands a continuous extension, not only of detailed statistics of what can be precisely measured, such as tons of grain, or square yards of textiles, but, even more urgently, of qualitative standardisation, so that the statistics can convey definite information as to the kinds and qualities, the excellences and the defects, of the output or other results.

In our Chapter IX entitled *In Place of Profit* we have described many of the expedients already adopted by the Communist Party and Soviet Government to ensure an exact reckoning up of every man's work, and of the results of the activities of each factory or plant, whether with regard to the productivity of labour, the use of raw material, the care of machinery, and the full utilisation of all the instruments of production. This formed part of the duty of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, when separate bodies of workers and peasants accompanied by specialists, roamed about the country investigating this plant or that factory, and reporting the results to the factory management, to the Trade

Union and to Gosplan. This certainly secured publicity but not always accuracy of measurement. Although the informal juries of inspection may be continued by the trade unions, this important institution was virtually superseded in 1934 by the two Control Commissions of the Soviet Government and the Communist Party respectively, made up of full-time investigators who were deputed to discover every failure to carry out successfully the decisions or commands that had been issued.¹

Even more important, from the standpoint of discovering hidden waste, was the tentative adoption, during the past few years, of a primitive system of cost-accounting. The so-called Cost-Accounting Brigades, formed under the supervision of the trade-union and factory committees, have sought to discover, by analysis of the total cost of production of each product, the points at which time was lost or waste of material occurred. To this was added the influence of socialist competition between brigades, factories, plants, ships, collective farms, municipalities and even republics; the results being widely published, the winners rewarded, and the losers helped by the winners to bring up their productivity. This has meant an immense amount of measurement and publicity, largely of a kind elsewhere unknown.

But all this inspection and analysis has left unascertained and unrecorded most of the cases in which the quality of the product varied from the standard, and was often sadly defective. Soviet statisticians are accordingly studying how they can bring to bear an exact measurement of quality, in supplement of the simple measurement of tons of grain or square metres of cloth.

Now the only universal measure of quality applicable to all commodities and services is their common value in money. It is with this valuation in money that the statisticians of other countries usually content themselves in their measurement of aggregate production and consumption. It has, however, two fundamental faults as a yardstick of quality. Money, whether coin or paper, gold or silver, the rouble or the dollar, is itself of perpetually shifting value in exchange, and is consequently not to be relied on for comparisons between different years or different places. Some measure of quality can be gained, in dealing with certain commodities, by adding statistics of weight to those of superficial area. Thus it is proposed that in all forms of textile cloth,

¹ See Appendix VI. to Part I., p. 474.

whether of cotton, wool, hair, silk, rayon or mixed substances, each package or unit for transportation should be measured simultaneously in square metres and in pounds weight. It is said that such a double measurement would be of great value in revealing certain qualitative differences. Under consideration in the USSR are also the various systems of grading according to quality, by independent public officials, which have been adopted by some countries concerned to maintain the reputation of their exports of butter, etc. The success of the voluntary British Standards Association in securing a large amount of standardisation, especially in engineering components and construction materials, is also being studied as possibly proving useful as suggesting measurements of quality.

A Universal Audit

To obtain the fullest utility from any collection of statistics, whether quantitative or qualitative, demands the adoption of another social instrument. It involves the development of a systematic audit of every branch of administration, not only as regards its transactions in money, or its use of stamps, or its system of bookkeeping, but extending to all its achievements in commodities and services, and to all the results, intended or unintended, of its operations on the workers concerned, or on the consumers whom it serves, or upon other branches of the administration, or upon the locality in which it operates. Cost-accounting, in the sense of determining precisely the cost, not only of every commodity but *also of each component in every commodity*, in comparison with that of each of them in other establishments, or other countries, or by other processes, would form an important part of such an audit. But the general economic and social results of the enterprise as a whole would be of no less interest. Such a universal audit—not yet existing in any country ¹—will, we predict, become an invaluable instru-

¹ The nearest approach to such a system of universal audit is seen, perhaps, though only in germ, in (a) the organised expert profession of public accountants in the United Kingdom, the United States and the British Dominions; (b) the official auditors of the Ministry of Health in England and Wales, whose work is confined to the operations of the local Government authorities; and (c) the office of the Comptroller and Auditor-General of the United Kingdom, whose jurisdiction extends only to the expenditure of moneys voted by Parliament. All these have the qualities of highly trained *expertise*; independence of those whose work they audit; irresponsibility for the success of the enterprise; and

ment in the Measurement and Publicity that will play perhaps the largest part of the "endless adventure" of the art of government during the remainder of the twentieth century.

The psychological conditions of such an audit are seldom adequately appreciated. It should be conducted by highly trained experts—trained in the special art of auditing—entirely unconnected, not only with the management of the enterprise under examination, but also with the management of any enterprise whatsoever; and confined to the one profession of auditing, in which they would pass their whole time in examining successively all the enterprises of the community, and eventually, in a new "international", those also of other communities. They would have no responsibility for any of them, and likewise no authority. They could dismiss nobody. They could not even reprimand anybody. They would only make their reports on what they had seen, adding any comments and suggestions that they thought helpful. The managements and the staffs concerned would have an opportunity of considering the reports; and, if desired, of replying to them. But the reports (together with the replies, if any), would be influential with the supreme authorities in the community; and eventually, when published with public opinion, both inside the enterprises and outside them.¹

powerlessness to reprimand or dismiss. But their audit is confined practically to cash, stamps and stores, and to calculations of profit and loss; it never enquires into social results, and seldom includes even comparative cost-accounting of components or processes; whilst it is far from being universal.

¹ In connection with the necessity of publication of the auditor's reports, we add another suggestion. Amid all the whirlwind of publicity that prevails in the USSR, in the newspapers, at public meetings and by the informative and critical speeches of the statesmen, the student of administration notices one omission. There is a marked absence of the detailed annual report of its proceedings which, in Great Britain and the United States, is habitually published by every joint-stock company or corporation for the information of its shareholders; and likewise, for the information of the public, by nearly every department or executive organ, whether central or local. The practical substitute in the USSR for these detailed statistical reports appears to be the newspaper paragraph or article, in which all the facts likely to be interesting to the casual reader are given in attractive journalistic form. But this is not enough. Neither the casual newspaper reader, nor even the busy journalist, is likely to detect what is socially and economically most important among the selected facts and figures that are alone placed before him. Moreover, dealing with only one enterprise at a time, he is unable to take a comparative view, either of past years or of other enterprises of the same sort, either at home or abroad, or of all the different enterprises of the same locality. The careful study and comparative analysis of the detailed reports themselves—and especially when illuminated by reports of such a comprehensive audit as will gradually become universal—is the work for the trained scientist in economics and other branches

Let us consider how this continuous bringing to bear, at every stage, of organised knowledge and the acid test of accurate statistics, may be expected to solve the perennial social problem of how to combine the authority of the manager or foreman in the factory with the workman's sense of personal freedom, and his impulsive resentment of "government from above". Reported discussions among the Comsomols show that, even in the USSR, there is still some anxiety as to the extent of the authority given to a director to decide what shall, and what shall not be done in the course of the day. Some think that the workers should control their own work, or at any rate should be continuously consulted about it. Indeed the vital question, who should give orders and who should obey them; whether the government of industry shall be "from above" or "from below"; agitates the Labour Movement throughout the world. But with the adoption of the principle of Measurement and Publicity this controversy will become largely meaningless. Paradoxical as this may seem to-day, we venture on the prediction that, from the standpoint of personal authority, it will matter far less than at present exactly how the executive command is apportioned. In industry, no less than in political administration, the combination of Measurement with Publicity is to-day already undermining personal autocracy. The deliberate intensification of this searchlight of published knowledge we regard as the corner-stone of successful democracy. The need for final decision will remain, not merely in emergencies but also as to policy; but the decisions which are deducible from ascertained and registered facts rouse none of the resentment provoked by assertions of personal will. Sailors may mutiny against a arbitrary captain, but never against the compass. A great deal of the old autocracy, once deemed to be indispensable in Government departments and capitalist industry alike, is ceasing to be necessary to efficiency, and will, accordingly as democracy be-

of sociology. Only from such a professionally expert analysis—preferably as the work of a scientific research institute—can the necessary education of public opinion be effectively stimulated and wisely directed, through the newspaper press and at public meetings. The requirement from the management of every enterprise or institution in the USSR, central or local, industrial or cultural, of a comprehensive, detailed, statistical annual report of all the proceedings of the concern during the previous year, to be printed and published, and systematically collected and made the subject of critical analysis by specialist scientific institutes, would be a valuable addition to the publicity already provided for.

comes more genuinely accepted, gradually be dispensed with. The practice of the USSR during the past decade has shown that much can be done in this way. It is plain that a steadily increasing sphere will, except in matters of emergency, be found for consultation among all grades and sections concerned, out of which will emerge judgments and decisions arrived at, very largely, by common consent, which will really be a common submission to accurately ascertained and authoritatively reported facts, driven home by the silent persuasiveness of the public opinion of those concerned. The factory committees, the Party groups, the directors of factories and plants, the All-Union Council of Trade Unions and Gosplan, will have before them not merely the spontaneous promptings of their members' minds, and not even only the information provided by their own officials, but much more. To such committees and councils there will come, as a matter of course, a stream of reports from independent and disinterested experts, retained expressly for this professional service, which will carry with them no coercive authority, but which will graphically reveal the results, material and moral, of each establishment or of each industry, in comparison alike with its own past, with the corresponding results of analogous cases elsewhere, and with the possibilities opened out by new discoveries great or small. "Tovarishchi," the chairman will say, in opening a joint meeting of the factory committee and the management, "you will have read the report of the health expert showing that our staff has a markedly lower standard of health than it had during the preceding decade, and lower also than the average of the district. Scarcely less disquieting is the education expert's report, which has also been circulated to you, reporting that our young men and women come too tired to the technical institute to be able to get adequate advantage from the costly instruction provided for them. On the other hand, we have the best output return in the whole industry; and, owing to your decision to put at once into practice the new method of operating, that was laid before us in the memorandum from the Soviet Control Commission, we have actually the lowest accident rate ever recorded. But it is plain that we cannot stand being gazetted to the public as being the most backward in health among all the establishments in the industry, and as depriving our young people of their educational chances. The question

that we have to consider is which of the suggestions put before us, or what modification of them, we can adopt for improvement in these respects, consistently with maintaining our good position in other respects." Or we may imagine the director of the trust controlling a great industry faced with reports giving, with graphic statistics, the results of investigation of the complaints of particular consumers' organisations, that supplies had been irregular or insufficient, owing to some arrangement of holidays, or of shifts, or the hours of beginning and quitting work, that proved to result in undue discontinuity of production. There might be no idea of lengthening the working day or of lessening the holidays ; but the problem of how best to maintain continuity of supply would have to be faced, and faced in the light of the reports discussing all the various solutions that had been suggested. To the obstruction of mere disgruntled criticism there would always be the challenging reply, "What are your alternative proposals ? Let us discuss them."

The Organisation of Public Opinion

We have seen, in the descriptions of the elections to the pyramid of soviets, of those in the trade-union and the consumers' cooperative movement, and of the perpetual gatherings of members in the federated industrial artels and the collective farms, how large is the part played in the USSR by the discussions in public meeting. We have described in our Chapter IX. entitled "In Place of Profit", how varied and extensive are the expedients by means of which the public opinion of the workers in the factory, the mine and the collective farm is brought to bear on the member who fails to live up to the standard of duty common among his comrades and neighbours. As another sample of the originality and inventiveness sometimes displayed in creating an informed public opinion, here is a scene described at a collective farm in the village of Shemyaline in the province of Moscow. "The economic plan of the kolkhos had been considerably obstructed through inefficiency", we are told. "At a club meeting a teacher suggested organising a puppet theatre to combat poor work and misconduct on the farm. Shortly afterwards Petrushka, the puppet, made his bow.

"All the kolkhosniki, old and young, came to witness the

spectacle. In the front row, with a sceptical and superior air, sat the kolkhos chairman.

"Bobbing and bowing, Petrushka, the main character of the show, appeared from behind the scenes and in clever lines scored the inefficiency of the kolkhos management.

"No kolkhosnik had ever spoken so sharply, so directly and with so much wit. The audience rocked with laughter and with assenting voices affirmed Petrushka's charges.

"'That's right!' they shouted. 'That's the boy, Petrushka!'

"But it was not merely amusing. The puppet's caustic criticism struck home. As the curtain fell the kolkhos chairman, his face livid with rage, rushed behind the puppet-box. 'Show anything you want, a tragedy or a comedy,' he cried, 'only remove your Petrushka.'

"Petrushka, however, was not removed. He is active to this day. He continues to work for the good of the kolkhos. Through his exposures, the chairman, who wanted to remove him, was himself removed; and the new management now works hand in glove with Petrushka, criticising the shortcomings and praising the good work of the members of the collective farm."¹

There are, of course, other ways of evoking and of organising the collective judgment than that of public caricature and censure. We find in 1931 a typical example of spontaneous participation of mechanics and automobile drivers in an attempt to save the flax crop, which was threatened by a breakdown of the tractors supplied to the kolkhosi of a particular district.

"Tractors all over the province", writes Anna Louise Strong, one of those who took part, "stood in the fields not moving, for complex causes yet to be analysed. Who moves in such a case? The Moscow Committee of the Communist Party, sorting over in its offices the reports of all Moscow's daily emergencies, decides that the break in flax sowing is most serious of all. It declares a 'mobilisation' of mechanics. Not a single mechanic in all Moscow is compelled to answer; that's not what mobilisation means. Mobilisation means that shop committees in a hundred centres announce and promote the idea; that mechanics willing to give some time to the sowing are helped by their foremen and fellow-workers to arrange their jobs, and go forth on this sanc-

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, July 2, 1935.

tioned public task, without forfeiting wages, while others make up the gap at home. What is the motive? The fun of participating in saving the sowing, in running the country; the pleasure of living a vivid, useful varied life.

"Automobiles are also mobilised to carry the mechanics to the farms. Since I have time, I decide to respond to the call. Our autos, five in number, loaded with sixteen mechanics, draw up in the afternoon at the Volokolamsk Tractor Station, one hundred and fifty miles north of Moscow, to which we are assigned. Quickly, in conference with the chief mechanic, we learn the condition of the tractors, in general and in detail. 'That April lot from Putilov', he swears. 'Thirty-three we got, all new ones: rotten! Eleven of them can't move on their own power from the railway station.

"Dividing the farms among our five automobiles we scattered, each to our own job. At early twilight I drove my load of three machinists to a little farm of fifty families, working their soil in common, with three tractors. Here we learned a second cause for the break in the sowing. The tractor drivers, six on two shifts, were peasant boys and girls who had seen their first machine one month before. When they heard a queer sound from the machine they stopped, afraid of breaking it, and waited for the mechanic. Hundreds of tractors all over Moscow province waiting for mechanics! And only a few dozen mechanics. That was the reason for our mobilisation.

"All night, while I slept in the teacher's room, the mechanic volunteers repaired tractors. And all night the six local tractor drivers stood up to watch their job—such was their eagerness to learn. When at four in the morning they called me to drive to the next farm, the local boys and girls, drivers of tractors, kept right on work, driving out to the fields.

"Our second farm was a different sort, a backward lot. Neither bread nor tea they offered our weary mechanics, arriving two hours past dawn. They swore at us instead; city workers were we, those city workers who deceive the farms with tractors. Take them, look at them, we don't want them.

"Our city mechanics took them, looked at them, repaired them, and put them to work in the fields. The attitude of the peasants grudgingly changed. The younger ones came and thanked us.

" At four in the afternoon the five autos gathered again at the tractor station to write a formal statement which the Russians call an ' Act '. It gave in technical terms the exact fault in every tractor and generalised from those faults. From the hard-won fields of Volokolamsk, we put our fingers into the distant Putilov Plant in Leningrad, and pointed out which shops were guilty. Certain iron castings regularly went to powder. A certain little gadget that a clever engineer had substituted for ball bearings wasn't doing the work. It was a clear specific indictment, not of the Putilov tractor, but of certain specified parts. All the mechanics signed it. Through gathering dusk I drove my car to Moscow, five hours, with sleeping mechanics in the seats. . . . The Act they had written went next day to the *Industrial Gazette*, newspaper of heavy industry, chief monitor of Putilov. . . . It led to a summons sent to the chief of production at Putilov, and a hearing held in the Commissariat of Heavy Industry, attended by a dozen organisations interested in tractors. The affidavit made by our weary mechanics had been in truth an ' Act ', with direct results in the tractor industry. And when spring passed into summer, the flax of Moscow province, which in early season had threatened to lag at 50 per cent of Plan, went over the top to 108 per cent, the best record in the Soviet Union. ' It was the work of the social organisation that saved us ', said the Moscow Tractor Centre." ¹

An arid-minded professor observes: " All these adventures are outside the sphere of economics ". " That is so," answers the Bolshevik. " They are part and parcel of the good life—a more potent instrument in the remaking of man and the production of the necessary plenty for all than the motive of pecuniary self-interest upon which the capitalist countries rely ". Who is right and who is wrong—the professor of political economy or the communist—will be proved by the event.

The Comradely Court

The unique institution of the Comradely Court, which we have elsewhere described ² as an organ of public opinion, demands further mention as a valuable contribution to the new social

¹ *Dictatorship and Democracy in the Soviet Union*, by Anna Louise Strong (New York, 1935), pp. 20-22.

² Chapter IX. in Part II., " In Place of Profit ".

order which, in the USSR, is, within its own sphere, actually beginning to supersede the coercive authority of the "police state". "Russia", says a recent observer,¹ "is honeycombed in factory, in farm, in apartment house, with the institution known as a Comrades' Court. . . . The Comrades' Court is not a state judicial organ in the ordinary sense of the term. It is a quasi-judicial body, representative of public opinion in the unit where it exercises jurisdiction. Its judges have tenure only for the actual sitting over which they preside, and they are elected *ad hoc* by the factory workers, the dwellers in the apartment house or the members of the collective farm, as the case may be. There is no official procedure at its sittings; those I attended were conducted very much like an English trade union meeting, with everyone present who felt he had anything relevant to say making his contribution. The maximum punishment the court can inflict is a fine of 10 roubles—or about 10 per cent of the monthly wages of the lowest paid Russian worker. The court can make representations to the management about the conduct of a worker in a factory which may result in his dismissal by the management; or it may initiate the expulsion of an undesirable tenant from his apartment. In the industrial field and on the farm, the tendency is for the judges of the Courts to be the best shock-workers there. This is the case in about 90 per cent of them. In other spheres, the tendency is to elect the men and women who are regarded by the relevant constituency as possessed of the best reputation for social initiative

"The real function of the Courts is twofold. On the one hand they bring the pressure of public opinion to bear on citizens who are held by their comrades to have shown a defective sense of social responsibility in some minor matter. It may be persistent lateness in work, or uncleanness in the home, or unjustifiable absenteeism, or excessive rudeness to other tenants in the apartment house, or a slanderous tongue, or negligence in carrying out orders. Whatever the offence, the Court has the invaluable effect of making the culprit aware of public standards to which he must accommodate himself. He learns to respect the authority of the Court not from the penalties it may impose—in half the cases I saw, it imposed no penalties at all—not from the public analysis of the alleged fault and the subjection

¹ *Law and Justice in Soviet Russia*, by Harold J. Laski (1935), pp. 36-38.

of the offender to the criticism of his fellow-workers or neighbours. The fact, of course, that tens of thousands of citizens have poured into the towns since the Revolution makes this self-imposed discipline a particularly valuable part of the process of social education.

“ It not only teaches discipline to all who are concerned in it. The Court is at every point a lesson in the art of conciliation. Quarrelsome neighbours, indifferent workmen, learn that they do not live to themselves alone. For the judges of the Court the work is of real importance partly as a lesson in government, and that art of effective self-expression which is so near to the heart of successful rule, and partly as a useful introduction to superior administrative tasks; there are many members of Comrades' Courts for whom service thereon has been the prelude to election to a local soviet. The institution, further, is a step towards the realisation of Lenin's insistent principle that as large a proportion of the population as possible should be related directly to the business of government. He saw, from the first days of the Revolution, the creative part that civic responsibility can play, however small be the authority conferred. There can be no doubt that literally scores of thousands of men and women have been educated to a sense of their social function by participation in the work of these Courts.

“ What is vital in the institution is the fact that their status is not imposed from above by the law, but grows from within by the force of the approval they win from the constituency they serve. The committee character of the proceedings is the root of this approval. A corporate opinion grows before one's eyes, as one listens to the proceedings; those present are not silent spectators, but citizens whose comments, even whose attitudes, are always relevant to the decision reached. It is important, further, that the ability of the judges to retain their place is a direct function of the satisfaction aroused by their decisions. These are perpetually canvassed by their constituency. I have even heard an offender, after a decision had been given, discuss in detail with an interested audience why it was inadequate in the light of the evidence offered. I was particularly impressed by the Courts in dealing with marital relations, and with cases in which a male worker had been offensive to a woman worker in the same shop as himself. On this side, the Courts are a

school of conciliation and neighbourliness. They introduce what may be termed 'justice without law' into all the relations of social life, in a way that undoubtedly adds to the quality of living. And the Courts are significant, further, because they have brought to the surface the immense reservoir of stout common sense the workers possess, and given it an institutional channel of expression significant far beyond the immediate purposes to which it is limited."

We add a further significance of this unique institution. As we have already hinted, one of the most keenly debated problems in the USSR, as among working-class reformers in other countries, is how to reconcile the necessity, in any extensive organisation, of "commands from above" with the hotly felt resentment of the "obligation to obey". This problem is not solved by any merely formal democracy. Whether authority is wielded by an individual employer or an autocratic dictator, or by a mass meeting of wage-earners, or by an ingenious social mechanism combining different kinds of commanders, there are touchy and thoughtless workmen who are unable to avoid some resentment at having to obey what comes to them as an incomprehensible but authoritative order. The decision of the Comradely Court, after argument and oral discussion by his fellows, comes to the workman in quite another guise. The malcontent has had his say. He cannot help realising that the judgment against him is the expression of the feelings not of any authority above him, but of his own comrades. He is far more likely to be weaned from the habits to which they object than he would be if he was condemned in a court of law under a prohibitory statute. It is the gradual extension of this type of organisation of public opinion—aided as it will be, by every improvement in the formation made available by a systematic expert audit—that we expect to see increasingly supersede alike the peremptory command of the employer and the penal sentence of the magistrate.

We do not know whether to the wealthy rentier who is habitually unaware what his functionless existence involves in the subjection of the workers, or to the temperamental anarchist of western civilisation, this vision of the "withering of the state", with its law courts, its police and its prisons, and its replacement by an ubiquitous system of measurement and publicity, reinforced by an all-embracing award of public blame and public

honour, strictly according to merit, will seem an attractive prospect. But we can assure him that in any community governed by communist principles he will have been so completely subject to these two powerful social influences from birth onwards, through all the vicissitudes of life, that he will feel the personal obligation imposed in the common interest on all alike, less of a nuisance than the drastic income-tax to which the Briton and the American millionaires are now subjected ; and, indeed, no more burdensome than the weight of the atmosphere !

Contradictory Trends in Foreign Affairs

At long last we reach the problem which to many persons, communists and anti-communists alike, seems of greater importance than any development of the good life in any particular community : seems to some of them, indeed, likely to determine in the wide world the destiny of civilisation itself, if not of the whole human race. What is to be the relation of the Soviet Government, with its dominance over one-sixth of the earth's surface, and its population likely within the next decade to exceed 200 millions, to the other nations of Europe and Asia, and of the world ? Will all the capitalist governments, as is still widely feared in the USSR, unite to a combined attack upon the only communist state, as the most practical way of resisting the insidious spread of communist ideas in their own countries ? Or will the Soviet Government, once it has made itself safe from attack, find itself driven to send its powerful Red Army to succour the communist workers of Germany and Austria, Italy and Hungary, in the persecution and oppression from which they are now suffering, and which may even be expected to be intensified if the USSR becomes obviously more prosperous than any capitalist state ? If various European powers go to war with each other, can the conflagration be prevented from becoming a universal Armageddon in which western civilisation may be destroyed ? If the Soviet Government should have succeeded by that time in establishing a good life for the broad masses in its own country, what would soviet ethics dictate as to its conduct as a nation towards the less fortunate nations of the world who were still in the gall of bitterness and the bond of iniquity of unregenerate capitalism ?

Now, the policy towards other nations of the Soviet Government has, in the eighteen years of its existence, gone through various phases which it is necessary to examine.¹ Put briefly, the change in relations with the other governments of the world has been from war to peace.

The World Revolution

When Lenin and his companions assumed office in October 1917, and for several years afterwards, they believed that a world revolution was imminent. They were convinced that the proletariats of the principal capitalist countries, impelled by the economic sufferings ensuing on the Great War, would be able to rise in rebellion against their respective governments, and that they would, if properly led, be able to seize power. The various treaties of peace imposed by the victorious governments in 1919 found large numbers of wage-earners favourably impressed by the sweeping measures of nationalisation and of proletarian control of industry that were reported from Moscow and Petrograd. It looked, indeed, as a German writer has put it, as if "in the years 1919-1920, the majority of socialist workmen in France and Italy, Germany and the former Austro-Hungarian countries, favoured an alliance with Bolshevism. Strong Bolshevik sympathies also existed in the Balkan States, Scandinavia, Poland and the Baltic States."²

¹ We are naturally unable, in this work of expositions and analysis of the present constitution and contemporary working of the USSR, to recount the whole history of its foreign policy, which would demand a separate treatise. The student may be referred to the successive reports of the proceedings of the All-Union Conferences of the Communist Party of the USSR, usually obtainable both in English and in French; the detailed work of Louis Fischer, entitled *The Soviets in World Affairs* (2 vols., 1930); *World Revolution and the USSR*, by Michael T. Florinsky (1933, 264 pp.), the same author's *The End of the Russian Empire* (New York, 1931), and his article in *The Political Science Quarterly* (New York, June 1932); the books by Leon Trotsky, entitled respectively *The Bolsheviks and World Peace* (New York, 1918, 238 pp.) and *The Permanent Revolution* (New York, 1931); and *L'Internationale Communiste après Lénine*, together with the appendices to vol. iii. of his *History of the Russian Revolution*; and his pamphlet *La Troisième Période d'erreurs de l'internationale communiste* (Paris, 1930). See also *A History of Bolshevism from Marx to the First Five-Year Plan*, by Arthur Rosenberg (1934, 250 pp.); *L'Histoire du parti communiste de l'URSS*, par E. Yaroslavsky (Paris, 1931); *Outline History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, by N. Popov (translated from the 16th Russian edition, 1935, 2 vols.); and the *Annual Survey of International Affairs* for 1934, by Arnold Toynbee (1935).

² *A History of Bolshevism from Marx to the First Five-Year Plan*, by Arthur Rosenberg (1934), p. 130.

The Third International

The Bolsheviks at Moscow could not understand why the German Government of 1918, dominated by the Social Democratic Party and presided over by a social democratic president (Ebert), did not at once transform the new Reich into a socialist state ; still less why the tumultuous uprising of the Spartacists in 1919 was sternly suppressed by a professedly socialist government. In these very months what were called soviet republics were actually established at Munich and at Buda Pest ; and if they failed to maintain themselves the failure could be plausibly ascribed to lack of sufficient preparatory organisation. The hostility of the foreign governments did not cease with the withdrawal in 1920 from soviet territory of the armies that they assisted and subsidised. In all but military measures these governments continued their war against the communist power. Lenin and his colleagues, in their own way, equally remained at war with the capitalist powers. So long as they were struggling desperately with the successive waves of armed intervention by foreign governments, the Soviet Government looked for help to the sympathetic proletariat of Western Europe. It was with this view that, in March 1919, the Third, or Communist, International was formally established at a congress summoned to Moscow by wireless broadcast. Passport and other difficulties prevented the attendance of more than a handful of foreign delegates, often with unconvincing credentials. The Second World Congress at Moscow in July and August 1920 was, however, numerously attended by duly accredited delegates from nearly every European country, and also from Asia and North and South America. At this Congress Lenin got adopted a detailed scheme of organisation for all the nascent communist parties of every country, including their obligatory federation in the Communist International (Comintern), to be governed by a periodically meeting world congress of delegates, with a standing executive committee in Moscow itself.¹ The "Twenty-one

¹ The "Twenty-one Conditions" will be found in full in *Soviet Rule in Russia*, by W. R. Batsell (1926), pp. 762-767. We reprint some of the most striking :

"Every organisation that wishes to affiliate with the Communist International must regularly and systematically remove the reformist and centrist elements from all the more or less important posts in the labor movement (in

Conditions " for the acceptance by the Comintern of the affiliation of any Communist Party, drafted by Lenin himself, demanded a complete and publicly avowed breach with every organisation or group affected with " reformism ", or sympathy with parliamentary democracy, together with the unflinching exclusion of any individuals who hesitated or doubted, or who shrank from the decision to organise " illegal activities ", or who had spoken or voted against a proposal to adopt the programme or to seek affiliation. What Lenin sought to create, suddenly and without preliminary propaganda, in each of the countries of the world, was something closely resembling the strictly disciplined Bolshevik Party of professional revolutionaries, which he had patiently and laboriously constructed out of the " underground " and exiled Russians whom he could influence in the twelve years 1903-1914. The Communist Parties thus formed, in all the countries of the world, were, under the direction of the Comintern at Moscow, to bring about the expected quick succession of revolutions in one country after another.

" Lenin's attempt in 1919-1920 to organise a revolution in party organisations, editorial offices, trade unions, parliamentary groups, cooperatives, and municipal administrations) and replace them with well-tried communists, without taking offence at the fact that, especially in the beginning, the places of ' experienced ' opportunists will be filled by plain workers from the masses."

" Every party belonging to the Communist International is obliged to carry on a stubborn struggle against the Amsterdam ' international ' of the yellow trade unions. It must carry on a most emphatic propaganda among the workers organised in trade unions for a break with the yellow Amsterdam International. With all its means it must support the rising international association of the red trade unions which affiliate with the Communist International."

" It is their duty to create everywhere a parallel illegal machine for organisation which at the decisive moment will be helpful to the party in fulfilling its duty to the revolution."

" As a rule the programme of every party belonging to the Communist International must be sanctioned by the regular congress of the Communist International, or by its executive committee."

" The duty of spreading communist ideas includes the special obligation to carry on a vigorous and systematic propaganda in the army. Where this agitation is forbidden by special laws it is to be carried on illegally. Renunciation of such activities would be the same as treason to revolutionary duty and would be incompatible with membership in the Third International."

" The parties wishing to belong to the Communist International are obligated to proclaim a clean break with the reformism and with the policy of the ' centre ' and to propagate this break throughout the ranks of the entire party membership. Without this a logical communist policy is impossible."

" All decisions of the congresses of the Communist International as well as the decisions of its executive committee, are binding upon all the parties belonging to the Communist International."

Europe", it has been said,¹ "was a magnificent experiment. There were, however, gigantic difficulties to be overcome before it could succeed. The tradition of the working class in [western] Europe, was, without exception, democratic in the sense that labour policy could only be decided upon in accordance with the free exercise of the right of self-determination on the part of the masses. The conversion of the proletariat from a policy of reform to one of revolution seemed only possible if the masses altered their opinions first, and subsequently discovered a suitable means of giving expression to them. Now the exactly contrary process was to be embarked upon with all possible rapidity. A revolutionary party committee was to be set up in every country and endowed with dictatorial powers over the members of the party, and with an unquestioned authority over the masses; and this party committee was to carry out a revolution."

Initial Success of the Comintern

Notwithstanding all difficulties, the Comintern had a certain measure of initial success. At the German Social Democratic Congress at Halle, in October 1920, Zinoviev, who had been elected president of the Comintern, attended to make a brilliantly ingenious speech lasting four hours, which swept into assent a majority of the delegates, who thereupon formed a "great, new, united" Communist Party. In France also a majority of the delegates to the Socialist Party Congress accepted the Twenty-one Conditions, and formed the French Communist Party. In Italy, on the contrary, both sections of the Italian Socialist Party, under Turati and Serrati respectively, rejected the conditions; and the Italian Communist Party was founded only by minority groups. In England only tiny bodies of sympathisers with what they had heard of the proceedings of the Second World Congress of the Communist International came together to establish the British Communist Party.²

None of these communist parties has ever come anywhere near securing the adhesion of the bulk of the wage-earners in its own country; or even the friendly cooperation of the various existing popular organisations, whether trade unions, cooperative societies,

¹ *History of Bolshevism*, by A. Rosenberg (1934), p. 143.

² In China also a Communist Party was established in May 1920, to which we shall presently recur.

or socialist groups. Naturally, therefore, none of them has managed even to attempt a revolution. But Lenin's effort to obtain international support in his desperate fight to maintain the Bolshevik revolution in Russia was not altogether without fruit. Though the Moscow Comintern in 1920, and the communist parties that it called into existence, did not bring about the world revolution, they made the workmen and their leaders more vividly aware of the hope and promise of the revolution in Russia itself; and of the scandal of the lawless military intervention in Russia by the governments of half a dozen capitalist countries seeking to crush the Bolsheviks. In England, in 1920, a further attempt by the government to send war stores and munitions to the forces attacking the Bolshevik Government was definitely stopped by public demonstrations and threats of strikes. In France, as well as in England, public feeling fortified the Government's growing weariness of supporting the "White" Armies which never achieved any lasting success.

Right down to the year of famine (1921) the Bolshevik leaders looked hopefully to the western countries for aid by popular uprising against the governments that continued to be unfriendly towards the communist state. Even at the end of 1920, when the wanton invasion by the Government of Poland had been repelled by the Red Army and the Polish troops had been driven back to the outskirts of Warsaw, the soviet authorities hoped to be aided by proletarian uprisings, not only in the Polish cities but also in the German industrial centres. The most that the soviet leaders gained was that the British Government felt able to give the Poles only diplomatic support; and the French Government ventured on nothing more than the loan of a competent general in an advisory capacity. When it appeared that there would be no popular uprising by either Germans or Poles, Lenin insisted, in 1921, on concluding peace, even at the cost of surrendering to Poland a strip of soviet soil.

By 1921, indeed, Lenin had realised that the imminent world revolution could not be counted upon, and would probably be indefinitely delayed. He explained that "the law of uneven development" of capitalist countries almost necessarily involved that the expected proletarian revolution could not occur simultaneously in all the countries of advanced industrialism; and that the most that could be hoped for was a succession of national

revolutions over a series of years. The communist "world state" which some enthusiasts had expected, but to which no content was ever given, simply faded out of the vision.

Soviet China

Rather more success seemed to be achieved in China. We take the following account from the impartial report of 1932 to the League of Nations by the Lytton Commission on the Manchurian problem. "The manifesto of the Soviet Government of July 25, 1919, declaring its willingness to renounce all privileges extorted from China by the former tsarist Government, created a favourable impression throughout China, especially among the intelligentsia. In May 1920 the Chinese Communist Party was formally constituted. Propaganda was especially conducted in Labour circles at Shanghai, where 'red syndicates' were organised. In June 1922, at its second congress, the [Chinese] Communist Party, which did not then number more than 300 members, decided to ally itself with the Kuomintang. Dr. Sun Yat Sen, although opposed to communist doctrine, was prepared to admit individual Chinese communists into the Party. In the autumn of 1922 the Soviet Government sent a mission to China headed by Dr. Joffe. Important interviews which took place between him and Dr. Sen resulted in the joint declaration of January 26, 1923, by which assurance was given of soviet sympathy and support to the cause of the national unification and independence of China. It was explicitly stated, on the other hand, that the communist organisation and the soviet system of government could not be introduced at that time under the conditions prevailing in China. Following this agreement a number of military and civil advisers were sent from Moscow by the end of 1923, and undertook, under the control of Dr. Sen, the modification of the internal organisation of the Kuomintang and of the Cantonese army. At the first national congress of the Kuomintang, convened in March 1924, the admission of Chinese communists into the Party was formally agreed to, on condition that such members should not take any further part in the preparation of the proletarian revolution. The period of toleration with regard to communism thus began.

"This period lasted from 1924 to 1927. Early in 1924 the

communists counted about 2000 adherents, and red syndicates approximately 60,000 members. But the communists soon acquired sufficient influence inside the Kuomintang to raise anxiety among the orthodox members of the party. They presented to the Central Committee at the end of 1926 a proposal going so far as to include the nationalisation of all landed properties except those belonging to workers, peasants or soldiers ; the reorganisation of the Kuomintang ; the elimination of all military leaders hostile to communism ; and the arming of 20,000 communists and 50,000 workmen and peasants. This proposal, however, was defeated ; and the communists ceased to support the intended campaign of the Kuomintang against the northern militarists, although they had previously been most active in the organisation of the nationalist forces. Nevertheless, at a later stage, they joined in it ; and when the northern expedition reached Central China, and established a Nationalist Government at Wu-Han in 1927, the communists succeeded in obtaining a controlling position in it, as the nationalist leaders were not prepared to join issue with them until their own forces had occupied Nanking and Shanghai. The Wu-Han government put into operation in the provinces of Hunan and Hupeh a series of purely communist measures. The nationalist revolution was almost at the point of being transformed into a communist revolution.

"The nationalist leaders at last decided that communism had become too serious a menace to be tolerated any longer. As soon as they were firmly established at Nanking, where another Nationalist Government was constituted on April 10, 1927, a proclamation was issued in which the Nanking Government ordered the immediate purification of the army and the civil service from communism. On July 5 the majority of the Central Executive of the Kuomintang at Wu-Han, who had so far refused to join the nationalist leaders at Nanking, adopted a resolution excluding communists from the Kuomintang, and ordering the soviet advisers to leave China. As a result of this decision, the Kuomintang regained its unity and the Government at Nanking became generally recognised by the party.¹

"During the period of tolerance several military units had

¹ What this decorous official report does not mention is the frightful character of this repression of communism by the Kuomintang. There seems no doubt, from other reports, that thousands of communists were summarily executed without trial, often with revolting tortures and mutilations.

been gained to the communist cause. These had been left in the rear, mostly in Kiangsi Province, when the nationalist army was marching to the North. Communist agents were sent to coordinate these units, and to persuade them to take action against the National Government. On July 30, 1927, the garrison at Nanchang, the capital of Kiangsi Province, together with some other military units, revolted and subjected the population to numerous excesses. However, on August 5, they were defeated by the Government forces and withdrew to the South. On December 11 a communist rising at Canton delivered control of the city for two days into their hands. The Nanking Government considered that official soviet agents had actively participated in these uprisings. An order of December 14, 1927, withdrew the exequatur of all the consuls of the USSR residing in China.”¹ It was not until 1932 that diplomatic relations between

¹ What has remained of communism in China is not accurately known. For the past five years there has been almost continuous fighting between the forces of the Nanking Government and the “Red” armies. The former are always claiming victories, and the area in which “Soviet China” prevails is always shifting. But at all times tens of millions of population seem to be under its sway. We take the following account from the book *One's Company*, by Peter Fleming (1934), whom *The Times* had sent to find out about it :

“By 1931 Communism had assumed the status of a national problem in China ; attempts by the Nanking Government to solve it were becoming annually more serious, though not more successful. A Chinese Soviet Republic had proclaimed itself, and controlled—as it controls to-day—an area of which central and southern Kiangsi and western Fukien are the permanent nucleus, but which has at one time or another been extended to include parts of Hunan, Kwantung and Hupeh. . . . The curse of China is ineffectiveness ; the Chinese communists are not ineffective. The Red areas are controlled, and rigidly controlled, by a central government with headquarters at the ‘capital’ Shuikin. . . . The form of government is modelled on the Russian ; the ‘Party’, guided by a small Central Executive Committee, is paramount. The territory under its control is subdivided into areas, each of which is ruled by a local soviet with a ‘Party’ man at its head. All land is common. When they came into the villages the first thing the communists did was to tear up all the landmarks. . . . The land (even including temple lands and burial-grounds) was then redistributed. All marketing of produce is done through a central government agency ; and to-day the peasant inside the Red Areas is buying his rice and pork cheaper than the peasant outside them. One central and at least two local banks have been established, and notes and silver coins have been issued, the former bearing the head of Lenin and the latter the hammer and sickle. A ‘progressive’ tax is levied in proportion to income. . . . The Red Armies are commanded by Chu Teh, a general of experience and resource, said to have had some German training. His political adviser is Mao Dsu Tung, a gifted and fanatical young man of thirty-five suffering from an incurable disease. This pair have made themselves into something of a legend, and the Communist High Command is invariably referred to as Chumao. In addition to the Red Armies in Kiangsi, there is a communist force of some 5000 rifles in southern Hupeh, and a large roving army which has found its way up to the borders of

the two governments were resumed. But it must be noted that since 1927 there has been no intervention on behalf of Soviet China by the Soviet Government, or even by the Comintern.

Rebuilding Soviet Russia

Meanwhile the practical Lenin had turned resolutely to the task of rebuilding social organisation, and particularly the manufacturing industry, at home. In order to obtain a temporary breathing space he did not shrink from the New Economic Policy that he was able to impose on the Tenth Conference of the Communist Party in 1921, although by this he ceded to the Russian capitalists some of the ground in trading, and even in manufacturing on a small scale, from which they had been drastically expelled in the period of War Communism. The Fourth World Congress of the Comintern in November 1922, to which Lenin presented an elaborate report entitled "Five Years of the Russian Revolution and the Outlook for the World Revolu-

Szechwan after being dislodged from Hupeh in the autumn of 1932. . . . All the Red Armies are equipped with wireless. The novelty of the Chinese communist movement lies in the fact that—in a country where the man with the big stick has always hitherto had the last word—the army does not, and cannot, rule the roost, as it would if the movement represented no more than that chance agglomeration of malcontents and freebooters which optimists see in it. The control of the Central Government (in other words, of the Party) is absolute, because the Party percolates, in the Russian manner, into every branch of military and civil life. There is, as it were, a Party man at the hub of every wheel. The mutiny of a division, the rebellion of a district, is impossible as long as there are officers and officials to see it coming, report it to the Party, and have it nipped in the bud.

"Moreover—again in the Russian manner—everyone belongs to curious overlapping organisations, all under Party control and supervision. As a member of (say) the League of Youth, the Farmers' Union, the Peasants' Revolutionary Society, and the *n*th Red Army Group, you are caught in the cat's cradle of obligations and threatened with a cloud of penalties. Even the Party members themselves are supervised by Control Commissions, working incognito and reporting to the Central Executive Committee. . . . It will be seen that a great deal depends on the quality of the leaders. These would seem to be for the most part young Chinese students (throughout the movement there is a tremendous emphasis on youth), many of them trained in the Lenin University in Moscow or in a similar institution at Khabarovsk. . . . There can be no doubt that the standard of ability among the leaders is high, and unquestionably most of them are sincere. There is probably less corruption in the Red districts than in any other area of equal size in China."

For a more detailed, though less trustworthy, account of these happenings see *The Chinese Soviets*, by Victor A. Yakhontoff (New York, 1934, 296 pp.). A vivid description of personal experiences in Hankow in 1927, with an appreciation of M. M. Borodin, is given in the interesting volume entitled *In Search of History*, by J. Vincent Shean (1935).

tion", largely devoted to a defence of NEP, made no protest against Lenin's new policy, nor against the steps taken towards industrial reconstruction. The rebuilding of large-scale manufacturing involved an extensive importation of machinery, and even of certain raw materials; and already in March 1921 the Soviet Government had signed a trade agreement with Great Britain, which had been followed during the same year by similar arrangements with other European countries.

International Conferences

In April and May 1922 the Soviet Government had made its first appearance at an important international congress, that at Genoa, at which Chicherin, the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, dumbfounded the delegates of the other powers by secretly concluding with the German Reich the far-reaching Treaty of Rapallo. Chicherin also attended the conference at Lausanne in 1923, to arrange a general settlement with Turkey; and eventually joined in the agreement by which the Dardanelles were formally demilitarised. In February 1924, immediately after the death of Lenin, the British Government accorded the Soviet Government *de jure* recognition, a concession followed during the same year by the governments of Italy and France. Meanwhile the reconstruction of soviet mining and manufacturing, with machinery bought from abroad and paid for by the export of timber and furs, was proceeding apace.

Socialism in a Single Country

The full object and justification of this policy of internal reconstruction was not popularly explained until Stalin, in the autumn of 1924, launched the slogan of "Socialism in a Single Country"; meaning that, in view of the failure of the world revolution to break out, the duty of the USSR was to make itself into a successful and prosperous socialist state, which would serve as an example and a model for the proletariat of the world.

Upon this promulgation of a change of Bolshevik policy there ensued what must seem surprising to those who believe that the USSR lies groaning under a peremptory dictatorship, namely, three years of incessant public controversy. This took various forms. There were repeated debates in the principal legislative

organs, such as the Central Executive Committee (TSIK) of the All-Union Congress of Soviets and the Central Committee of the Communist Party. There were hot arguments in many of the local soviets, as well as in the local Party organs. There was a vast literature of books and pamphlets, not stopped by the censorship and published, indeed, by the state publishing houses, extending, as is stated by one who has gone through it, to literally thousands of printed pages.¹ Amid all the disputants, who coalesced and redivided in successive combinations, the two protagonists were Stalin and Trotsky. Hence it is tempting to-day to ascribe the whole struggle to the temperamental incompatibility of these rival claimants of the succession to Lenin. But there was a substantial issue in debate, at any rate until it was finally and authoritatively decided by the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party in April 1925; a decision ratified, after more discussion, by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Party Conferences of October 1926 and December 1927.²

What the Controversy was about

The difficulty of discovering "what it was all about" is increased by the characteristic method of controversy adopted by

¹ *World Revolution and the USSR*, by Michael T. Florinsky (1933), p. 130. We are unable, in this exposition of the constitutional structure and trends of progress in the Soviet Union of the present day (1935), to do justice to the life-long revolutionary career, and the considerable services, of Leon Trotsky, which have been, for the past seven years, obscured by the malevolence of those by whom he was opposed and defeated. In the main controversy of 1925-1929 he may be deemed to have had the advantage over his adversaries in the citation of texts, even if, judged by subsequent experience, he was incorrect in his forecasts and unstatesmanlike in his particular recommendations.

The student who seeks to disentangle the various phases of this prolonged controversy should begin by the perusal of all the publications and the reports of speeches by Stalin and Trotsky that he can get hold of. He may then study such chronicles, unfortunately not unbiased, as *L'Histoire du parti communiste de l'URSS*, by E. Yaroslavsky (Paris, 1931); and *Outline History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, by N. Popov (translated from the 16th Russian edition, 2 vols.).

² After these decisions, Trotsky persisted in his agitation, attempting to stir up resistance; and his conduct became plainly factious. It was this persistence in faction after the Party had definitely decided that led to his banishment to Alma Ata at the beginning of 1928, and to Constantinople at the beginning of 1929. His own version of the proceedings may be followed in his publications of 1929-1930, such as *La Défense de l'URSS et l'opposition* (Paris, 1929, 84 pp.; in Russian); *La Troisième période de l'erreur de l'internationale communiste* (Paris, 1930, 64 pp.); *Die permanente Revolution* (Berlin, 1930, 168 pp.; also in English, New York, 1931).

both sides. The question was not put as "which policy would be likely to be most advantageous or most successful". It was perpetually argued as "what was the view taken by Marx and Engels, and by Lenin himself; and what exactly did these authorities mean by this or that text discovered among their voluminous writings". It is now obvious that no one had directly and explicitly grappled with the particular problem, in the light of all the facts, economic, social and political, even as they were in 1845 or in 1905; and, of course, these great authorities were none of them conversant with the state of things in 1925, which alone was relevant to the issue. Ignoring this vain appeal to dead authors, to which all the disputants clung, let us try to examine the problem in itself.

The Four Arguments of the Trotskyists

Trotsky, and with him many of the ablest and most responsible Bolsheviks, retained the belief, which they had derived from Marx and Engels, that it was impossible for socialism to be safely and durably established in any one country by itself alone. One ground for this belief was the economic argument upon which Marx and Engels had proceeded in 1847. This was most clearly stated by Engels, in a document of 1847, which had been published in Moscow only in 1923. "Large-scale industry," said Engels, "by creating the world market, has established so close a connection among all the peoples of the globe, especially in the case of the civilised peoples, that each of them depends on what happens to others. . . . Large-scale industry has so levelled the social development in all civilised countries that everywhere the bourgeoisie and the proletariat have become the two determining social classes, and the struggle between them is the chief struggle of our time. The communist revolution, therefore, will not be merely national, but will take place simultaneously in all civilised countries; that is, at least in England, America, France and Germany. . . . It will also exercise a considerable influence upon the other countries of the world, and will completely change, and much accelerate, their former course of development. It is a world revolution, and will therefore have the whole world as its arena." ¹

¹ From Engels' MS. *Principles of Communism*, a draft used by him and Marx in the preparation of the Communist Manifesto of 1848. It was not published until the new issue of the Russian translation of the Communist Manifesto itself in 1923.

To this it may to-day be answered that the injurious effects of foreign capitalist competition on the nascent industries of the USSR, which might be undersold by cheap foreign products, and the possible catastrophic currency depreciation and price-changes that foreign manipulations of the exchanges might effect, were both obviated by the plan that the Bolsheviks had already adopted (but of which neither Marx nor Engels had ever dreamt) of a rigid Government monopoly of all international trade, and an absolute prohibition of any import or export of the soviet currency. This plan of foreign economic relations has continued to be completely successful as a measure of defence.

Another ground on which it was argued that Socialism in a Single Country was impracticable was that, even if it were for a moment established, it could not be maintained against the combined attack which the capitalist countries would inevitably make for its destruction. The answer as it seems to-day is obvious. The apprehension, the probability and even the certainty of such an attack on the first socialist community was, and is, irrelevant to the issue. Unless the objectors wished all attempts at industrial reconstruction of the USSR to be abandoned, and the penury and periodical famine to be continued, whilst waiting for the socialist revolution to take place in the capitalist countries, it seems plain that the USSR would become progressively more able to resist such an attack, the greater its advance in industrial reconstruction. To abandon the rebuilding of large-scale industry would be to render impossible any effective defence against a renewed intervention by the foreign armies.

There were two other objections to Stalin's policy that deserve notice. It was denied that the collective ownership of all the principal means of production, together with all the operations of banking and credit, combined with the collective administration of commodity distribution and of the rapidly expanding social services, constituted even progress towards the socialist state. All these things, it was said, amounted only to state capitalism, corresponding with reforms already partially adopted by parliamentary democracies. Here we have an echo of the old utopian conception of a socialism akin to the philosophic anarchism of Kropotkin, as the dream of a community without troublesome international complications; without deliberate organisation of education and public health; without the central-

isation that is indispensable in a populous community with modern means of communication; without foreign trade; without electricity; without the elaborate mechanisation of agriculture, which alone gives economic security—in short, without the means by which any extensive community can now lead a civilised life. Those who say "It is not socialism, but only state capitalism"—and they still exist in the USSR as in other countries—can only be told that everyone is free to call anything by any name that he pleases. What the proletariat of every country means by socialism is the supersession of the landlord and the capitalist, together with the profit-making motive, by collective ownership, in a condition of social equality, with the universalisation of security by the appropriate organisation of social services.

The final objection that we can disentangle from the controversy of 1924–1927 is that the pursuit of socialism in a single country meant the betrayal of the world proletariat, to whom the hope had been held out of a world revolution. It was, so Trotsky alleged, the policy of a narrow nationalist egoism, unworthy in the successors of Lenin, Engels and Marx. Better far, it was said, devote all the energies of the USSR to the tasks of the Comintern. The proper communist policy, it was urged, was to promote actively a proletarian insurrection in every country, by fomenting strikes, inciting colonial rebellions, subverting the troops, and eventually seizing power by a forcible revolution in one state after another. The answer was plain. Five years' experience had shown in 1924 that there was little promise, in Western Europe or the United States, of any early success along such a road. After all, the revolution in each country could be made only by the people of that country. Would it not be likely to produce a greater effect on the mind of the wage-earners in every advanced industrial country, and on those of the oppressed natives of every capitalist colony, if socialism were successfully established in a single great country; if it were made manifest that the landlord and the capitalist could be dispensed with, and if social equality and economic security were in that country seen to be enjoyed by every family without distinction of colour or race, class or position? The building-up of socialism in a single country was, in fact, in itself the most promising method of causing proletarian revolutions elsewhere; and of propagating

communist theories in a way to which the capitalist governments would find it difficult to take exception.

From War to Peace

We trace to the year 1928 the effective change of the policy of the Soviet Government in its foreign relations, from measures of hostility (largely through the Comintern), to measures of peace conducted by the USSR Government itself. The soviet leaders became, from that date, ever more absorbed in their gigantic task of building up the mining and manufacturing industry of their own country, in which they went from success to success. Their task proved more difficult than had been expected. The collectivisation and mechanisation of agriculture, seriously grappled with in 1928-1929, in the hope of removing permanently the menace of famine, was found to involve a severe struggle with the recalcitrant peasants, which for several years taxed to the utmost the powers of the Government and the Party, and prevented any scattering of effort in foreign parts. At the same time it became more and more evident that it was the degree of success attained in raising the standard of life in the USSR, and not the machinations of the Comintern and the local communist parties, that was most influential in the conversion to communism of the British and French working men. Moreover, on the coming of the great slump in 1929, opinion in Western Europe and the United States, notably among business men, and even among economists, showed signs of change. Many influential people began seriously to lose faith in the capitalist system, which had previously seemed so secure. The Bolsheviks came to feel, not merely that they had a strong case to put before the world, but also that their arguments were likely to prevail among the thinkers as well as among the wage-earners, and that it required only the undeniable demonstration of continued economic success in the USSR to convert to Soviet Communism a substantial part of the population of every capitalist country.

During the past seven years (1928-1935) the Soviet Government has, through its Foreign Office (Narkomindel) and its diplomatic agents, persistently striven for the establishment of genuinely peaceful relations with all foreign countries. Towards Japan, which has been guilty of provocation after provocation, in

aggressive frontier incidents, in fishery disputes, and in repeated maltreatment of the soviet officials administering the jointly owned railway through Manchuria, the Soviet Government has shown a dignified forbearance unusual among governments. It has finally sold the railway to the government which coveted it on the easiest of terms. At the same time, as the best means of averting attack, it has allowed to be known the extent of its preparations for defence, by concentration of a large fleet of bombing aeroplanes, and the accumulation of troops and all necessary stores along the Siberian railway—above all, by making the Far Eastern province as a whole, with all its garrison, self-supporting in munitions as well as in all other requisites, even if cut off from the rest of the USSR for a whole year. These measures of defence appear to have achieved their object. The Japanese General Staff seems to have recognised that they deprived the intended invasion of any prospect of success. Towards all other countries the Soviet Government has pursued a policy of appeasement. Litvinov, since 1930 in sole charge, as People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, has repeatedly informed the diplomatic world that the Soviet Government entirely accepted the view that the internal organisation of a country was a matter for its own people to decide, and that there was no reason why nations adopting different economic and political systems should not live in amity together. The Soviet Government has, with quiet persistence, concluded pacts of non-aggression with all its neighbours who were willing to join, and all but Japan and Germany have done so. It has joined the League of Nations and taken a leading part in its work. It has thrown all its weight into the attempts to secure an all-round limitation of armaments. It has even secured recognition from the United States. On the accession of Hitler to power in Germany, with his never-disavowed project of territorial expansion eastward, the Soviet Government has welcomed the conclusion of a virtual alliance for mutual defence, first with France and then also with Czechoslovakia, with the concurrence of the other members of the Little Entente. Litvinov's lengthy speech to the Central Executive Committee (TSIK) on December 20, 1933,¹ was a masterly exposition of the

¹ English translation printed in full in the pamphlet *Our Foreign Policy* (Cooperative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the USSR, Moscow, 1934).

position of international relations among all the countries of the world, in which the necessity of maintaining the utmost friendliness one with another was emphasised. "Peace is indivisible", which is Litvinov's slogan, has travelled all over the globe. Stalin himself has come forward to receive with honour and cordiality the successive ministers of foreign powers who travelled to Moscow during 1935 to cement friendly relations with a country whose martial strength and economic prosperity had demonstrably made it one of the world's Great Powers. There can be no doubt in the mind of any candid student that the policy in international relations of the Soviet Government, with the complete assent of its people, has to-day become one of non-interference and peace.¹ So far as the Soviet Government can lay down the conditions of the good life in international relations, it has done so by recognising the importance of making itself a model civilisation, which all the world will be attracted to follow; and of relying exclusively on the force of example as the most promising way of spreading soviet ideas.

This new outlook of the Soviet Government upon foreign affairs is well summarised in Litvinov's statement to the French press in July 1935. He described the three basic principles on which soviet policy was based. "First, the Soviet Government does not need land or property belonging to other countries and it therefore has no intention of making war upon anyone. Secondly, under the conditions of modern imperialism, any war must be

¹ It has been remarked by a hostile critic (H. Rollin, in his *Histoire de la révolution russe*, pp. 153-279) that Lenin was much influenced by what he learnt from the writings of Clausewitz that war is only a continuation by other means of the policy pursued in peace. It may not be too fanciful to see in the momentous change in international relations made by the soviet authorities that the peaceful measures which they adopted increasingly from 1929 onwards have been but a continuation, by other means, of their previous policy. It was never hostilities as such that they wanted, but the conversion of other nations to communism; and it came to be recognised that this was more likely to result from the economic success of the USSR, which any war would seriously disturb, and which would otherwise serve as an exemplar, than by any inculcation of insurrection. What has finally changed the situation for the Soviet Government is the emergence, during the last few years, of three powerful aggressors (Japan under its militarists, Hitler's German Reich, and Mussolini's Italy), all alike bent on acquiring additional territory at the expense of the "satiated powers", among which the Soviet Union finds itself in company with the western parliamentary democracies and the United States. The imminent danger of a war in which all Europe might be involved, and in which the USSR might be the first to be attacked, compels the Soviet Union to range itself on the side of those capitalist powers who are at the same time seeking to resist fascism and to maintain the peace of the world.

converted into a universal bloody clash and slaughter ; for under present-day conditions no war can be localised and no country is able to maintain neutrality, no matter how hard it may try. Thirdly, any war causes privations and sufferings primarily to the great masses, and the Government of the Soviet Union, which is a government of the toilers, is opposed to and hates war.”¹

The Subversive Tactics of the Comintern

What, meanwhile, has been the policy of the Comintern, and, under its influence, that of the various local communist parties in other countries ? The student of their several proceedings will, we think, conclude that, down to the end of 1934 at any rate, they continued unchanged in spirit and very little modified in substance. They were even invigorated from Moscow itself. The Sixth World Congress of the Third International, which took place at Moscow in 1928—apparently the most numerous attended of any that have been held—was a lively and disputatious gathering, which busied itself, in its 46 prolonged sessions, with interminable discussions about this or that source of dissatisfaction with the shortcomings and failures of the various local organisations.² The discussions in the Congress were dominated by Bukharin, who was, it is clear, acting as the mouthpiece of Stalin himself, with whom he professed to be in complete

¹ It will be remembered that the Soviet Government, in response to the request of the Government of the United States, gave a very definite undertaking against militant propaganda in the treaty of 1934. “Litvinov”, said Mr. Chamberlin, “gave President Roosevelt a sweeping assurance which cannot be paralleled in soviet discussions of this delicate subject with other governments. Under this assurance the Soviet Government undertakes ‘not to permit the formation or residence in its territory of any organisation or group—and to prevent the activity on its territory of any organisation or group, or of representatives or officials of any organisation or group, which has as aim the overthrow or the preparation for the overthrow of or bring about by force of a change in the political or social order of the whole or any part of the United States, its territories or possessions’ ” (*Russia's Iron Age*, by W. H. Chamberlin, 1935, p. 235).

² *The Programme of the Communist International* (New York, 1929, 96 pp.) is only one of the numerous publications in several languages giving the full text of the lengthy resolution and the rules. A verbatim report of the proceedings of all the 46 sessions was printed in successive issues of *International Press Correspondence* from July to September 1928. (A complete bound set of these issues of the French edition may be obtained from the Bureau des Éditions, Paris.) The proceedings and conclusions are critically analysed, from a special point of view, in *World Revolution and the USSR*, by Michael T. Florinsky (1934, 264 pp.).

accord. This Congress, it has been said,¹ "performed the momentous task of providing the international communist movement with a definite programme", and also with "the general lines of the policy actually to be followed by the Comintern and the Communist parties". The conclusions of the Congress were embodied in an unusually lengthy programme, extending to nearly 30,000 words, which re-stated, in substance, the Communist Manifesto of 1848, enlivened by personal denunciation or abuse of most of the socialist or labour leaders of the European countries who remained outside the Communist Party. The rules binding upon every communist party in the world were completely revised. They expressly maintained the continuous control of every affiliated party by the standing committee at Moscow; and the obligation of every party to obey all directives given by such committee. The "programme" adopted by the Congress formally prescribed, as the final stage of the local party agitation in every country, "the general strike, conjointly with armed insurrection against the state power of the bourgeoisie". "An absolutely essential condition precedent", it was laid down, was "intensified revolutionary work in the Army and Navy". Throughout all the activities "constitutional methods must unflinchingly be combined with unconstitutional methods".

So far we see no substantial change of policy from that laid down by the previous world congresses. The new feature was the emphasis laid upon the importance of building up socialism in the one country in which it had been established, and of making the communist parties of all the other countries sufficiently powerful to prevent any attack upon the Soviet Union by their several capitalist governments, whom in due course they would be able to overthrow by armed insurrection after the troops had been subverted. It was with this double object that the communist parties were to continue to wage war upon all the other organisations of the workers in their several countries. By their exposure and denunciation of the social democratic or labour parties, who persisted in vain parliamentary struggles; of the trade unions, who busied themselves with merely economic issues; and of such bourgeois intellectuals as the philosophic anarchists, the Guild Socialists and the Fabians, the communist parties were to take from all these false prophets every vestige of working-class

¹ *World Revolution and the USSR*, by Michael T. Florinsky (1934), p. 176.

support, in order to concentrate in the Communist International the complete adhesion of the entire proletariat. It was in this way that the workers of the world were to unite for the destruction of all the governments other than that of the USSR, and, by means of this destruction, for the universal establishment of communism throughout the world.

Between 1928 and 1934 the communist parties in the different countries had each its own chequered history of spasmodic agitations and incessant defeats. For seven years no world congress was held, the assembly being often announced for the ensuing year, but always being postponed. Meanwhile the presidium and secretariat of the Comintern continued in active correspondence with each affiliated party, reprimanding them all in succession for their failure to gather strength, and frequently issuing "directives" on both policy and tactics. The full executive committee met regularly twice a year, when the attendance of a few of the members representing other countries was obtained. It must suffice to say that a study of these proceedings indicates that Moscow continued to prescribe not merely lawful but also definitely illegal agitational activities, which, it was publicly boasted, were carried on in defiance of the law in many countries with which the government of the USSR stood in friendly relations, no less than in others with which there was still no diplomatic intercourse. Continual efforts were made to subvert the soldiers and sailors; political strikes were fomented; mass demonstrations were held; a "united front" with every working-class organisation was persistently demanded ("from below"), whilst the trade union and socialist leaders were nevertheless vilified and denounced as "social fascists"; and no opportunity was neglected of trying to pull down the governments of the countries with which the Narkomindel (the Soviet Foreign Office) was simultaneously seeking to promote reciprocal intercourse and a mutual advantageous exchange of products. These openly avowed and persistent hostilities, conducted in almost every way short of military operations or armed insurrection, stood out increasingly in contrast with the attempts of the Soviet Foreign Office (Narkomindel) to strengthen the friendly relations of the USSR with all the capitalist powers.¹

¹ This is all the more remarkable because Stalin has been himself continuously a member of the presidium of the Comintern, which constitutes its standing

To put the issue squarely, was it practicable to combine the slogan of "Governments of the World, unite to preserve the peace of Europe" with the slogan of the Third International in 1928, "Workers of the world, unite to destroy all the capitalist governments"?

It may well be that some inkling of these contradictory trends in the foreign relations of the Soviet Union had a depressing effect on the constant agitation of the various communist parties in their pursuit of the world revolution. At any rate we notice, after 1930, without any avowed change of policy, or even any manifest change of heart, a gradual diminution in the volume of activities, alike in the Moscow committee and in most of the communist parties of both Europe and America, the effective membership of which seems to have fallen away in numbers. There is a general indisposition, against which Moscow makes no protest, to arrange for a further world congress; and this is year after year postponed. During the whole of the seven years 1928-1934 there is no substantial change in the tone of the pronouncements of D. Z. Manuisky, who, since the removal of Zinoviev, has acted as president of the Comintern, or in the publications by its other members.¹

The New Orientation of 1935

The Seventh World Congress of the Communist International, which was at last held at Moscow in July and August 1935,

executive, and at the same time a member of the Politbureau of the Communist Party, in concert with which the foreign policy of Narkomindel is necessarily determined. Moreover, D. Z. Manuisky, who took an active part in the 1928 Congress, and who succeeded Zinoviev in acting as president of the Comintern, has publicly declared that "not one important document of big international significance was issued by the Communist International without the most active participation of Comrade Stalin in its composition" (*Stalin, a collection of reminiscences and laudations published by Ogiz, Moscow, p. 93; quoted in Russia's Iron Age, by W. H. Chamberlin, 1935, p. 178*).

¹ See *Leading the World Proletariat to New Decisive Battles*, by O. Pyatnitsky and V. Khorin (Cooperative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the USSR, Moscow, 1934, 64 pp.); *World Communists in Action*, by O. Pyatnitsky (London, 1931, 64 pp.); *Thèses et résolutions de la XI^{me} Assemblée Plénière* (Paris, 1931, 44 pp.); *Thèses and résolutions* [of the Twelfth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International] (Moscow, 1933, 36 pp.); *La Position de l'Internationale communiste devant la crise, la guerre et la fascisme*, par O. Kuusinen (Paris, 1934, 88 pp.); *The Revolutionary Crisis is Maturing*, by D. Z. Manuisky [Speech at 17th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union] (Moscow, 1934, 70 pp.).

differed in several ways from its predecessor of 1928.¹ The attendance appears to have been less than half in numbers, although the communist parties of over sixty countries were professedly represented. Although Stalin appeared on the platform at the opening meeting, and was in due course re-elected to the presidium of the Comintern, he did not address the Congress himself. It is significant that the report on the work of the Comintern as a whole, and on that of its Executive Committee, was made, not by D. Z. Manuisky, who had been acting as president, but by two of the other members (Ercoli the Italian, and Pieck the German).² The whole task of leading the Congress was entrusted, not to any soviet statesman, but to the Bulgarian Dimitrov, the hero of the German Reichstag fire trial, whose fervent speeches, though they lasted for many hours, were enthusiastically listened to. It was Dimitrov who moved the long resolution in which the Congress was assumed to formulate the new programme, and it was Dimitrov who was elected secretary of the Executive Committee to carry it into effect. At the same time it was announced that the resolution itself, together with the existing rules in which the Congress had made no alteration, stood referred to the new Executive Committee, for such alterations in them as might be called for.³

In the absence of a definitive text of the programme and rules, the change, if any, that has been effected by the 1935 Congress cannot be determined with any precision. We infer

¹ Pending the publication of an official report, the proceedings at the Congress can be most conveniently followed in the successive issues of *International Press Correspondence* from July to December 1935, as well as in the unrevised reports in the *Moscow Daily News* for these months.

² He had made a long speech to the plenum of the Executive Committee of Comintern in December 1933, describing the accession to power of Hitler, *La Lutte pour l'Allemagne des Soviets*, par Wilhelm Pieck (Bureau de Editions, Paris, 1934, 96 pp.).

³ It is an ironical comment on the ambiguities of the widely reported speeches at the World Congress of 1935, that these speeches led to a renewal of the serious diplomatic protests of the United States and some other governments against the militant propaganda of the local communist parties. What the activities of these parties during the past few years had not produced, was suddenly produced by the boastful exaggerations of their delegates to the Moscow Congress—just at the moment when the soviet statesmen were seeking to bring about the change from the tactics of war to the tactics of peace! It is these public avowals of seditious activities which, by their effect on public opinion, compel foreign governments to withdraw from friendly cooperation with the Soviet Government, perhaps even to the extent of suspending diplomatic relations.

that a definite attempt has been made by the soviet leaders to bring the whole Communist International, with its subordinate local parties, more nearly in line with the policy pursued by the Soviet Union through its Commissar of Foreign Affairs. We note that Dimitrov laid stress on the necessity for abandoning the habit of vilifying all the social democratic and trade union leaders who stood outside the local communist parties, and that he particularly blamed the confusing trick of denouncing them as "social fascists". He strongly urged that, in all countries of parliamentary democracy, the communist parties should make a sincere attempt to combine with these leaders and their organisations in a joint resistance to fascism, which was, in various forms in the different countries, the immediate enemy of all working-class movements. This "united front" was to be demanded, no longer as hitherto "from below", by incitements to the masses to revolt against their leaders, but "from above", by persuading these leaders of its urgent necessity if any working-class movement was to survive.¹ At the same time, however, Dimitrov seems to have insisted, perhaps as a sop to the prejudices of his hearers, that the local communist parties, whilst joining hands with the trade unions and the labour and socialist parties in resisting fascism—perhaps also in promoting the closer alliance of their governments with the Government of the USSR—were nevertheless to continue unrestrained their own active propaganda in favour of a complete communist revolution in their several countries, almost certainly entailing armed insurrection. Whether these or any other of Dimitrov's propositions will be expressly embodied in the programme and rules as revised by the Executive Committee is, at the time of writing, unknown.

¹ This new policy of a "united front from above" in resistance to fascism could point to one achievement of importance. The pro-fascist demonstration in the streets of Paris in February 1934, which led to the resignation of the Daladier Ministry and its replacement by a "National Government" under Doumergue, seriously alarmed all the working-class organisations. After prolonged consultations a "Pact of United Action" was signed on July 27, 1934, by the leaders of the Communist and Socialist Parties, for a joint campaign to defend democratic liberties, to prevent preparations for a new war, to abolish the ministerial decrees (issued otherwise than by direction of the Assembly), and to combat the fascist terror in Germany and Austria. In the course of the joint campaign the two parties agree not to attack or criticise each other, but otherwise each retains freedom of recruitment and propaganda "though refraining from insulting the other" (*France in Ferment*, by Alexander Werth, 1934, p. 285).

If we are correct in our inference that the soviet statesmen have attempted to bring about a radical change in the policy or tactics of the Comintern (and incidentally also in those of the Profintern), together with those of the affiliated communist parties in the parliamentary democracies, we think the decision a wise one. The events of the past decade indicate that there is no likelihood of any early communist revolution in any of these parliamentary democracies, or in any of their colonial dependencies. There is a nearer danger, in one or other country, of drastic repression of any working-class activities, with new statutory restrictions of democratic liberties. Even an outbreak of war among the European powers, which would endanger the progress of the Soviet Union and might even destroy the civilisation of Great Britain and France, affords, in the present state of education among the masses, no prospect of the establishment of a communist social order upon the ruins that the war would leave. If it were possible to avert these dangers by bringing about an effective unity among all the working-class organisations within each nation, if only a unity for defensive action, the gain would be great. Such a defensive unity would bring, not only the communist parties, but also the other working-class organisations of the western world, into line with the policy in international relations which Stalin and Litvinov have been pursuing during the past five years.

The United Front from Above

We cannot say that the prospect of obtaining such a unity in any country but France (and permanently not even throughout all France) is at all bright. To begin with, it remains to be seen whether the new policy of the Comintern will be promulgated by the Executive Committee in the clear and unambiguous language, without evasive reservations, that alone would be likely to ensure its genuine adoption by the communist parties in the various countries. With relatively few exceptions, these parties are not made up of the right sort of people. For the most part they are, at any rate, the very opposite of the elaborately instructed, strictly disciplined and willingly obedient men and women whom Lenin enrolled as professional revolutionaries in the Bolshevik party of 1903-1914. Whilst many of them in various countries

have displayed the utmost courage and devotion, even to the point of martyrdom for the cause, it is rebellion that is in their blood, not social reconstruction ; it is combating their enemies that they are after, not converting these opponents to communism. If, whilst not actually opposing or denouncing the other working-class organisations with whom they were joined in defensive alliance, they kept up, as they have hitherto done, a constant carping criticism of the separate action of the trade unions, or of the parliamentary activities of the labour and socialist parties, the defensive alliance would have neither strength nor stability. Will the Executive Committee at Moscow have the determination and the ability to make clear to these parties, without ambiguity or reservation, the imperative need of a change in tactics ?

For our own part, we doubt whether it is practicable in the western democracies for any effective defensive alliance against fascism to be established among organisations so different in character and immediate objects as the trade unions, the socialist and labour political parties, and the communist parties affiliated to the Third International. Still more do we doubt whether in the western democracies the communist parties affiliated to the Third International can obtain through such a " united front " any substantial accession of strength for their avowed object of bringing about the establishment of a communist social order. For this doubt there seem to us to be two grounds. In the first place, such a defensive alliance among disparate and mutually antagonistic organisations, appealing for the allegiance of the masses of the people, serves rather to emphasise these differences, and may even make for the continuance of their common rivalry in pursuit of their several objects. This continuance of rival organisations may well interfere with, or even prevent the emergence of, a national organisation wholly devoted to the establishment of a communist social order, of a kind congenial to the aspirations of the particular country, and therefore able to make such an appeal to the masses of the people as would cause its more impotent rivals to wither away. There is reason to think that only after a coalescence into such a single united party could any of the western democracies, by parliamentary action, be transformed into a communist social order.

"Orders from Moscow"

There is the gravest ground for doubt whether the communist parties affiliated to the Third International could ever themselves attain the position of a single united party of the masses in any of the western democracies. We see no chance of any of these communist parties securing either the coalescence with itself of the other organisations claiming working-class support, or absorbing into its ranks the mass of the members adhering to them. The peoples of the western democracies, like those of the Scandinavian countries and Switzerland, will not stand government, or even authoritative direction, from a foreign capital, even if that capital is under a government with whose policy they are generally in sympathy. Experience indicates that no popular movement will ever become powerful in any country, or at least in any in which the Protestant religion has prevailed, if it is believed to take its orders from, or to be controlled by, the governing group of any foreign country. It was not the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church against which our Plantagenet and Tudor rulers so often rebelled in England, but specifically against "government from Rome". It might even be argued that the Roman Catholic Church has become more successful in its missionary efforts in Protestant countries since it became unconnected with the Roman government. There is reason to believe that communism would, in many countries, spread faster if it were not supposed to involve government from Moscow. "We are not going to take our orders from Moscow" is the spoken or unspoken reaction of any assembly of British workmen towards any resolution proposed by a member of the British Communist Party repudiating the policy or defaming the character of the chosen leaders of the socialist or trade union or cooperative movement of Great Britain. Our conclusion is that, somehow or other, the appearance and the fact of "orders from Moscow" must be dropped out of communist propaganda.¹ Is it not chiefly a

¹ It does not seem that Lenin insisted on "government from Moscow". We find him saying that "There is one, and only one kind of real internationalism; hard work at developing the revolutionary movement and the revolutionary struggle *in one's own land*, and the *support* (by propaganda, sympathy and material aid) of such, and only such struggles and policies in every country without exception". Thus he did not always insist on the local activities being *directed*, still less *governed* from Moscow (*Lenin's Collected Works*, vol. xx. Book I. of 1929, American edition; see *New Minds, New Men?* by Thomas Woody, New York, 1932, p. 257).

mistaken adherence to an "orthodoxy" of the past that prevents the Comintern from making it clear that it now restricts its relations with the various communist parties to offering them such "information, sympathy and material aid" as they may from time to time desire; while disclaiming all intention or desire to direct or control their local activities? It is the people of each country who will insist on themselves directing their own policy and that of their government. It is only by the conversion of each people to communism, of the brand which it may prefer, that communism of any kind will spread. Is it too paradoxical to suggest that the soviet statesmen are coming to recognise that it is the Third International itself, with its insistence upon the dictation to all peoples, or at any rate to the communist parties of all countries of one particular social order, that excites repulsion?¹ There seems much to be said for the view that the conversion to communism of the peoples of other countries—and therefore the world revolution for which Lenin and his colleagues vainly looked in 1918—is likely to come about more quickly by the successful building up of the socialist state in the USSR, and the discovery of this success by the thinkers as well as by the working masses of the other countries, than by any dictatorial instigation of the Comintern itself. A cool observer of the world's public opinion might well conclude that, at the present time, Moscow's most effective agents for converting both Europe and America to communism are not the Communist International and its affiliated communist parties, but VOKS and Intourist;² the periodical theatre and musical festivals that attract so many appreciative visitors; and especially the various international conferences which force the chemists, the physiologists, the doctors, the educationists, the engineers and other specialists in all the countries of the world to compare the relative progress in their particular technologies of the USSR with their own lands.³

¹ Was this the reason for the repeated postponement of the Seventh World Congress, which ought to have been held in 1930 but was not summoned until 1935?

² VOKS is the Society for Promoting Cultural Relations with other countries; and Intourist is the government tourist agency.

³ Another kind of international organisation might with advantage be added. Socialism and communism have passed beyond the stage of mere rebellion, easily to be confused with anarchism. The Soviet Government has come to a position of commanding influence in world affairs. Socialist administrations are actually in office in several other countries. In others there are socialist oppositions awaiting only an electoral victory to assume ministerial office. Hundreds of cities in France, Great Britain and other countries are

A New World Order

We note that there are critics of the Soviet Government who assert that its change over in international relations from a policy of war to a policy of peace for the sake of a quick success in its own country, was a "betrayal of the world proletariat". Such critics take the change to mean that the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union have deliberately given up the aim that Lenin pursued of "world communism"—of eventually bringing about in every capitalist country a "classless society", based on social equality and universal economic security, in the midst of plenty for all men, irrespective of race or colour; thereby not merely spreading everywhere the conditions of the Good Life, but also superseding war between nations. This accusation is unfounded. Those who are leading and directing soviet policy to-day are not less fervent than Lenin in the desire for world communism, and in the belief that it will be brought about. On the contrary, their belief and their desire have alike been confirmed and strengthened. Lenin, following Marx, looked to the future solely with the eye of faith. Stalin

governed by socialist municipal councils. Experience has proved that it is not practicable to combine for political purposes the representatives of governments with those of agitational groups, many of them "illegal". What seems suggested is a new body in which socialist or communist statesmen and municipal administrators (in general agreement about eliminating the landlord and the capitalist, and dispensing with the incentive of private profit) could periodically compare experiences, and discuss the relations of the trade union and cooperative movements to the political government, and the many problems of a collectivist administration, in each of the branches of social organisation, such as education, health, the conditions of labour in mining, manufacturing and agriculture respectively, taxation, credit and currency, international relations, and the prospects of a world government. Such a periodical conference, meeting successively in the different state capitals that would welcome it; holding separate sessions for the several subjects; and regarding itself exclusively as a scientific body, would constitute a worthy crown to the various institutes in the social sciences established or assisted by the several governments. If it were attended by the ministers, ex-ministers and probable future ministers of the several departments in the various countries, and if socialist or communist specialist experts in the subjects concerned were invited to contribute reports and papers, it would not be necessary to come to any agreement on any issue, and, following the practice of scientific conferences, not even to pass any resolutions. The object would not be the outvoting of minorities by majorities, but the discovery of truth. The validity of the conclusions arrived at on the several subjects could, anyhow, not be determined by the delegates' votes. The papers and discussions themselves would advance the knowledge of those on whom, in each country, the responsibility of action must fall; and thus contribute more powerfully to the building up of the various socialist states of the world, than any amount of agitation.

and his colleagues feel that to them it has been given to add to this vision the solid basis of achievement—achievement in no small measure of the actual building of the socialist state over one-sixth of the world's surface, among what will shortly be 200 millions of people, of vastly differing races and of every stage of civilisation from sheer savagery to a culture inferior to none. With so much achievement in little more than a decade, Soviet Communism cannot but stride forward with ever-growing confidence in the spread of its doctrine.

What has happened to the international policy of the Soviet Union during the past seven years is not a change of aim but a change of tactics. The objective remains the same ; but about the procedure by which it can be reached with the least delay there has been a change of mind, perhaps even a change of heart. Soviet statesmen have been compelled to realise that no progress was being made towards the outbreak of communist revolutions in the western democracies, still less was there any hope of such insurrections attaining any immediate success. Some at least of these statesmen recognise the futility of seeking to manœuvre the workers of other countries, with quite other traditions, and enjoying a standard of life and a measure of freedom and economic security far greater than those of tsarist Russia, into attempting a violent revolution in their several communities, probably entailing a disastrous civil war. On the other hand stands an alternative method of propaganda, that of erecting a shining example of socialism in a single country, which can be imitated elsewhere, and which is already extorting, even from a prejudiced and reluctant world, an ever-increasing curiosity, interest and admiration. It is, we believe, the large measure of success of this kind already obtained by the tactics of peace that has persuaded the soviet statesmen more and more steadfastly to abandon the tactics of war, in their unfaltering pursuit of their original aim of a communism extending the whole world over. It is, in short, by means of their own devotion to the establishment of the Good Life, not only in their own country, but also in its relations to other countries, that they are now hoping and expecting to see it adopted elsewhere. In the following epilogue we venture to give our answer to the question whether the world is not here witnessing the emergence of a new civilisation.

EPILOGUE

A NEW CIVILISATION ?

As we have seen, the Bolsheviks consider that what they are doing among the 170 millions of people of the USSR is much more than introducing them to newspapers and books, the theatre and the opera ; or improving their health, and increasing their wealth production. What they believe themselves to be establishing in the world is nothing less than a new civilisation.

Now there is no generally accepted definition of what amount or kind of change in the manner of living among a whole people constitutes a different civilisation. Nevertheless it is commonly recognised that certain contemporary communities are, in the aggregate, sufficiently unlike to warrant us in speaking of them as distinct civilisations. Thus, there is substantial agreement that the Chinese, the Hindus, the Moslems and the Christianised white Europeans (including their descendants in other continents) belong to different civilisations. Moreover, within historic times, other civilisations have existed and passed away. We need only instance the Sumerian and the Egyptian ; to which some would add, as equally distinctive, the civilisations of Troy and of Tyre, of Etruria and of Carthage, and doubtless those of other defunct communities that further archaeological researches may uncover.

It is plain that many different factors may enter into the making of a distinctive civilisation.¹ To some the most im-

¹ The word "civilisation" is sometimes used in the singular to denote the progress of human society from primitive to civilised ; and sometimes in the plural in order to distinguish one civilisation from another. Thus Professor Arnold Toynbee in his brilliant and erudite *Study of History*, vols. i.-iii., enumerates (after dismissing the 600-odd primitive societies) 27 distinct civilisations within historic times, of which 5 survive to-day. These are : Western Civilisation, which, as he observes, has succeeded in embracing within its system

portant seems the nature and character of its particular religion. Those communities in which Christianity has been dominant stand out from the rest. In other instances, as in China, racial characteristics afford the most noticeable difference. What may be called the political organisation of a community has sometimes—for instance, in feudalism—served as the mark of a distinct civilisation. Even more distinctive of different manners of life may be the economic organisation, as in the contrast between

not only Europe and North America, but also all navigable seas, and all the ports of the world; and four other extant civilisations, the Islamic, Hindu, Far Eastern and "Orthodox" Christianity. This last example of an extant civilisation is difficult to identify to-day, as the Greek Orthodox Church, as distinct from the Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches, which characterise what he calls Western Civilisation, barely exists now that the vast Eurasian continent has rejected its creed and code of conduct. Perhaps Professor Toynbee sees a survival of Christianity in the communist's aim of "from each according to his faculty, and to each according to his need".

On the other hand, H. T. Buckle, in his famous *History of Civilisation in England* (1857), seems to regard "civilisation" as taking different forms, largely determined in the past by different climatic environments, but distinguished in its latest and most developed form by the rise of science as a way of controlling nature.

Seignobos, the French historian, divides "civilisation" into ancient and modern. He makes the end of ancient civilisation to be the death of Charlemagne; but he also differentiates mediaeval civilisation from contemporary civilisation. He even mentions that, in the eleventh century, the world was divided into two civilisations: the West, with its miserably small towns, cabins of peasants, rude fortresses, etc.; and the East, with Constantinople, Cairo, Bagdad, Damascus—the Moslem and Byzantian worlds being far better built, better policed and more enlightened than the western world. "By contact with the orientals the people of the west became civilised" (see his *History of Mediaeval Civilisation*, pp. 110-117; also his *History of Civilisation: Contemporary*).

In the *Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire*, by A. Rostovtzeff, the author describes the decay of ancient civilisations, which he attributes (1) to the penetration of lower classes and lower races into the government of the Roman Empire; and (2) to the rise of the Christian religion, which distracted men's minds from perfecting human life in this world, to securing personal salvation in the next (see chapter i.). His conclusion is significant: "The evolution of the ancient world has a lesson and a warning for us. Our civilisation will not last unless it be a civilisation, not of one class but of the masses. The oriental civilisations were more stable and lasting than the Greco-Roman, because, being chiefly based on religion, they were nearer to the masses. Another lesson is that violent attempts at levelling have never helped to uplift the masses. They have destroyed the upper classes, and resulted in accelerating the process of barbarisation. But the ultimate problem remains like a ghost, ever present and unalaid. Is it possible to extend a higher civilisation to the lower classes without debasing its standard and diluting its quality to the vanishing point? Is not every civilisation bound to decay as soon as it begins to penetrate the masses?" (*ibid.* p. 486). This reminds us of one of the paradoxical dicta of Bernard Shaw that the conversion of savages to Christianity has involved the conversion of Christianity to savagery.

communities living mainly by hunting or fishing, or by rearing cattle, or by cultivating the soil; and those engaging extensively in commerce, or, with the constantly increasing use of power-driven machinery, in mining and manufacturing. Or we may notice whether the several families of a community habitually work for themselves; or whether, as slaves, serfs or wage-labourers, the majority serve the owners of the means of production.

For our present purpose there is no need to discuss all known or possible civilisations. It will suffice to start from the common division of the three thousand years' history of Europe since the days of Homer into the three successive civilisations that are covered respectively by the story of Greece and Rome; by the widespread adoption of Christianity and feudalism; and by the modern world from 1492 down to our own day. Everyone is familiar with the characteristics of contemporary civilisation of this specifically European kind, which has undoubtedly resulted in great progress and has been carried by white settlers, traders or travellers all over the world. It will suffice to emphasise its four main features. First in date stands the Christian religion, with the code of conduct that it inculcates. Then, increasingly after the fifteenth century, comes the so-called capitalist system of the private ownership of property, notably in the means of production, to be utilised, under the direction of the owners, upon the incentive of the making of profit either by the employment of workers at wages or by trading in goods; or latterly, by the manipulation of money and credit by the financiers. Further we notice, continuously during the past two centuries, even if apparently momentarily arrested, a widespread trend towards government on the system of parliamentary democracy. Finally we have to note during the past hundred years, as peculiar to this particular civilisation, an unprecedented increase, through knowledge, of man's command over Nature, along with an increasing application of science, under the influence of humane feeling, to the amelioration of the lot of some sections of the poor. Such being the starting-point, the question that is asked is whether what is developing in the USSR since 1917 is so markedly different from the manner of life in the England or the France or the United States of the past three or four centuries as to justify calling it a new civilisation. Let us try to set out the features in which

Soviet Communism differs essentially from the characteristic civilisation of the western world of to-day.

The Abolition of Profit-Making

We place first in far-reaching importance the complete discarding, as the incentive to production, of the very mainspring of the western social order, the motive of profit-making. Instead of admiring those who successfully purchase commodities in order to sell them again at a higher price (whether as merchant or trader, wholesale dealer or retailer), Soviet Communism punishes such persons as criminals, guilty of the crime of "speculation".¹ Instead of rewarding or honouring those (the capitalist employers or entrepreneurs) who engage others at wages in order to make a profit out of the product of their labour, Soviet Communism punishes them as criminals, guilty, irrespective of the amount of the wages that they pay, of the crime of "exploitation". It would be difficult to exaggerate the difference that this one change in ideology (in current views of morality as well as in criminal law) has made in the manner of life within the USSR. No one can adequately realise, without a wide study of the facts of soviet life, what this fundamental transformation of economic relationships has meant, alike to the vast majority of the poor and to the relatively small minority who formerly "lived by owning", or by employing others for profit.

The change has not had the particular results anticipated by our capitalist reasoning. It has not meant compulsion to take service under the government as the only employer.² It has not prevented millions of individuals from working independently, or in voluntary partnerships, for their own or their family's subsistence. It does not forbid either the independent producers or the producing partnerships to sell the product of their own labour in the public market, or by contract, for any price they can get. It has not involved the abolition of personal property, or any compulsion to have all things in common. It has not prevented inequality of possessions, or of incomes, or even differences of earnings. The payment of interest on government

¹ Compare the mediaeval crime of "regrating", and the sin of usury; as to which see *The Acquisitive Society*, by Professor R. H. Tawney (1921).

² See Chapter III. in Part I., "Man as a Producer", and Chapter IX. in Part II., "In Place of Profit".

loans, and the receipt of interest on deposits in the savings bank, have not ceased. But the habit of able-bodied persons living without work has become disgraceful, however great may be their savings or their other possessions ; and the class of wealthy families, whether as owners of land, employers of labour or rentiers and financiers, has ceased to exist. More important still is that the control of the instruments of wealth production by individuals seeking to enrich themselves, and the power of the landlord and the capitalist over those whom they can employ at wages, or from whom they can exact rent, has passed away.

The Planning of Production for Community Consumption

The abolition of profit-making as the incentive to the capitalist entrepreneur, together with the transfer to collective ownership of the principal means of production thereby involved, made indispensable the deliberate planning of the production of commodities and services. Instead of the individual capitalists producing what they severally thought they could make profit out of, and incidentally vying with each other to satisfy the desires of such consumers as could, by having the means to pay the price, make their demand " effective ", some national authority had to work out statistically and communicate to each factory or mine its own particular share of exactly what the whole community of consumers, irrespective of their means, needed and desired. For this purpose every factory or mine, every farm or oil-field, every institute or office, and indeed every enterprise, whether industrial or cultural, now makes a return showing what machinery and materials it is using, and what commodities and services it has been and expects to be producing, to be compared with next year's aggregate needs and desires of the whole community. This enormous calculation, which was, in every other country, thought to be beyond human capacity, is, as we have described,¹ actually performed in the USSR by the State Planning Commission (Gosplan), in incessant consultation with the powerful All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions, the highly organised Consumers' Cooperative Movement, and the several People's Commissars directing the tens of thousands of

¹ Chapter VIII. in Part II., " Planned Production for Community Consumption ".

separately administered factories, mines, oil-fields, state farms, warehouses, ships, railways and what not. We cannot discuss again whether or to what extent this gigantic planning is successful in ensuring that every person in the USSR gets the commodities and services that he needs or desires.¹ But if we notice that the work of Gosplan does, in fact, relieve the USSR from the alternation of booms and slumps that characterise the capitalist world—still more if we realise that this deliberate planning of all production for community consumption ensures the complete abolition of involuntary mass unemployment, whether “technological” or “cyclical”—we can hardly deny that the new system effects a startling transformation in the economic relationships of the whole community, which has changed the very mentality of the producers, whether administrators, technicians or manual workers. The highly organised trade unions of the USSR, containing over 18 million members, are not only whole-heartedly in favour of increasing the productivity of labour by such devices as piece-work rates, cost-accounting, and competing among themselves as to who can make the greatest output at the lowest labour-cost, but are also constantly pressing for the adoption of more and more labour-saving inventions, in order that the machine may increasingly become the slave of mankind. This is because there is no longer any conflict of interests in production. Whether between enterprises or between grades or kinds of workers or producers, there is, as is commonly said in the USSR, no enemy party; no person’s gain is rooted in another person’s loss. Every individual engaged in production, whether of commodities or of services, benefits materially by increased or improved production, and by the zealous and efficient service of every other producer. When it is realised that everybody’s share of the aggregate net product is made actually greater by any increase or improvement of that product, it is actually and visibly to everybody’s pecuniary interest that no one should be inefficient, no one idle, no one negligent, no one sick. There is a universal and continuous incentive to every producer, whether manual worker or technician, to improve his qualifications, and to render the utmost service, in order to increase the common wage fund, which is wholly divided without any tribute to landlord or capitalist, among the whole body of producers, according to the sharing arrange-

¹ Chap. VIII. in Part II., “Planned Production for Community Consumption.”

ments that the whole body of producers themselves make. Hence the eager zeal and devotion of the "shock brigades" (udarniki) to do more work than is customary, and the public honours that are accorded to them. Hence the unpaid service of the "Saturdayers" (subbotniki), who give up their free time to clearing off arrears in any enterprise that lags behind its programme. Hence the "socialist competitions" in which shifts or brigades, factories or oil-fields, ships or state farms, and even municipalities and republics, enter into formal agreements to vie with one another as to which can achieve the greatest output or create the least "scrap", or build the greatest number of new schools, or establish the most technical classes, or erect the most new dwellings over a given period. And most remarkable of all, from the angle of western competitive sportsmanship, it is from the same unity of interest that springs the custom of the winning team in these competitions making it a matter of honour immediately to proceed to the assistance of the losing team, in order to teach those who have failed in the competition how they can improve their production so as not again to fall behind that of the winners. The unity of pecuniary interest extends, in fact, to all the various enterprises in the USSR. Each becomes eager to help every other enterprise, whether of the same or of any different kind, to attain the greatest possible product, because it is the aggregate net product of all the enterprises in the USSR that provides not only all the social services (the socialised wage) but also the wage-fund to be shared among the producers (the personal wage); so that not only the divisible income of each enterprise, but also that of the other enterprises, and thus the share of all the producers of all kinds and grades in all the enterprises, ultimately depends upon the total net output of the whole of them.

Social Equality and Universalism

It is claimed that the whole social organisation of Soviet Communism is based upon a social equality that is more genuine and more universal than has existed in any other community. To engage in socially useful work, according to capacity, is a universal duty. It is a distinct novelty in social life that there should be no exemption from this duty in favour of the possessors

of wealth or the owners of land, the holders of high offices, or those having exceptional intellectual or artistic gifts or attainments, the geniuses or the popular favourites. Work, like leisure, has to be shared by all able to join in social service. There is only a single social grade in the USSR, that of a producer by hand or by brain; including, however, those so young that they can only prepare themselves for becoming producers, and those so aged or so infirm as only to be able to look back on the work they did in their strength. This is what is meant by the "classless society", in which each serves in accordance with his ability, and is provided for appropriately to his needs.

The depth of the difference between this manner of living and that of capitalist states is scarcely to be fathomed. But it involves the very opposite of uniformity or identity among all men. It not only allows, but even actively encourages and promotes, the utmost development of individuality in social service. Nor does it produce an exact equality of earnings or other income; although the prohibition of profit-making by "speculation", or "exploitation", and the collective ownership of all the principal means of production, coupled with drastically progressive income taxes and death duties on exceptional individual fortunes, effectively prevent the gross inequalities which threaten the stability of states in which millionairism is not only tolerated but allowed to become a plutocracy.

But the principle of social equality goes much further than community in work and leisure, common schooling and games, with a constant approximation to substantial equality of standards of income and expenditure. It extends, in a manner and to a degree unknown elsewhere, to the relations between the sexes, and within the family group. Husbands and wives, parents and children, teachers and scholars, like friends of different sexes, or of not too unequal incomes, like managers and factory operatives, administrators and typists, and even army officers and the rank and file, live in an atmosphere of social equality and of freedom from servility or "inferiority complex" that is unknown elsewhere. What is still more unique is the absence of prejudice as to colour or race. The hundred or more different races and language groups of the USSR of nearly all shades of colour, including the wildest nomads and the most rooted townsmen, the

most urbane diplomatists and the most primitive barbarians, enjoy not only complete identity of legal and political rights, but also the fullest equality of freedom in economic and social relations. Wherever schools exist at all, those living within reach are educated in common; they work together at wage-rates differentiated only by differences in the tasks; they use the same public conveyances, the same hotels and holiday homes, the same public utilities; they join the same trade unions and other voluntary associations; they sit side by side in the lecture-rooms, libraries, theatres and cinemas. They form mutual friendships irrespective of race or colour, and intermarry freely. Again, there is no imposition of a central pattern. On the contrary, the cardinal bond of the Soviet Union is the guarantee to each "national minority" of its own "cultural autonomy". Each maintains its own vernacular, its own schools, its own newspapers, its own publishing houses, its own theatres; and they are all specially assisted to do so out of federal funds. What is more, each of the dozens of constituent or autonomous republics making up the USSR freely elects or appoints, if it chooses, its own people to the local representative bodies and to the local offices, and is vigorously incited and encouraged to do so by the Government at Moscow. It would be hard to overestimate the sense of freedom and equality—far exceeding that of the corresponding arrangements as to "natives" in analogous dependencies of other states—produced by this effective cultural autonomy and local government by officials of one's own race.

There is yet another feature in the social equality of the civilisation of the Soviet Union which we term "universalism". Other communities have willingly acquiesced in the fact that the advantages and amenities which their civilisation provides, including most of the luxuries of life, do not reach the poorest or weakest, or least developed, or least thrifty or least well-conducted members of the community. The current economic and social arrangements do not enable these unfortunates to reach the same standard of health and education, or to attain the same longevity or intellectual development, or even to procure the amount of food, clothing and shelter, that is deemed necessary and normal among the more favoured classes. A few such communities are, in the twentieth century, just beginning to realise these features of the inequality in which their social life is rooted. It is a

distinctive feature of the social arrangements of the Soviet Union¹ that, to a degree unparalleled elsewhere, they provide for every person, irrespective of wealth or position, sex or race, the poorest and weakest as well as those who are "better off", in all cases equality of opportunity for the children and adolescents, and, increasingly, also a common and ever-rising standard of living for the whole population. This is well seen in the sphere of education. Other communities, especially during the past century or two, have striven to create educated, and even cultivated classes within the nation. The Soviet Union is the first to strive, without discrimination of sex or race, affluence or position, to produce not merely an intelligentsia but a cultivated nation.

A Novel Representative System

In every community of any magnitude, social organisation has to include a system by means of which the desires and the common will of the population can be expressed. In contrast with every other community, the USSR has evolved a complex and multiform representative system of complete originality, based upon the principle of universal participation in public affairs, under the guidance of a highly organised leadership of a unique kind. As we have described,² man is represented in three separate capacities, as a citizen, as a producer and as a consumer. In each case the franchise is the widest in the world, though with peculiar and steadily dwindling disqualifications, whilst the extent to which the entire population actually participates in elections is without parallel. The representative system has hitherto been, above the 70,000 village or city soviets, one of indirect election; but it was in 1935 decided to replace this by direct election upon a franchise uniform among both sexes, all races, and every kind of occupation, throughout the USSR.

It is impossible to enumerate all the channels, and it would be difficult to exaggerate the extent, of the participation in the public affairs of the Soviet electorate of over 90 millions of men and women. The characteristic multiformity of every kind of soviet organisation, economic or political, together with its three-

¹ See Chapter X. in Part II., "The Remaking of Man".

² See Chapter II., "Man as a Citizen"; Chapter III., "Man as a Producer"; Chapter IV., "Man as a Consumer", all in Part I.; also Chapter IX. in Part II., "In Place of Profit".

fold system of representation, and the omnicompetence, as regards powers and functions, of each tier of councils in its ubiquitous local government, are in vivid contrast with the dominance of the parliamentary systems of the western world. To begin with, the universal electorate in the USSR does a great deal more than elect. At its incessant meetings it debates and passes resolutions by the hundred thousand, in which it expresses its desires on great matters and on small; by way of instructions or suggestions to the "deputies" whom it chooses and can at any time withdraw by a vote of "recall", and who habitually take notice of these popular requirements, even when it is not found immediately practicable to carry them into effect. Nor does the participation in public affairs end with the perpetual discussions in which the Russian delights. In every village, as in every city, a large part of the detailed work of public administration is actually performed, not as in France or Great Britain or the United States, by paid officials, and not even, as in small or primitive communities, by the elected deputies or councillors, but by a far larger number of the adult inhabitants themselves, as part of the universally expected voluntary social service.

The same characteristic multiformity and popular participation prevails also in the extensive and highly organised trade unionism, in which are voluntarily included five-sixths of all the persons employed at wages or salaries, whatever their occupations or grade or remuneration. The trade unions by no means confine themselves to their extensive collective bargaining over wages and hours, and other conditions of employment, which far exceeds that of the trade unions elsewhere, together with their active share in the administration of the factory or the mine.¹ For instance, it is to the trade union organisation that is now committed not only the control but also the actual administration of the colossal services of social insurance, which are more extensive and costly than those in any other country, and to which the workers make no individual contribution. This huge administration is carried on, not wholly or even mainly by the paid officials whom the trade unions appoint, or by the committees which they elect, but personally, without remuneration, by something like 100,000 "activists" among the trade unionists themselves as part of their social service.

¹ See Chapter III. in Part I., "Man as a Producer".

The Consumers' Cooperative Movement, which numbers over 70 million members, displays a like multiformity of organisation, and a similar personal participation by its vast membership, in the complicated business of distributing over the huge area of the USSR the greater part of its food and other commodities.

Yet another variety is exhibited by the immense and highly differentiated voluntary associations, sometimes numbering even millions of members apiece. These multifarious self-governing associations, which often enjoy financial subventions, undertake public service of one or other kind ; partly educational, partly propagandist, including also sports and games of every description, along with music, painting, dancing and acting, as well as active cooperation with various branches of government service, from the promotion of science and art up to the assistance of the defence forces.

The Vocation of Leadership

All the diversity of participation in the universal multiformity of organisation which distinguishes the USSR from every other country makes more than usually indispensable that leadership without which democracy, in any of its forms, is but a mob. It is on this point that the actual constitution of the Soviet Union, which is not completely written in any statute, differs most substantially from every other known to political science. In the USSR the function of affording to the population the necessary guidance of public affairs is assumed by a voluntary but highly organised and strictly disciplined Vocation of Leadership, which calls itself the Communist Party. It is, as we have explained,¹ unlike anything that the western world understands by the term "party" in the political sense. Far from seeking to enrol everyone professing agreement with its policy or "voting its ticket" or subscribing to its funds, the Communist Party of the USSR has a strictly limited membership, amounting to less than 3 per cent of the electorate, or less than 2 per cent of the census population, recruited exclusively by cooption, after prolonged probation, on qualifications of character, ability and zeal coupled with ungrudging acceptance of the existing régime. We need not repeat our description of the way in which this peculiar companionship is organised on the common pattern of indirect election ; nor

¹ Chapter VI. in Part I., "The Vocation of Leadership".

yet that of the higher standard of personal conduct than is expected from the ordinary citizen to which its members are held. Perhaps its most significant difference from the political parties of western politics may be found in the manner in which it maintains this standard by incessant corporate supervision, supplemented every few years by a systematic public examination of the entire vocation, and the drastic "purging" out of all backsliders and offenders, even to the extent of a fifth of the membership at a time. With its voluntarily assumed special obligations of "poverty" (limitation of salary by a common maximum) and "obedience" (willingness to undertake any service imposed by its own corporate authority), as well as in its enforcement of discipline only by the penalties of reprimand and expulsion, the Communist Party of the USSR may be thought to resemble in structure the typical religious order of the Roman Catholic or the Greek Orthodox Church. But unlike the monastic orders, the Communist Party employs its members exclusively in the secular occupations of citizenship; more than half of them continuing their work at the bench or in the mine, and some 40 per cent filling the administrative or other offices to which they get elected or appointed. There is, however, a spiritual difference. It is an absolute condition of membership that the candidates must be free from any vestige of belief in supernaturalism, and that they must continue to adhere to "Marxism", as from time to time authoritatively determined.¹ Since the offering of guidance in public affairs by political leaders is an inevitable feature of civilised society, we may classify the Communist Party of the USSR as a professional association voluntarily qualifying itself specially for the exercise of this function, analogous to any other organised scientific profession.² For in the Soviet Union it is claimed that political science takes the place of the electioneering ballyhoo called politics in our western states.

¹ Moreover, the Communist Party in the USSR is unlike the religious order in not being subject to any chief imposed upon it from without, and being democratically governed by its own membership, dispersed in some 130,000 Primary Party organs, which elect a pyramid of tiers of committees, rising up to an All-Union Conference, with its central committee and sub-committees; Stalin, whom foreigners are apt to think of as a dictator, being merely the principal secretary to the organisation, a post from which he could at any moment be dismissed by the highest committee.

² It is interesting to recall that essentially such a Vocation of Leadership, termed the Order of the Samurai, was suggested by Mr. H. G. Wells in 1905 in his book entitled *A Modern Utopia*.

Such an assumption of leadership and guidance in public affairs by a carefully selected, deliberately organised and strictly disciplined vocation plainly constitutes a fundamental difference between the USSR and every other community. Elsewhere this function of leadership and guidance is assumed, often without avowal, by monarchs, aristocracies, churches, military castes or, more recently, by the shifting juntas or groups, termed cabinets or parliaments, composed mostly of landowners, capitalist employers, financiers, merchants, bureaucrats, lawyers or mere accumulators of wealth, with more or less pretence of ascertaining and understanding the desires of the people at large, but to the habitual exclusion of more than a handful of the small peasants and manual working wage-earners who make up two-thirds of the population.

We need not here attempt to measure the success or to estimate the value of this exceptional Vocation of Leadership, which may well be deemed the dominant political feature of Soviet Communism. The student of the past couple of decades of the USSR will not go far wrong if he ascribes to the outstanding members of the Communist Party the initiative and the decision issuing in nearly all the achievements, as well as some of the shortcomings, of the administration since the Revolution of 1917. Nor do we undervalue the passionate zeal and devotion of the far-flung membership when we suggest that it is the peculiar form of organisation of this Vocation of Leadership, which seems to have been devised and principally worked out by Lenin and Stalin themselves, that is responsible for much of the amazing degree of success against immense difficulties which our preceding chapters have had to recount. Nevertheless, as we have described in the preceding chapter, this concentration of authority in a highly disciplined Vocation has had its drawbacks; there has been an atmosphere of fear among the intelligentsia, a succession, within the Party, of accusations and counter-accusations, a denial to dissentient leaders of freedom of combination for the promotion of their views, and among the less intelligent of the rank and file, no small amount of the chronic disease of orthodoxy.

The Cult of Science

One of the differences between the soviet civilisation and that of other countries is the way in which science is regarded. Unlike the groups of landed proprietors, lawyers, merchants, bureaucrats,

soldiers and journalists in command of most other states, the administrators in the Moscow Kremlin genuinely believe in their professed faith. And their professed faith is in science. No vested interests hinder them from basing their decisions and their policy upon the best science they can obtain. Moreover, under the guidance of the Communist Party, public opinion in the Soviet Union has come, to an extent unparalleled elsewhere, to be overwhelmingly in favour of making the utmost use of science as manifested in labour-saving and wealth-producing machines and invention. The whole community is eager for new knowledge. There is no country, we imagine, in which so large and so varied an amount of scientific research is being carried on at the public expense, alike in the realm of abstract theory and in that of technology. There is certainly none in which there is so little chance of that frustration of science by the profit-making instinct of which the British and American scientists are now complaining.¹

This intense preoccupation, and even obsession, with science in the USSR has steadily increased during the past six years of the successive Five-Year Plans—significantly enough, just at the time when even the United States has shut down much of its scientific activity. Nor is this contrast surprising. In the USSR the dominant purpose of everyone who takes part in public affairs is concentrated on increasing the aggregate wealth production, as the first condition of raising the cultural level of all the 170 millions of people. The instrument by which this universal levelling-up can be effected is, as is widely believed, science itself. As we have described in a previous chapter,² science is more and more dominating the schooling and the college training, and more and more enrolling in its service the most energetic and capable of the young. The continuous application of science to agriculture as well as to manufacture; to the discovery and utilisation of new substances, plants or animals, as well as to the improvement of those already known; to the development without limit of electric power and its use, not only in the various forms of communication and transport, but also in altogether novel transformations of the processes of mining and metallurgy, opens up a bright vista of what may amount to a new “Industrial

¹ See, for instance, *The Frustration of Science*, by Sir A. Daniel Hall and others, edited by Professor F. Soddy (1933).

² Chapter XI. in Part II. “Science the Salvation of Mankind”.

Revolution " in which, if only a parallel development in sociology and ethics enables it to avoid the mistakes of the previous centuries, the population of the USSR may give a practical example of what was meant by the old stipulation " unless you be born again ".

" Anti-Godism "

The feature in Soviet Communism that has most scandalised the western world is undoubtedly the widespread " anti-godism " which is common to the Soviet Government and a large and apparently a steadily increasing proportion of the whole population. An aggressively dogmatic atheism denies the existence, and the possibility of the existence, of anything supernatural behind or beyond what science can apprehend or demonstrate. This sweeping denial has, it is claimed, the merit of a public and persistent repudiation of the equivocal hypocrisy in which the governments and churches of other countries, together with hosts of merely conventional Christians, are to-day implicated. That is, for the remaking of man, no small matter. It is not with impunity that nations or individuals, outgrowing any genuine faith in a personal deity who hears their prayers and governs alike the ocean and the earthquake, the harvest and the hearts of men, can continue to practise rites and accept religious institutions as if they were still believers. No code of conduct professedly based on the supposed commands of an all-powerful ruler will outlast the discovery that it has, in fact, no such foundation. One result of this widely spread equivocation is seen in the practical abandonment at the present time by millions of young persons in Europe and America, not only of Christianity, but also, along with it, of nearly all the commandments by which their parents were guided, without acquiring any substitute. Another result is the actual retrogression, in principles and in acts, of this or that nominally Christian country, if not of many of them, to the characteristics not of civilisation but of barbarism—the blood-lust and sadism accompanying the worship of a tribal god—out of which they seemed to have emerged centuries ago. All this is noticeably increasing the number of those who think that there is something to be said for the paradoxical claim of Soviet Communism that it is, in morals as well as in economics and political science, actually leading the world.

The spokesmen of Soviet Communism defend their attitude towards religion also on other grounds. They are engaged in the colossal task of raising to a higher level of civilisation, not only the workers in the cities, but also the huge mass of barbarian and even savage peoples of the backward regions of the USSR—the entirely unlettered races of the Arctic Circle or the Central Asian mountains, the nomadic tribes, the scattered hunters and fishers of northern and eastern Siberia, and with all these, the slow-moving and stubborn peasantry of the remote "deaf villages" of the great plain. So strongly does primitive man cling to the superstition and magic derived from his barbarous ancestry that there is still a great deal to be done in the USSR to eradicate from the minds of these backward peoples such of their traditional and proverbial beliefs and practices as obstruct the adoption of scientific methods of production, and hinder the extension of hygienic measures for the prevention and cure of disease. The Vocation of Leadership in the USSR feels therefore justified in advising, and the People's Commissars in commanding, the exclusion from the schools and the newspapers of any approval of supernaturalism, and in substituting for it the complete inculcation of science in all the relations of life, together with the encouragement of and assistance to the research from which advances in science are to be expected. And all this applies, as we have elsewhere suggested, not only to the study of physical and biological facts, but also to the scientific study of social institutions and to that of the important part of the universe which we term human behaviour.

Emergence of a Communist Conscience

But science, whether in the discovery of truth about the universe or in the dismissal of untruth, is not, by itself, enough for the salvation of mankind. If scientific knowledge is to be brought to the service of humanity, there must be added a purpose in man's effort involving a conception of right and wrong to be embodied in the Good Life. We need not repeat our description of the purpose, or our analysis of the code of conduct, emerging, as a new conscience,¹ from the actual experience of life under

¹ There is no warrant for the modern assumption that the word conscience refers to some supernatural revelation, or to assume that it implies a command

Soviet Communism. The feature in this new morality which stands out in sharpest contrast with the morality of capitalist societies is the recognition of a universal individual indebtedness. No human being reaches manhood without having incurred a considerable personal debt to the community in which he has been born and bred for the expense of his nurture and training. That debt he is held bound to repay by actual personal service by hand or by brain. Moreover, he is required throughout his able-bodied life to employ in the service of the community the faculties which he has derived from it. Any person who neglects or refuses to pay this debt by contributing, according to his ability, to satisfying the needs of the present or future generations is held to be a thief, and will be dealt with as such. He will, to begin with, be faced everywhere and at all times with the manifest disapproval of his mates. If his idleness or slackness continues, or if his example proves contagious, or if it is accompanied by negligence causing breakage of machinery or wastage of material, he may have to be isolated for appropriate remedial treatment. But in mental no less than in physical diseases prevention is better than cure. The encouragement of good habits is deemed even more effective in producing virtuous conduct than the discouragement of bad ones. Hence what the governing classes of the West consider an almost recklessly extravagant development of educational work in the Soviet Union from the crèche to the scientific research institute. Hence the adoption of schemes of remuneration according to social value, and constant promotion from grade to grade. Hence, too, the incitement to extra effort in the shock brigades, constantly intensified by socialist competition, and the manifestations of public honour, public ridicule and public disgrace; along with the helpful patronage of the weak or untrained by the strong and skilful. All this deliberate creation of virtuous behaviour is combined with a continuous application of the principles of measurement and publicity which are thus used to foster the habits of the Good Life.

of the Deity. The *New English Dictionary*, in nearly four columns of quotations and derivations, finds no such usage. The word replaced "inwit" (see *The Aynbytte of Inwytt*, 1300). Dean Swift preached that "the word conscience properly signifies that knowledge which a man has within himself of his own thoughts and wishes" (*Works*, 1745, vol. viii. p. 233). For the conditions and manner of its emergence in man see *The Dawn of Conscience*, by J. H. Breasted, New York, 1932.

The insistence on the liquidation of individual indebtedness, as the basis of virtue, is balanced by an equal insistence on the fulfilment of its corporate obligation as a social institution by every group or organisation. Whether a village soviet or the All-Union Congress, whether a factory committee or an industrial trust, whether a village cooperative society or the great Centrosoyus, whether the smallest collective farm or the office directing the entire foreign trade of the USSR, the group of individuals concerned is always made conscious of the necessity of fulfilling the obligations to the community for which, rather than for the purpose of enforcing its own rights, the corporate entity has been called into existence. It is interesting to find, among these corporate obligations of every social institution in the USSR, not only the fulfilment to the utmost of its particular technical purpose but also the adoption and maintenance of universal principles of Soviet Communism. We need only name the widest practicable participation of all the citizens in every service, and in all corporate functions; the development of multiformity of structure according to circumstances instead of clinging to a rigidly prescribed uniformity; and the whole-hearted acceptance of the rule of universalism, irrespective of sex or race, affluence or official position.

It is these outstanding features of the emergent morality of Soviet Communism that seem to us to mark it off from that of all other civilisations. In particular, it is just these features that enable communist morality to embrace more than the exaction of the performance of duty. Within its sphere is also the positive provision not only of universal opportunity for the enjoyment of life but also of equal provision of leisure for individual disposal. It is an essential part of the Good Life in the USSR that every person should actually have the opportunity of working at the job that he finds within his capacity and chooses as that which he likes best. Labour, the Bolsheviks declare, is to cease to be merely continuous drudgery of an inferior class or race, and is to be made a matter of honour and a joy for every member of the community. It was for this even more than for exacting the performance of duty that Lenin based the Good Life on social equality in the midst of plenty. If this idea seems fantastically utopian, that little fact itself marks the gap between the two civilisations.

A Synthetic Unity

The foregoing summaries of the principal features of Soviet Communism demonstrate at least its contrast with western civilisation. But do these separate characteristics constitute a synthesis which can properly be considered a new way of living, distinct from that pursued by other civilised societies? We suggest that they do.

The characteristics of Soviet Communism, which we have summarised one by one, exhibit, when we take them together, a distinct unity, itself in striking contrast with the disunity of western civilisation. The code of conduct based on service to the community in social equality, and on the maximum development of health and capacity in every individual, is in harmony with the exclusion of exploitation and the profit-making motive, and with the deliberate planning of production for community consumption; whilst both are in full accord with that universal participation in a multiform administration which characterises the soviet system. The economic and the political organisations, and with them the ethical code, are alike staked on a whole-hearted reliance on the beneficial effect of making known to every citizen all that is known of the facts of the universe, including human nature itself; that is to say, on science as interpreted dialectically, to the exclusion of any miraculous supernaturalism or mystical faith in the persistence of personal life after death. The Worship of God is replaced by the Service of Man.

We may note in passing that the synthetic unity of the new civilisation of the USSR, whether or not it can be said to be in any degree due to geographical or racial factors, is at least in harmony with them. The vast monotonous and apparently boundless steppe, sparsely peopled and only patchily brought under cultivation, with its prolonged winter cold and darkness, certainly influences its various inhabitants towards a common unity; to this or that form of collectivism; to mutual help in voluntary cooperation; to incessant discussion in village meetings and to the acceptance of centralised guidance from a Vocation of Leadership.

Disintegrating Capitalism

This synthetic unity of the various features of Soviet Communism is clearly very different from the warring "contradic-

tions" that continually disillusion contemporary western civilisation. Why the striking increase in the productivity of labour arising from the application of modern science in industry and agriculture should have led, in all capitalist countries, to the paradoxical result of destitution continuing in the midst of plenty; why inventions should be simultaneously encouraged and not applied; why science should be at one and the same time promoted and frustrated; why the capitalist-producing organisation should close factories, shut down mines, stop building operations and habitually destroy the undue abundance of its harvests, whilst millions of people go underfed, under-clothed and under-housed, and are yet refused employment at wages, and so cannot make their demand for commodities "effective"; all these contradictions immanent in the latter developments of capitalism insult reason and yet seem to defy reform. These contradictions are perceived by those who are unaffected by communist propaganda. It is no less a person than the Chief Medical Officer of the British Government who has just told the nation that "*Unemployment, under-nourishment and preventable malady and accident seem to be the unavoidable concomitants of current civilisation in Western Europe of the present day*".¹ It is an American technologist who declares that "A new machine which can lighten the human burden is not a thing of evil, but a blessing to mankind. An idea which increases efficiency in an office or factory—enables one person to do the work of two without greater effort—is not in itself harmful to society. *It is the utilisation of these machines without regard to human needs that has led us into our present ghastly predicament.*"²

Nor is this the only form taken by the contradictions. The capitalist employer or trader or financier usually supports the church and even attends its services; but his common sense and business experience forbid any attempt on his part to square his profit-making, which competition makes ruthless and even nationally destructive, with the denunciations of the prophets and the exhortations to mercy and compassion, and brotherly love toward all men, to which he piously listens on Sundays,

¹ Annual Report for 1933 of the Chief Medical Officer, Ministry of Health and Board of Education, entitled *On the State of the Public Health*, by Sir George Newman, K.C.B. (Stationery Office, 1934), p. 254. See also *Public Ill-Health*, by C. E. McNally (1935).

² "The Problem of Technological Unemployment in the United States", by Irving H. Flamm, in *International Labour Review* (March 1935), p. 347.

and to which the statesmen whom he supports continue to pay what is, necessarily, in many, perhaps even a majority of them, an insincere homage. "Compromise is as impossible", to quote the words of Professor Tawney, "between the Church of Christ and the idolatry of wealth, which is the practical religion of capitalist societies, as it was between the Church and the state idolatry of the Roman Empire. . . . It is that whole system of appetites and values, with its deification of the life of snatching to hoard, and hoarding to snatch, which now, in the hour of its triumph, while the plaudits of the crowd still ring in the ears of the gladiators, and the laurels are still unfaded on their brows, seems sometimes to leave a taste as of ashes on the lips of a civilisation which has brought to the conquest of its material environment resources unknown to earlier ages, but which has not yet learned to master itself."¹ Moreover, the autocratic position attained by the owners of the means of production, whether employers or landlords or financiers, with the growing inequalities of wealth and enjoyment, becomes daily less compatible with the exigencies of parliamentary democracy, just as both parliamentary democracy and Christianity are severally discovered to be incompatible with the imperialism manifesting itself in the exploitation of subject races to which capitalism is increasingly driven; whilst statesmen, capitalists and clergy are alike becoming aware that their countries are drifting, as it seems owing to the very disunity characterising their common civilisation, helplessly towards another world war. "The growth of civilisation hitherto known to history", it has been said by an acute student of both the past and the present,² "has . . . always followed a curve. The vigour and constructiveness cause what seems to us an upward movement in human society until a point is reached at which no further movement in that direction is possible unless the small civilised minority are prepared to share both the material products and the psychology of civilisation with the mass below them. No civilised minority has yet been found willing to make the necessary sacrifices, and the result has always been a struggle in the heart of civilisation and society; the upward movement immediately stops; the gates are once more opened to the barbarians; the curve descends and civilisa-

¹ *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, by R. H. Tawney (1926), pp. 286-287.

² *Quack Quack!* by Leonard Woolf (1935), pp. 165-166.

tion fades and dies. . . . *We are living through one of these periods of struggle and decivilisation.*"

Let us end this rapid summary of the contradictions inherent in the civilisation of western Europe by the less pessimistic prediction of an American thinker regarding the coming revolution in his own country.¹ "It would be pleasant to be able to predict that those who accede to power will be at once wise, efficient and resolute, that the old ruling classes will gracefully bow to the inevitable, that neither violence nor civil war will follow, that a system of socialised planning will smoothly come into being, which almost at once will realise all the beneficent possibilities of a technical civilisation. If all this does occur so painlessly, it will be the first time in history that a social revolution has been completed with neatness and dispatch. What is much more likely is that there will be a prolonged period of turmoil and uncertainty, the moderates will ingloriously fail, and there will be fighting, swings to the left and reaction. It will be a period of terrible discomfort, of mingled herosim and meanness, of the clumsy effort of human beings slowly to adjust themselves to the new conditions of life. Eventually the outcome will be the final disappearance of government by private profit-makers over the means of production, a chance for social management to learn its task by experience. This will not be Utopia. The perfect society has never yet resulted from a revolution. The process will simply be the adjustment of mankind to a new phase, made necessary by its own evolution. The new society will consist of men and women in a new bond of comradeship setting forth on still another voyage to the unknown."

Will Soviet Communism Endure?

For the first four or five years of the soviet revolution, during the period of civil war and famine, all the governments of the world assumed that the Bolshevik rule would pass away, and be superseded either by the return of tsardom or by one or more parliamentary republics. Even seven years ago, after the formal recognition of the Soviet Union by many of the governments of the world, the predominant opinion of those who thought they knew about Russia was that Soviet Communism would presently

¹ *The Coming American Revolution*, by George Soule (1934), p. 303.

be liquidated. It was held that the Five-Year Plan would be a hideous failure, that the great dams and power stations, like the gigantic new factories, were destined to stand as silent and motionless on the steppe as the pyramids of the Egyptian deserts ; that the debts contracted abroad for production goods would never be paid ; and that the foreign specialists would troop away as their salaries ceased. To-day not even the most embittered enemy denies that Soviet industry is a going and even a steadily increasing concern ; or that more and more factories and power stations, schools and technical institutes, new cities and cultivated areas, are being opened up on both sides of the Urals, all the way from the Baltic to the Pacific. It is admitted that roads and canals and new lines of railway are extending in all directions from the Arctic Circle to the Central Asian mountains and the Black Sea, whilst civil aviation is already as prominent in Siberia as in Western Europe. About the complete success of collectivised and mechanised agriculture there may be, in certain quarters, still some doubt. But the experience of the last three harvests seems to justify the claim of the Soviet Government that the initial difficulties of this gigantic transformation have been overcome. There is, indeed, little reason to doubt that the aggregate output of foodstuffs, and of such specialised crops as cotton, tea, flax and sugar-beet, is being increased at a great rate. Already every soviet citizen may have as much food as he can pay for—for the Russian a great thing—and that he can also pay for much else than food is demonstrated both by the total absence of involuntary unemployment and by the rapidly increasing sales of popular luxuries. Even the bankers of London and New York are impressed by soviet debts being for the first time paid in native gold, whilst purchases are increasingly made for cash on delivery rather than on onerous credit terms. Besides these pacific activities, the very enemies of Soviet Communism warn us that, notwithstanding its supposed inefficiency, it has somehow built up a well-armed, highly disciplined and extensively mechanised Red Army a million strong ; and, above all, the largest bombing air force in the world. The change in governmental opinion about the USSR is shown by the successive arrivals in Moscow of the foreign minister of state after state, bent on concluding pacts of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union ; and by its admission, on a practically unanimous invitation,

into the League of Nations. What would happen to any government in Europe or Asia in the event of a great war no one can foresee. The Bolshevik Government evinces an insistent eagerness to ensure world peace ; and this might rashly be taken as a sign of weakness. On the other hand, it is becoming evident that the rulers of huge territories, possessed of great air fleets, such as the USSR and the U.S.A., stand at an advantage in conflict with smaller and more densely populated countries such as Japan and Great Britain, Germany and Poland, and other European states. In short, the survival-value of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, whether in peace or in war, is to-day estimated at least as highly as that of any other of the Great Powers.

At this point we hear an interested reader asking " Will it spread ? " Will this new civilisation, with its abandonment of the incentive of profit-making, its extinction of unemployment, its planned production for community consumption, and the consequent liquidation of the landlord and the capitalist, spread to other countries ? Our own reply is : " Yes, it will ". But how, when, where, with what modifications, and whether through violent revolution or by peaceful penetration, or even by conscious imitation, are questions we cannot answer.

POSTSCRIPT TO THE SECOND EDITION

To the readers as well as to the authors of *Soviet Communism* it seems a tiresome business to add to its 1193 pages four score more by way of Postscript to this second edition. Our excuse is that during the past two years changes have been made and events have occurred that have been widely advertised and eagerly discussed, both by friends and by opponents of the Soviet Union. We do not like to let the book continue to be sold without mention of these happenings.

Foremost among these newcomers into the field of controversy is the new constitution of the USSR, already announced in the first edition (see pp. 84-87), but to-day the law of the land, in course of being implemented from end to end of the vast territory from the Baltic to the Pacific. As a set-off against this novel and surprising "Declaration of the Rights of Man", there is the dark shadow of the Moscow Trials, with its sequel of "conspiracy-hunting", a tragic hangover from the violence of the revolution and civil war. But this is not all. Alike in the organisation of Man as a Producer and Man as a Consumer, notable developments have taken place since 1934 ; such, for instance, as the Stakhanov Movement, started by members and officials of the trade unions, which, in their growth, have themselves been thoroughly reorganised. When we visited the USSR in 1932, and again in 1934, the success of the collective farms (associations of owner-producers) was still in doubt. Eye-witnesses during 1936 and 1937 testify to the marked change in the life and mentality of the peasants in these collective farms, whose greatly increased purchases of formerly unknown luxuries demonstrate their growing prosperity.

Passing from Man as a Producer to Man as a Consumer, there needs to be recorded, along with the vast increase in production,

a new and extensive reorganisation of the whole system of retailing commodities to cope with a great increase in popular demand, and a consequent shift of the sphere of the ever-growing consumers' cooperative movement. As some of our critics not unjustly complained, we omitted altogether, in the first edition, to describe the working of the system of currency and the place of money in the Soviet Union. Since we wrote in 1934 the whole of rationing has disappeared, and with it all the separate kinds of "exclusive" retail shops at which particular sets of citizens enjoyed specially privileged supplies and prices. Now everyone buys where he will, at prices substantially uniform. This enables us to expound very simply the paradox of currency in the USSR, where neither surplus nor scarcity of notes has any effect on prices, production or foreign trade; and money serves only to give the citizen unfettered freedom to spend his income where and when and how he chooses.

More exciting is the "stop in the mind" of our Bohemian admirers of revolutionary communism at what seems to them the terrifying resurrection of what they call "puritan ethics", manifested by the public insistence on cleanliness and decency of personal conduct; the prohibition of abortion and homosexuality; the objection within the Communist Party to sexual promiscuity among its members; and, most reactionary of all, the outspoken approval of lifelong attachment of husband and wife as the most appropriate setting under Communism for family life! Considering all these changes in the form, if not also in the substance of Soviet Communism, have the developments since 1935 warranted the provocative words in the title of our book, "A New Civilisation?" If so, can we, by omitting the mark of interrogation, answer the question in the affirmative? In the concluding paragraph of this Postscript, we give some reasons for such a decision.

The New Constitution

We chronicled, in our first edition, the decision of the Congress in January 1935 to formulate a new constitution in which would be substituted "equal franchise for not entirely equal, direct election for indirect, and secret for open voting" for all representative organs, from the city and village soviets to the

Central Executive Committee of the USSR. The proposal, made by Molotov, the President of the Council of People's Commissars, was immediately referred to the Central Executive Committee (TSIK) with instructions to prepare a complete draft for submission to a specially summoned All-Union Congress. The very next day the Central Executive Committee, on the suggestion of Stalin, who was elected to preside, appointed a committee of 31 leading statesmen and constitutional authorities to carry out the task. This committee called to its aid no fewer than twelve sub-committees, to eleven of which specific chapters were entrusted, whilst the twelfth, of which Stalin himself was chairman, served as an editorial body, coordinating the work as a whole. Within five months this committee had reported to the Central Executive Committee, by which its draft was approved. On June 12, 1936, this draft was published to the world with an invitation to all the citizens of the USSR to criticise freely, and to suggest without any limitations, whatever alterations they desired. There followed a nation-wide discussion, extending over the whole 13 chapters and 146 clauses of the draft, a public discussion unparalleled in scope and range. The document was published in full, not only in thousands of newspapers but also in cheap pamphlet form, eventually to the number of sixty millions of copies in a dozen different languages. It was broadcast, chapter by chapter, from scores of radio stations to the listening crowds at thousands of public loud-speakers, and over two million domestic wireless sets. Innumerable public meetings were held—the number reported was 527,000—for exposition and free discussion in factories and on farms, in village streets and city halls, from the Polish border to the Pacific coast. The aggregate attendance was estimated at thirty-six and a half millions. As a result, more than a hundred and fifty thousand suggestions and criticisms were received by the twelve sub-committees at Moscow, by whom they were boiled down to a hundred or so of useful criticisms, most of them supplying accidental omissions from the draft, or making verbal improvements. Along with these minor changes half a dozen amendments of substance were recommended to the Congress for acceptance. In November 1936 the specially elected All-Union Congress (the eighth and last) assembled in the Great Hall of the Kremlin to the number of 2016 delegates, representing 63 nationalities or races from all parts of the USSR.

After ten days of eager discussion during which all delegates claiming to speak were heard, the recommended amendments were all carried, either by acclamation or by substantial majorities, and the draft as amended was, on December 5, 1936, finally adopted without a dissentient voice.¹

The Significance of the New Constitution

What is the dominant feature of the New Constitution? To the British or American publicist it may seem to be the broadening and strengthening of the political structure of the community. But we suggest that the importance of these purely electoral changes has been exaggerated. Thus, the method of direct election of representatives, by the largest electorate ever known, is no innovation in the Soviet Union. It has for years prevailed both in city and village, no fewer than seventy-seven million votes having been directly cast for the soviets at the last general election prior to that of 1936, out of a total electorate of over ninety-one millions. In fact, direct election by adult suffrage was actually included in the published programme of the Bolshevik Party as long ago as 1903. It is true that, amid the revolutionary turmoil of 1917-1918, the civil war of 1918-1920 and the incessant labours at reconstruction during the past dozen years, it was almost necessarily arranged that, whilst the elections to the seventy thousand city and village soviets continued to be direct, the members of the four or five thousand district and provincial councils, like those of the supreme assembly, the All-Union Congress of Soviets, should be indirectly elected, as members of the Senate of the United States were until 1913. It is not clear to the outsider how much difference has been made in the character and composition of the U.S. Senate by the substitution of direct for indirect election. No one can predict with any confidence

¹ The best description of all these proceedings is *The New Soviet Constitution*, by Anna Louise Strong (New York, 1937, 169 pp.). We have added to the Appendices of Part I (pp. 528¹-528³³) a translation of the whole text of this New Constitution, together with our own summary of its clauses, rearranged in a way to emphasise its importance as a new Declaration of the Rights of Man. It remains to be said that all the constitutions of the previous constituent republics of the Union, together with those of the new promotions to that status, have been superseded in the course of 1937 by new enactments of the several legislatures, incorporating all the features of the revised federal constitution, in some cases with minor additions on local topics.

that any greater difference will be made by the analogous change in the USSR. Even the adoption of secret voting everywhere and its substitution, throughout the rural districts, of some 600 substantially equal constituencies of considerable magnitude, for the show of hands in hundreds of thousands of relatively small village meetings, may be found, in the circumstances of the USSR, where the personal tyranny of landlord and capitalist is unknown, to make little change.¹

Similarly, with regard to the enlargement of the electorate and the equalisation of representation of citizen and villager. Certainly, the gesture is impressive of the abandonment of all exclusions² and inequalities from the electoral franchise, which becomes unquestionably by far the widest in the world. Neither ill-gotten wealth nor former anti-social occupation, not even family relationship to the late Tsar, nor membership of a religious order, will henceforth deprive a soviet citizen of his vote. It has scarcely been noticed that, with one conspicuous exception, these exclusions had already mostly lapsed in practice. The principal innovation in 1936 is that, without any change of official policy towards theology, nearly fifty thousand practising priests of the Greek Orthodox Church, together with some hundreds of Roman Catholic, Evangelical, Mohammedan, and Buddhist officiants, now for the first time receive votes. (This reveals, by the way, how untrue is the common statement that religious worship had been suppressed in the USSR.) But what are fifty thousand in an electorate that has already reached a total not far short of one hundred millions? Possibly more significant is the enactment that the vote of each of the sixty odd millions of rural electors

¹ It should be noted that, during 1937, the system of voting by secret ballot instead of in open meeting has been adopted also in the elections within the Communist Party and the trade union movement. Why? Because it is felt that open voting "in meeting assembled" leads in some cases to cooption of new members by the committee, owing to neglect of the officials to call meetings and indifference of the members to attend them. From a historical standpoint it is interesting to note that there was a similar objection, in England, to the Open Vestry of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; and that Select Vestries, coopting new members, were established in many districts. The method of indirect election to superior authorities has also been tried and found wanting in Great Britain. The indirectly elected body ceases to be subject to popular approval or control, and tends also, in practice, to choose its new members by what is virtually cooption. (See, for the English experience, *The Parish and the County*, by S. and B. Webb.)

² Other than for certified mental deficiency, or judicial sentence expressly including a temporary deprivation of electoral rights.

will henceforth count as much as that of each of the thirty odd millions of urban electors, instead of only about half (usually misstated as one-fifth) as much. This is Stalin's effective answer to the constantly repeated slanders as to the oppression of the peasants, and their supposed disaffection. They are now confidently expected to vote in much the same way as their sons and daughters and brothers and sisters who have migrated to the cities.

To the student of political science the most important innovation is, not any reshaping of the electoral machinery, but the enshrinement in the constitution of a new set of the "rights of man". The Declaration of Independence of the American rebels of 1776 and the United States Constitution of 1787 were both founded on an almost unfettered individual ownership of private property for the making of profit. The French Declaration of the Rights of Man in 1789 (and as re-written in 1793) had a similar basis. These were alike sanctifications of the motive of individual profit-making, then believed to be the necessary foundation of economic progress. Even in the *Principles of a Civil Code* Bentham allowed only one encroachment upon private property—that of taxation—and recognised only four "ends" of civil government, without specifying how they could be attained, namely, subsistence, security, equality and abundance. In 1848 Louis Blanc asked in vain for the addition of the "right to work", meaning the right to be found paid employment by the state. In 1936 the Soviet Constitution ensures to every citizen, not only protection against aggression and arbitrary arrest, but also the right to have remunerative work; for the women the right to a specially elaborate provision for motherhood; for both sexes the right to specified hours of rest and paid weeks of holiday; the right of education of every kind and grade and at any age, open to all, free of charge; and, most far-reaching of all, the right to full economic provision, according to need, in all the vicissitudes of life. And this formal enactment of such enormously extended "rights of man" is but the explicit consecration in the constitution of what is, throughout the USSR, already very largely in operation.

A few words may be added with regard to the amendments recommended by the government and adopted by the congress out of the hundred and fifty thousand separate criticisms or

suggestions yielded by the nation-wide discussion. A few of these were merely verbal, including some further additional explicit recitals of existing law, such as the safeguarding of property in such collective ownership as trade unions and cooperative organisations, sports clubs, etc., and the reaffirmation of the right of inheritance. Another emphasised that the permanent occupation of land in usufruct secured to collective farm associations was to be for ever free of rent (though not of taxation!). A numerous supported proposal to continue indefinitely the deprivation of the right to vote heretofore suffered by priests, monks and other ministers of religion was emphatically negatived as contrary to fundamental Bolshevik policy. Universalism in electoral matters was carried to a further point by amendments extending direct election even to the Soviet of Nationalities (the chamber of the bicameral Supreme Council giving equal representation to large and small national constituents of the USSR—see pp. 88-91); and making its total membership equal in number to that of the other chamber (Soviet of the Union). Otherwise it is remarkable how much of the constitutional structure of the USSR, as settled in 1924, was retained in the draft formulated by Stalin's committees, and how completely their proposals were approved in popular discussion, and finally enacted by the congress.

Considered as a political gesture, alike to the millions at home and to other nations, the sternest critics allow the new constitution to be a political masterpiece. For the first time since the revolution of 1917 Moscow was able to sound the note of achievement. Those in authority at the Kremlin were able to announce, in effect, that the immense difficulties of so gigantic a social and economic reconstruction are overcome. Not stability only, but also success, had been substantially secured. A second impression is that of maturity. The child born in 1917 has come of age and is now taking an adult place in the world. Development, far from having stopped, is plainly proceeding at a greater rate than before; but it is seen now to be the development of a new type of democracy broadening into ever wider circles and still rising towards its prime. It must, however, be remembered that constitutions are judged, in the long run, not by what they say, but according to how they work—or are worked! The "Twelve Tables of the Law" (see pp. 528³¹–528³³) enshrined in the new

constitution of the Soviet Union, as it was enacted in December 1936, will be judged by the world according to the way in which these provisions are found to be actually working, say, in December 1942, after five years experience without war ! Today they at least mark a distinct stage in political progress ; and they point in what seems to most Britons and Americans, Frenchmen and Scandinavians, the right direction.

The Treason Trials

From the high lights of the New Constitution we descend to the dark depths of the Moscow Trials. To many people in Great Britain and the United States the outstanding feature of the record since 1934 is the series of trials of highly placed soviet citizens for high treason, conspiracy to assassinate, criminal intercourse with the spies and other agents of foreign powers, and even the wilful wrecking of railways and industrial plants. That so many men in high official positions, mostly active participants in the Revolution of 1917, and some of them companions of Lenin, should have committed such crimes, sometimes over a number of years, has seemed to Western observers almost incredible. That in the course of the customary private investigations, prior to the judicial trials, the defendants should, one and all, have made full and detailed confessions, unreservedly repeated in open court, of the guilt not only of themselves but also of their fellow criminals, seemed to raise the tragic story to the fantastic madness of a nightmare ; it seemed that the confessions must have been forced on the prisoners by torture or the threat of torture.

A distinguished Irishman long resident in London, hints that what needs explanation is rather the British procedure in criminal prosecutions, which differs so remarkably from that of all the other nations of Europe. In his view, the conduct of the prisoners in these Russian trials is in full accord with the Russian character.¹ In England, our friend remarks, a prisoner indicted for

¹ "What did Radek mean," asks Sir John Maynard, "when he said that 'there are in this country semi-Trotskyists, quarter-Trotskyists, one-eighth-Trotskyists . . . to these people we say . . . whoever has the slightest rift with the Party, let him realise that tomorrow he may be a diversionist, tomorrow he may be a traitor, if he does not thoroughly heal the rift by complete and utter frankness to the Party.' We think that he unconsciously furnished a clue to the riddle of the confessions. Not only in these Trotskyist cases, but in many others, we have seen accused persons apparently eager to confess, and to insist

treason is practically forced to go through a legal routine of defence. He pleads Not Guilty ; and his counsel assumes for him an attitude of injured innocence, refusing to admit any evidence that is not within certain rules, demanding legitimate proof of every statement and setting up a hypothesis as to what actually happened which is consistent with the prisoner's innocence. He cross-examines the Crown witnesses mercilessly. He puts the prisoner into the witness-box and asks him questions so framed that by simply affirmative answers or indignant denials or at worst by flat perjury (which is considered allowable on such occasions) he may seem to support the hypothesis. The judge compliments the counsel on the brilliant ability with which he has conducted his case. He points out to the jury that the hypothesis is manifestly fictitious and the prisoner obviously guilty. The jury finds the necessary verdict. The judge then, congratulating the prisoner on having been so ably defended and fairly tried, sentences him to death and commends him to the mercy of his God.

May not this procedure, which seems so natural and inevitable to us, very intelligibly strike a Russian as a farce tolerated because our rules of evidence and forms of trial have never been systematically revised on rational lines. Why should a conspirator who is caught out by the Government, and who knows that he is caught out and that no denials or hypothetical fairy tales will help him to escape—why should he degrade himself uselessly by a mock defence instead of at once facing the facts and discussing his part in them quite candidly with his captors ? There is a possibility of moving them by such a friendly course : in a mock defence there is none. Our candid friend submits that the Russian prisoners simply behave naturally and sensibly, as Englishmen would were they not virtually compelled by their highly artificial legal system to go through a routine which is useful to the accused only when there is some doubt as to the facts or as to the guilt or innocence of the conduct in question. What possible good could it do them to behave otherwise ? Why should they waste the time of the court and disgrace themselves by prevaricating like pickpockets merely to employ the barristers?

on the completeness of their guilt. And the confessions have not been of the defiant kind. Rather have they been of the penitent kind, of a sinner making a clean breast of his sins, and extenuating nothing." ("Light on the Trotskyist Trials", by Sir John Maynard, in *The Political Quarterly*, July 1937, pp. 403-416.)

Our friend suggests that some of us are so obsessed with our national routine that the candour of the Russian conspirators seems grotesque and insane. Which of the two courses, viewed by an impartial visitor from Mars, would appear the saner ?

Nevertheless the staging of the successive trials, and the summary executions in which they ended, appeared strangely inconsistent with the other actions of the Soviet Government. For the past seven years its policy had seemed to be directed towards exciting admiration for its achievements, and even towards winning the respect of the Western world, and especially of Britain and the United States. It must have been foreseen that this whole series of trials, the numerous shootings to which they led, and the ugly publicity and popular abuse of the defendants which the Soviet Government apparently organised and encouraged, and especially the malignity with which Leon Trotsky, safe in far-off Mexico, was assailed, would produce a setback in the international appreciation which the Soviet Union was increasingly receiving. The Soviet Government must have had strong grounds for the action which has involved such unwelcome consequences.¹

Let us first set out the facts before attempting any interpretation of them. We described in our first edition (pp. 533-534) the principal public trials of this kind during the past decade, from the so-called Shakhty prosecution in 1927-1928, of Russian tech-

¹ The principal source of information must always be *The Case of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Centre : A Verbatim Report published by the People's Commissariat of Justice of the USSR* (586 pp.), published in 1937 within a few weeks after the trial, at the price of half a crown or one dollar in London and New York respectively. An abbreviated version, with preface, is given in *The Moscow Trials* (January 1937), edited by R. T. Miller (London, 1937). See also *Soviet Justice and the trial of Radek and others*, by Dudley Collard, Barrister-at-Law, with an introduction by D. N. Pritt, K.C., M.P. (London, 1937); and the very informative article, "Light on the Trotskyist Trials", by Sir John Maynard, in *The Political Quarterly* for July 1937. The best press comment known to us is Malcolm Cowley's lengthy review of the proceedings in *The Nation* (New York) for April 7, 1937 (pp. 267-270). Radek's statement is published in *The Slavonic Review* for April 1937. *Moscow, 1937*, by Lion Feuchtwanger (London, 1937, 134 pp.), gives two valuable chapters of an eye-witness's impressions.

Trotsky's own case for his policy (written before the trial) may be studied in his book *The Revolution Betrayed* (New York and London : 1936-1937; also in French, *La Revolution Trahie*); also *The Third International After Lenin* (New York, 1936, 356 pp.); together with his book entitled *The Stalin School of Falsification* (New York). See also *The End of Socialism in Russia*, by Max Eastman (New York and London, 1937, 46 pp.), and *World Revolution, 1917-1936*, by C. L. R. James (London, 1937).

nicians in the Donetz Coalmines, together with some German engineers; the monster trial at Kharkov of the Ukrainian Nationalists in 1929-1930, and that of the so-called Industrial Party at Moscow in 1930-1931; down to the prosecution of the Menshevik professors and officials in 1931. It may well be a matter for doubt and enquiry how far the breakdowns or betrayals of soviet organisation revealed in these trials were attributable to deliberate treason on the part of the perpetrators, in conspiracy with the ever-active *émigrés* in Paris or at Prague, and how far to the constant suspicions of associating with disloyalty under which the intelligentsia of the period had to work. It is only fair to describe (see pp. 555-556) how Stalin, in his widely reported speech of June 23, 1931, made an attempt to get the Soviet Government out of this vicious circle by insisting on new relations with the professional experts, and generally with the intelligentsia, who were henceforth to be treated with respect and trust.

Unfortunately this generous spirit did not long prevail. The trial of the Metro-Vickers engineers and their Russian colleagues in January 1933 (see pp. 557-558) revealed (though only in some of the defendants) not only cases of mild bribery and the systematic collection of information coming within the legal definition of espionage, but also a negligence that was hardly to be distinguished from sabotage, which was visited by the court with sentences of discriminating moderation. There promptly followed a renewed campaign of incitement by the *émigrés* of Prague and Paris, with which was apparently connected the illegal and secret entry into the USSR, across its western land frontier during 1934, of more than a hundred emissaries, bearing arms (and some of them bombs), nearly all of whom were, without publicity, promptly arrested, and held for interrogation. It will be recalled that it was during this period that Hitler was proclaiming his intention of annexing the Ukraine, and of securing forced concessions of much-needed minerals from the Urals—a threat which, it might be argued, implied that he was aware of there being allies within the USSR who would help him to overcome Stalin's government, just as he later became aware of confederates in Spain among the army officers bent on overthrowing the Republic government, and installing a Fascist régime in alliance with the Fascist Powers.

In December 1934 the head Bolshevik official in Leningrad (Kirov) was assassinated by a dismissed employee, who may have acted independently out of personal revenge, but who was discovered to have secret connections with conspiratorial circles of ever-widening range (see pp. 558-561). The Government reaction to this murder was to hurry on the trial, condemnation and summary execution of the hundred or more persons above referred to, who were undoubtedly guilty of illegal entry and inexcusably bearing arms and bombs, although it was apparently not proved that they had any connection with Kirov's assassination or the conspiracies associated therewith. These conspiracies were gradually unravelled in several successive trials during 1936, which involved the condemnation and summary execution of Kamenev, Zinoviev and others of lesser notoriety.

A climax which seemed final was reached by the criminal proceedings in January 1937 against such leading Bolsheviks as Pyatakov, Serebryatakov, Radek and Sokolnikov, with others less well known abroad, upon charges of conspiracy to overthrow the Government by force, treasonable associations with German and Japanese government agents to this end, attempts at assassination of Molotov and other leaders, and criminal sabotage of mine and railway working resulting in loss of life. Yet only a few months later came a new sensation, when eight generals of the Red Army were tried and condemned to death for treasonable association with the emissaries and spies of foreign governments preparing for invasion of the USSR. The unpleasant impression of these proceedings on the Western world was deepened by the bias persistently shown against the exiled Leon Trotsky, constantly alleged to have been the chief instigator and director of the whole series of crimes. The confessions of the defendants; the manner in which their several stories corroborated one another; their frank explanations of the way they had yielded to the temptation of giving their general adhesion to a treasonable conspiracy of which they did not at first understand the scope; and how they had then found themselves unable to escape from the toils in which they had become entangled;—be it added, a certain amount of further corroboration deduced from incautiously published utterances both by German and by Japanese statesmen, convinced the British and American journalists present at the trial in January 1937 that the defendants were really guilty

of the treasonable conspiracies with which they were charged. Careful perusal of the full reports of the proceedings and speeches at the public trial leaves upon us the same impression, so far as concerns the actual defendants, though without necessarily endorsing the judgment on Trotsky himself, who was not before the Court, and of whose personal participation there was little testimony that would have been accepted as evidence in a British court. It must, however, be admitted that the impression made upon public opinion in the United States and Western Europe has been unfavourable to the Soviet Government, even to the extent of creating a certain sympathy with Leon Trotsky; this sympathy causing to be forgotten, not only his repeated published demands and incitements that the government of Stalin must be overthrown, but also that it is Trotsky and the Trotskyists in America and Western Europe who are avowedly seeking to create forcible revolutions everywhere, in opposition to Stalin's administration, which, as we have described (pp. 1110-1118), has for the past ten years abandoned that policy for one of "building socialism" in the USSR, in the hope that it will be able to influence the world towards Communism, not by any revolutionary incursions into other countries, but by the peaceful example of its own economic and social achievements in the Soviet Union.

If we may attempt a detached and philosophical interpretation of these proceedings, alike of the various defendants and of the Government which brought them to trial and sentence—a hypothetical explanation which is not offered as a justification of either party—we suggest that they are the inevitable aftermath of any long-drawn-out revolutionary struggle that ends in a successful seizure of power. The successive generations of Russian revolutionaries, continuing for a whole century, during which they were hunted by the Tsar's police, in constant peril of exile and imprisonment, flogging and death, were moulded to a particular "pattern of behaviour" which became a fixed character. Lies and aliases, deceit and trickery, theft and assassination, filled their whole lives. These revolutionary conspirators, successive generations of whom we have known personally in exile, were not criminals in the ordinary sense. Even if it came to them in their warfare to commit theft, forgery or murder, they cannot accurately be classed as thieves, forgers and murderers. The

best of them were heroic, even if we think them mistaken ; though some among them succumbed to the temptation of betraying their comrades and even becoming Tsarist spies and *agents provocateurs*.

An analogous manifestation of the same pattern of behaviour may be traced in the action of those who have come to the top, and who are now concerned to "maintain the revolution". They are incurably distrustful of the loyalty of their colleagues. Opposition, however reasonably expressed, looks like defeatism and incipient rebellion. Every passing grumbling among the intelligentsia starts a jealous watchfulness which goes far to make life intolerable. A whole crop of suspicions, jealousies, delations, accusations and counter-accusations is as unmistakeable an aftermath of a long-drawn-out revolutionary struggle ending in a constitutional upheaval as the subsequent conspiracies and attempts at counter-revolution themselves.

The pattern of behaviour produced in these underground revolutionary conspirators may be traced in like struggles in other countries. Even England and Scotland, in the small population of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with a much less fundamental revolution, produced generation after generation of conspirators, to whom treason and killing, with lies and deceit, were only part of what they felt to be a righteous effort. The Scottish noblemen seem to have conspired and killed, one side against the other, protestant and catholic, whig and covenanter, Hanoverian and Stuart, for almost a couple of centuries. In England, Cromwell and King Charles ; General Monk (the hero or the traitor ?), Monmouth and his army ; Judge Jeffreys' atrocious Western Assizes, hanging or flogging every prisoner whom he disliked ; the whig nobles who put their hands to a flagrantly treasonable invitation to William of Orange ; Churchill and others who betrayed their king on the battlefield ; the perpetrators of the Glencoe massacre ; the secret correspondence with the Stuart pretenders of Bolingbroke and even Marlborough ; the century of repression of the Jesuits, with the persecution of the English catholics—not to mention the long-drawn-out time of trouble in Ireland—all these exhibit just such a "pattern of behaviour" among those concerned, many of whom we now think of as ordinary and even devoted citizens, whose efforts and sacrifices secured for Great Britain its present political democracy

and freedom in matters of opinion, which most of us have come to deem superior to absolute kingship by divine right, with an orthodoxy enforced by law.

The French Revolution of 1789-1795 ushered in a similar period of conspiracy and struggle, leading to a whole succession of counter-revolutions, not reaching the stability of a democratic republic, with its large measure of personal security and social equality, for nearly a century. Much the same pattern of behaviour can be traced in Barras, Sieyes, Babeuf, Buonaparte, Talleyrand with the Legitimists and Orleanists, and the early life of Napoleon the Third.

In Russia (which was in 1900 in the matter of morals and civilisation very much where Britain and France stood in 1700) the pattern of behaviour of the revolutionary conspirators culminated in a bitterness and mutual antagonism more acute and all-pervading than in any other example. It was only by a hard struggle and after prolonged suffering that the revolution of 1917 was successful; when the little group of leading Bolsheviks under Lenin found themselves the Government. It took nearly three more years for them to beat off the White armies unlawfully supported by half a dozen foreign governments, in a civil war which ended in a devastated country and a terrible famine. The psychological effect on all the combatants and sufferers was profound. This extreme embitterment and lasting suspicion characterises any prolonged civil war, as distinguished from a war between separate states. A civil war hardly ever ends by a peace treaty. The soldiers of the armies of warring states eventually retire behind their respective frontiers, and need not retain any evil feelings against their former opponents. The partisans in a civil war have to continue to live among their neighbours, even with those lately in arms against them. The revolutionary pattern of behaviour among the Russian revolutionaries was intensified and embittered by the continued clash of loyalties and ambitions among the half a dozen different sections of revolutionary opinion, not to mention also the various nationalities, religions and races making up the 170 millions scattered over one-sixth of the earth's surface.

Now to get back to the Russian conspirators who have, during the decade 1927-1937, been convicted on their own confessions of attempts to create a counter-revolution. Are not such

attempts at a counter-revolution exactly what was to be expected? Has there ever been a great and successful revolution without attempts at a counter-revolution? The Stalin group, who now constitute the government, have had immense difficulties to face in their fight against famine, and in their effort to raise to a higher level of efficiency and civilisation what is reputed to have been the worst peasantry in the world.

In establishing the new social order it was inevitable that there should arise, throughout the whole decade, honest and legitimate differences of opinion as to policy. What were those differences? We need not recite here (see pp. 168, 243, 1101-1104) the earlier issues on which, between 1921 and 1927, Trotsky and his shifting groups of friends took one view, whilst Stalin and his following took another. Outstanding was the supreme issue as to whether the revolution in Russia was to be supported by ceaselessly fomenting other revolutions in other countries, which Trotsky demanded as the only way in which the Bolshevik régime could be maintained in Russia (this Trotsky called the "permanence of the revolution"). Or, on the other hand, as Stalin insisted from 1926 onwards, when the revolutions in other countries had failed to occur, should not the Soviet Government postpone—some said abandon—the project of seeking to foment revolutions in Western Europe and the United States, and rather apply all its energies to building up the industries and revolutionising the agriculture of the USSR itself, in the hope that this exemplar of a successful socialist state on an immense scale might arouse the proletariats of the rest of the world themselves to transform, one after another, the capitalist governments of Europe and America? It is not without significance that it was in the dark days of 1931-1933, when the fate of the collective farms seemed to many to be trembling in the balance (see pp. 245-272), that the conspiracies unveiled in the trials of 1937 are stated, by Radek and others, to have taken shape. It was only to be expected that those who thought the government policy wrong and disastrous to the country should take to underground conspiracy to resist it and to upset the government which had adopted it. If some of these conspirators took in their stride both wrecking and assassination, this was exactly what Stalin and others of them had been doing, with a good conscience, most of their lives prior to 1917. If it is true

that they called in aid of their conspiracy hostile governments, this is just what the patriotic and high-minded English and Scottish nobility, statesmen and ministers of religion did three centuries ago in calling in alternately the Dutch and the French.

How long is this apparently continuous series of conspiracies and attempts at counter-revolutions likely to last? The only probable answer is that sporadic attempts of this kind—arising as they do fundamentally from the pattern of behaviour by which the lives of the conspirators have been moulded—may well continue as long as the pattern of behaviour itself. This, as experience indicates, is a lifelong matter. Not until the present generation of those whose early lives were spent in underground conspiracies against the Tsar has passed away will the USSR be as free from attempts at counter-revolution as Great Britain became after 1760, generations after the century of rebellions of 1641–1745. With the ever-increasing success of Soviet Communism in solving the paradox of poverty in the midst of plenty, which capitalism seems to find insoluble, these spasmodic attempts will become more feeble, and will be presently confined to incipient conspiracies which are strangled at birth by the public opinion of the rising generation. But the pattern of behaviour fades slowly in those whom it has moulded, and only with the death of the last of those who conspired against Nicholas and Stolypin will it have entirely disappeared. “For a long time to come”, wrote Lenin to one of his followers in November 1922,¹ “there will be doubts, uncertainty, suspicion and treachery”, a forecast which is borne out by the evidence in the Moscow trials of 1937.

To complete the story down to the autumn of 1937, it must be said that not only the trials and the executions but also the successive demotions and dismissals of such highly placed Party members as Bukharin, Rykov, Rakovsky, and Yagoda, together with a whole series of unexplained removals from office and transfers from post to post, maintained the popular excitement and the general suspicion which spared no one.² Possibly quite unconnected with such treasonable conspiracies as were widely suspected, was another series of trials in many of the constituent

¹ *The Letters of Lenin*, translated and edited by Elizabeth Hill and Doris Mudie, 1937, p. 475

² Almost wholly confined to the officials and the intelligentsia.

republics in the course of 1937 in which highly placed officials, mostly, but not exclusively, Party members, were found guilty of various forms of malversation, including embezzlement and diversion of public property to private uses, shameless extravagance and riotous living at the taxpayers' expense, coupled with forgery and fraudulent accountancy in some cases, and of culpable negligence, amounting to bribery and connivance, and positive wrecking, in others. That many cases of this kind should occur in a population now risen to 180 millions must be regarded as inevitable. After such a régime as the Tsar's government, which was notorious for widespread bribery, graft and malversations far beyond that of Western Europe or the United States, no student of social institutions could believe that none of the corruption had survived. What surprises the Englishman and the American is the Russian practice of smearing over all such offenders with the epithets of Trotskyist, diversionist, menshevist, deviationist, and even bourgeois, when they seem to be only common thieves. We imagine that many of these criminal trials during the spring and summer of 1937 may have been the direct outcome of the systematic inspection and checking of the whole industrial and agricultural organisation which has been for some time in progress as part of the improved administration of Gosplan and Gosbank, which in Britain would have been termed an audit. It may well have been deemed advisable, for the sake of deterrence, to depart exceptionally from the practice (for which there is much to be said) of not publishing broadcast the proceedings in such criminal trials, so as not to put it in the mind of the casual reader to imitate the offences. The occurrence within a year of a few hundred cases of administrative corruption, whether in the federal republic or municipal enterprises, or in the cooperative or trade union movements, in a community having four times the population of Britain or France and one-third more than that of the United States, would not in these countries seem in any way remarkable.

The Stakhanov Movement

Let us now return to the internal development of the new social order. One of the most important, and to the Western economists one of the least expected features of Soviet economy—one which during the past three years has grown impressively

in vividness—has been the revolution in the wage-earners' mentality towards measures and devices for increasing the productivity of labour. The divorce of the manual-working wage-earners from the ownership and direction of the capital upon which they work, and therefore from the product of their labour—specially characteristic of the capitalist system since the Industrial Revolution—has produced in the Western world, so employers have long complained, an intuitive hostility to any new methods of working or any technical improvement of processes, and, most of all, to the introduction of any labour-saving machinery permitting the employment of new kinds of workers. This persistent obstruction to any increase in labour productivity that might enable some of the present workers to be dispensed with, amounts in capitalist countries, so the economists declare, to a continual drag on economic progress. In the Soviet Union, as we described in some detail in our first edition (pp. 697-804), any such obstruction to industrial improvement, and any such drag on economic progress, has been, for the past decade, increasingly absent. We have described the feeling or conviction of the Soviet trade unionist—incredible as this seems both to many a Western trade union official and to most Western employers of labour—that, in soviet industry, there is no "enemy party". The manual workers in the factory equally with the office workers, the agricultural workers like those in the mine or the oil-field, realise that the whole of the aggregate net product, after the necessary allocations for taxation and common services have been made, but without deduction of tribute to landlord or capitalist, is genuinely at the disposal of the aggregate of workers, from the director and technicians to the mechanics and labourers, for distribution among themselves, either in social services or in personal wages or salaries, in such ways and at such rates as they, by their own trade union organisation, choose to determine.¹ It

¹ The trade unions of the USSR have had their own part in the universal "cleaning up" and improvement of organisation of the past two years. Their total membership has increased from eighteen to twenty-two millions. The number of separate unions has grown from 154 to 163. The central councils of many of the unions "lost contact", according to the deliberations of the plenum, "with the rank and file members"; and they must, therefore, keep closely in touch with all the factory committees by their own staffs of officials. The steady increase in the aggregate funds administered by each union for insurance and other social purposes has greatly enlarged the financial work which, it was complained, was not carried out properly: "It was managed

follows that it is to each man's pecuniary interest that not only his own productivity but also that of every one of his colleagues (of whatever grade) in the particular enterprise, and even that of everyone in the whole aggregate of enterprises of every kind throughout the USSR, should be as great and as continuous as possible. The wage of each worker in the USSR, whether by hand or by brain, depends, in a very real sense, on the mainten-

bureaucratically, without the participation and control of the rank and file members. . . . Roubles were wasted if not also embezzled by the leading organs ; by the Bureau of Social Insurance at the AUCCTU, by the Ukrainian, Leningrad and White Russian Trades Councils" (from the Resolution of the Sixth Plenum of the AUCCTU). This financial work has now been lightened by charging the whole cost of the medical services direct to the People's Commissariats of Health of the several constituent and autonomous republics. During 1937 the cases of slackness among officials and members have received repeated consideration. Here and there the local committees and officers had dispensed with the members' meetings, even for the re-election of officers and committee members, preferring the easier method of cooption. The All-Union Congress of Trade Unions, which ought to have been elected at least biennially, had not been convened since 1932, although the number of unions had been enlarged from 154 to 163, and All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions (AUCCTU) contenting itself with filling vacancies by cooption. Moreover its plenum had not been convened since 1934. All this slackness, which the rank and file had failed to correct, was made the subject of prolonged discussion when the Sixth Plenum of the AUCCTU was at last held (from April 27 to May 15, 1937), at which 106 members and candidates of the AUCCTU, 122 chairmen of the executive committees of the unions, 46 instructors and 104 chairmen of the factory workers' committees were present. The whole membership and all the officers were very seriously scolded, and the procedure for the future, especially as regards the election of committees and officers, was elaborately reformed with the object of ensuring, from one end of the USSR to the other, a more vigorous trade union democracy. A lengthy resolution was passed by this plenum, in which it was agreed to abolish the practice of cooption and to re-elect individually all officers and members of the committee meetings by a secret ballot ; to publish the financial reports of all central committees of the unions ; to re-elect all the executives before July 15, to hold the oblast conferences and the union's congresses before October 1, and to convene the All-Union Congress of the Trade Unions on October 20 ; to dissolve the regional councils as cumbrous ; to elect in all enterprises and institutions councils of social insurance, to improve the work of inspectors and to introduce examinations for them—all inspectors in future must be elected from skilled workmen and Stakhanovite employees ; to re-establish the practice of concluding *coldogovors* (see the specimen pp. 505-528) ; to convene regular industrial conferences ; to urge all trade union organisations to take more active part in solving the housing problem ; to widen the cultural work and to repair the slackness of the club administration ; to introduce a vigorous control of funds and to open educational courses for trade union officials. The plenum finally elected a commission for drafting new model rules to be submitted to the All-Union Congress of Trade Unions in October 1937 (*Trud*, May 16, 1937, No. 110 (4962) ; see also *International Press Correspondence* for June 12, 1937). It is hard to imagine a British, French or American trades union congress so drastically overhauling the whole trade union organisation !

ance and the progressive increase of the productivity of all of them. This conviction has produced, as we have described (see pp. 747-767), among the wage-earners of the USSR, and especially among the five-sixths of them who are trade unionists (now increased in number to over twenty-two millions), a veritable passion for productivity.¹

Out of this multitudinous striving after greater productivity, and especially out of the experiments in cost-accounting, there emerged in 1935 what has been called the Stakhanov Movement ; which has, without increase of capital outlay or working cost, and without throwing any wage-earners out of work, doubled and trebled the product of many manufacturing processes, and even many processes of mining and agriculture, with the result, it is computed, of increasing the total output of the USSR by as much as 10 or even 20 per cent within a single year.

"The Stakhanov Movement", said Stalin in 1935, "as an expression of socialist competition, contrasts favourably with the old stage. In the past, about three years ago, in the period of the first stage . . . socialist competition was not necessarily connected with new technique. At that time, in fact, we had hardly any new technique. . . . The Stakhanov Movement, on the other hand, is necessarily connected with new technique. We have before us . . . new people, working men and women, who have completely mastered the technique of their jobs, have harnessed it and driven it forward."

What exactly is this Stakhanov Movement, and how did it originate ? The Soviet leaders regard it as a "response" to "the historic speech on cadres made by Comrade Stalin on May 4, 1935, when he told the younger workers in the USSR that they must 'master technique'", particularly the technique of each worker's own particular job. The response was not long delayed. In August 1935 a miner, Alexei Stakhanov, aged twenty-nine, in the Donetz coalfield, pondering over his highly

¹ The Russian newspapers of 1935-1936 were full of reports and comments on Stakhanov experiments. The British or American readers should consult a remarkable book entitled *Labour in the Land of Socialism: Stakhanovites in Conference* (Moscow, 1936, 240 pp.; Cooperative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the USSR), being a report of 35 speeches at the "First All-Union Conference of Stakhanovites"; also the report by V. I. Mezhlauk in *The Second Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the USSR, 1931-1937* (Moscow, 1937, 671 pp.), pp. xix-xxii.; and the (Russian) *Organisation of Work in the Stakhanov Movement* (Moscow, 1936, 208 pp.).

skilled task of operating a pneumatic drill or coal-cutting machine, had the idea that he could cut out more coal during his six-hour day, if he could concentrate all his effort and attention continuously on cutting, whilst arranging for the various subsidiary operations of getting the place ready and removing the coal that was cut to be performed by the other members of the team with whom he worked, enabling them to concentrate similarly on their own particular processes. When he explained his idea to his fellow workmen and to his immediate superior, the assistant manager, he was met with the natural indisposition to any change of habits. But Stakhanov persisted, and called in aid his fellow members in the local organ of the Communist Party. This body, being on principle favourable to increased production, brought the necessary pressure to bear on the mine management; and Stakhanov proceeded to days of continuous coal cutting, in co-operation with assistants giving equally continuous days of subsidiary attendance. The result was immediately amazing. Instead of the six or seven tons per shift usual in the Donetz mines, or the ten tons of the specially highly organised German mines in the Ruhr, Stakhanov began at once to cut 102 tons in one shift, an amount which was later increased. "If, after this, we calculate the productivity of labour for the whole of a brigade which has adopted the Stakhanov method, we find . . . for each member of the brigade . . . 35 tons or more per shift . . . an average productivity three, four and five times greater than the same pneumatic drill gave formerly." ¹

The idea promptly spread to other industries. We give a second example from a cotton-weaving shed. A woman cotton weaver, Evdokia Vinogradova, aged twenty-one, herself described how she discovered that it cost her less time and labour to mend the broken thread and restart the machine when she walked continuously along each row of Northrup automatics, instead of rushing hither and thither in all directions across the vast floor, to attend particularly to each loom that was interrupted, now here and then there. She found that by traversing successively the long rows of looms (each worked without belting by its own electric dynamo) and dealing in its turn with each break as it was reached, she could keep going, with less aggregate interruption, as many as 96, 144 and eventually no fewer than 220 looms (the

¹ *Labour in the Land of Socialism : Stakhanovites in Conference*, pp. 37-38.

whole floorful); whilst nine unskilled assistants concentrating on feeding spools of thread and shifting the weft, by escaping the incessant distraction of change of process, enjoyed a like economy of physical effort and lessening of mental strain. Thus the team composed of one highly skilled weaver, Evdokia Vinogradova, and nine assistants, may be said to be managing 22 looms per head; an output which is stated to surpass the highest Lancashire or New England output per head on the same Northrup looms by more than 50 per cent.

The new movement received, from Stakhanov's very first experiment in continuous coal cutting, the eager support of the quickwitted People's Commissar of Heavy Industry, S. Ordjonikidze,¹ who repeatedly warned the managerial departments against any obstruction of the workers' projects for the rearrangement of their tasks. With the unrivalled Soviet apparatus for giving publicity to any new invention or discovery in social organisation, the Stakhanov Movement quickly spread to nearly every manufacturing industry from the Polish frontier to the Pacific Coast, as well as to some of the processes of agriculture and mining. Even the salesmen and cashiers in the crowded retail stores of the cities discovered means of quickening their service in the hours of greatest pressure by having ready packed the quantities usually demanded of the commodities in greatest request; and by preparing beforehand the piles of small change required for each denomination among the rouble notes that would be presented during the day. Already before the end of the year 1935 the Soviet Government was able to hold the "First All-Union Conference of Stakhanovites" at Moscow, attended by many hundreds of outstanding workers in all sorts of enterprises.² At this conference not only Alexei Stakhanov and Evdokia Vinogradova, but also three other coal miners and four other women weavers, two forge-hammer men in automobile works, three locomotive engine drivers on the railways, a woman filling tins of vegetables in a cannery, a woman machine-knitter, two women boring-machine operators in an armament factory, a turner in a carburettor works, and various others, severally

¹ This was emphasised in the obituary notices of this able organiser, who died suddenly of angina pectoris on February 18, 1937.

² The table on next page purports to give the percentage of Stakhanovites amongst Industrial workmen on August 1, 1936:

described in fascinating detail, how they, merely by rearranging the processes of their jobs, so as to cut out waste of time and effort, had substantially increased productivity, and at the same time lessened spoilage. One after another, the directors and foremen confirmed the accounts of these "Stakhanovites", whose numbers were growing to hundreds in each large enterprise; and emphasised not merely the increase in productivity but also in the gain involved in the shortening of factory time required to turn out big and complicated machines, or execute large orders; as well as the lessening of the waste in faulty product. Nor was the advance always a case of improvement on the exceptionally low mechanical capacity of the Russian ex-peasant. One director after another felt able confidently to assert that various Stakhanovites had attained results actually superior to the best that was done in the same processes in Germany or Belgium, Britain or the United States.

The Stakhanov Movement, it will be seen, is the obverse of the American system of "scientific management" as devised by Taylor. He went on the plan of emptying out of the workman's job every factor of initiative, thought or mental effort, so as to get from the labourer almost exclusively physical effort, and so to arrange that physical effort, by motion-study and prescribed rest pauses, in such a way as to increase its productivity to the utmost. All the mental effort that maximum productivity required was assigned to a group of "functional foremen" directing the factory as a whole. In the Soviet Union the Stakhanov

Branches of Industry	Men and Women	Women	Young People
Electricity	42·0	32·1	55·1
Petroleum: (a) oilfields .	36·4	14·7	33·5
(b) oil-refining plants .	57·7	38·5	57·5
Iron mines	21·6	5·3	19·4
Cast-iron	26·2	14·1	25·1
Metal industry	27·7	19·4	26·2
Chemistry	26·7	16·5	34·6
Textiles	19·7	21·3	16·1
Leather	39·8	40·4	36·9
Boots	41·4
Meat	38·8	32·0	37·6
Confectionery	35·5	39·0	29·5
Timber industry	30·5	26·0	32·5
Paper industry	23·8	19·2	25·5

(*The USSR—The Country of Socialism*, Moscow, Gosplan, 1936, p. 106.)

Movement, devised and introduced by the workmen themselves, consists essentially in such a rearrangement of each job as to give to each workman the opportunity of concentrating his mind, throughout his short working day of six or seven hours, upon the particular process entrusted to him, so that he can exercise his own initiative and devote his own mental as well as physical energy to his special work, without any loss of speed by passing from one task to another. Worker after worker testified that he or she did not thereby suffer either increased physical exertion or mental strain. On the contrary, continuance at the same task led to a particular rhythm which was less fatiguing, because less "worrying" than distracted and irregular operations. It was also not a case of the workers' actions being driven ever faster by having to keep up with machinery that was always being speeded up. The pace for each member of the team was set, not by any wheel that the management turned, but by the workers' team itself, which determined its own rate of working, and set its own rest-pauses. Nor was it a case of the leading operator forcing greater speed on subordinate attendants. Not the leader alone, but all the members of the team shared alike in the decision of how the work should be done, and in the advantage of unbroken concentration on a precisely defined task, by which both time and "worry" were saved. Moreover, all alike were always on piece-work rates, and all secured a substantial increase of earnings—sometimes doubling or trebling their previous takings for the month—as a result of the increase in output which they had jointly produced. It need hardly be said that, in the Soviet Union, no attempt was made to cut the piece-work rates. The increase in earnings, far from increasing the cost of production of the commodity or service, actually involved a decrease, owing to the lessening, per unit of output, of overhead expenses.

We do not overlook the fact that workers of all kinds and grades differ in temperament, and that some prefer to lounge and loiter through a longer working day, even if they dispense with holidays. Others willingly exert themselves more rapidly as well as more continuously during more limited hours, which they think recompensed by longer intervals for rest and recreation, and more frequent holidays. Such differences of tempo and of continuity also characterise different occupations and different jobs within each occupation, among which workers may choose

according to their idiosyncracies. It would be as tyrannous to coerce the quick man into an essentially leisurely job as the slow man into the job admitting of greater speed and concentration of effort. But besides the remedy of this initial freedom of choice, there is much to be done by training and habit to fit the man to the job. It is a characteristic fallacy of the amateur onlooker to think amazing and almost incredible the high speed and large output which the trained and practised craftsman accomplishes without turning a hair. It was recognised by the manual workers, equally with the factory managers, that the improved methods of working, like the introduction of new labour-saving machines, would involve in due time a readjustment of "norms", or standards upon which the piece-work rates were calculated, so as to secure, in agreement between the trade unions and the management, a new approach to equality of remuneration for the same effort as between job and job. The permanent advantage to all the workers, by hand or by brain, was seen to reside in the greater amount of commodities which the community as a whole is able to share among its working members, together with their youthful and aged dependants. At the same time, it must not be forgotten that there are some tasks for which piece-work speed is dangerous, and also some kinds of machines and plant which can easily be unduly depreciated by too swift or too continual working.

"Wherein", asked Stalin at the "First All-Union Conference of Stakhanovites", in 1935, "lies the significance of the Stakhanov movement?" In words which demand attention from the economists of the Western world, he asked: "Why was it that capitalism smashed and defeated feudalism? Because it created higher standards of productivity of labour; it enabled society to produce an incomparably greater quantity of products than was the case under the feudal system. Because it made society richer. Why is it that socialism can and should and certainly will defeat the capitalist system? Because it can furnish higher models of labour, a higher productivity of labour than the capitalist system of economy. Because it can give society more products and can make society richer than the capitalist system of economy can."¹

To appreciate fully the economic significance of the Stakhanov Movement of 1935-1937, it must be seen, as Stalin saw it, as the culmination of the successive manifestations of the revolution in

¹ *Labour in the Land of Socialism*, pp. 15-16.

the wage-earners' mentality, described in our chapter entitled "In Place of Profit" (see pp. 697-804), towards increasing productivity, on which, as Stalin suggested, the success of socialism ultimately depends.

The Success of Collective Agriculture

According to all the information that we have been able to obtain from those who have visited the rural districts of the USSR during the past few years—some of them staying for months in collective farms—and from such published reports and statistics as exist, the condition of the 22 millions of families grouped in nearly a quarter of a million kolkhosi, taken as a whole, has considerably improved since 1932-1933.¹

"The change in four years", states one eye-witness,² "is almost unbelievable. . . . Again and again the machine has come to the rescue of the Russian Revolution, and has quickly healed up wounds that an unexpected catastrophe had inflicted on the country. Certainly, the village of Reshitlorka [Ukraine] this summer (1936) was a living example of such a recuperation. Hardly a peasant family but had a cow and some boasted more than one cow and one pig. The three collective farms into which the village was divided had imported beehives in the spring, some of which they had distributed among the members for their individual use. In 1932 people wandered about the market-place sadly and sullenly in quest of eggs and butter. The sale of meat

¹ Among recent books by eye-witnesses may be cited: *Vom Aussterbendem Dorf zu Sozialistischer Kollektivwirtschaft* (Monographie Zweier Sowjetdorfer), von Schuwajew, Moscow, 1935; *In a Collective Farm*, by Vern Smith (New York and London, 1936, 239 pp.). The (Russian) *Agricultural Economy in the USSR* (1465 pp. Moscow, 1936) contains over 1000 detailed tables of statistics relating to the development of the different branches of agriculture, and of its organisation in the Soviet Union for the years 1928 to 1935. This immense mass of statistical information as to area, crops and yield is copiously reviewed and dissected in *Soviet Agricultural Reorganisation and the Bread Grain Situation*, by V. P. Timoshenko (Stanford University, California, April 1937), in which every possible adverse criticism is adduced, nevertheless leading up to the conclusion that there has certainly been a great improvement during the last few years.

² See the article entitled "Russian Defensive Strength" in *The Round Table*, No. 106, March 1937; and, in corroboration, some incidental references in "The Anti-Bolshevist Front", by Wickham Steed, in the *Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs*, March 1937. See also the article by Maurice Hindus, at p. 14 of *Soviet Russia To-day* (New York) for May 1937.

was completely forbidden. Now the tables groaned under the weight of cheese, butter, eggs, meat and other foodstuffs. On the fringe of the bazaar peasants were selling for meat live cows, sheep, calves, pigs and fowls. The shops which four years ago boasted mainly cosmetics and cobwebs, which had not an ounce of sugar or cereals or herring, were now crammed with sugar, cigarettes, and tinned fish and meat. The number of shops had multiplied at least three times. Everywhere in the Ukraine this summer (1936) it was the same story of abundant crops, fewer and fewer families without their own cow, pig, chickens. Everywhere collective farms were setting out huge orchards, developing large apiaries, digging ponds in which to catch the spring waters, and use them for pleasure, for the cultivation of fish and for irrigation.

"The Kuban, the land of the doughty Kuban cossacks, was even more of a revelation. There, four years ago, people were in open rebellion. Women and children, and sometimes men disguised as women so as to avoid possible physical retaliation, marched up and down the streets heaping oaths and curses on Soviet officials. . . . Mayevskaya, rechristened Krasny Tamenetz, is one of the most prosperous collective farms in the Kuban. Its people received in 1936 for each labour-day $4\frac{1}{2}$ kilos of grain and 6 roubles in cash, in addition to other forms of produce. The collective farm has its own electric plant, which furnishes light for every home and every barn ; and 70 new houses were being built for members."

The published statistics show that the total area sown and cultivated in the USSR, and the total yield in harvest, have as a whole risen, and were, in the aggregate in 1936-1937, considerably in excess of the figure, not only for 1924, when things were at their lowest, but also for 1913.¹ The increase has not been so much in wheat and rye, for which sufficient has now been provided for home consumption, whilst some other commodities serve better for international exchange. The greatest increase during recent years has accordingly been in the so-called technical crops, such as flax, hemp, cotton, sugar beet and sunflower, as well as in

¹ The official statistics state that the total area sown in 1935 was 132.8 million hectares, as against 105 in 1913. Of this area 103.4 million hectares were in grain in 1935 as against 94.4 in 1913 (translated from *Socialist Construction*, published by Gosplan, Moscow, 1936, p. 278).

potatoes, tea, tobacco, various kinds of fruit, flowers for the city markets, and even (to the extent of some 30,000 acres) the approved substitute for the india-rubber plant (kok-sazuz). The colossal destruction of livestock by the recalcitrant peasants during 1929-1933 (see p. 236) began in 1934-1935 to be made good, notably in pigs and large-horned cattle.¹ This has been achieved partly by improved administration in the special stock-breeding state farms (sovkhosi), and, with increased knowledge and care, by the growth of the dairy and piggyery herds of many of the kolkhosi; and partly by the device of enabling the families in kolkhos membership, to a number that had in 1935 already reached some six millions, and by 1938 is expected to approach twenty millions,² to obtain a calf for favourably deferred payments, to be reared on the peasant's individual holding. The individual family enterprise which this small-holding represents (which is no innovation, as it was expressly provided for in 1928) has been formally generalised in the model kolkhos constitution, now universally adopted with minor variations by the members' meetings.³

Much collateral evidence of the great advance in prosperity during the past few years is available. The doctors attribute the steadily improving health of the peasantry during recent years largely to their being better nourished. They are plainly eating more wheaten bread than ever before, and more butter and meat. There are considerable balances at any date due to the collective farms from the diverse institutions to which they send regular

¹ The figures for 1935 may be compared with those for 1929-1933 on p. 246. On June 1, 1935, there were still only 15.9 million horses as compared with 34 million in 1929; and 49.5 million sheep, etc., as compared with 147.2 million in 1929; and 49.3 million large-horned cattle as against 68.1 million in 1929. But the pigs had increased to 22.6 million as against 20.9 million in 1929 (*The Second Five-Year Plan*, by M. I. Mezhlauk, p. xxxvi, Moscow, 1937).

² *Ibid.* p. xliii.

³ Adopted by the Second All-Union Congress of Collective Farm Shock Workers, and approved by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU, February 17, 1935.

This elaborate and detailed constitution and code of administration, which in the English translation exceeds 6000 words, affords the best vision of the kolkhos organisation. It will be found as an appendix to the volume *In a Collective Farm*, by Vern Smith, pp. 214-229.

The area of the individual holding of each member's family, which can be altered by the general meeting of members, varies from half an acre to as much as three acres according to the district, and also proportionate to the number of workers in the family and the amount of their livestock.

supplies, week by week, of vegetables and other farm produce or fresh fish, under the network of voluntary contracts of purchase and sale at wholesale market prices, by which the USSR is now covered (see pp. 333, 693-694). These have been steadily increasing in amount. The kolkhosi have nearly all got current accounts in the State Savings Bank in which they deposit temporarily their undistributed balances. The aggregate amount of these kolkhos balances in July 1936 was three times that in July 1934. In addition, many of the kolkhosi have lately been making investments in the government's internal loans, which yield premiums as well as interest. Throughout all the rural districts the sales of the Consumers' Cooperative Societies, membership of which is practically universal among the adult peasants, have during the past two years increased in amount by leaps and bounds, and greatly widened in range. The villagers are everywhere buying not only boots and clothes and unaccustomed household furniture (for instance, iron bedsteads) but also sports goods, fancy soap and cosmetics, books and stationery, photographic cameras, musical instruments, wireless sets and expensive delicacies.

This is not to say that every kolkhos has attained prosperity. The government still has periodically to remit arrears to particular collective farms unable to pay their dues. At the end of 1936 the government cancelled all outstanding arrears, so as to allow them all without exception to start free of debt. How many of the quarter of a million are still struggling against poverty we are unable to say. What is now remarked is the emergence of what are popularly called "millionaire" kolkhosi, being collective farms in which the aggregate divisible income of the membership (which varies from a few dozen families to a thousand or so) during 1936-1937, in cash and in kind, has exceeded a million roubles. Of these there are reported to be several thousands in the USSR, the collective income, in a few cases of the larger farms, running up to five million roubles. Family incomes for the year, in particular kolkhosi, of thirty, forty and even sixty thousand roubles are occasionally to be found.¹ It is this

¹ Here, the British economist may say, we see emerging the phenomenon of economic rent. It must, however, be remembered that the principal examples of economic rent, namely, those arising from building site-values and from the working of minerals, are definitely excluded from kolkhos enjoyment or

widespread prosperity that explains the considerable aggregate investment of the collective farms during the year in additional farm buildings and sawmills, schools, clubhouses, bathhouses, motor lorries and bicycles, and occasionally even aeroplanes. By the end of 1936, no fewer than 7600 collective farms had installed electric light and power in their dwellings and farm buildings, which is more than are to be seen in Britain. The grain crop from 1,877,500 acres was threshed in about 4000 electrically driven threshing machines. In the southern farms half a million sheep were sheared electrically. In Central and Northern Russia many kolkhosi now use electricity for heating the glass-houses in which large crops of vegetables are raised. It is interesting to come across instances in which the collective enterprise of the kolkhos has enabled emergencies to be met, and difficulties to be overcome, that would have transcended the powers of an independent peasant family. In this way kolkhosi have defeated local droughts by constructing ponds as local flood or snow reservoirs; in the summer stocking them with fish and using them as swimming baths. Or by digging primitive irrigation channels to be filled by pumps from these ponds, sometimes electrically driven. Or even, in one case that we know, by carrying water from the river by a human chain of buckets.¹ Efforts such as these are believed to have saved the situation in 1936, when unusual cold in April and local drought conditions prevailed

ownership. Accessibility to the bazaar or other free market remains, but may be deemed of small importance, as a considerable proportion of the produce is disposed of to the Government. By far the largest part of the difference per head in net divisible income between the various kolkhosi plainly results from their inequalities in competence of management, in skill and assiduity of labour and in the extent to which improvements in method have been adopted. Their members are not exempt from the progressive income tax and death duties.

¹ "Two years ago in the republic of Kabarda in the North Caucasus, after the crops had been put in, there was no rain. Day after day the sun rose hot and dry and the soil began to parch and bake. Thereupon Metal Kalmykov, the political leader of Kabarda, one of the most amazing personages in the revolution, and incidentally the most brilliant and most humane collectiviser in the country, issued a call to the whole population to go out with picks, shovels, spades and bring the mountain streams to the land and save themselves from disaster. Schools closed, offices closed, factories wherever possible closed, and the whole population, including Kalmykov and all his secretaries and assistants, went into the fields and shovelled dirt. About half of the land of the country was irrigated when the rains splashed down. Meanwhile the ditches are there, and whenever drought threatens crops the mountain streams can be turned on almost like faucets" ("Russia's Greatest Victory", by Maurice Hindus, *The New Republic*, April 14, 1937, p. 286).

in many parts, which might otherwise have caused a serious shortage. Or the kolkhos has erected, by joint effort of its members, additional storing-places for the crop, or new shelters for livestock and machinery, by which the members' collective property is better preserved.

We infer accordingly with some confidence, if without complete statistical proof, that, taken as a whole, the system of kolkhosi, as it has now been got to work, has during the past three or four years become substantially successful. Alike with respect to the individual shares divided among the families in membership, and to the amount received by the government, the condition in 1934 and 1935, and, under less favourable climatic conditions, even that of 1936 taken as a whole, together with the prospects for 1937, indicate positive prosperity. There is a fair promise not only of this success increasing and becoming more nearly universal, but also of its proving equal to deal successfully with the periodical adverse climatic conditions that would have meant, to an individual peasantry, a serious famine. It is significant that the Soviet Government has lately become convinced that, in the present state of development of the rural population, the kolkhosi are proving more successful than the sovkhosi. These nine or ten thousand relatively gigantic state farms, worked by wage labour, from which so much was expected a decade ago, have been in many cases reduced in size by subdivision; in other instances changed from such specialised enterprises as "grain factories" into mixed farming; and, most significant of all, in various localities, transformed into kolkhosi, either by the division of their land among neighbouring collective farms, or by the establishment, instead of the sovkhos, of a group of newly arrived or transferred peasant families as one or more new collective farms. It is reported that during 1935-1936 some 55,000 acres were added to the aggregate under collective farms, much of this by transfer from sovkhosi. There are now fewer sovkhosi, and they were sowing in the spring of 1937 only one-tenth of the area of grain sown by the kolkhosi.¹ We can discover no case of reversion to individual peasant holdings.

¹ These state farms are now (1937) under three separate administrations. The People's Commissar of Sovkhosi had within his jurisdiction 13 million acres sown by sovkhosi; the People's Commissar of Food Industry and the People's Commissar of Agriculture had each about 2 million acres. At the same time

The eye-witness on whom we rely, in agreement with those foreign agricultural experts whose testimony we have been able to obtain, agrees in attributing the success of the collective farms to three main factors, about which there is disagreement only as to their relative efficacy. The first of these is the extensive mechanisation of agricultural processes rendered possible by the enlargement of scale of the farm.

"Collectivisation of the land", says the eye-witness already quoted, "is the only apparent reason for the amazing change in the condition of the countryside and in the attitude of the people, Cossacks and peasants. Dire as has been its cost in human life and in sorrow, few peasants, even among those who loathe the new discipline, still doubt its superiority over the old way of farming. . . . In the country at large, collectivisation has become firmly entrenched: the [hundreds of thousands of] tractors, combines and other modern implements have wrought a great change in the minds and lives of the Russian peasantry."¹

The effect of this mechanisation upon the yield is often misunderstood. It is said for instance, that the tractor, not being manure, though it lessens labour, does nothing to increase fertility. But, at any rate, the tractor-plough and the combine-harvester alike increase the actual yield of produce per hectare. The accomplished agricultural expert whom the German Government has, for years, maintained as part of its embassy in Moscow to be perpetually reporting on Soviet agriculture, has lately become emphatic in his testimony as to this cause of such success as he admits the kolkhosi to have latterly attained. In the old days, he pointed out in 1936, when the work was done by horses, or by the peasant himself with his wife, there was often an insufficient interval between the end of the summer and the beginning of winter snows to get completed the autumn ploughing of every tiny strip of the peasant holding. Much of the soil was often hardly scratched, and part was sometimes not ploughed at all. But now, under the complete tractorisation of the collectivised arable areas of the USSR, the whole cultivable surface can be

the area sown by collective farms reached 189 million acres, whilst that sown by individual peasants was less than two million acres.

It has been stated that "the Government has recently turned over about a fourth of all land in state farms to collectives" (*Soviet Agricultural Reorganisation and the Bread Grain Situation*, by V. P. Timoshenko, 1937, p. 365).

¹ *The Round Table*, No. 106, March 1937.

ploughed 18 inches deep in ten days. In one Ukrainian kolkhos a visitor was informed in 1936 that the ploughing had taken only five days.

Sowing has been everywhere expedited. In 1937 a majority of the kolkhosi in a particular district were reported to have completed their spring sowing within three days. After the autumnal sowing, when winter comes, the snow fills the deep furrows now customary, and remains undisturbed until it melts in the spring, when the water does not flow off, but, in each furrow, sinks gradually into the soil. This, in the semi-arid area, causes a marked increase in fertility.¹ Moreover, much more time has become available for weeding and repeated harrowing, resulting in increased yield. Similarly the use of the combine-harvester effects both a more complete and a more speedy harvesting of the grain, with a shortened period of risk from bad weather, and actually less loss in warehousing. In one kolkhos in the southern Ukraine the whole harvest of grain was reported in 1936 to have been reaped, threshed and stored in 18 days—processes formerly extending over several months. Experiments have been made, now thought to have been not altogether successful, in the use of the aeroplane for spring sowing, so that this can be begun earlier in the year. This enables the seed to be scattered actually upon the snow, when it sinks down gradually, through the melting mass, into the moistened earth. Such broadcast sowing upon the snow may have to be resorted to, even with all its drawbacks, in backward seasons in which the snow lies very late. But now that the use of the tractor enables each of the successive operations to be completed within a few days, the kolkhosi are warned not to sow too early; the sowing by aeroplane will be done only in exceptional cases in a backward spring. Fertilisers and germi-

¹ "Thus the peasant lands are plowed to a depth of twenty and twenty-five centimeters. They are well cultivated. One does not have to be an agricultural expert or a dirt farmer to appreciate the vastness of this one change in peasant farming with all that it implies in conservation of moisture and in destruction of weeds. In the Ukraine and the Kuban, Russia's chief grain-growing regions in Europe, there were no rains last summer. Yet wherever I travelled in these sections crops on the average were as good as and often better than the year before. Again and again older peasants told me that never in all their experience as farmers did they remember a time when crops resisted so successfully the onslaught of the drought. Even in the Volga regions, where the drought was most severe, the collective farms, because of superior tillage, managed to save about a third of the crop" ("Russia's Greatest Victory", by Maurice Hindus, in *The New Republic*, April 14, 1937, p. 286.)

cides can be spread, and effective campaigns against locusts and mosquitos can be carried out quickly and cheaply, and even a little irrigation effected by water sprinkling from the air. It is therefore strictly accurate to say that mechanisation may be used so as positively to increase the quantity of the product in some cases even more advantageously than additional fertilizers.

The second factor in the economic success of the collective farms within the last decade, especially during recent years, and one which many critics ignore, has been the very general increase in knowledge of their members. To bring these lately quite illiterate peasants into the educational atmosphere of the settlement of the farm affairs, by frank discussion, in frequent members' meetings; to have these meetings addressed by more competent instructors, whether the elected chairman, the representative of the machine and tractor station, or a visiting official from the Commissariat of Agriculture; to send away groups of members as delegates to Moscow, or to hear some leader at a district conference; and to have the reports of these delegates discussed at the members' meeting—all this, together with the circulation in the villages of literally millions of copies of books of every kind, not to mention the newspapers, and the habitual listening-in to the Moscow and other radio talks, has produced an outburst of learning among this backward population of a hundred and twenty millions of persons from the Baltic to the Pacific, which may not unfairly be compared in magnitude with the more advanced but far less widespread Renaissance of the fifteenth century, which can have touched only a few thousands of people in each of half a dozen nations. To predict, as one enthusiast did in 1930, that the kolkhos would become the peasant's university, was perhaps going too far. Yet within less than a decade something comparable with this has actually happened in thousands of collective farms that were formerly stigmatised as the "deaf villages" of the remote steppe.¹

¹ As to the advance in schooling in the collectivised villages, a British visitor, inspecting a village school in 1934, found the elder boys and girls being taught to read and speak, not only their own vernacular and Russian, but also German: and then discovered that in all seven-year schools (8-15) a foreign language was a compulsory subject, in practice either German or English. The seven-year school was already universal in nearly a thousand cities in the USSR (unless it had become the more advanced ten-year school (8-18); it was already existing in all the villages of the Ukraine and in about half of those of the RSFSR and by 1938 it would be universal from the Baltic to the Pacific. The English-

The third factor in this success has been the ingenious use that has been made of the peasant's inherited passion of acquisitiveness. Membership of the kolkhos does not involve and (contrary to careless mis-statement) has never involved the abandonment of the peasant's own dwelling, his own garden, or even the paddock for his own poultry-run, piggery and cow. All this he keeps, as has always been his habit, for the profit of himself and his family. Even the scattered strips which the peasant used to plough and reap, and which are now thrown together in one great open field, to be cultivated collectively, are dealt with on an individual piece-work basis. The net yield is annually distributed, not equally among the members as such, but unequally, strictly in proportion to the number of work-days (an arbitrary measure of the amount of labour, fixed by the members' meeting) registered as performed by each worker. The government now takes from the kolkhos, and that in kind, only the proportion of the produce which had been settled before the beginning of the agricultural year, leaving to the workers the whole advantage of any increased area sown, or of more intensive cultivation in the course of the year. In the cases that have been investigated, the total share taken by the government for agricultural tax and payment for the use and repair of the tractors and other machinery supplied, amounted to less than one-third of the yield, leaving to the members much more than, under equivalent weather conditions, they had ever enjoyed before; not only more than the Tsar, the landlord and the usurer had left them, but more than the great mass of them (as distinguished from the minority of kulaks) had ever enjoyed as individual peasants since the Revolution.¹

The working members are, by decision of the members' meeting, organised in brigades, and each brigade is now usually

man thought with shame that in no single village school in all England and Wales was any foreign language being taught. The Russian villages have now gone further. In 1937, as eye-witnesses have told us, some of the larger villages in the Ukraine have already converted their schools into ten-year schools, retaining their own pupils until 18, whilst attracting others from the neighbourhood; and sending quite a good proportion on to institutions of university grade, with maintenance grants from the kolkhosi to which their parents belong.

¹ After payment of the Government dues, what is left is disposed of as the members' meeting decides. After covering all the advances to members, the farm expenses and the planned reserves for seed, etc., the net balance may be either allocated by vote to new buildings or other collective improvement, or divided among the members in proportion to their work-days. The members may either sell their shares in the free market or to other consumers jointly, and

made responsible for the continuous performance of a particular section of farm-work—it may be a particular area of the arable, or a particular herd of cows, or the management of the piggery, or the driving of the tractors—for at least a whole year. In these various ways the common human desire for increased spending-money is so harnessed and adjusted as to stimulate all the men—and not less the wives and the adolescents—always in the direction of increased quantity, efficiency and regularity of labour. This ingenious adaptation of the ingrained propensities of an age-long peasantry, which is especially characteristic of the agricultural kolkhos, is not, as is often ignorantly asserted, a departure from the original plan of 1928, when the form of the *artel* was expressly adopted for the collective farm in preference to that of the commune; still less is it a “reversion to capitalism”. It is, on the contrary, merely a continuation, with some minor improvements, and over a limited part of his field of activity, of the private enterprise which once filled the peasant’s whole life. The peasant, who could not have been suddenly swept into complete communism, has been, largely though not wholly, collectivised. Nor can the collective farm accurately be called a return to capitalism, seeing that the kolkhos members are, like everyone else, whether individually or collectively, definitely prohibited, under severe penalty, from resorting to either of the two characteristics of capitalist enterprise, namely, taking for themselves divide the proceeds; or (as some obstinate individuals prefer) take their shares themselves to the nearest free market and retail them for their individual advantage.

Much misunderstanding has arisen from the practice of the Government of inducing (and doubtless practically requiring) the kolkhos to enter into a contract to supply the Government with a specified amount or proportion of the yield at a price arrived at by agreement. This has been assumed by critics to be always a “nominal”, some say a “confiscatory”, price, far below the price of bread in the cities, amounting in fact to an almost unbearable burden. We are unable to make a satisfactory estimate. As described to us by members of the kolkhosi that we visited, the Government price was, in effect, a wholesale price, certainly substantially below what the peasants could obtain by retail sales if they took the trouble and incurred the expense of transporting the crop to the nearest bazaar, and selling it, bit by bit, to individual consumers. That was, however, as the peasants declared, an unprofitable alternative. The Government gave them the privilege of obtaining, also at a wholesale price, all the articles of equipment, together with seed and fertilisers, required by the farm. We are not convinced that the transaction is more onerous than is the sale to the travelling grain dealer as was usual before the Revolution, and as is still common in other peasant communities. For similar wholesale purchases by the Government, at a collectively agreed price, in the fishing industry, see pp. 291-292; and for furs and skins, see pp. 295-296.

the product of labourers whom they hire at wages, or buying commodities in order to sell these at a higher price.

No candid observer in 1937 can doubt that the collective farm system has proved not only its economic superiority over the starveling peasant holding, however skilfully developed ; but also its cultural advantages in enlightening what Marx and Lenin called the " idiocy " of rural life : this is why it has now, after little more than a decade of trial, generally speaking, won its way to reluctant approval by the members. This came about by degrees, as the workers' dividends steadily increased, though not by any means entirely because of their increase. First to be converted by experience were the women and the adolescents (two-thirds of the whole), who found themselves suddenly emancipated from their thralldom to the male head of the household ; becoming free members of the governing assembly ; and for the first time drawing their own individual incomes from the common estate. The elderly men long remained sullen, bewailing their lost autocracy, but were frequently mollified by being appointed inspectors of quality, charged to walk about to see that loss was prevented and waste eliminated ! Willing acceptance of the new organisation was greatly promoted by the official declaration in 1935, which was in 1936 enshrined in the New Constitution of the USSR, that each kolkhos was secured, in perpetuity, the occupation of the land allotted to it, undiminished in area, and free of rent (except in the form of taxation of the annual product). This sense of permanence of occupation in usufruct—scarcely distinguishable from the Russian peasant's idea of complete ownership—has been brought home to the 22 million families by the issue, in the course of 1936–1937, to each of them, of a well-got-up, attractively bound " book ", containing a map of the kolkhos land. This shows the boundaries separating the land of each kolkhos from that of its neighbours, and also contains a copy of the rules for the administration of its affairs that its members' meeting has adopted. Visitors to the homes during the past year have been impressed with the naïve joy and pride with which this " title deed " is treasured. A small part of its result is the zeal with which, in one kolkhos after another, the boundaries have been marked on the ground by stones or fencing, the land being then cultivated right up to the edge, instead of broad strips being left waste to avoid disputes. Another is the constant effort to

drain the swampy patches, stub up the bushes and level the little irregularities by reason of which parts of nearly every kolkhos area have previously defied effective cultivation. The transformation of feeling is marked by the fact that there is manifested (1937), in various parts of the USSR, a movement to the kolkhosi, in place of the former movement away from them. Some kolkhosi, indeed—perhaps because so many of their young people are now in the cities studying to be doctors or engineering technicians, or agronomists (see pp. 1179-80); or because they need a book-keeper or a particular craftsman; or because they have been allotted additional land from a disrupted sovkhos—were found in 1936 to be actively seeking additional members from the neighbouring small towns. Several at least of the persons extruded from Moscow because of failure to find rooms there, or situations which they were willing to accept, have been admitted to kolkhosi wanting additional members. We happen to have heard on good authority that the government of a neighbouring state was, in 1936-1937, warned by its agents in the USSR that the feeling in the country districts had completely changed from that prevailing four or five years ago, and that no assistance from mass discontent was now to be counted on, whether in the Ukraine or the Kuban or anywhere else, among the peasantry.¹

¹ We append the testimony of an eye-witness whose personal acquaintance with the Russian peasantry makes him an unrivalled authority. Mr. Maurice Hindus described in April 1937 what he calls "Russia's Greatest Victory".

"Some years ago while on a visit to a village in the province of Ryazan I attended a meeting at which a teacher of agriculture delivered a lecture on gardening. At great length he explained to his audience that the way to grow large firm heads of cabbage was to set the plants in squares and far enough apart so that the cultivator could go through the rows both ways. The peasants listened and seemed impressed, and then went home and planted cabbage the way they had always done—close together, the theory being that the more plants there were in a row the more cabbage they would have. Last summer, while visiting villages all the way from the black-earth region to the Turkish border in Armenia, I made a particular effort to look into gardens, and wherever I saw cabbage it was planted precisely as the above-mentioned teacher of agriculture had urged his hearers to do.

"The Crimea and the Southern Ukraine always had to import seed potatoes. In recent years Professor Lysenko, by his method of vernalization, that is, starting growth in the cellar, has made it possible for these territories to raise their own. In the past year 10,000 collective farms in the Ukraine no longer had to import seed potatoes. Meanwhile White Russia, though especially suited to potatoes, is cutting down on its potato acreage and planting more and more flax. The peasants there had long ago been told that flax was more profitable than potatoes, but habit, inertia, dread of innovation—ancient foes of progress in the Russian village—kept them from making the shift. Now under collectivisation the shift is being readily achieved.

[Continued overleaf.]

The Retailing of Commodities

The reader will not need to be told of the continuous progress made, year after year, in the USSR, in practically every branch of wealth production. Nor need we give any account of the colossal new enterprises that are going on in every part of the USSR. Everyone will have heard of the Moscow Underground Railway, of which the second section will soon be opened for

"More perhaps than any other farmer in Europe the *muzhik* was wary of new ways of farming, chiefly because his own experience and the experience of his ancestors had taught him that the old ways, however crude and ineffectual to the man of the laboratory, were sure to yield results, even if poor ones, but that the new method, because it was new, might prove a failure, and then what would he do in winter with no cabbage, no onions, no pork, no potatoes? . . . There is not a collective farm but boasts its quota of members who at first scoffed and swore at new methods of tillage, but who subsequently recognised their error and have since been ready to follow the proposals of the agronomist.

"In 1927 one-third of the peasantry had no draught animals. One-fifth had no cows. Of those who had horses, one-half had only one horse per family. With the best of intentions these peasants could not use heavy ploughs—a horse could not pull them—or any other modern machine. The size of the average individual farm was a little over eleven acres, and few owners of such small holdings could hope to attain a degree of prosperity that would enable them to buy modern agricultural implements. That was why about three-fourths of the Russian peasantry sowed their grain by hand, a process as slow as it was wasteful. Nearly half of them did their harvesting by hand. Peasants with no horse, or with only one horse—and they were in the vast majority—could use a light plough or a *soha*, a wood-framed plough, neither of which could turn up a furrow of more than ten or thirteen centimetres. In the absence of heavy disk harrows they could not prepare proper seed beds, and a marked feature of their fields was their lumpy condition. In time of drought the sun quickly baked up their land and when fall or winter came they faced starvation. . . .

"Russia paid an appalling price for collectivisation; more than for any other enterprise of the revolution, save for the conquest of power. The blunders that the soviets and the Communist Party committed in the first three years of the movement have turned many a friendly foreign journalist into an implacable and lasting foe of the revolution. . . . Yet now as one travels about the country and sees the superbly tilled fields and the increasing herds of livestock, especially sheep and swine, it seems unbelievable that only four years ago the Ukraine and the Kuban and other districts were smitten with hunger and devastation. . . .

"Because they are so new and are such a stupendous departure from former methods of work, the collectives have many difficulties to overcome. There are not enough good managers. There are not enough good foremen. There are entirely too many office workers and executives. On some farms about one-fourth of the workers hold non-productive jobs. The division of labour is still clumsy and wasteful. . . . Certain branches of farming, especially horticulture, have been grossly neglected. This is why fruit is so scanty in Russia. Bureaucracy, the chief curse of the revolution, though not so viciously rooted as in the city, is yet in evidence on some of the best collectives. But these are faults of organisation which time and experience should overcome. . . ." (Article in *The New Republic*, April 14, 1937, pp. 284-287.)

traffic, nor is it necessary to do more than mention the White Sea Canal, connecting Leningrad with the Arctic Ocean. We can hardly omit the vast series of ship canals, hydro-electric stations and irrigation works which are rapidly making Moscow a port from which ships sail into five separate seas. Meanwhile the production of coal and mineral oil, iron and steel, manganese and aluminium, and finally gold, has during the past two years exceeded all records. The distinctive feature of these years has been a spectacular increase in the production of all sorts of household commodities. The Soviet Government has found itself up against another problem, namely, that of getting the goods to the customers.

We described in the first edition (pp. 304-310) how much more difficult it had proved to be, in so vast a territory, to construct efficient social machinery for the retail distribution of commodities in satisfaction of the consumers' desires, than to organise, with a growing measure of success, the production of these commodities, and even their actual transport by rail and road. In the course of the year 1917, Lenin (and, we think, among the Bolshevik leaders he only) discerned that the function of retailing must be undertaken, at any rate in the earlier stages of socialism and communism, by the then inchoate consumers' cooperative movement. It was, however, not until 1929-1931 that the elimination of the profit-making private retailer, who had been re-established under the New Economic Policy (NEP) of 1921, was substantially completed. Meanwhile the consumers' cooperative movement had been growing by leaps and bounds from one end of the USSR to the other, coming, in 1935, to have about 73 millions of members, organised in some 45,000 societies, strongly federated in *Centrosoyus*. It had covered the greater part of the USSR with its retail distributing points. It had constructed, with government assistance, magnificent mechanised bakeries equal if not superior to the best in the United States or Great Britain. Its central stores in Moscow and Leningrad could claim in 1935 to be unsurpassed by any retailing establishment in the cooperative world. Nor could it be forgotten that in the earlier years, at a time when all other credits were refused to the Soviet Union, *Centrosoyus* had obtained, largely with the willing aid of the English and Scottish Cooperative Wholesale Societies, the necessary imports, especially of tea, textiles and hardware,

which would otherwise have been lacking. But we had also to describe (see pp. 323-327) how persistent was popular dissatisfaction with the inability of Centrosoyus to cover successfully the whole field of distribution, and how its sphere of operations had been successively encroached upon. Already in 1934 we recounted at some length (see pp. 327-335) how various important parts of the function of retailing household commodities were being undertaken by other authorities.

During the past three years not only have these encroachments increased, but also the whole ground has been surveyed and the functions of the several authorities have been systematically reallocated.¹ In 1935, with the advent of plenty, the whole working of retailing was fundamentally changed by the successive abolition, for bread, for meat, and presently for all commodities whatsoever, of rationing and ration cards. The retailing system is, in 1937, one of substantial identity of prices, with steadily diminishing variations from district to district, to all purchasers in all shops, by whatever authority conducted, with freedom to all customers to buy where they like, and as much as they can pay for. In 1937 we find the whole business of retailing commodities (including public catering) growing to the colossal figure, as planned, of 131 thousand million roubles (say £5,000,000,000) for the year, shared among three sets of institutions, which we may designate respectively governmental, cooperative and the bazaar.

Government retailing has, during the past three years, been increasing at a great rate. It is conducted by many different public authorities, federal, republic and municipal, including the USSR People's Commissariats of Food Industry and Light Industry, as well as, for particular kinds of commodities, those for Heavy Industries and Timber Industries; in the constituent and autonomous republics, the People's Commissariats of Local Trade; and, in the principal cities, the municipal soviets. This systematisation of governmental retailing is not yet complete and further rearrangements may be expected. At present the dis-

¹ The student will find a critical survey of some of the changes described in this section in *The Review of International Cooperation* for December 1935, pp. 441-442, 444-450. Those in Moscow are described in *Moscow in the Making*, 1937, by Sir Ernest Simon and others, pp. 20-21, 32-33. Statistics will be found in the publications of Gosplan and Centrosoyus relating to each successive year.

tribution of the work of retailing among these various governmental organs cannot accurately be stated as being according to the kinds of commodities dealt with, or according to the magnitude of each enterprise, or according to the section of consumers to be served, or even according to locality.¹

Cooperative retailing, which had been, for years, most seriously encroached upon in the cities, was entirely excluded from the 654 chief towns by decree of 29th September 1935. This drastic transfer, from the voluntary consumers' cooperative societies to various governmental organs, of the magnificent central stores and mechanised bakeries in all but the smallest cities of the USSR, was misunderstood by cooperators in the capitalist countries, among whom it provoked some animadversions.² It was made without compensation to the individual members, but it was accompanied by a very extensive increase in the capital which the Soviet Government placed without charge at the disposal of the consumers' cooperative movement as a whole; and the government action, far from lessening the business of Centrosoyus and the thousands of rural societies that were left to it, promptly resulted in a considerable aggregate increase. An extensive reorganisation of the administration was immediately undertaken. The whole attention of Centrosoyus was directed to satisfying the rapidly growing demands of the 130 millions of villagers to whom the kolkhosi were bringing prosperity (see pp. 1171-80). Many of the tiny societies in the smaller villages, often working year after year at a loss, were amalgamated by

¹ See, for instance, the complication between the functions in retailing of the various kinds of governmental organisations in Moscow, described in *Moscow in the Making*, by Sir Ernest Simon and others, 1937.

² The position of consumers' cooperation in the USSR was discussed with some acerbity at the meetings of the executive of the International Cooperative Alliance in February and April 1937. It is not always remembered that, in marked difference from the arrangements of the consumers' cooperative movement of Great Britain, that of the USSR makes no use of the device of dividend on purchase, nor does it pay any interest to its shareholders, who (again differing from British practice) hardly ever hold more than a single share. The taking up of this share, and the completion of payment of its price, amounts to little more than an entrance fee, giving the right to purchase at the store. This right was not taken away when the stores in the cities became governmental, although it ceased to be exclusive. The compensation to the cooperative movement as a whole took the form partly of a complete remission of taxation on all cooperative trading during the year 1937 and partly of a nominal loan of 350 million roubles, not repayable, as additional capital to enable it to undertake the vast extension of its aggregate business that is rapidly taking place.

decision of their members' meetings into larger units permitting of the engagement of competent managers and trained salesmen at more liberal salaries. To enable the expansion of the peasants' demands to be still better met, Centrosoyus has established during 1936-1937 in the chief village centres more than 5500 relatively large department stores, usually under the management of the committees of the district unions into which the village cooperative societies with the consent of their meetings of members had been grouped, which offer for sale a range and variety of goods altogether beyond the previous experience of the countryside. With the aid of extensive credits from federal funds, and of this drastic reorganisation of the village societies, their sales during 1936-1937 have gone up by leaps and bounds. Centrosoyus can accordingly expect (although the number of separate societies has been reduced to 22,500, and the membership to 38,500,000, that it will, before the end of the year 1937, record total retail sales, for the villages alone, of more than 30,000 million roubles, being three times as great as in 1934 ; and actually far in excess of the entire cooperative turnover in 1934 for city and village together.¹

¹ At the same time various other kinds of retail organs were shifted from one administration to another. The "Departments of Workers' Supply" (ORS) administered in connection with the mines and factories of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry, and (so far as they served the railway workers) of the People's Commissariat of Transport, into which, as we described (pp. 333-335) most of the "closed cooperative societies" had been converted, were "liquidated", and replaced by open retail shops and productive departments governed by the People's Commissariats of Local Trade of the several republics. Those serving the workers in the peat industry, and in the industries connected with the non-ferrous and other metals, and with non-metallic minerals, have not yet been transferred. The special army (including navy and air force) cooperatives have been converted into open retail shops under the People's Commissariats for Local Trade of the several republics. Those connected with the state farms (sovkhosi), 340 in number, with 360 million roubles turnover, have been converted into consumers' cooperative societies, and transferred to Centrosoyus.

The bakeries outside the 654 chief towns remain under Centrosoyus. On October 1, 1936, there were as many as 17,558 of them, with an output of 4304 thousand tons of bread and confectionery in the year, and an aggregate selling price of about 4000 million roubles. The catering business has been shared on similar lines. In all the larger cities and towns in the various republics it is now undertaken by the People's Commissariat of Local Trade, whilst everywhere else it is left to the Consumers' Cooperative Movement, which is rapidly extending restaurants, buffets, tea-rooms, and common kitchens throughout the villages. On October 1, 1936, these cooperative enterprises already numbered 5158 with an annual turnover of 630 million roubles.

The peculiar "Integral Cooperatives" (see pp. 293-296) have had a special development. All the enterprises situated to the north of the 62nd degree of latitude have been placed under the newly formed Main North Sea Way Com-

Meanwhile the immemorial bazaar, which existed at the Revolution in every urban centre, and had been for the past twenty years alternately suppressed and restarted under more or less regulation, has been again taken into favour, and given a recognised place in the retailing system. Every kind of working producer (as distinguished from the profit-making "speculator" or "exploiter"), such as the members of a collective farm or fishery (kolkhos) and the surviving remnants of the independent peasantry; the still numerous handicraftsmen working independently on their own account, and the members of a cooperative productive society (kustar artel or incop); the miners or factory operatives cultivating allotments in their spare time; the professional hunter, trapper or angler, and the worker who uses his leisure to combine sport with catching for sale; and, finally, any person who wishes to dispose of any article for which he has no further use—all are now allowed, and are actually encouraged jointly or individually to bring their wares for sale direct to consumers in the free market or bazaar, for which the municipalities to-day provide more or less comfortable accommodation, properly cleansed and lighted, often with rows of stalls protected from the weather and kept in order by the local militiamen (police). With the bazaar must be grouped—for, in so vast an area and for so diverse a population, no part of the old social structure disappears completely and ubiquitously—the periodical fairs still held in such centres as Baku and Tashkent, Arkhangelsk and Simferopol, which are now attended only by working producers and consumers to the exclusion of profit-making dealers or merchants or employers of hired labour. Such fairs, restricted to their new kinds of sellers and buyers, have been increased in number and frequency, being held periodically at short intervals, in or adjoining many smaller towns and even large villages, mainly for the convenience, as retail sellers, jointly or individually, of the members of the collective farms and fisheries, and the allotment-holders among the workers in the government mines, oilfields and fac-

mission (described in *40,000 against the Arctic*, by H. P. Smolka, 1937), in which many of the separate enterprises have been absorbed. Those lying to the south of the 62nd degree have been assigned to Centrosoyus, and have been converted into consumers' cooperative societies, confined to trading (134 societies, with 829 shops serving 102,000 members). Meanwhile the productive activities have been taken over by "incops" (associations of producers of the artel type (see pp. 220-233)).

tories ; and for affording additional facilities, as retail buyers, to all the dwellers in the countryside.¹

It remains to be said that nearly all these retailing agencies, whether governmental, cooperative or bazaar-like, make use simultaneously of all the usual apparatus of retailing, from gigantic central stores in the great cities, either for particular classes of commodities or having a variety of departments for many kinds of wares ; with similar department stores in over 5000 rural centres ; through a whole series of smaller stores, themselves of various kinds, serving particular localities ; in Moscow and Leningrad fleets of motor delivery lorries taking goods to the customer's home, down to an interminable range of fixed or peripatetic stalls, stands, pedlars' packs and delivery vans, temporarily serving all sorts of crowds in market and fair, in busy thoroughfares or in the harvest fields.

There is also the extensive and growing form of retailing that we may designate public catering, in connection not only with all sorts of residential institutions such as orphanages and students' hostels, but also the provision of meals for payment either in dining-rooms open to all comers, or in schools and colleges, factories and offices ; together with the supply of refreshments at the parks and railway stations. The form of retailing, like all the rest, is shared in at different places by the various forms of governmental organisation and by the consumers' cooperative movement.

Along with this extensive reorganisation of retailing agencies there has gone a steady increase in magnitude and variety in the systematic provision, under free and voluntary contracting, of regular supplies of foodstuffs (including vegetables, fruit and fish) to institutions having to provide meals, whether hotels and residential hostels, public restaurants and dining-places, factories and offices of all kinds, as well as to Centrosoyus and separate co-operative societies, and to various governmental organs. The sellers thus undertaking regular supplies may be either collective farms or fisheries, or workers holding allotments, or independent

¹ These modern fairs—really only enlarged periodical consumers' markets—are to be distinguished from their better-known predecessors, such as that of Nizhni-Novgorod, which were largely attended by merchants and dealers for wholesale transactions. The modern analogue to these older fairs may be seen in the Soviet Government's periodical auction sale of furs, when Leningrad is visited by hundreds of foreign buyers, largely American and British.

producers, whether peasants, hunters or anglers. This network of free and voluntary contracting (from which all merchants, dealers and employers of hired labour are excluded) now extends from end to end of the Soviet Union to an extent shown at present, so far as we are aware, by no aggregate statistics.¹

It is, we think, not always realised that this multiform development of the organisation by means of which commodities and services are increasingly brought to the very doors of the consumers' households throughout so much of the USSR has meant a great increase in personal freedom, especially to the woman housekeeper, not only by the removal of restraint (such as rationing) but even more by the widening of opportunity. Such an increase of individual freedom within the social organisation is outside the economist's consideration and is, indeed, not to be measured quantitatively at all, but only evaluated qualitatively by unstatistical comparisons. Viewed in this way, the manifest improvement in the distribution of commodities and services in the USSR during the past quinquennium, which has, in actual practice, enabled any person to spend his wages in any one of a dozen different kinds of retail shops, and to purchase, up to the total of his income, as much as he chooses of any of the greatly increased variety of things now placed within his reach—must count for as genuine an enlargement of his opportunity to satisfy his desire to consume or use as the doubling or trebling of production under the First and Second Five-Year Plans, or as the quickening of transport by the substitution of the train and the motor car for the horse and cart. The ever-increasing freedom thus secured to the consumer in the Soviet Union has not been achieved by any reversion to profit-making, in either of its characteristic forms of the trader buying in order to sell again at a higher price or the disposal by the employer of the product of his hirelings. Nor has it been achieved by leaving prices to be freely settled by the haggling of the market. It has been attained

¹ At the same time the consumers' cooperative societies in the villages have been encouraged increasingly to meet their members' demands for particular foodstuffs (especially meat and fish, potatoes and other vegetables, and various fruits) by an organised system of "self supply". This has greatly increased during the past three years, in such forms as the society's own fishpond, vegetable garden, orchard, piggery or dairy, on the one hand, and, on the other, the society's purchases from collective farms or individual peasants, anglers or allotment-holders, to an amount during 1937 expected to exceed 6000 million roubles.

by adjusting supply to the expected demand under a comprehensive plan for production, transport and distribution alike, at retail prices fixed for all the several commodities ; fixed, as we fear the economist would say, arbitrarily by the various authorities concerned. More intelligently, the distribution as well as prices of commodities and services may be said to be fixed deliberately, with a constant tendency towards equality as between district and district, with the object of enabling all the inhabitants of each place to find at their disposal as much of the various commodities as they, in the aggregate, are expected to desire to purchase ; and at the same time so as to yield to the public authorities as much as is required to provide for public needs outside the economic calculus, such as defence, public health, education, provision for those incapable of work, scientific research, all the forms of art and beauty, and the distant future of the race. It is interesting to note that the result is arrived at by deliberate and steadily increasing application of competition or emulation among retailing organs of diverse kinds, but competition or emulation stopped off any action upon prices, and directed exclusively towards satisfying those customers' desires which it is in the public interest to encourage, namely, for quality, purity, durability, beauty, style, good taste and what not—never the yearning of the unregenerate man or woman for a “ cut price ” !

Soviet Currency

It has been made a matter of reproach that in our first edition there was no description of the working of the system of currency in the USSR. If we had been writing a history of the Soviet Union there would have been numerous experiments to describe,¹ from the attempt to dispense altogether with any form of money under “ war communism ” to the measureless printing of notes during the Civil War, and (as in the German Republic) the unexpectedly successful supersession in 1924 of a ruined

¹ For studies of currency changes in the USSR the student should see *Soviet Policy in Public Finance, 1917-1928*, by G. Y. Sokolnikov and associates (Stanford University, California, 1931, 470 pp.) ; *Currency Problems and Policy of the Soviet Union*, by L. N. Yurovsky, 1925 ; *The Russian Finance System*, by W. B. Reddaway, 1935, x and 106 pp. ; *Soviet Money and Finance*, by L. R. Hubbard (1936, 339 pp.) ; *Banks, Credit and Money in Soviet Russia*, by Arthur Z. Arnold (New York, 1937, 559 pp.).

currency by the device of an ostensibly new rouble ; from the frequently attempted legal regulation of prices in the bazaar to the local suppression of that social institution, to be followed by its rehabilitation and even encouragement with enlarged scope ; from the various systems of specially favoured retailing of goods to customers employed in particular industries or offices, or to purchasers bringing with them particular media of exchange, and then the sweeping away of all such contrivances in favour of an extraordinary simplicity of treatment of what has usually been something between magic and a mystery. When we wrote in 1935 there was already so little complication about Soviet currency that it simply did not occur to us to give its working any place in our description of the contemporary social organisation of the Soviet Union. During the past three years the matter has been made even more commonplace by the successive discontinuance in 1935-1936 of the rationing by card of foodstuffs and textiles, and eventually of all household commodities, to which in the Great War all nations had to resort, and by the abolition of such specially privileged retailing as the remainder of the closed cooperative societies, open only to persons engaged in particular factories or occupations, and the discontinuance, on February 1, 1936, of the Torgsin shops selling only for payment in gold, platinum or valuta (p. 329). The retailing system throughout the USSR is now substantially one of uniform fixed prices for each city or geographical province, tending steadily to a general uniformity. There are many varieties of retail shops, but the very smallest difference between them in respect of prices or use of currency. The one exception, and that more apparent than real, namely, the bazaar or free market, will be considered later.

Let us see plainly how currency now works in the USSR. It is, of course, strictly a federal monopoly. The USSR People's Commissar of Finance, with the concurrence of the Sovnarkom (Council of Ministers), provides from time to time whatever currency, in the form of inconvertible rouble notes and subsidiary coins, he thinks desirable for the convenience of the government and the public. The USSR enjoys, in fact, like all other great nations to-day, what is literally a managed currency, though this is "managed" on a system quite different from that in operation in any other country, that is to say, without reference

to the foreign exchanges or the international valuations of national currencies. For, incredible as it may seem to the bankers and economists of the Western world, the fluctuations in the aggregate amount of Soviet currency, or in its velocity, have no discoverable effect upon the price level of commodities and services, either within the USSR or elsewhere, or upon the relation between the volume of currency and that of transactions in goods.

The explanation of this paradox is to be found, not in the nature of the currency itself, but in the peculiarity of the economic structure of the USSR. The common idea that the volume of money combined with what is called its velocity must inevitably affect the volume of transactions in goods, and the general price level, depends on the assumption that all business is inspired and guided by the motive of profit-making, and that the market for commodities, or for the use of capital or credit, is everywhere as free as it is in Threadneedle Street. But instead of Threadneedle Street being typical of the universe, over a large part of the earth's surface production is wholly or mainly carried on from other motives than profit-making, and the market is not by any means free. We need here say nothing of the power of custom which governs prices in the common transactions throughout most of Asia and Africa—that is, among nearly half the human race; or the large area of the world in which agriculture, fishing and hunting are carried on practically for self-subsistence. In the USSR profit-making has become a criminal offence, and has passed out of the economic picture as completely as pocket-picking. Accordingly, in the USSR the prices of commodities are fixed, much as those of urban water, electricity and gas are elsewhere fixed, neither by custom nor by the chaffering of buyers and sellers, but by a superior authority, the government decisions in the USSR being arrived at (see pp. 625–647) on a whole range of considerations unconnected with currency. The possible influence of other currencies upon prices in the USSR is definitely and permanently excluded by the legal prohibition of both import and export of Soviet currency, and by a rigid government monopoly of all foreign trade and of international banking transactions. Equally, the amount of the Soviet issues of currency has no effect whatever upon either the aggregate amount of capital investment in new undertakings or the choice of industries or of localities in which such investments shall be made, because (as explained at pp.

633-644) these decisions are made after elaborate investigation entirely irrespective of currency considerations. It seems, therefore, that the Soviet authorities are justified in their constantly repeated claim that their currency, though varying from time to time in aggregate amount and presumably also in velocity, does not produce either inflation or deflation, in so far as these terms denote either rises or falls of the general price level, or alterations in the aggregate volume of employment or of capital investment, or changes in the direction either of the one or the other. It may be said, indeed, that the Soviet rouble notes operate over the whole range of buyers' transactions in the USSR almost precisely as postage stamps everywhere operate in the single commodity of postal service. An unnecessarily large supply of postage stamps in the pockets of the people does not raise the postage rates, nor cause any greater number of letters to be written, nor letters to be sent to certain places rather than others. A scarcity of postage stamps has equally no effect in lowering postage rates and none whatever on our choice of persons to whom we choose to write.

This is not to say that there are never any changes in prices in the Soviet Union, just as there are from time to time changes in the rates of postage. In the case of commodities as in that of postal services, in rates of wages as in the price of vodka, the changes occur because the government has definite reasons for making the change. But the reasons are independent of currency considerations. There may be social advantages in increasing or decreasing particular rates of wages or the sales of particular commodities. There may be a shortage of supply of certain commodities, and a glut of others, which makes it socially convenient to contract one demand and to widen another. What happens, it may be asked, to the roubles that the peasant or workman does not spend because there is a shortage in the supply of what he yearns to purchase? Very often he buys something else; it may be beer or books, or he temporarily hoards these unwanted roubles—there was a time when the peasants stuffed their pillows with them—or more intelligently he puts them in the government savings bank. What seems not to happen is a rise in the government shops of the retail prices, or in the postage rates that the government fixes, in the one case as in the other.

Can we not say the same about bank credit? The various

branches of the State Bank (Gosbank)¹ grant credits to the various enterprises, whether industrial or cultural, strictly for such purposes only as have been specifically approved in advance by the State Planning Department (Gosplan) as the outcome of a whole range of considerations into which the aggregate volume of currency and credit, or the velocity of either of them, enters not at all. The dates and conditions on which these advances are to be made, and how they shall be repaid, are in every case precisely determined without regard to the volume or velocity of the currency in circulation. The usual case is that of a government factory requiring credit for the amount of wages and cost of material and components (the rates of all these being fixed) in order to enable it to produce the commodities commanded by the legislature at the instance of the State Planning Commission. Such an advance involves, in practice, the issue by the bank of rouble notes and subsidiary coins for the payment of wages; and the advance will be repaid to the bank when the finished commodities are delivered at prices so fixed as normally to cover all the direct and indirect costs, including taxes. It is accordingly not the aggregate volume or amount of bank credit and currency that determines the decision of the factory director—who gets his orders from Gosplan, irrespective of any currency considerations—as to the amount or kind of commodities to be produced, or the prices that will be charged for the finished product, or the surplus (which the Western world would call profit) that will normally be made by the enterprise. There will, indeed, sometimes be a loss, due to breakdowns of machinery or failures of the human factor, in workman or director. Gosplan knows well that nothing can be done without the three D's—Deficiency, Damage and Delay. In due course those who caused the failures will be carpeted, and perhaps removed, demoted or punished. The loss will be made good from public funds, but will have nothing to do with credit or currency. In either case the incomparable superiority of the

¹ The State Bank (Gosbank) had, in 1935, 2313 and it has now (1937) over 2600 local branches. The subsidiary banking establishments, which act largely under its direction, and with its aid, now comprise (a) the Prombank (for capital construction in industry and electrification); (b) the Torgbank (for capital construction and cooperative trading); (c) the Selkhosbank (for agricultural enterprise); (d) the Tsekombank (for municipal and housing enterprises); (e) forty-four municipal banks (for local service); and, most important of all, (f) the Vniestorgbank (for foreign trade and international remittances).

system of planned production for community consumption (see pp. 662-670) which the centralised direction by Gosplan alone makes possible, is manifested in the absence of booms and slumps, and in that of involuntary mass unemployment, whatever may be the variations in the volume of currency or bank credit.

That is, as any economist who has given attention to the facts of the USSR will probably agree, the general picture. But some additional explanations are required. What about the ubiquitous bazaar, the free market, in which all sorts of commodities (though a tiny fraction of the aggregate turnover) are sold direct to consumers in free competition, bazaar fashion, at whatever price the sellers can get from those customers who choose to buy in the bazaar rather than in the retail shops? The Soviet Government soon discovered, like other governments, that it is futile to impose a legal maximum price for anything of which it does not control the supply. But this does not mean that the price level of the free market now escapes government control. During the past few years, whenever the People's Commissar of Internal Trade has heard that the price level in any particular free market was substantially above that fixed by the government for other retailing, he has opened a government shop in or next to the bazaar, and offered for sale, under specially attractive conditions of quality and cleanliness, and at an attractively low price, quite irrespective of the cost of this tiny fraction of his huge turnover, the commodities in which profiteering was prevailing. In this way the peasants have been compelled in innumerable instances, without any imposition of a maximum price, to reduce their demands by as much as 20 or 30 per cent at a blow, indeed, down to the level of the prices in the other forms of retailing.

Analogous to the bazaar, and equally exempt from price regulation, but steadily influenced towards assimilation to the government's price level, is the free market enjoyed by the self-supply of the consumers' cooperative movement (p. 356), and the system of contracts for periodical deliveries entered into by communal feeding organisations in school or factory, and by consumers' cooperative societies, with individual producers, industrial artels and agricultural or fishery kolkhosi (pp. 731-733). The range and volume of this free marketing, in a wide range of forms, is steadily increasing (pp. 1171, 1188). But it is apparently not

allowed, any more than is that of the bazaar, to pass into higher price levels (otherwise than merely transiently) than those dictated by the government.

What about the influence upon the internal price level of the rates of exchange in other countries? By the government monopoly of both importing and exporting, and of all international banking transactions, no one even knows what the exchange value of the rouble in this or that valuta might be if it was left to be freely settled in the respective money markets of the world. In fact, there are and can be no such rates. Hence the supposititious rates of exchange for the rouble do not affect even the decisions of the Soviet Government as to what it will import and export. It is the aggregate cost of all its imports that controls the aggregate of all its exports, and not conversely. The government finds that its various departments consider desirable the purchase abroad of certain commodities which it is inconvenient or impracticable to produce at home. These have to be paid for at the world price, not in roubles but in sterling, dollars or francs. To obtain this valuta, in the absence of foreign loans, the People's Commissar of Foreign Trade is driven to export timber or furs, wheat or flax, manganese or gold, or anything else that can be sold abroad at world prices, up to an aggregate that will equal the cost of the imports. The choice among things to be exported is made, principally, according to the relation between the expense of production of an additional output of the various commodities obtainable in the USSR, on the one hand, and, on the other, upon the world price in valuta of each of these commodities that can be spared for export. It is for instance always possible to increase the production of timber or manganese, if these are fetching good prices abroad. But it may seem preferable to export native gold, even if it costs more to produce than additional timber or manganese, if the gesture of "payment in gold" is calculated to impress the London money market, and thus raise the credit and the political influence of the Soviet Government! It will be seen that only a *differential* change in world price level (such as a greater rise in manufactured articles than in primary products) affects the choice of commodities to be exported. A universal rise in the level of world prices affecting equally all the articles of import and export leaves the Soviet Government unconcerned.

How then, asks the pertinacious enquirer, did it come about that there was always in Moscow and Leningrad, Kharkov and Kiev, the so-called "Black Exchange", where native speculators illegally offered to the tourist, for American dollars or British pound notes, five, ten or even twenty times as many roubles as the State Bank would give? This means that there were always Russians desirous of obtaining valuta (foreign currencies), in order to remit by post to relations or friends living abroad, perhaps to pay their passage money to Russia; or to subscribe for books or newspapers published abroad; or (and this was until 1936 perhaps the most important demand) in order to make special purchases at "Torgsin", the government shops offering a large range of commodities at tempting "New York prices", but payable exclusively in valuta, or in gold or platinum, which the government wished to collect in order—strange though such a proceeding sounds to capitalist ears—to diminish the country's export of such other commodities as timber or grain. It is plainly always convenient for the Soviet Government to lessen the amount of bulky commodities that it needs to export in order to pay the bill for the imports required. It may be added that, with the closing in 1936 of the Torgsin shops, on the one hand, and on the other the recent substantial reduction in the arbitrarily fixed retail prices in the USSR, and the new government valuation there of the dollar, the franc and the pound sterling, the Black Exchange is reported during the present year to have nearly ceased to exist.

But, it will be asked, how does the Soviet Government, with its universal fixing of prices, and its deliberate management of the currency irrespective of the volume of sales and purchases, contrive to bring about the "equalising of supply and demand"? When there is a falling off in the harvest, or a breakdown in industrial production, or any of the innumerable cases of short supply, so that much less is produced than suffices to satisfy the would-be consumers, what happens? There can be, for the moment, no genuine equalising of demand and supply. In the Western world we are accustomed, in such a case, to let the problem be solved by a rise in the price of the scarce commodity. The effective demand, we say, shrinks with every rise, by the falling away of applicants unable to pay a higher price, until a point is reached at which every would-be purchaser can be

supplied. This means, not that the supply of the commodity becomes equal to the desire to possess it or to the previous demand, but only that the richer persons get the whole supply, whilst the poorer persons get none at all, even if they are dying for lack of it. In the Soviet Union rich and poor are on an equality in the matter. The practice may be "first come, first served"; involving the temporary phenomenon of queues. Or a preferential supply may be afforded at a low price to particular sets of workers. Thus we saw, for a time, the phenomenon of "closed cooperative societies", confined to the workers (of all grades from the director to the gate-keeper) in favoured key-industries. Or whatever is available (as with milk in short supply) may be wholly reserved for the young children. We in England dislike such preferences, and prefer "selection by ability to pay the economic price". It is true that in the Great War we resorted to the rationing of sugar, meat, etc., in order that the very poorest might not be deprived. This was resented by the wealthier housekeepers. The present writer vividly remembers the disgust with which a millionaire shipowner (and his wife) received the first proposals of rationing, first of freight space so as to ensure transport for the indispensable imports, even at the cost of excluding those on which a higher rate would gladly have been paid for carriage; and then of sugar and meat. Why not, they exclaimed, leave the equalising of supply and demand, as the economists advise, to be effected by a change in the price level? The Soviet Union has, it thinks, a better plan for dealing with the condition of commodity scarcity, in which it had to spend the whole of its first decade. Now, when there is plenty of all the principal kinds of commodities (although there may not yet be quite all the grades of quality, or even quite all the varieties of colour or shape that the caprices of such a host of buyers might dictate), the Soviet Government, like the manufacturers elsewhere who fix the retail prices of their own branded goods, applies itself rather to organising the selling of its abundant stocks, even by various forms of advertisement.

An interesting explanation may be given of the way in which, when there seems to be an inconveniently large amount of currency in the pockets of the people, the Soviet Government relieves this inconvenience. There is, at all times, a perpetual flow of rouble notes to the State Savings Bank, by way of excess of deposits over

withdrawals, as well as to the Government Treasury in the steadily rising receipts from railway, river and air passenger traffic, and from the ever-growing sales of books and newspapers. In addition, the government raises from time to time an Internal Loan by asking the people to subscribe, in roubles, for bonds of conveniently small amounts, repayable at fixed dates, either with interest or with lottery prizes. These loans—virtually short-term deferments of the people's spending on consumption goods—help the People's Commissar of Finance to provide, without additional issues, the notes required to pay the wage-bills of new enterprises of capital construction. Meanwhile the loans, like the constant increase of Savings Bank deposits and other government receipts, withdraw great blocks of paper roubles temporarily from circulation.

There is one other feature of the Soviet currency system as it now exists which seems worth notice. It calls for no store of gold or other metallic currency for the purpose of maintaining public confidence in the notes and in the stability of their exchange value. This advantage, indeed, is now common to the currency system of practically all the nations of advanced capitalism, which have ceased, either by law or by administrative practice, to pledge themselves to give coin in return for their own government notes. It has been found by experience in most countries that, at the present level of popular education, whenever there is a condition of plenty in the commodity market government notes (and, usually, even the notes of joint-stock banks) continue to pass freely from hand to hand as a medium of exchange within each country, even when these notes are inconvertible into metallic coin.

This newly discovered truth, which the economists and the financial wiseacres of "the City" do not seem eager to explain to the public, is not yet adequately recognised by the journalists and the plain man, who still talk of "fiduciary issues" as if they were exceptional and even a little dangerous, so that any increase is apologised for. Most governments retain metallic reserves, and make widely known their amount (which hardly ever suffices to redeem their whole issue) professedly in order to "maintain confidence" in their paper money. In fact, however, these metallic reserves are nowadays maintained on other grounds. This is why they are sometimes kept secret, a secrecy which the

Briton thinks rather shocking or at least suspicious. The gold reserve in the USSR, as in Britain or France, is no longer required in order to induce agriculturists or shopkeepers to part with commodities for notes. Government gold reserves are now maintained for quite other reasons, in order to provide for the sudden increase in expenditure involved in mobilisation and war, or for the emergency of earthquake or famine; or, generally, for shipment from time to time to other countries to enable unusually large quantities of imports to be obtained in any urgent need. In the USSR, where the community itself, by one or other of its organs, is practically the universal retailer, there can be no fear that its own inconvertible notes will not be accepted in payment for purchases within its boundaries, and it is therefore plain that no metallic reserve is required to maintain confidence in the rouble. The Soviet Government has accordingly ceased to tell the world how great is its gold reserve, any more than how powerful are its bombing aeroplanes, although it can be deduced that it includes a substantial proportion of an annual gold production which has already become the second in the world.

The Control of Abortion

A remarkable instance of the realism with which the Soviet authorities watch the operation of the particular measures to which they have been driven by circumstances; and of the courage and decision with which, when necessary, they reverse their action, is afforded by the new law of June 24, 1936, relating to abortion. In our first edition we described (pp. 826-833) how a widespread popular demand from the women had led, in 1920, to a limited legalisation of abortion. It was a time of extreme economic hardship. There was as yet no adequate provision of medical aid or maternity hospitals, and but few crèches or kindergartens. There was then in the USSR next to no popular knowledge of birth control. The housing conditions were still indescribably bad. One result was the secret practice (as in Western Europe and America) of illegal abortion, with its inevitable consequence, not only of high mortality rates but also of severe injury to health of many of the women resorting to it. After serious consideration and prolonged discussion in the medical profession

as well as among the statesmen and the public, it was reluctantly decided, largely as the only practical expedient for stopping the practice of illegal abortion at the hands of unqualified persons, to provide for the performance of abortion in maternity hospitals, with strict limitations and under the most hygienic conditions. This law, which was stated to be a temporary expedient for so long as "the moral traditions of the past, and the difficult contemporary conditions of the present, force a certain proportion of women to decide on the operation", remained in operation for sixteen years. It was generally considered to have achieved the immediate objects at which it aimed. The resort to secret operations by unqualified persons, with the consequent evil results, was believed to have fallen away (at any rate in the cities) to next to nothing. It could even be claimed that the USSR, where abortion was in certain cases legalised, had, during the past decade, a smaller percentage of abortions to population than either France or Germany, where the operation was always a criminal offence.¹

In 1936 the law was repealed. By the decree of the Central Executive Committee (TSIK) and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (Sovnarkom) of June 27, 1936, the performance of abortion anywhere and by any person was again made a serious criminal offence, except only in cases in which the continuation of pregnancy threatens the life or may seriously undermine the health of the pregnant woman, or in which there is a danger of serious diseases of parents being passed on to children, when

¹ We abstain from citing figures as to the number of abortions, whether in Moscow or in the USSR, or in other countries; such estimates in different places varying from one abortion per seven or ten births, up to nearly twice as many abortions as births. The fact is that in no country do the statistics about abortions, and their effects either on maternal mortality or on the birth-rate, escape serious criticism, owing to the vague and conflicting definitions in use, and the lack of any registration of pregnancies. There are certainly some indications, in such statistics as exist, which support the common opinion that in practically all countries the practice of secret abortion, attempted or completed, is prevalent in all social classes; and that, in the present century, in most places, it appears to be increasing. What may be the relation between the practice of abortion and that of contraception is obscure. The student may be referred to a recent medical treatise entitled *Abortion Spontaneous and Induced*, by F. J. Taussig, M.D. (London, 1936); to Vol. VII of the *Proceedings of the International Congress for Studies of Population*, Rome, 1931; and to the Epidemiological Report by the secretariat of the Health Section of the League of Nations, July 15, 1933; together with the British Ministry of Health Report of an investigation into maternal mortality (In England, cmd. 5422, 1937; and in Wales, cmd. 5423) and other enquiries therein cited.

the operation might be performed only by qualified practitioners in hospitals and maternity homes.¹

It is not clear what were the facts or the arguments on which this important change of policy was based. In the preamble of the decree of 1936 it was claimed that the material security of the women, the vastly increased provision of maternity homes, crèches and kindergartens, and the very considerable financial assistance given from public funds for childbirth and towards the maintenance of children, had rendered abortion no longer necessary on economic grounds. The decree very confidently recited that, even under the best conditions "abortions are harmful to health". It seems clear that the total number of cases dealt with in the hospitals of the large cities had steadily increased, so that there were, in some places, more abortions than births. It was not denied that the hospital authorities had been able to show that the operation was in only an infinitesimal proportion of cases fatal, or accompanied by septic infection or perforation, and that the patients in hardly any case manifested any immediate deterioration in physical health. On the other hand, the practitioners of the health authorities had been becoming progressively more uncomfortable at the increase of various pelvic disorders, leading to "decreased fertility, ectopic pregnancy, the tendency to miscarriage, prolonged labour, endocrine disturbances and the delay in normal sexual response".² Whatever may have been the effect on the general birth-rate of the limited legal practice of abortion, it must be recognised that a steady growth of the population of the USSR, even at an increasing rate, is, to say the least, not unwelcome either to the governing authorities or to public opinion. There is felt to be room for at least twice or thrice the present population, great as it is, and sheer economic gain to the community in developing the immense

¹ Decree of June 27, 1936, published in *Izvestia* June 28, 1936. A summarised translation will be found in *The Slavonic Review* for January 1937, pp. 458-461.

² As to the after-effects the student should note such testimony as "The Sequelae of Induced Abortion as a factor in depopulation, with special reference to tubal sterility", by I. C. Rubin (also the bibliography for 1910-1931, and other papers in Vol. VII of *Proceedings of International Congress for Studies of Population*, pp. 127-145). Evidence as to the Russian experience will be found in such medical reports as "Erkrankungs, und Sterblichkeitsfrequenz vor und nach der Freigabe des Aborts in der SSRUnion" (*Die Medizinische Welt*, No. 52, December 1929, pp. 1857-1859); and "L'Avortement artificiel", par Serdukov, in *Le Journal de gynécologie*, March 1928, pp. 196-288.

open spaces, besides additional security against foreign aggression either from the West or from the East. We do not know whether there is any evidence for the suggestion that some of the women who insisted on abortion felt in their hearts that it was a sin, and suffered accordingly not only agonies of remorse, but also a subtle deterioration in character. We must assume that the Soviet Government became convinced, that, whatever might be the preponderance of opinion among the women, the permanent interests of the community as a whole made a change of policy imperative.

It can hardly be said that the action of the government was dictatorial in form or method. Draft proposals for the prohibition of abortion were published for public discussion during 1935, accompanied by others for making divorce less easy, stiffening the father's responsibility for the cost of maintenance of children born from mating unregistered as marriage, and promising substantial additions to the money payments made to all mothers. The subject was agitated for some months. Articles and letters appeared in the thousands of newspapers; numerous discussion meetings were held in clubs and factories; criticisms and suggestions were publicly called for. The newspapers reported that more than 12,000 suggestions and criticisms, protests and demands, were sent to the government within a few weeks; many of them from groups of women indignantly objecting to the proposed change. So far as it could be estimated, the opinion of the women (though not that of the men) seemed to be preponderatingly in favour of free abortion whenever desired. Nevertheless, so convinced was the government of the need for a reversal of the policy of 1920, that the Sovnarkom (cabinet of ministers) and the Central Executive Committee (TSIK), which may not unfairly be regarded as corresponding to the House of Commons, passed the new law, it is understood, by overwhelming majorities. At the same time the public provision for maternity and child maintenance—already far more munificent than in any other country—was extended and improved in all directions. The decree itself provided for an immediate increase in the allowance for the baby's *layette* from 32 to 45 roubles, and that towards its food for the first year from 5 to 10 roubles per month. This alone would involve, for six million births, an increased charge on public funds of more than four hundred million roubles (16 million pounds

sterling) per annum. In addition, a special bonus is made payable to every mother who has now or may subsequently have as many as six children, of 2000 roubles a year for five years from the birth of each subsequent child ; whilst to those who have now or may subsequently have ten children, the bonus for each additional birth will be 5000 roubles for the first year and 3000 roubles for each of the next four years. Even more important in the long run may be the enormous addition that is being rapidly made to the number and capacity of maternity homes, crèches and kindergartens. Considerable progress has already been made in these new constructions, whilst already (1937) some hundreds of thousands of claims to the bonus payable on additions to families of six or ten, have been made and passed for payment. It is doubtful whether the feminine objections against the new law have been removed ; for, whilst the birth-rate in the cities in 1937 seems to have bounded upward, it is impossible yet to form any useful estimates of the effect on the health or fertility of the women throughout the USSR, or on the growth of population.¹

Some Criticisms

We pass now to certain weighty criticisms or accusations made both by friends and by enemies of the Soviet Union, particularly in view of the developments of the past few years. These fall under three main heads: the continued inequality of incomes, the growth of bureaucracy, and the repression of individual freedom of thought.

Inequality of Incomes

Admittedly there is, in the USSR of to-day, no sign of the coming of identical, or even of substantially equal incomes for all workers by hand or by brain. On the contrary, the utmost use continues to be made of such forms of remuneration as piece-

¹ The fullest account (accessible to British or American students) known to us of these proceedings is in the article "Woman and the Family", by Alice Withrow Field, in *Research Bulletin on the Soviet Union*, November 1936, issued by the American Russian Institute for Cultural Relations with the Soviet Union, 56 West 45th Street, New York City. See also articles by Louis Fischer in *The Nation* (August 21, 1935 ; July 18 and 25, 1936) (New York) ; and by Jessica Smith in *Soviet Russia To-day* (New York), July and August 1936, together with notice in *The Eugenics Review* for January 1937.

work rates and payment according to social value (*i.e.* scarcity) or technical skill, not to mention also such devices for intensification of effort as socialist competition and Stakhanovite rationalisation of industrial technique—all candidly justified by their demonstrated results in increasing production. The same argument is held to warrant the payment of higher salaries to officers chosen for superior capacity to discharge managerial or administrative duties of social importance; as well as a system of promotion from grade to grade. In every branch of art and literature, whilst the average performers may be continuously employed and paid modest salaries, the outstanding men and women are usually remunerated by the job, often on some sort of royalty basis, which, in a few cases (notably in music and the drama, and for the most popular authors) mounts up to immense sums in particular years. The effect of all these devices is to make the maximum divergence of individual incomes in the USSR, taking the extreme instances, probably as great as the corresponding divergence, in incomes paid for actual participation in work, in Great Britain if not in the United States. It is not clear whether the divergence between the extreme instances in the Soviet Union is actually widening. It is, however, plain that, with the huge increase during the past few years in the number of great enterprises and in the magnitude of their transactions, the number of persons receiving incomes many times as great as those of the mass of the less skilled manual workers, typists and elementary school teachers now runs up to tens of thousands.

This inequality in incomes is regarded by many friends of the Soviet Union as a serious departure from socialist principle in the social pattern that it is working out. Trotsky makes the existence of such financial inequality in the USSR of to-day the main point in his indictment, *The Revolution Betrayed* (1936). They have evidently not considered that a government aiming at equality of income must ascertain, however roughly, the figure at which it is possible or desirable to equalise. Under the Tsardom the Russian masses worked for twelve roubles a month and slept ten in a room, paying the housewife whose room it was two or three out of the roubles for the accommodation. In the first terrible years of War Communism an equal division of income, had such an operation been possible, could hardly have improved on the standard of life they represent. But skilled labour, much less

professional work and competent management, cannot be obtained so cheaply ; and it was just these grades that were most desperately needed to increase production or even to maintain it. Foreign workers had to be imported from America, England, Belgium and Germany. Now, an English workman could not have lived on twelve roubles a month. Twelve roubles a week would not have tempted him. Professional men could not do their home work in kitchens shared by ten tramps. It was clear that the ideal income level must be that of highly cultivated workers, and the condition of the rest brought up to it instead of levelling everyone down to the standard of the tramp in the kitchen.

For the moment, therefore, the ideal of equal incomes for everybody had to be not only dropped but vigorously disparaged by the Soviet rulers. Its realisation must await the time when production will have reached a point yielding enough to give the uncultivated, unskilled person as much as the educated expert, by which time it may be assumed that there will be no uncultivated persons in Russia, and that any scarcity of labour will be in the ruder rather than in the more refined types of labour. In the meantime excessive inequalities of income can be dealt with, as they are at present, not by direct reduction of payments for work, but by a graduated income tax.

We need not emphasise the impracticability of transforming, within less than twenty years, a population of many millions, spread over one sixth of the earth's surface, with every diversity of race, language, occupation and habit, from a traditional self-regarding instinct rooted in the primitive struggle for existence to a like intuitive acceptance of the principle of an equal sharing of desirable things among all the citizens. Whatever may have been fondly imagined by enthusiasts, a new civilisation does not arrive with any such suddenness, simultaneity or completeness. It is part of the very nature of things that no great community can pass from inequality to equality in a jump, or even within a generation. Stalin himself made this quite clear in January 1934. In his report to the Seventeenth Congress of the Communist Party he distinguished between the two stages of the Bolshevik programme. First, that of creating a socialist society, in which there would be an equal right of all those who worked to receive according to the amount of work they had severally performed. Secondly, the transition to a communist society, in

which there would be an equal right of all who worked to receive according to their requirements. In his view the Soviet Union is still in the first stage.¹

It is perhaps more important to consider in what sense either socialism or communism is, or should be, rooted in equality. Plainly, no real equality is secured by identity either of money wages or of the allotted shares of commodities ; if only because the number and kinds of dependants on incomes vary, and the needs of the individuals differ. To pay workers all alike would clearly be to make very unequal provision for needs. Nor would equality be attained by letting each person help himself from a common store. Even in a family it is soon found that individuals differ as widely in their knowledge, energy and capacity to help themselves to what their needs really require, as in the character and urgency of these needs. Not unless and until the individuals in a great nation become all alike in energy, capacity and knowledge can we assume, even under the most unfettered helping themselves from a common store, that the result would be anything like equality of provision for all human needs.

What Soviet Communism is aiming at, and, as it seems to us, by its Planned Production for Community Consumption and its principles of multiformity in social structure and universalism in consumption and use, what it is increasingly securing, amounts to what is better termed social equality. Instead of an identical wage or share, there has to be a whole series of collective arrangements. To secure for all the 180 millions between the Baltic and the Pacific identity of legal, political and social status. To give to all the infants and children, and to all the adolescents and adults, irrespective of race, language, age or sex, unlimited opportunities of education and training without fee and according to individual desire and capacity. To ensure to every person able to work effective access to continuous employment at tasks within his or her capacity, at a wage-rate settled by the trade union, and at least adequate for subsistence, secure against interruption either through the foreman's caprice or the employer's bankruptcy, or because of a capitalist crisis. To organise the best possible provision for the entire population, without any other differentiation than that of each individual's particular need, in every vicissitude of life, from birth to burial, including

¹ See the full quotation at p. 702.

the prevention of disease and accident, the utmost medical and surgical aid in childbirth and all kinds of ill-health ; immediate succour of the widows and orphans, the incapacitated and the aged, as well as of any who are temporarily and involuntarily unemployed. Finally, to make all that collective provision for music and the drama, amusement and recreation, sports and pastimes, excursions and travel, without which leisure and holidays cannot be effectively enjoyed by the multitude. This, and nothing less than this, is the task with which the Soviet Union is struggling ; and towards the achievement of which it has certainly, in the past twenty years, made very much greater progress than any other government within the same period. In fact, no other government in the world is even attempting such a task.

With this continuous progress towards an ever more complete social equality, people in the USSR make very little complaint of the variety in personal incomes. If piece-work rates or socialist competition, high salaries to specialists and administrators or great bonuses to inventors do, in fact, cause increases in the aggregate production of commodities and services, they are usually felt to be devices fully justified by results.

So long as there is no reversion to private profit-making (in the sense of either mere trading in commodities or making gain out of hired labour), the theoretic objection to the existence of a variety of grades of wages or salaries, and of large but transient incomes earned by popular authors and artists, is negligible. What would be seriously objected to would be the establishment of any large amount of inherited wealth and of a class of vocationless rich. This is often recklessly predicted by outside critics. We see no sign of the emergence of any idle class of vocationless rich, or of the inherited ownership of tributes from productive industry in the form of rent or interest, which makes so objectionable the far greater social inequality of Great Britain and the United States. With progressive income and inheritance taxes there would be no difficulty in counteracting any unforeseen developments in this direction in the USSR. Even the swollen royalties of popular novelists and dramatic authors could (in the absence of capitalists competing for their services) easily be curtailed.¹ So long as a vocation for every

¹ It was simply never foreseen that the books of a popular author would (as did those of Gorky) sell to the extent of a million copies a year for twenty years.

man is insisted on by public opinion, and so long as all children and even all backward races enjoy genuine equality of opportunity, there is (where no class of functionless rich exists) little social harm in transient inequalities of personal earnings or possessions which involve no differences of education or manners, and therefore create no distinctions of social class.

In one direction, indeed, we descry a danger, which has already led to counteracting efforts. What is likely to happen to the wives of the men earning the exceptional incomes? The men themselves are kept too continuously at work, and have to cope with too perpetual a stream of difficulties, for them to succumb to the insidious temptations which everywhere beset the idle rich. But the wives of the commissars, of the directors, of the superior technicians, and of the popular authors, what (beyond care for their children) are they to find to do, if, as is often the case, they abandon their own vocations soon after marriage? It is interesting to watch, in the Soviet Union of the past few years, the frequent holding of conferences for wives of Red Army commanders or of factory directors, or of scientific technicians, for the purpose of getting them to assume social duties, either by pursuing a vocation of their own in art or literature, or by some means in which they can indirectly promote the success of their husbands' work. There is no "welfare work" for them: the government does not leave room for amateur charity, nor is there any social wreckage on which to practise philanthropy. They must either discover new social activities for themselves, or else learn to understand their husbands' vocations and thereby become real helpmates in their difficulties.¹

Bureaucracy

In the Soviet Union itself, there is incessant popular criticism of the great, and, as it is often suggested, the growing evil of bureaucracy. By this is meant (apart from the increasing number of those paid at a rate considerably above the incomes

¹ A similar danger has been noted in the absence of any recognised sphere of duty among the wives of the British members of the civil service of India. But we do not learn that any conferences of wives have been held to discuss what should be done! The world-wide organisation of the Salvation Army has long had a rule requiring the fiancée of any officer of the Army to undergo six months' training in the duties of an officer's wife!

of the mass of the people) the habit in officials of ignoring or being irritated by the desires or feelings of the public, and even of those of the members of the official's own organisation; together with the multiplication of forms to be filled up, and regulations to be observed, which surround everything with a maze of complications against which the citizen feels helpless. In part, we think, this criticism comes to no more than the average sensual man's impatience of the unavoidable apparatus of any highly developed industrial community—an impatience, due to ignorance or misunderstanding of what is necessary for the efficient working of any social organisation which we recognise as essentially anarchist in derivation. But collectivists themselves do well to overhaul, from time to time, the social apparatus they are driven to construct. The leaders of the Soviet Union have repeatedly insisted on such an overhaul. During the present year (1937) strenuous efforts have been made, both in the trade union organisation and in the Communist Party, to cut out the dead wood. The officials of every grade are told to remember that their first duty is to serve the public. The rank and file of their membership, in these organisations, and also those in the consumers' cooperative movement and the collective farms, are scolded for not insisting on more frequent meetings, and for failing at such meetings to complain of every shortcoming. To the student familiar with the bureaucracy of American joint-stock monopolies, French government offices, or Italian identity papers, what is remarkable in the Soviet Union is, not the amount of its bureaucracy in this sense, but the sustained effort that is made to suppress it, and to lessen its inconveniences to the public.

Repression of Independent Thinking

Far more serious, in its possible danger to future progress in social evolution, is the continuance in the USSR of the deliberate discouragement and even repression, not of criticism of the administration, which is, we think, more persistent and more actively encouraged than in any other country, but of independent thinking on fundamental social issues, about possible new ways of organising men in society, new forms of social activity, and new developments of the socially established code of conduct. It is upon the power to think new thoughts, and to formulate even the

most unexpected fresh ideas, that the future progress of mankind depends. We discussed this danger at some length in our first edition (see pp. 996-1004), making some suggestions for its mitigation. The fatal feature of this disease of orthodoxy is that it is highly infectious. It spreads rapidly to men and women of all occupations, to teachers and students of all types of culture, injuring their intellectual integrity and cramping their creative powers, not only in the social sciences, but also in music and drama, in literature and architecture.¹

In 1931 Stalin himself called for a new and more rational treatment of the intelligentsia. Unfortunately the question of freedom of independent thinking for the intellectuals has become, in the past few years, entangled in the need for continued vigilance in defence of the existing régime, both against conspiracies from within and aggressions from without. We have already discussed (see pp. 1037-1042) the dangers to which the Soviet Government feels that it is exposed, and the atmosphere of suspicion and repression to which such a feeling of imminent peril inevitably leads. The British if not also the American student will know, from the past history of his own government, how little intellectual freedom on fiercely controversial subjects is apt to be allowed, either by government or by public opinion, during the first generation or two after a violent social revolution.² The recent admission to the franchise, and to full and equal membership of the trade unions and the cooperative societies, of all the deprived classes, including even the former "Whites", the former members of the hated tsarist police, and the existing priests and other ministers of religion, entirely irrespective of their present opinions, in less than twenty years after the Bolshevik Revolution, affords some ground for hoping that, as the imminent danger of counter-revolution and foreign aggression fades away, the repression and discouragement of independent thinking, even on the most fundamental issues, will be silently discontinued.

A New Civilisation

In 1933, when settling the title of the book-to-be, we chose

¹ See *The Seven Soviet Arts*, by Kurt London (London, 1937, 381 pp.).

² In Great Britain the Roman Catholics remained disqualified for the franchise, as well as for membership of the House of Commons and the municipal councils, and even for admission to the Universities and public schools, for more than a century and a quarter after the British Revolution of 1689.

"Soviet Communism" to express our purpose of describing the actual organisation of the USSR. Before publication, in 1935, we added the query, "A New Civilisation?". What we have learnt of the developments during 1936-1937 has persuaded us to withdraw the interrogation mark. We see no sign in the USSR of any weakening on the stern prohibition of private profit-making; meaning by this either the buying of commodities with the object of selling them at a higher price (termed speculation), or the hiring of workers for the purpose of making pecuniary gain out of their product (termed exploitation). Moreover, fifteen years' experience of three successive Five-Year Plans has demonstrated the practicability of what the Western world declared to be beyond human capacity, namely, the advance planning of the wealth-production and the cultural activities of an immense population; together with the deliberate organisation of the whole for the supply and service of the community without the guidance of "price in the market" arrived at by the chaffering of buyers and sellers.

This twofold change of fundamental base effected by Soviet Communism—the abolition of the profit-maker's trading and hiring of wage-labour guided by the competitive price system, and the substitution of deliberately planned production for community consumption at authoritatively fixed retail prices, according to the utilitarian instead of the economic calculus¹—seems to us to be so vitally different from the essential base of the capitalist organisation which has during the past four centuries spread over the Western world, as definitely to amount to a new civilisation. This is not to say that, in twenty years, the Soviet Union has achieved a condition of plenty as statistically opulent as the richest capitalist nations have reached in the course of several centuries. In spite of a material progress during these twenty years which has probably never been equalled in any other country at any period of its history, the 180 millions of Soviet citizens have still an insufficient supply of

¹ Economists owe to the late Professor F. Y. Edgeworth (in his *Mathematical Psychics*, 1881) a distinction, which some of them forget, between the economic calculus, dependent on price in a competitive market, the necessary basis of a capitalist system; and the utilitarian calculus, based on greatest happiness, the greatest possible aggregate of pleasure, "summed through all time and over all sentence" (p. vii), which is what the sociologist or the statesman has to estimate.

what seem to be necessities of civilisation—to name only two, of bedrooms and of boots! What is really significant in this connection is the economic discovery that the substitution, for profit-making manufacturing, of planned production for community consumption frees the nation not only from the alternation of booms and slumps, but also, by ensuring an ubiquitous effective demand in the growing population, from the hitherto incessant social malady of involuntary mass unemployment. As to increasing plenty, Soviet Communism has the guarantee, not only of a continuous advance of technical science, but also of the psychological discovery by the workers that the planning system eliminates the enemy party from distribution. The entire net product of the community is in fact shared among those who cooperate in its production, in whatever way they themselves decide, without tribute to a hereditary parasitic class. This produces an emotional passion for production among the industrial millions such as heretofore has only been manifested in other countries by the individual peasant proprietor or the profit-making entrepreneur. In the USSR it is the trade unions that most strongly insist on the utmost use of labour-saving machinery and piece-work rates, socialist competition and Stakhanovism.

But there is another and a non-materialist factor in Soviet Communism, setting it in contrast with the civilisation of the Western world. It is based on an intellectual unity throughout all its activities. It definitely rejects every remnant of the superstition and magic which the most matter-of-fact twentieth-century man in the capitalist societies retains in his conception of the universe and of man's place in it. That is to say, Soviet Communism has a new ideology as well as a new economics. Soviet Communism puts no limit to the growth of man's knowledge. It counts, in fact, on a vast and unfathomable advance of science in every field. But (as is specially characteristic of a new civilisation) it refuses to accept as knowledge or as the basis of its code of conduct any of the merely traditional beliefs and postulates about man and universe for which no rational foundation can be found, or any of the purely subjective imaginings of the metaphysician or the theologian. It is working out the ethics of a new civilisation upon its own experience of social life. And in that pragmatic evolution of a code of conduct based

essentially upon the hygiene of the individual and of the social organism of which he forms part, Soviet Communism is assisted by the essential unity in principle of its economics and its ethics. Under Soviet Communism, with its planned production for community consumption, the pecuniary gain to the profit-making entrepreneur, nicknamed the economic calculus, the free working of which is the be-all and end-all of capitalist civilisation, is deemed an undesirable guide to action, whether public or private. The dominant motive in everyone's life must be not pecuniary gain to anyone but the welfare of the human race, now and for all time. For it is clear that everyone starting adult life is in debt to the community in which he has been born and bred, cared for, fed and clothed, educated and entertained. Anyone who, to the extent of his ability, does less than his share of work, and takes a full share of the wealth produced in the community, is a thief, and should be dealt with as such. That is to say, he should be compulsorily reformed in body and mind so that he may become a useful and happy citizen. On the other hand, those who do more than their share of the work that is useful to the community, who invent or explore, who excel in the arts or crafts, who are able and devoted leaders in production or administration, are not only provided with every pecuniary or other facility for pursuing their chosen careers, but are also honoured as heroes and publicly proclaimed as patterns and benefactors. The ancient axiom of "Love your neighbour as yourself" is embodied, not in the economic but in the utilitarian calculus, namely, the valuation of what conduces to the permanent well-being of the human race. Thus in the USSR there is no distinction between the code professed on Sundays and that practised on week-days. The citizen acts in his factory or farm according to the same scale of values as he does in his family, in his sports, or in his voting at elections. The secular and the religious are one. The only good life at which he aims is a life that is good for all his fellow men, irrespective of age or sex, religion or race.

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- Bukharin, Nicolai (b. 1888), joined the Party, 1904; published with Lenin *Pravda* in Austria; member Central Committee, 1917; editor of *Pravda*, 1918—1928; frequently sided with Trotsky; removed from offices, 1928—1929; readmitted, 1929; member of presidium of Commissariat of Heavy Industries, also member of Academy of Sciences; author (with E. Preobrajensky) of *The ABC of Communism*, 1923—86, 243, 367, 944, 959, 1045, 1067, 1107; arrested 1937
- Bulak-Balakhovich, formerly officer in tsarist army; took command of White Army in White Russia; joined Yudenich, and then Petlura; retreated with Polish troops, 1920—543
- Bunyan, James, 536
- Burns, Emile, 944
- Butler, Samuel, 898
- Cachin, Marcel, 553
- Calcott, M. S., 587
- Campbell, Thomas D., 234, 272
- Carrit, E. P., 944, 947
- Castagne, 140
- Cederholm, B., 575
- Chadwick, Edward, 834
- Chamberlin, W. H., 16, 104, 106, 163, 214, 235, 262-3, 282, 476, 536, 554, 575, 577, 594, 641, 776, 1000, 1006, 1009-10, 1107, 1110
- Charques, R. D., 888-9
- Chase, Stuart, 234, 340, 367, 863, 879
- Cher, 554
- Chernavin, Vladimir (Tchernavin), professor of ichthyology in Agromomic Institute of Leningrad, 1921—1923; 1926—1930, in charge of biological laboratories of Northern Fisheries Trust at Murmansk; arrested in 1930 and sent to Solovetsk, whence he escaped in 1932, in company with wife and child, to Finland and London—575, 585
- Chernishev, I. P., 221, 234
- Chernov, V. M., 575
- Cherviakov, A. G. (b. 1892), was long a teacher; joined Party, 1917; since 1923 one of the presidents of TSIK; president of White Russian Republic—464
- Chicherin, Georg V. (Ornatsky) (b. 1872), mainly Menshevik until 1917; member of Central Committee of Party, 1927—1930; People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, 1918—1930—78-9, 128, 1099
- Childs, S. Lawford, 163
- Chu Teh, 1097
- Coit, Stanton, 1018
- Cole, G. D. H., 646, 944
- Cole, Margaret I., 132-4, 137, 139, 235, 603, 645, 822, 827, 912, 933
- Comte, Auguste, 923
- Conus, Esther, 812, 814, 822
- Counts, G. S., 888
- Crottet, A. A., 163
- Crowther, J. C., 898, 959
- Cuenot, 832
- Cummings, A. J., 558
- Dalton, Hugh, 603, 645
- Danishevski, 985
- Darwin, Charles, 950, 999, 1014

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 Devaud, Eugene, 889
 Dewey, John, 888
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 Diakonov, V. A., 781
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 Dimitrov, 1111-12
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 Dutt, R. Palme, 408, 412
 Dvoretzky, A., 822, 833
 Dzerzhinsky, Felix (died 1926), Polish nobleman, for many years member of Central Committee of Social Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania; delegate to Fourth and subsequent congresses of Bolshevik Party; in penal servitude, 1912-1917; from April 1917 member of Bolshevik Central Committee; from 1918 president of Teheka and Ogpu; also at times People's Commissar of Home Affairs, and of Transport, also Chairman of Supreme Economic Council; his great fondness for children led to his being made chairman of commission for liquidating the "homeless waifs"; and to his successful work on this problem—573-4, 576-7, 586, 588
 Eddy, Sherwood, 259, 800, 1006
 Efremov, 553
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 Eismont, 365
 Engels, Friedrich, 396, 598, 901, 944-5, 991, 996-9, 1001-2, 1005, 1068, 1101
 Enisian, 382

Enukidze, A. S. (b. 1877), was the secretary of TSIK of USSR from 1920 to 1935; removed and expelled from Party in 1935 for gross negligence and personal dissoluteness, but appointed president of Transcaucasian Federation; subsequently, on evidence of further guilt, removed from this office, and made assistant director of Kislovodsk, 1935—464, 484, 491, 1067
 Epstein, M., Assistant People's Commissar of Education of RSFSR—891, 917, 927
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 Fischer, Louis, 204, 276, 283, 432, 552-5, 557, 560, 595, 941, 1090, 1058
 Fisher, the Rt. Hon. H. H., 536
 Fleming, Peter, 1097
 Flexner, Abraham, 992
 Florinsky, Michael T., 558, 1090, 1100, 1107-8
 Fox, Ralph, 944, 947
 Fraval, L. A., 602
 Freeman, Joseph, 163, 204, 359, 697, 738-9, 1044
 Freeman, T., 221
 Freund, Heinrich, 132
 Friedlander, I., 149
 Friedman, Elisha M., 110, 362
 Frumkin, 976
 Frunze, Michael Vassilevich (1885-1925), born in Turkestan, of Roumanian origin; arrested, 1904; took part in Moscow rising, 1905; sentenced in 1907 to five years' imprisonment; escaped to Chita in 1915; in 1918 was head of Minsk civil militia, but commanded armies in civil war against Wrangel, Petlura and Makhno. In 1925 appointed Narkomvoemor, but died same year—122, 541
 Gaissinovich, S., 898, 900-901
 Gantt, Horsley W., 833
 Gayster, Azon Israelovich, member of presidium of Gosplan, and president of Academy of Agricultural Science, 602

- Genkin, D. M., professor of law, Moscow; specialist on Incops—221, 224, 870
- Gens, A., 827, 831-2
- George, Rt. Hon. David Lloyd, 864
- Gerbacy, Richard, 277
- Ginsburg, L., 612-13, 863
- Gladkov, Feodor, 1044
- Gnoussev, V., 221, 234
- Godwin, William, 1042
- Goode, N. T., 888
- Gorachev, 385-7
- Gorin, P., 12
- Gorky, Maxim (1868-1937), born Nizhni-Novgorod, now Gorki; arrested and exiled, and, 1905, imprisoned; published Socialist daily newspaper; from 1906 has spent winters in Capri; returned to Moscow 1928, and became greatest proletarian writer—319, 553, 590, 941
- Grabe, J., 198, 583
- Graftio, 961
- Gregory, T. E., 603, 642, 649, 659, 667-8, 694
- Grenard, Fernand, 16, 573, 613
- Grigoriev, 540
- Grinko, Grigory Federovich (*b.* 1890), has been successively People's Commissar of Education, Ukraine; president Ukraine Gosplan; vice-president central committee Ukraine Party; vice-president Gosplan USSR; vice-commissar of Agriculture USSR, and People's Commissar of Finance USSR—113
- Groman, 554-5, 635
- Gruzdev, B., 901
- Gubkin, I., 988
- Guest, L. Haden, 833
- Guiboud-Ribaud, P., 587
- Gurkiz, S. I., 1000
- Gurvich, G. C., 16
- Haensel, Paul, 112, 542, 573
- Haines, Anna J., 182, 210, 822, 827, 833, 836, 838-40, 842, 852, 854-7
- Hall, Sir A. Daniel, 981, 1133
- Halle, Fannina W., 448, 545, 812, 814, 816, 822, 824, 827, 832-3, 1044-5, 1054
- Hamant, 832
- Hans, N., 888, 893-5, 897, 903
- Harper, S. N., 124, 127, 163, 165-6, 340, 357, 370, 378, 392, 402, 412, 424, 738, 741-2, 888
- Harris, Henry, 827
- Harrison, C. A., 888, 900, 901
- Hartmann, Nicholas, 1018
- Hartshorne, Charles, 953
- Hastings, Somerville, 827, 833, 846, 857
- Hayek, F. A., 603, 659, 676
- Hecker, Julius F., ix, 426, 944, 1005-6, 1008-9, 1011
- Hegel, 945, 996
- Heifetz, E., 149
- Heiftz, L., 870
- Herriot, Edouard, 124, 127, 948
- Hessen, S., 888, 893-5, 897
- Hewes, Amy, 163
- Hindus, Maurice, 124, 234, 239, 278, 284, 620, 654-5, 657, 1044
- Hobbes, Thomas, 339
- Hoetzsch, Otto, 128
- Hogben, Lancelot, 945, 950
- Hook, Sidney, 441, 444, 944
- Hoover, Calvin B., 163, 360, 475
- Horabin, J. F., vii
- Hurst, F. E., 259, 282
- Hutchins, T., 909
- Hutchinson, L., 112
- Huxley, Julian, 959
- Ignatiev, V. I., 62
- Ikov, 554
- Ilf, Ilya, 1063
- Injevatkine, Gregor, 257
- Isbach, A., 257, 263
- Istrati, Panait, 776
- Ivan the Terrible, 573
- Ivanovsky, I., 287
- Jagow, A., 603
- Jakobson, Michael, 163, 171, 174, 191, 192, 207
- Joffe, 976, 1095
- Jones, B. Mouat, 959
- Judenich, see *Yudenich*
- Judine, Serge, 859
- Just, 912
- Kaganovich, Lazar Meissoevich (*b.* 1893), by origin Ukrainian leather worker; joined Party, 1911, active worker; member of TSIK since 1924; secretary to Central Committee of Party and member of Politbureau, 1928; secretary of Moscow Party and leading member of Moscow City Soviet; has successively reorganised the trade union movement, Moscow municipal administration, MTS and collective farms, and central Party organisation, and is now People's Commissar of Means of Communication (railways)—36, 42-3, 52, 56, 58, 86, 170-71, 213, 251-2, 255-6, 258, 264, 268, 270-72, 278, 319, 357, 365, 372-3, 378, 388, 436, 440, 477, 560, 580, 755, 774, 863, 871, 937, 939-40
- Kaiser, George, 603

- Kalinin, Michael Ivanovich (b. 1875), originally metal worker in Putilov Works, but also active as underground worker in Reval, Tiflis and Moscow, 1898-1917; in 1919 succeeded Sverdlov as president of TSIK of Republic, and since 1924 president of TSIK of USSR; member of Central Party Committee since 1919, and now also member of Politbureau—34, 99, 101, 204, 250, 278, 369, 423, 430-31, 464, 484, 491, 591, 770
- Kamenev, Lev Borisovich (Rosenfeld) (b. 1883), arrested and emigrated, 1902; attended Third (1905) and Fourth (1907) Party Congresses; was on editorial board of *Pravda*; returning to Russia was arrested 1908 and again emigrated, but returned 1914 to be again arrested and exiled to Siberia in 1914; between 1917 and 1935 successively held various offices (delegate to Brest-Litovsk Peace, ambassador to Italy, president of Council of Labour and Defence, etc.); but almost invariably developed factional intrigues (often with Zinoviev, sometimes with Trotsky) against the Party policy; repeatedly removed from office or relieved of assigned task; three times (1927, 1932 and 1935) formally expelled from Party, but twice readmitted on abject recantation and promise of loyalty; in 1935 arrested with Zinoviev on suspicion of connection with assassination of Kirov, and eventually found guilty by Supreme Court of conspiracy, and sentenced to long term of imprisonment—464, 559-60, 616, 901, 1067; again tried, and shot, 1937
- Karavai, M., 257
- Karpinsky, A. P., 211, 958, 961
- Karpov, Lev Jakovlevich (died 1921), eminent scientist in industrial chemistry; member of Central Committee of Party, 1903-1904; held important industrial positions from 1918 until his death—611
- Kats, R., 870
- Katzenellenbaum, Zakhary F. Solomonovich, 113
- Kaufmann, L., 178, 189, 697, 705, 708-9, 711, 714-15
- Kautsky, Karl (b. 1854), a very leading German Social Democrat, author of many polemical volumes on Socialism, and against Soviet Communism; worked successively in Zurich, Stuttgart, London, Berlin; editor of *Die Neue Zeit* in Vienna from 1883 to 1917—615
- Kayden, E. M., 221-2, 285, 305
- Kazakov, 528
- Keeton, W. G., 558
- Kennan, George, 575
- Kerensky, Alexander Federovich (b. 1881), leading lawyer and Social Revolutionary; member of Fourth Duma; in February 1917 became Minister of Justice in Provisional Government, and in July 1917 premier; in October 1917 escaped abroad—308, 442, 532, 536, 573
- Kerzhentsev, Platon Michaelovich (Lebedev), joined Party, 1904; emigrated, 1912; Soviet minister to Sweden, 1921; ambassador to Italy, 1924; director of administrative affairs of TSIK—358, 410, 744, 1013, 1015
- Khaltourine, Stepan V. (1856-1882), prominent revolutionist worker; principal founder of North Russian Workers' Union, 1878-1879; member of Narodnaya Volya; in 1880 caused explosion in Winter Palace intended to kill Tsar; assassinated in 1882 Strelnikov, prosecutor in Odessa; hanged, 1882—163
- Khibir-Aliev, 464
- Khomiakov, 1050
- Khoysky, R. I., 870
- Kindermann, Karl, 575
- King, Beatrice L., 888, 901
- Kingsbury, John A., 588, 656, 821-2, 827, 832-3, 842, 844, 853, 857, 886
- Kirov, S. N. (1881-1934), member of Party from 1904; worked illegally at Tomsk, Irkutsk and Vladivostok; a commander in Civil War; from 1922 member of Central Committee of Party; in 1923 secretary of Party Committee of Azerbaijan; from 1926 secretary of Leningrad Party Committee; from 1928 member of Politbureau; assassinated, December 1934—558, 560-61
- Kisselev, Alexey Semonovich (b. 1879), metal worker; joined the Party, 1898; chairman of St. Petersburg Metal Workers' Trade Union, 1912-1913; member and secretary of USSR TSIK; author of *Tasks of the City Soviets in the Light of the New Decree*, 1933—36
- Kleist, Peter, 128
- Knickerbocker, H. R., 603
- Knorin, V., 381-2, 1110
- Koerber, Lenka von, 583, 587-8

- Kogan, L. I., 760
 Kohn, Hans, 144, 146-7, 154, 1008
 Koisky, I. R., 221
 Kokovtzeff, V. N., Count (1853-1928), finance minister in Stolypin's Cabinet; after Stolypin's assassination became premier—649
 Kolchak, Alexander Vassilievich (1873-1921), admiral in Tsar's navy; became dictator of Siberia during Civil War; after defeat of his army he was arrested by Czechoslovak troops and handed over to Soviet army, when he was shot by order of the Irkutsk revolutionary committee in January 1921—343, 537
 Kolesnichenko, S., 392, 399
 Kollontai, A. M. (b. 1872), mainly educated at German universities; from 1904 to 1916 was a Menshevik, working in the women's movement, for which she propagated in United States; returned to Russia in 1917 and was arrested by Kerensky's Government; became member of Bolshevik Party Central Committee, taking part in October rising; in 1918 People's Commissar of Social Welfare; from 1920 to 1922 she was associated with opposition factions, and was reprimanded by Comintern; she then became loyal Party member; appointed USSR minister, Mexico; then to Norway; and then to Sweden; is author of various novels, dealing with sex relations and communist ethics—812, 817, 1044
 Komarov, N. P., 938, 940
 Kon, Felix Yakovlevich (b. 1864), long member of Polish Proletarian Party; sentenced to many years of hard labour in Siberia; returned to Poland in 1904 and continued revolutionary work; in 1922-1923 became one of the secretaries of Comintern—464
 Konchalovsky, Maxim Petrovich, 985-986
 Korber, Lili, 697, 764
 Korel, I., 961
 Korolenko, Vladimir, 221
 Korostovetz, Vladimir, leading landowner in White Russia, and official in Tsar's Foreign Office; escaped to Poland, 1918; author of *Seed and Harvest*, describing his life and adventures—532, 1004
 Korovin, E. A., 128
 Kosarev, A. V., 395
 Kotlyarevsky, Sergey F. Alexandrovich, 62
 Kotov, Vassili Afanasievich (b. 1885), locksmith; joined the Party prior to war and was arrested in 1916; took part in fight against Yudenich, 1919; member of Party central committee and of TSIK of USSR; head of Social Insurance Bureau of RSFSR to 1934; then head of Insurance Department of AUCCTU—863, 867, 874, 876-7, 880-81, 886
 Kovalevsky, M. W. de (1851-1916), professor of political science at St. Petersburg University; deprived of his post in 1887 and emigrated; founder of Higher Russian School in Paris, 1905; returned to Russia and became member of First Duma—221, 241, 890
 Kovalyov, K. N., 812
 Krasnoff, 611
 Krassin, L. B. (otherwise Nikitich, Zinin, Winter, etc.) (died 1926); a leading revolutionary from 1902; attended Third and subsequent Party congresses; exceptionally active in organisation work; in 1909, at the split, he joined the Vperyod group, and presently withdrew from politics, achieving a high technical position in chemical and electrical industry. He returned to active Party work in 1918, from which time he occupied a succession of important administrative and diplomatic posts, including mission to London in 1920. At the Thirteenth Party Congress he was elected member of the Party central committee. Later he became successively USSR People's Commissar of Foreign Trade and soviet ambassador at London, until his death—589, 611, 616-18
 Krischanowski, M., 603
 Krizhanovsky, Gleb W. (b. 1872), a distinguished scientist in electricity and chemistry; in 1929 elected member of Academy of Sciences, and its vice-president. Took leading part in social democratic activities in St. Petersburg towards end of nineteenth century, becoming a member of RSDLP Party in 1903. Withdrawing from active politics after 1905, to devote himself to science, he joined the soviet administration in 1918, and took leading part in industrial reorganisation.

- At Eighth Congress of Soviets in 1920 he reported on electrification for the Goelro, and later became chairman of Gosplan and a member of the Party central committee, actively engaged in administration—554, 615, 959
- Kropotkin, Peter (prince) (1842–1921), founder of Anarcho-Communism; distinguished scientist in geography, and secretary of Imperial Geographic Society; active in propagandist revolutionary work in St. Petersburg until his arrest in 1874, when he escaped from prison to Scotland; was deported from Switzerland to France in 1881, and in 1883 sentenced by French court to five years' imprisonment for membership of International Workers' Association, but was released in 1886; then settled in London, until return to Russia in 1917. Disappointed with the centralised collectivism of the Soviet Government, he lived in retirement until death—60, 575, 1102
- Krupskaya, Nadezhda Konstantinova (b. 1869), became the wife of Lenin in 1898; worked in St. Petersburg as member of League of Struggle for Emancipation of Working Class in 1895–1896, and was exiled to Siberia, where she joined Lenin. After expiration of sentence she emigrated with him, actively helping in the most secret work at London, Paris, Geneva, Zurich, Vienna and Cracow, returning with him to Petrograd in 1917. She was long secretary of editorial board of *Iskra*, and attended all Party congresses. Since 1918 she has held important positions in educational work—402, 405, 1047
- Krylenko, Nicolai Vassilievich (b. 1885), prominent leader in 1905–1908 of revolutionary movement among the students; served as ensign in the Great War, and in November 1917 was appointed by Lenin to be Commander-in-Chief of the rapidly dissolving army; subsequently held various offices, latterly as assistant to People's Commissar of Justice, and Procurator of RSFSR—553-4, 556, 1058
- Kuibishev, Valerian Vladimirovich (1888–1935), joined Party, 1904, and active in 1905 revolution; engaged in Party work in Siberia (born at Omsk); frequently arrested, and sentenced in 1908 to five years' exile, in 1915 to three years' exile, whence he escaped, but was again arrested and exiled; fought throughout Civil War; in 1917 president of Supreme Economic Council; some time secretary of Party central committee; president of Gosplan; deputy chairman of Sovnarkom and Council of Labour and Defence; member of Politbureau until death—67, 477
- Kurella, Alfred, 901
- Kuropatkin, Alexey Nicololavich (1848–1926), general in tsarist army and Minister for War, 1898–1904; conducted war with Japan, 1904–1905; in 1916 governor of Turkestan, dismissed in 1918—529
- Kursky, Dimitry Ivanovich (b. 1874), leading advocate and law professor; joined Party, 1904; 1918–1928, in Ministry of Justice of RSFSR; in 1928 soviet ambassador to Italy—464
- Kuusinen, O., 1110
- Labry, Raoul, 9
- Ladejinsky, W., 235, 262, 265-6, 278
- Lapandin, 724
- Larin, Y. (Lurie, M. S.) (1883–1932), political economist of advanced but erratic opinions. In 1906 advocated a Labour Congress and a broad Labour Party; then Menshevik - Internationalist. Joined Bolshevik Party, 1917; and held various economic posts (delegate to Berlin about Brest-Litovsk Treaty and member of Supreme Economic Council); attended Seventh and later soviet congresses; and became member of RSFSR central executive committee and USSR TSIK; withdrew from Party and emigrated, becoming hostile critic abroad, until his death—611-13
- Larsons, M. I., 575
- Laski, Harold J., 132, 588, 1071, 1086
- Lassalle, Ferdinand, 4
- Lawrence, Martin, 347
- Leary, D. B., 888
- Lebedeva, V. P., 812, 822, 827, 877
- Lee, F. E., 304
- Leibovici, Raymond, 827, 828, 860
- Lenin, N. (Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov) (1870–1924). Born at Simbirsk, son of Ilya Ulyanov and Maria Alexandrovna Blank; younger

brother of Alexander Ilyich Ulyanov, who was hanged in 1887 as being concerned in an attempted assassination of the Tsar Alexander III. by the People's Will (Narodnaya Volya) party. He entered Kazan University, August 1887, but in the following December was expelled and exiled to his mother's small farm at Kokushino, where he read the works of Marx. He was allowed to reside at Kazan in October 1888, and at Samara in May 1889. In November 1891 he was permitted to sit for examination for law degree, St. Petersburg University, and for several years had small practice in local courts as defending counsel. In 1893 settled at St. Petersburg, and instructed workmen groups. His first publication was *What are the Friends of the People?* 1894. In 1895 he was deputed to proceed abroad (on excuse of ill-health) to arrange for establishment of revolutionary journal, visiting Austria, Switzerland, Berlin and Paris. Returning to St. Petersburg, 1895, he was arrested, kept in prison until 1897, and then exiled to Siberia for three years. Krupskaya was shortly after also exiled, and joined Lenin in 1898 upon marriage. He returned alone to St. Petersburg, 1900, leaving Krupskaya to complete her own sentence, and went to Switzerland and Munich, where Krupskaya joined him, 1902. Together they visited London, 1902, France, 1902-1903, London again, 1903, for Social Democratic Congress, always engaged in propaganda and study, and the publication of *Iskra*, from which he was driven to resign in 1905, when he started *Forward* (*Vperyod*). The Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) led to Gapon's appeal to Tsar, December 1905, and "Bloody Sunday". Lenin attended congress at Stockholm, 1906, and London, 1907. In 1908 published *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*; attended Copenhagen Congress of Second International, 1910. During these years of reaction resided mostly in Switzerland and France, and in 1913 moved to Cracow for sake of easier communication with revolutionists in Russia. On outbreak of Great War (1914) he was arrested by Austrian Government,

but released after ten days, moving to Vienna and Switzerland. After February revolution (1917) contrived to leave, with other Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, etc., in "sealed carriage" through Germany for Sweden, Finland and Petrograd, where he took command of small Bolshevik Party and prepared for seizure of power. To escape arrest by Kerensky's police he went into hiding outside Leningrad, keeping in constant communication with Party. In October he reappeared and deposed Provisional Government, becoming president of Sovnarkom of People's Commissars. He insisted on concluding peace with Germany (Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 1918). In the same year Volodarsky and Uritsky were assassinated, and Lenin was wounded by revolver shot by Dora Kaplan, a Social Revolutionary. Half a dozen foreign governments supported, by invasion, the White Armies. Then followed three years' desperate fighting to maintain the revolution and avert famine. In 1921 Lenin was victorious, but had to adopt New Economic Policy (NEP) as temporary expedient. In May 1922 he had a paralytic stroke, but struggled desperately for health. A second stroke in December 1922 compelled him to go into the country for prolonged rest. He had a third stroke in May 1923, and lingered until January 1924, when a fourth stroke produced death—8, 9, 13-16, 48-9, 59, 78, 96, 112, 139-40, 162, 166-8, 170, 206, 219, 222, 237, 238, 277, 304, 308, 341-4, 349, 392, 396, 401, 403, 405, 408-9, 411, 427, 431-2, 434, 438-45, 474, 529-30, 532, 534-5, 540-42, 545-8, 559, 573, 594, 603, 605-6, 609, 612-15, 618, 633, 646, 687-8, 698, 701-3, 735, 746, 753, 758, 773, 799, 805, 808, 810-12, 814-16, 818, 824, 836-8, 862-3, 887, 889, 891, 901, 917, 927, 944-5, 947, 954, 966-7, 991, 997, 999, 1001-2, 1006, 1017-19, 1023, 1036, 1053-4, 1056-7, 1063, 1070, 1087, 1090-92, 1094, 1098, 1101, 1106, 1113, 1115, 1117, 1132

Leontiev, A., 253

Le Play, Pierre G. F., 720

Levine, Isaac Don, 432, 614-15

Levit, Boris, 325

Levitsky, Nicholas Vassilevich (b.1859),

- humane Russian landowner and co-operator; member of Narodniki; organised first agricultural artel in Kherson gubernia in last decade of nineteenth century. After the 1917 revolution devoted himself to co-operative movement in the Ukraine—241
- Levy, H., 944, 947
- Litvinov, Maxim Maximovich (Val-lakh, Maximovich) (b. 1876), in revolutionary work, 1898; arrested and imprisoned, 1901; escaped to Switzerland and worked there and in London until 1917; joined Party, 1902; agent for *Iskra*; member of Bolshevik central committee; and attended Third Congress and International at Stuttgart in 1907. In 1917 sent as diplomatic agent to London, and was there arrested and held as hostage; exchanged for Bruce Lockhart. From 1918 in Commissariat Foreign Affairs, head of numerous diplomatic and trade missions and international conferences; vice-commissar, 1929; People's Commissar since 1930; member of League of Nations Council since 1934; elected member of central committee of Party in 1934; member of USSR TSIK—86, 128, 558, 1105-6, 1113
- Lozovsky, Solomon Abramovich (A. S. Dridso) (b. 1878), was a blacksmith; joined Party, 1901; arrested but escaped to France, 1909; secretary of trade unions and cooperative societies in France; returned to Russia, June 1917; expelled from Party for heterodoxy, 1918; became an Internationalist, and secretary of various trade unions; readmitted to Party, 1919; one of the founders, and since 1921 the secretary of Profintern; member of USSR TSIK; candidate for central committee of Party—164, 214-15
- Lubinov, Isidor Evstigneievich (b. 1882), joined the Party, 1902, filling various Party and governmental posts; in 1924 became president of Centrosoyuz; in 1934 People's Commissar of Forestry and Timber Industries—285
- Ludwig, Emil, 432
- Lunacharsky, A. V. (Voynov) (1875-1933). From 1905 engaged in editing legal Bolshevik paper, the *Novaya Zhizn*; attended Third and Fourth Congresses and International Congress at Stuttgart, 1907; during the war belonged to the Internationalists and collaborated in Trotsky's paper *Nashe Slovo*. After 1917 revolution joined Bolshevik Party and became People's Commissar of Education for RSFSR until 1929; then member of presidium of USSR TSIK and chairman of its scientific commission. In 1930 elected to Academy of Sciences, and in 1933 appointed first soviet ambassador to Spain, but died before taking up this post—887-9, 897, 901, 915, 919, 1007, 1048
- Lurie, M. S. See *Larin*
- Luzhin, A., 33
- Lyadov, M. N., 340
- Lyubchenko, P. P., 816
- Macartney, W. C., 75, 81, 153
- Mackenzie, F. A., 1006
- Macmurray, John, 944, 947, 1005
- Madyar, L., 553
- Maisky, Ivan Michailovich (Lyakhovetsky) (b. 1884). He was born at Omsk, educated St. Petersburg and Munich universities; joined revolutionary movement, 1899, being many times arrested. Emigrated to Germany and England and came in association with Mensheviks. Returned to Russia in 1918 and joined Bolshevik Party. Director of expedition for exploring Mongolia, 1919-1920; president Gosplan (Siberia), 1921; director Press Department of Narkomindel, 1922-1925; counsellor of embassy to London, 1925-1927; to Tokio, 1927-1929; soviet minister to Finland, 1929-1932; ambassador to London, 1933—560-61
- Makhno, Nestor Ivanovich (b. 1889), was a peasant; in 1905 joined the anarchists. In 1918 formed a band of peasants which fought indiscriminately the landlords, the German armies and the Ukrainian Government forces, opposing Petlura, who was driving the German army out of Ukraine. Later Makhno's band opposed the soviet army, but soon joined it in opposition to Denikin's forces. Makhno again opposed soviet army whilst Wrangel was advancing, and after an unsatisfactory armistice, was completely defeated and escaped in 1921 to Roumania—538, 540, 543
- Malevsky-Malevich, P., 305

- Manuisky, Dimitry Zakharovich (b. 1883), joined the Party, 1904; arrested, 1906, but escaped abroad; was in *Vperyod* Group, 1909; participated in October revolution in Petrograd, 1917; member of Party committee in Ukraine, 1920-1925; later member of Comintern, and its Executive Committee; and of Central Committee of the Party—411, 464, 1110-1111
- Mao Dsu Tung, 1097
- Maquet, Gustave, 603
- Margolis, M. L., 149
- Markov, P. A., 919
- Marley, Lord, 149, 151
- Marsakov, 319
- Martov, L., 340
- Marusya, 538
- Marx, A., 149
- Marx, Karl, 14, 342, 344, 349, 396, 407, 427, 438, 440, 441-4, 533-4, 702, 813, 818, 901, 941, 944-5, 950, 954, 991, 996-9, 1001, 1003, 1005-6, 1014, 1016, 1021-2, 1053, 1063, 1068, 1070, 1101
- Maslov, S. S., 545
- Mavor, James, 612
- Maxwell, B. W., 16, 18, 20, 28, 30, 36, 39, 64, 93, 128, 155, 340
- Mazepa, Isaac, 129, 248, 261, 553
- McCullagh, Francis, 1006
- Mechnikov, Ilyia Ilyich (1845-1915), eminent chemist and biologist; member of Academy of Sciences—844
- Medvedev, 978
- Mehnert, Klaus, 392, 424, 889, 1044
- Melgounov, Sergey Petrovich, 575
- Mendeleyev, 950
- Menzhinsky, Vyacheslav Rudolfovich (1874-1934), Polish nobleman; joined revolutionary movement, 1895; emigrated until 1917, when appointed to Narkomfin; later soviet consul-general at Berlin, and subsequently president of USSR Intelligence Department in United States; member of presidium of Tcheka; in 1926 president of OGPU until death—129, 577
- Mezhlauk, V., has filled many posts; was vice-president of Supreme Economic Council; successively member and president of Gosplan and Commissar of Heavy Industry—622
- Miasnikam, A. F., 464
- Mikoyan, 732-4
- Mikulina, E., 738
- Mill, John Stuart, 720, 734
- Miller, Margaret S., 112, 603
- Milyukov, Paul Nikolaevich (b. 1859), was professor of history, Moscow, 1895, and Sofia, 1897-1898; leading member of "Cadets" in Duma, 1907-1913; Minister for Foreign Affairs, February-May 1917; emigrated to London, 1917, and Paris, 1921, where he edited *Les Dernières Nouvelles*—808
- Minervin, 528
- Mirski, Dimitry S., prince; was in tsarist army but resigned; rejoined for the war, and afterwards fought in Denikin's army, from which he escaped to Greece and London. Appointed lecturer at King's College, London University; became leading promoter of Eurasian Movement in Paris. Afterwards wrote biography of Lenin and rallied to support of Bolshevik Party, returning to Moscow in 1933—12
- Mises, Ludwig, 649, 660, 676
- Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhilovich (Skryabin) (b. 1889). Born at Kazan, where he began revolutionary work, 1906; was arrested and exiled, 1909; in 1911 secretary of Bolshevik journals, and 1912-1914 on staff of *Pravda*; took a leading part in October revolution, 1917; closely associated with Lenin. In 1920-1921 secretary of Central Committee of Party in the Ukraine; and since Tenth Party Congress secretary of TSIK. Since 1930 has been chairman of USSR Sovnarkom. Is member of Politbureau—9, 21, 85-6, 98-100, 204, 278, 369, 423, 430-31, 440, 484, 491, 774, 781
- Monkhouse, Allan, 84, 104, 354, 558, 567, 568, 576, 581, 583, 659, 683
- Morgan, John, 235
- Morozov, 385
- Moulton, H. G., 113
- Muller, Herman J., 978
- Muller, 984
- Munblitt, E. G., 856
- Munro, Ion S., 437
- Mussolini, Benito, 87, 431, 437
- Nadeau, L., 575
- Narimanov, N. N., 464
- Nearing, Scott, 888
- Nekrassov, N., 305, 987
- Nesline, 856, 858
- Neugebauer, 950
- Newsholme, Sir Arthur, 588, 656, 821-822, 827, 832-3, 842, 844, 853, 857, 886
- Nicholas the First, 573
- Nikolayev, A., 208, 558

Nodel, W., 282, 305, 309, 318, 321-2, 328, 334-5, 567
 Noulens, J., 573
 Nov, D. V., 1001
 Noyes, J. H., 779
 Nyurina, F., 812, 814

Obolensky-Ossinsky, Valerian Valerianovich (Obolensky) (b. 1887). He joined Party, 1907; exiled, 1910; edited legal Bolshevik journal; again arrested and exiled to Kharkov, where he became member of military revolutionary committee; active in October revolution, and became president of Supreme Economic Council, 1918; later director of Gosbank and then People's Commissar of Education, 1920. Associated with group of "Left Communists", 1918, and "Democratic Centralists", 1920-1921. He was appointed Soviet Minister to Sweden, 1923 to 1927; and member of presidium of Gosplan, 1929-1933; then head of Department of National Economic Accounting of USSR. Is candidate of Party central committee—602-3

Ognyov, N., 897

Oleinhoff, Nils, 603

Olkhovsky, 973

Oppokov, G. I., 611

Ordjonikidze, Grigory Konstantinovich (b. 1886), joined the Party, 1903, in Georgia; repeatedly arrested; emigrated to Persia and Paris; returned to Russia, 1917; fought in Civil War, and member of military soviet of Caucasian Front; since 1926 member of presidium of Party central committee, and of USSR TSIK; People's Commissar of Heavy Industries—1000; died 1937

Ostrovityanov, V., 966, 969

Owen, Lancelot A., 532

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Page-Arnot, R., 944, 947

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Pashukanis, E., 462

Pasvolsky, Leo, 113

Paton, G., 110

Patouillet, J., 132

Paul, Leslie A., 285, 305, 316, 320

Pavlenka, Stepan B., 984

Pavlov, Ivan Petrovich (b. 1849), the eminent physiologist; Nobel prize-man; member of Academy of Sciences—844, 862, 983; died 1936

Pazhitnov, K., 221

Pazukhina, Eudoxia, 234, 267, 565

Perchik, L., 146, 155

Perret, M. D., 754

Peter the Great, 573

Petlov, Eugene, 1063

Petlura, Simon Vassilevich (1877-1926), Right Wing Social Democrat and Leader of Ukrainian People's Republic, 1919; sided with Polish troops in fighting against soviet army; escaped to Poland and Paris, where he was assassinated in 1926 by Shwartzberd, Jewish Ukrainian nationalist—308, 538, 540, 543

Petrov, A., 287

Petrovsky, Georgey Ivanovich (b. 1877), was a metal worker, born in Kharkov; social democrat from manhood; arrested many times; took part in 1905 revolution, and escaped to Germany. In 1912 elected to Fourth Duma, and chairman of Bolshevik Fraction; exiled to Siberia, 1915; in 1917 became People's Commissar of Home Affairs. Since 1919 has been chairman of Ukrainian Central Executive Committee; and since 1922 also chairman of TSIK of USSR. Is candidate of Politbureau of Party—464

Piatnitsky, Josef Aronovich (b. 1882), joined the Party, 1898, and specialised in transport of illegal literature from abroad; later member of central committee of Party and of that of Comintern—214, 381, 1110

Pieck, Wilhelm, 1111

Pierce, Charles Saunders, 952-3

Pierre, André, 18

Pierremont, E., 575

Pinkevich, A., 888, 899, 959

Pistrak, 889, 901

Pitimir, 1004

Pitt, 1042

Plehn, Carl C., 112

Plehve, Vyacheslav Konstantinovich (von), leading tsarist official; 1881-1884, director of department of police; 1889, State Secretary for Finland; in 1902, Minister of Interior; assassinated, 1904, by E. Sazonov (Social Revolutionary)—529

Pokrovsky, Mikhail Nikolaevich (1868-1932), principal Marxian historian; began work, 1892; became Marxian before 1900; joined Party, 1905; member of Moscow committee,

- 1906-1907; delegate to Fifth (London) Congress, 1907, where elected to Party central committee. Joined Vperyod Group in Paris, 1909-1911, writing his five volumes of *History of Russia*. Returned to Russia, 1917, and elected chairman of Moscow soviet; from 1918 to 1932 was Assistant People's Commissar of Education RSFSR—12, 966
- Poletika, W. von, 235
- Pollock, Friedrich, 603, 611
- Popoff, G., 575
- Popoff, P., 285
- Popov, N., 304, 340, 364, 613-14, 1090, 1100
- Poppelmann, Prof. Heinrich, 107
- Postgate, R. W., 408, 912
- Postov, 979-80
- Postyshev, Paul (b. 1888), joined the Party, 1904; arrested and exiled to Siberia for four years, 1908. In revolution of 1917 was head of army of Far Eastern Republic. From 1926 member of Party Politbureau and secretary of Ukraine Party, and Kharkov Party Committee. At 16th Party Congress appointed secretary of Party central committee—262
- Premysler, R., 966, 969
- Price, George M., 863, 869-70, 872, 876, 878, 881-2
- Price, M. Phillips, 611
- Pritt, D. N., 131-4, 137, 139, 588
- Prokofiev, G. E., 593
- Prokopovich, Sergius (b. 1871), a professor; was a "Legal Marxist", then collaborated with Mensheviks; and later joined the Cadets. In 1917 Minister of Food Supplies in Kerensky's Government. Now lives in Prague and edits hostile *Bulletin on Russian Economic Conditions of Today*—362, 652
- Purves-Stewart, Sir James, 833
- Pushkin, 155, 920
- Radek, Karl, 86; imprisoned 1937
- Rainov, Prof. T., 957, 959
- Rakovsky, K. G. (b. 1873), was a physician, Bulgarian Social Democrat; emigrated from Roumania to Geneva, 1891; attended International at London in 1896 as Bulgarian delegate; married a Russian; visited Russia in 1897 and in 1900, when he was instantly expelled. Later he was imprisoned at Jassy, and released by soviet troops, 1917, when he joined the Party; becoming in 1919 president of Ukrainian Sovnarkom, which agreed to join Soviet Union, 1922; later soviet ambassador to London, 1925-1926. Became involved in Trotskyist faction, and was expelled from Party, being appointed president of a provincial university. Recanted his opposition in a dignified letter, 1933, was appointed in Commissariat of Health; removed from office, 1937—78, 464, 1066
- Ramzin, 553, 583, 589
- Rapoport, Vera, 822
- Rasputin, 530, 1004
- Ratner, G., 285
- Ratzenburg, Manfred Langham, 147
- Rein, Prof., 849
- Reussner, M. A., 966
- Revzina, 969
- Reynolds, R. A., 833
- Rezunov, M., 33
- Riddell, W. R., 558
- Ridley, Geoffrey, 933
- Robbins, Lionel, 603, 632, 684
- Robinson, C. G., 234
- Robinson, G. T., 529, 531-2
- Rollin, Henri, 124, 340, 424, 613, 1106
- Romanov, Panteleimon, 1044
- Ronin, Solomon Lazarevich (b. 1894), able economist; member of presidium of Communist Academy and of the board of Prombank; author of *Foreign Capital and Banks*—609
- Roosevelt, Theodore, 431, 1107
- Rosenberg, A., 14, 340, 1090, 1093
- Rosenberg, James N., 149
- Rosenfeldt, 554
- Rosenhaupt, H., 833
- Rosenholz, A. P., 110
- Rostovtzeff, A., 1120
- Roubakine, Dr. Alexandre, 831, 842
- Rubinov, I. M., 149
- Rudzutak, Y. I., 387, 464
- Rukeysner, W. A., 576-8, 582, 586, 641, 931
- Rutherford, Lord, 950
- Ryazanov, 1056, 1066
- Rykov, Alexey Ivanovich (b. 1881), first joined Party, 1902; several times arrested; member of Party Central Committee, 1905, but became a conciliator and opposed October rising, 1917. After the revolution was engaged in economic administration. Member of Politbureau from 1919 to 1929. Becoming involved in the "Right Opposition" he was expelled from Party in 1929; but on recantation was readmitted promptly. In 1930 he was trans-

- ferred from chairmanship of USSR Sovnarkom to be People's Commissar of Posts and Telegraphs—48, 243, 424, 440, 464, 611, 800
- Rysakoff, A., 82
- Sabanin, Prof. A., 128
- Sakhat-Muratov, 385
- Salutzki, 559
- Samoilovich, 382
- Sapir, S., 305
- Sapronov, T. V., 464
- Savarov, joined the Party, 1908; became a leader of "New Opposition" in 1925; expelled from Party at Fifteenth Congress for Trotskyist participation; but in 1928 he recanted and was readmitted. Then worked in Comintern—559
- Sawadsky, A., 132
- Scheffer, Paul, 552-3
- Schierband, Wolf von, 564
- Schiller, Otto, 235, 246
- Schlichter, 553
- Schmidt, Otto J., 743
- Schulze-Molkau, Rudolf, 147
- Schweitzer, Robert, 650
- Segal, Louis, 603, 616
- Seibert, Theodor, 375-6
- Selitzky, I. A., 221, 870
- Semashko, Nikolai Alexandrovich (b. 1874), able medical scientist; studied Moscow University, 1893; arrested, 1895 and 1905; passed examinations at Kazan University; emigrated, 1901, and joined Party. A nephew of Plekhanov, owing to divergence of views he hardly ever saw his uncle, but formed friendship with Lenin, with whom he associated in Paris, Geneva, etc. Served as doctor in Balkan war. Returning to Russia in 1917, he began acting as Medical Officer for Petrograd, but was appointed in 1918 Minister of Health for RSFSR, a post that he retained until 1930. Now editing *Soviet Great Medical Encyclopedia*—833-7, 839, 842, 852, 855
- Semenov, 976
- Serafino, 928
- Seraphim, H. J., 113
- Serrati, 1093
- Sevridov, 528
- Shaginyan, M., 790
- Sharonov, 763
- Shaw, G. Bernard, 1050, 1120
- Shchushev, 928
- Shean, J. Vincent, 1098
- Sheftel, S., 340
- Sholokhov, M., 570, 1044
- Shulgin, Alexander, 262
- Shvernik, Nikolai Michailovich (b. 1888), was a metal worker; joined Party, 1902; in 1918 became chairman of Samara city soviet; in 1922-1925 he was head of the RSFSR Workers' and Peasants' Inspection; later member of Central Committee of Party; and from 1930 secretary of All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions—8, 172, 174, 176, 178, 190-91, 204, 210, 212, 370, 713, 736, 739, 749, 751-2, 756, 760, 773-4, 863, 865, 868, 871, 881-2, 928
- Simon, Sir John, 558
- Sklifassovsky, Dr., 859
- Skomorovsky, D., 901
- Skoropadsky, Pavel Petrovich (b. 1873), was formerly officer of Imperial Guard; became Hetman of the Ukraine from April to December 1918, in subjection to German dictation—538, 540
- Smidovich, P. G., 382, 464
- Smirnov, 365
- Smith, Sir Hubert Llewellyn, 692
- Smith, Jessica, 812, 1044
- Soddy, F., 981, 1133
- Sokolnikov, Grigory Yakovlevich (b. 1888), was born in Poltavskaya gubernia, but received secondary schooling in Moscow; joined Party, 1905; arrested and exiled to Siberia, 1907; escaped to Paris; belonged, 1910-1911, to group of conciliators, and later worked on Trotsky's newspaper, but then joined Lenin's group, and returned with him to Russia in 1917. In 1918 chairman of delegation to sign Brest-Litovsk Peace; and was prominent military worker during Civil War. At Sixth Party Congress in 1917 he had been elected to Central Committee. From 1922 to 1925 he was People's Commissar of Finance, when he rehabilitated the currency. From 1925 to 1927 he was associated with opposition groups, with which he definitely broke in the latter year. At Sixteenth Party Congress was elected candidate to Central Committee; then university professor of finance; and, 1929-1933, was soviet ambassador to London—112, 114-15, 117-118; tried and imprisoned, 1937
- Solovyov, 1050
- Soltz, Arnold Aaron (b. 1872), was born in Vilna; joined Party, 1898,

- after Second Congress was Bolshevik. Many times arrested. After February revolution 1917 edited *Pravda*. In 1920 member of TSIK, and from 1921 continuously member of presidium of Central Control Commission till 1934; is a president of Supreme Court, and in 1934 assistant to procurator of USSR—556, 1056-8, 1061
- Soukhanov, 554
- Speransky, Count Michael Michailovich (1772-1839), tsarist statesman; best known as chairman of commission for codification of law—44, 985
- Stalin, Josef Vissarionovich (Djugushvili, Ivanovich, David, Nijeradse, Chizkov) (b. 1879), was educated at priests' seminary, Tiflis, which he left for revolutionary work; leader of Marxian group in Tiflis, 1897, and member of Georgian Party committee, 1900; repeatedly arrested and exiled, but escaped and resumed underground activity; attended Bolshevik congresses in Finland, Stockholm and London, 1907; again arrested, exiled and escaped; member of Party central committee, 1912; worked on *Pravda* and *Zvezda*; deported and again escaped; leader of Bolshevik group in Duma and director of *Pravda*. Again arrested and exiled to Turukhan. After February revolution returned to Petrograd as active member of Party central committee; was member successively of "The Five" and "The Seven"; People's Commissar of Nationalities, 1917-1923; also of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. Since 1922 general secretary of Party central committee, and member of Politbureau; since 1930 also member of Council of Labour and Defence (STO); since 1934 also member of presidium of executive committee (TSIK) of USSR congress of soviets; also member of presidium of Comintern—62, 79-80, 89, 99-101, 110, 140-44, 161-3, 235, 244, 247, 255, 267, 278, 344, 347, 369-70, 388, 396, 411, 423-424, 429-40, 443, 448, 464, 474, 541, 552, 555, 560-61, 563, 566, 580, 619, 633, 700-702, 713, 728-30, 732-4, 736, 745, 774, 787, 799, 801-2, 804, 888, 890-92, 910, 940, 945, 954, 967, 997, 1003, 1017, 1099-1100, 1106-7, 1109, 1111, 1113, 1132
- Stanley, Arthur Penrhyn, 997
- Starobinsky, A., 856
- Stasova, 381
- Stechoos, 538
- Steinberg, J., 536, 573, 575, 613
- Steinman, M., 1006
- Stekloff, G. M., 407
- Stepniak, Sergey Michailovich (Kravchinsky) (1852-1895), artillery officer and revolutionary of the 'seventies. Joined Tchaikovsky group in 1872; in 1878 collaborated with Bakunin. In 1878 he killed with a dagger Mezentssev, head of tsarist gendarmerie, and escaped to London, where he lived as an author until run over by a train in 1895—234, 563-4
- Stetsky, A. I., 1000-1002
- Stolypin, Peter Arkadievich (1862-1911), tsarist statesman; a sternly repressive Minister of Interior and chairman of council of ministers, 1906-1911. Carried through important agrarian reform establishing peasant proprietorship. Assassinated in the Tsar's presence by revengeful police official in Kharkov opera-house, 1911—240-41, 244
- Strong, Anna Louise, journalist; born and educated in United States, taking Ph.D. degree at age of 23. Humanitarian sympathies led her to join in Quaker relief organisation for famine of 1921; from that year she made the soviet cause her own; engaged in journalism, she has visited many countries, mostly in the service of *Moscow Daily News*, to the staff of which she belongs; has published various books, including autobiography entitled *I Change Worlds* (1935)—267, 437, 447, 528¹-528², 978, 1044, 1083, 1085, 1148
- Strumilin, Stanislav Oustavovich (b. 1877), able economist and statistician; joined Party, 1899; long attached to Gosplan, of which he was sometime vice-chairman; author of various works on economic problems and on planning—616
- Sturmer, 1004
- Sun Yat Sen, 1095
- Sverdlov, I. M. (Andrey) (1885-1919), born at Nizhni Novgorod (now Gorki), and joined Party under influence of his brother Zinoviy, who was adopted son of the author Maxim Gorky. Several times arrested and exiled, the last time (1913) to a remote village where he met Stalin. He was one of the

leaders of the October revolution; a brilliant organiser as a member of the Party central committee, and from 1917 to 1919 a member of TSIK, until his premature death in 1919—16, 431

Stvistun, 941

Taracougio, T. A., 128

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Tawney, R. H., 1034, 1121

Tchernavina, Tatiana, 575

Teper, Lazare, 21

Thadeus, P. J., 277

Thompson, Dorothy, 812

Tikhomirov, W., 221-2, 285

Timaschew, N., 132

Timoshenko, Vladimir P., 27, 234

Tobashev, 271

Tolmachev, 365

Tolstoy, Leo, 814, 920, 1044

Tomsky, Michail Pavlovich (Efremov) (b. 1880), at first compositor and engraver; joined Party, 1904. In 1905 in revolution, was elected Starosta of Reval soviet; was arrested and exiled, but escaped to St. Petersburg, 1906; attended Party congresses in London, 1907, and was sent by Party to Paris, 1909. On his return was arrested and sentenced to five years imprisonment, 1909-1914, and to exile to Siberia until 1917. In 1917 became president of Moscow Trade Union Council and member of Ispolkom of Petrograd branch of Party; and at Eighth Party Congress in 1919 was elected to central committee. From 1917 to 1929 was president of All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions. In 1924 he was sent to London as member of TSIK of USSR. In 1928-1929 was one of leaders of Right Opposition to the Party policy; expelled from office, 1928, but recanted and readmitted in 1929; member soviet of People's Economy, 1929-1932; appointed head of RSFSR state publishing house (Ogiz) in 1932—163, 168-71, 219, 424, 464, 1066 in 1937 prosecuted, when he committed suicide

Toynbee, Arnold, 992, 1090, 1119

Trillat, Jean V., 889, 901

Trotsky, Leon (Bronstein, Pero) (b. 1879), son of peasant in Kherson gubernia, educated at Nicolaev and Odessa, where he was active in the

South Russian Labour Union. Arrested 1898, he was in prison for two years, and then exiled to Irkutsk for four years. In 1902 he escaped to Vienna and London, where he joined Lenin in writing *Iskra*. In 1903 temporarily joined the Mensheviks, but left them in 1904 to advocate theory of "permanent revolution" with Parvus. Attended Second Party Congress as delegate from Siberian Union; in 1905 returned to Russia and was elected chairman of St. Petersburg soviet; arrested in 1907, he was exiled for life to penal colony at Obdorsk (Siberia), but escaped before reaching it, to Petrograd and Vienna, publishing *Pravda* for circulation in Russia. Broke with Mensheviks and went to Paris; attended Zimmerwald Conference, 1915, and was then expelled from France to Spain, and from Spain to New York. Returning to Russia in 1917, he was arrested by British Government at Halifax, but released on request of Provisional Government, which then arrested him in Petrograd; joined Bolshevik Party in 1917, and became People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, and negotiated at Brest-Litovsk, but refused to sign treaty. Appointed People's Commissar for War, he organised Red Army, and was largely responsible for its successes, 1918-1920. After Lenin's illness, he became persistently in opposition to the Party policy, and was transferred from Commissariat of War to that of Transport; expelled from Party, 1927, and exiled to Alma Ata; deported to Turkey, 1929; lived in France until 1934; in Norway until 1936; since then in Mexico—16, 96, 122, 128, 164, 168, 204, 243, 309, 348, 438-40, 529-31, 541, 619, 810, 1002-3, 1067, 1090, 1100, 1103

Tsikhon, Anton Michailovich (b. 1887), a metal worker; joined the Party, 1906; from 1918 to 1930 filled various important posts in Moscow; 1930-1934, People's Commissar of Labour for USSR; member of TSIK—884

Tskhakaya, M. (Barsov) (b. 1865), commenced Marxian propaganda in Georgia, 1883, working underground in Tiflis, Batum, Kutais; in 1897 and 1900 arrested and exiled. Then

- emigrated, returning to Russia with Lenin. Attended Third, Fifth and subsequent Party Congresses. After Georgia joined the Union, he became president of Transcaucasian Central Executive Committee, and member of TSIK of USSR—464
- Tugwell, R. G., 234, 668, 863, 879
- Turati, 1093
- Turgenev, 1044
- Turin, S. P., ix, 12, 163
- Ugrimoff, A. von, 285
- Ussachev, T., 392, 399
- Vaillant-Couturier, P., 124
- Valersctin, L., 253
- Valois, Georges, 553
- Vandervelde, Emile, 554
- Vardin, 559
- Vassilyev, M. I. (Yuzkin) (*b.* 1878), a Bolshevik lawyer; many times arrested and exiled; after 1917 held various legal offices; now president of Supreme Court of USSR—575, 582
- Vavilov, N. I., 965, 978-80
- Veblen, Thorstein, 1064
- Vernadsky, G., 573, 607
- Voinova, A. I., 796-7, 819
- Volgin, V. P., 962, 965
- Volokitin, 751
- Voroshilov, Klement Eframovich (*b.* 1881), son of railway watchman, he worked successively as miner, shepherd, farm labourer and factory worker; first arrested for organising a strike, 1899; frequently imprisoned for revolutionary activities; joined Party, 1903. During Civil War commanded various divisions, and helped to organise Red Cavalry; member of Central Committee of Party since 1921; member of Politbureau since 1926; commander of Moscow military district, 1924; People's Commissar for War (now Defence) since 1925—122, 278, 436, 440
- Vorosin, 743
- Vyshinsky, 561
- Wallis, J. E. P., 597
- Ward, Harry F., 392, 407, 583, 646-8, 665, 697, 705, 708, 741, 743, 747, 749, 752-4, 760-61
- Washburn, C., 888
- Weiss, Paul, 953
- Wells, H. G., 343-4, 536, 604, 606, 1037, 1131
- Werth, Alexander, 1112
- Williams, A. R., 234, 532
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- Wrangel, Baron Peter Nikolayevich (1878-1928), began military career in Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905, and held important commands in Great War, 1914-1917. In 1918 he joined Hetman Skoropadsky in the Ukraine, then Kornilov in South Russia; commander Caucasian Army, 1919; and successor to Denikin, 1920. Defeated at Perekop, November 1920, he embarked his whole army and many civilians, and brought them to Constantinople. Died at Brussels, 1928-343, 537, 543
- Yagoda, Genrikh Grigorevich (*b.* 1891), joined the Party, 1907; arrested and exiled, 1911; worked as cashier in Putilov factory, 1913; took active part in Civil War; vice-chairman of Intelligence Department of USSR in U.S.A.; vice-president of Ogpu, 1924; appointed People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of USSR, 1934; member of TSIK—577, 595, 760; in 1937 removed from office
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- Yakovlev, Jakov Arkadieievich (*b.* 1896), joined the Party, 1913, whilst studying at Polytechnical Institute, St. Petersburg; in 1917 was secretary of Dniepropetrovsk committee of Red Army; in 1923 in charge of Press Department of Party; in 1926 Assistant People's Commissar of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, and editor of *Peasants' Gazette*; since 1929, People's Commissar of Agriculture of USSR; member of Central Committee of Party—234, 278
- Yakovleva, Varvara Nikolaevna (*b.* 1884), joined the Party as student of first Moscow women's college. Arrested in 1910 and exiled, but escaped abroad; returning illegally,

- was again arrested and exiled to Astrakhan. Active in October rising, 1917. Worked in Narkompress. Since 1930 People's Commissar of Finance of RSFSR—29, 817
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- Yaroslavsky, Emelyan (*b.* 1878), was born at Chita, of Siberian exiles; had very adventurous life, often arrested, and in 1908 sentenced to five years' hard labour. In 1917 was elected as member of Party to the Constituent Assembly; in 1921 a member of Central Committee of Party; and later a member of TSIK of USSR. Leading member and sometime president of the Anti-God Union. Member of presidium and secretary of Central Control Commission—163, 340, 364, 378, 1043-5, 1062, 1067, 1090, 1100
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- Zaslavsky, Eugen Ossipovich (1840-1878), son of a tsarist general; organised South Russian Labour Union, arrested 1875 and imprisoned until his death—46, 163, 211, 941, 964
- Zatonsky, Vladimir Petrovich (*b.* 1888), began his revolutionary activities whilst at secondary school, 1905; graduated at Kiev University, and became lecturer in science. Joined the Party in 1917, and became in 1918 president of TSIK of Ukraine; in 1919 Narkompress of Ukraine; later chairman of central control commission and People's Commissar of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection of Ukraine; and later People's Commissar of Education of the Ukraine—553
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- Zinoviev, Grigori Evseyevich (Radomytsky) (*b.* 1883), joined the Russian Social Democratic Party, 1901, working as student at Berne; and Bolsheviks in 1905 on returning to Russia; elected member of Central Committee, 1907; arrested and emigrated, 1908; returned, 1917, and pursued with Kamenev a doubtful policy. In 1918 president Petrograd soviet; president of Comintern, 1919-1926; member of Central Committee, 1907-1927; twice expelled for factional opposition, in 1927 and 1932, but readmitted on recantation, 1928 and 1933; president of Centrosoyus, 1928-1930. In 1934 was implicated in conspiracy out of which came assassination of Kirov, and was for the third time expelled from Party and sentenced first to exile and then, in 1937, to death—411, 559-60, 1067, 1093, 1110
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